Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Not so far as I know.

It was absolutely farcical, but not very funny, when you consider that the hundreds of police officers involved had far more useful things that they could have been doing. But it seems even that was not enough for the Government. Through this Bill, they are attempting to introduce a raft of further constraints on the right of the British people to express themselves via peaceful street demonstrations.

The law surrounding protest is in a complete mess. Recent legislation has been knee-jerk and reactionary, leaving the legal landscape a complete muddle. Police often struggle to know how to police demonstrations properly, which usually leads to excessive heavy-handed policing and people being charged with all sorts of offences when they may not have been. This has also made the law extremely unpredictable: the mission creep of legislation and case law over recent years has meant that there is now a raft of serious criminal offences —that is, indictable offences—tried in the Crown Court that are no doubt adding to the unacceptable backlog in the courts. It is very easy for someone to attend a peaceful demonstration and inadvertently commit an offence or a more serious offence than they would have reasonably expected their conduct to amount to.

For example, a protester who temporarily blocks a road—as many do—would historically have been charged with wilful obstruction of the highway under Section 137 of the Highways Act. This was a summary-only offence, which used to have a maximum sentence of a fine, although this was increased to six months’ custody in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 introduced a new offence of interfering with national infrastructure, which includes all A and B roads, with a maximum sentence of 12 months’ custody. Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 also created a new statutory offence of public nuisance, which only requires the doing of an act that obstructs a public right. This is far wider than the old common-law offence that required the obstruction to be “significant”. The effect of all the above, as an illustration, is that someone who stands or sits in a road, as part of a protest, could be charged with any of the four offences that I have just mentioned. There is no real consistency in the charging decisions between different police forces or different CPS regions, meaning that people are often charged with very serious offences for minor conduct. There have even been cases in which different people are charged with different offences arising from identical conduct at the same protest.

The various laws about protest overlap with each other and have not been developed as a coherent framework. Protesters and police are unsure about which laws apply in particular situations. This results in inadvertently heavy-handed policing, inconsistent prosecution, miscarriages of justice, waste of the public purse and clogging up the courts. More importantly, it results in a cumulative chilling effect on our democracy and a stifling of debate. It is high time that the disorganised and disjointed framework of statutes covering the democratically vital activity of protest is subject to a root-and-branch review—one that is truly independent and thorough—and that is precisely what Amendment 371 calls for.

However, since Amendment 371 was laid, the Government have announced a review of public order and hate crime legislation. It is being chaired by the noble Lord, Macdonald of River Glaven, for whom I have the greatest respect. But the terms of reference for the review seem to be focused rather narrowly and do not appear to cover the matters I have just raised—namely, the unco-ordinated and overlapping legislation on protests. I doubt that, in the short period until the review reports next month, the noble Lord will be able to examine the different approaches to arresting and charging between the different police forces. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the Committee that the current review will be broad enough to cover all the shortfalls in the existing regime I have outlined. If he cannot give that assurance, Amendment 371 will need to be passed on Report to generate the full review that is needed.

Amendment 369, if passed, will hopefully prevent future Governments cumulatively eroding protest rights, as has been customary for the last few years.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I would vote against Amendment 371. It is a difficult area and there has to be balance. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it very well. We get more disruption from Remembrance Day every year across the country because roads are closed and people cannot do what they want to do. There are many times in society when we do things which cause disruption to others, but, if pushed, I would be more towards the position of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, than I would Amendment 371.

I have three points to make on Amendment 371. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it duplicates what is already in the convention rights, and I cannot see the purpose of that. Secondly, it says nothing about the basic dilemma, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, demonstrated very well: most protest is intended to cause disruption in order to attract attention. People say that causing disruption is a right in a democracy, and I agree with that entirely, but I have to say that it is one of the most inefficient mechanisms for getting an argument over. A guy shouted about Brexit outside my office for about three years. All I could hear was one word about not liking Brexit; I never heard what his argument was. I am not sure a protest ever does any of that. It just attracts attention.

Disruption does cause that attention, but making Amendment 371 the only reason why the police would have to decide whether a march went ahead and if conditions were to be imposed would not address that basic dilemma. Nor would it address the dilemma that mass disobedience has, as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, achieved far more in the way of democratic change than many forms of parliamentary intervention. It is a mechanism, but a balance has to be struck. Individuals have a right, in addition to the police allowing them to do so, to make sure they can get to a hospital or that a fire engine can get through when it needs to, rather than simply when someone concludes that they will let it through.

Thirdly, the criminal law is the wrong place to state convention rights. If you are going to state them, there may be a place in law, but the criminal law is for declaring offences. If you want to start declaring rights, you might want to start declaring human responsibilities. The start of the Human Rights Act talks about human responsibilities but never got around to providing any enforcement mechanisms. All those things we ought to have as duties towards each other are articulated nowhere. Protestors can have their right to protest, but they do not have to worry about the rights of the poor child who cannot get to school or people who are trying to attend a place of worship. They have rights too, but the protestor apparently does not have to balance their rights when considering exercising his or her own.

My final point is a direct challenge to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who I really like and respect, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was quite right: it is quite unfair to criticise the police for arresting people at marches who are supporting a proscribed terrorist organisation. You may not like the proscription, but this place passed the legislation. We also passed legislation saying that it is an offence to support a proscribed organisation. Therefore, if you start waving banners about and saying you support these organisations, there will be a consequence. I do not see how it is okay to argue that the police, in taking action on the laws we passed, are doing something wrong. You may not agree with the law, but it is not right to blame the police for exercising it. That is a confusion that has arisen over the last few months, and it is one we can put right.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

The objection was to the way that terrorism legislation was misused to, in effect, suppress protest. It was misused by combining as a group Palestine Action with two other desperately terrorist organisations, so that MPs and Peers had no opportunity to decide on one and not the other two. It was a bit of a fix.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. My only challenge is that I do not think it is fair or accurate to blame the police for that confusion. I would stand up for the police, of course, but it would be better of this place to acknowledge that dilemma without blaming them for exercising the powers that we gave them.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, the hour is late, so I will resist the temptation to go further into the rights and wrongs and logical inconsistencies of some noble Lords’ views on the proscription of Palestine Action.

I hope that I offer the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lords Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, some reassurance that, in my view, they do not necessarily need to put Amendment 371 on the statute book or even wait for the review lead by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. There is an excellent review into protest law, Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, which I was privileged to lay before the House in my then role as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. The review covers this whole area. I am pleased that the last Government enacted some of its recommendations, and I am still urging this Government to go somewhat further. It may not strike quite the same chord, but it is there, and it has been done. Some of the recommendations from that review are related to this topic, but they will come in later groupings, so we will get to them when we do.

I will offer a couple of brief thoughts on these fascinating amendments. Many noble Lords have mentioned the balance here, and clearly there is one. It is probably true that the amendments from noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, take a maximalist approach. I am not sure that even I would go that far, and it might well prove to be unworkable. However, it is important for any legislator looking at this area to understand where the public are on this. If we talk about defending democracy, but so gratuitously ignore and act against the very strongly held views of the public on this, then we are getting ourselves into a very difficult place.

None of this detracts from the right to protest. I mentioned my own review, which was published last year. In that review there is polling, which accords with a great deal of polling done by other sources, that shows just how strongly the public object to and oppose disruptive protests. Big majorities of the public are in favour of the right to protest, which is reassuring, but, as soon as it becomes disruptive, they oppose it by a margin of about nine to one.

The proposed new clause in Amendment 369 raises an interesting challenge by explicitly stating the right to protest. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is, of course, right that this is unnecessary, in the sense that the right is already enshrined in other areas. Further, where the proposers of this amendment seek to draw the balance glaringly omits the issue of disruption—it completely omits it.

The prospect of avoiding all disruption in protests is clearly not realistic and would go against the point. But we are in an era when much protest is increasingly organised and designed to cause significant economic damage through the disruption of people’s daily lives, often preventing working people from getting to work. I am seeing senior trade unionists scowl at me for making this point, but I would just ask those who have been in trade unions to consider what it feels like for working people to be stopped from being able to go to their workplace and contribute fairly, and being intimidated and shouted at as they go through the doors of their factory or try to go through them and are blocked.

Any attempt to place a balance, whether it is on the statute book, or in an attempt to create new laws, or to shift that balance, which does not acknowledge the harmful effect of disruptive protests on the economy or acknowledge that these things need to be properly balanced, is destined to make very bad law and be intensely unpopular with the public.