Riots Communities and Victims Panel

Lord Henley Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their response to the recommendations for immediate action contained in the interim report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel published on 28 November.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, we welcome the interim report from the independent Riots Communities and Victims Panel into the serious events of last summer and will study its findings carefully. There are a very large number of recommendations, which we shall consider in detail and with care.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply and for his welcome of the report. Does he agree that we are indebted to the panel that produced the report and for its work so far, including that of my noble friend Lady Sherlock? The report offers many challenges to government, local authorities, community organisations and faith communities, and cites positive examples of young people who are responsible, ambitious, determined and conscientious, despite having deprived backgrounds. It also says that for many there is a common theme of people needing hopes and dreams, and that a sense of injustice, powerlessness and a lack of opportunity weighed heavily in their minds. They did not feel that they had a stake in society. Does the Minister agree that that should trouble us all? Notwithstanding difficult economic times, what assurance can he give the House on the Government’s priority in tackling these matters?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as the noble Lord will be aware, the report came out only on Monday this week, so it is a bit early to make a very detailed response to all the recommendations. I have had a brief chance to look at the report but I have been engaged in other business in this House for most of the week. The report addresses itself not just to the Home Office but to other government departments and, as the noble Lord quite rightly said, to a whole host of other groups all of whom will need to consider what is in it.

Further, we await a report from HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, the Met and the police in Manchester and Merseyside. The IPCC is also conducting a report, so a great deal will have to be looked at in due course. It would be wrong to announce too early how exactly we will respond to the very many recommendations in this report.

[Lord Cotter]

My Lords, on 11 August, I asked the Government,

“to ensure that measures”—

to assist businesses in riot areas—

“are taken very speedily, with minimum red tape and bureaucracy”.—[Official Report, 11/8/11; col. 1526.]

In my Oral Question on 13 September, I asked the Business Minister to,

“continue to monitor the situation”.—[Official Report, 13/9/11; col. 617.]

On both occasions I received reassuring replies. I am shocked to learn from the report that many people have not yet had any compensation at all. Indeed, seven months after the riots in March the expectation from the report is that nearly nine out of 10 large claims and as many as half of small claims for business will not be met. It is likely that this situation will be answered—

[Lord Cotter]

I want to ask the Minister to ensure that we get a clear response now on behalf of business because I feel that it is inexcusable and that there is a sense of betrayal. Will the Minister give us a response quickly?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, a number of the recommendations relate to the Riot (Damages) Act 1886, the Act that governs compensation for businesses that were affected by the events last summer. I will answer a Question on this subject in two weeks’ time. The immediate recommendations from the interim report were that there should be an extension of the deadline for the submission of claims. I can confirm that we will look at that, just as we will look at the workings of the whole of the Riot (Damages) Act in due course.

[Baroness Sherlock]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that comment in particular. As a member of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel, I had the privilege of meeting a great number of people and was very moved and shocked by stories of loss and trauma, so I welcome the fact that the Government will look at the Act.

Two things were raised most often with us. First, we did not meet a single person who had received a payout under the Riot (Damages) Act. Has anyone had such a payment and, if not, will the Government move to overhaul the Act in some detail? Secondly, there was a sense that people in areas hit by riots felt that they had been abandoned by the police. I met some hugely brave police and PCSOs who had gone out there and risked their lives. Will the Minister comment on what the Government will do in response to make sure that police tactics are appropriate for the kind of disorder we now see? That means smart policing, not just tough policing.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness on her contribution to this report as one of the four members of the panel. We are very grateful to her for all her work. We will review the Riot (Damages) Act. It is a fairly ancient bit of legislation and obviously needs looking at. We will also review police tactics and how they worked and we will look at the reports from the Met and other police authorities. We should also look at the areas where we had no riots because there are possibly lessons to be learnt from why there were riots in some places and not in others. There will be a great deal to consider and no doubt the noble Baroness and her panel will produce yet more for us as this was only an interim report. I look forward to that, and the Government will respond in due course.

[The Lord Bishop of Ripon and Leeds]

My Lords, one of the most heart-warming flipsides of the tragedy of the riots that comes out from the report was the way in which it brought out the best in so many people, including many young people. What can the Government do to recognise and honour those who supported communities during the riots, those who cleaned up afterwards and, indeed, those who, in many cases, prevented riots developing in the first place?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate is quite right to draw attention to all those who did such sterling work during and after the riots. We all owe an immense debt of gratitude to them. I think we should also learn what we can about how some communities came together and either prevented riots or cleaned up after them. Again, I believe that there are lessons to be learnt, and the Government will take note of that in due course.

[Baroness Kingsmill]

My Lords, in the light of the Minister’s remarks on the riots and in the light of his obvious condemnation of the violence that was incurred by them, will he also add his voice to those condemning the remarks of Mr Jeremy Clarkson last night that strikers should be put up against a wall and shot in front of their families?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am not, fortunately, responsible for the remarks of Mr Jeremy Clarkson and do not have to answer for him, but I think the noble Baroness can imagine what I think about his remarks.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, will the Minister assure the House that in looking at the operation of the 1886 Act, consideration will be given not only to extending the time limit for a claim, which I think is a few weeks, but to the whole ethos of the Act: that is, the question of claiming against police authorities and the fact that the Act goes back a century and a quarter to a period when policing was much more formative in its development than it is nowadays?

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord is right to draw attention, as I did earlier, to the age of the Act. It is possibly coming up to its sell-by or use-by date, which is one of the reasons why we want to review it. The recommendation in the report was that the submission of claims should be extended to 90 days. The Government had already extended it from 14 to 28 days. Extending it to 90 days is a very interesting suggestion and will be looked at as part of a wider review of the whole Act.

[Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean]

My Lords, will the Minister answer the specific question raised by my noble friend Lady Sherlock? Have any compensation payments been made so far?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I apologise for not answering that part of the question. My understanding is that some payments have been made but I confess that the number is very few. We would like to see more paid in due course, although we want to make sure that the right claims are paid. There have, in some areas, been rather a large number of claims and one suspects that not all of them are quite as valid as others.

Interpol

Lord Henley Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what means they have to hold Interpol to account, especially where United Kingdom citizens are involved.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, Interpol facilitates international police co-operation. It does not have executive powers and its agents do not make arrests. Interpol is held to account by its member countries, through processes including the annual general assembly and the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files.

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth]

I thank the Minister for his answer. Is he aware that the Interpol red notice system is being abused by some Governments for political reasons? In particular, I have in mind Benny Wenda, the West Papuan independence leader, who was granted asylum in this country. As a UK citizen, he has suddenly been served with a red notice. Will the Minister agree to take up with Interpol the question of whether this notice violates Article 3 of the Interpol constitution, which expressly forbids such notices being served for political reasons?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the first point I ought to make is that the United Kingdom will not arrest or extradite any person solely on the basis of a red notice. I cannot confirm or deny, in the particular case the noble and right reverend Lord referred to, whether Mr Benny Wenda has or has not received a red notice from the Indonesian Government through Interpol. I can confirm that there are arrangements in place whereby objections can be made to what Interpol have done. I referred in my opening answer to the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files. I would hope that those who are interested in this will take up those measures as is appropriate.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, will the Minister answer the more general point raised by the noble and right reverend Lord, of whether the Government will institute discussions with Interpol about whether, at the Interpol level, they can mitigate the use of red notices for political reasons? He has given some assurance to the House in regard to the specific case mentioned by the noble and right reverend Lord, but there is a much more general issue at stake here.

[Lord Henley]

I accept what the noble Lord says, and I will take note of that. He will know that Interpol’s constitution enshrines neutrality, and its Article 3 forbids Interpol’s involvement in political, military, religious and racial matters. The noble Lord will also know that all notices that are issued should be—I stress “should be”—checked by Interpol’s secretariat to ensure that they meet Interpol’s criteria for neutrality. Any that do not should not then be published. The wider point of whether the United Kingdom Government should take this up, or whether it should be taken up by Mr Benny Wenda or his friends, is another matter. However, there are two ways this can be done. First, member Governments can intercede with Interpol, and secondly, there is the procedure by which complaints can be made through the CCF, the Commission for Control of Interpol Files.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I wonder if my noble friend can say whether there is jurisdiction in courts in the United Kingdom to set aside a red notice on the application of a person on whom it has been served?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am not aware that there is. I want to make it clear that the United Kingdom Government will not either arrest or extradite a person solely on the basis of a red notice. If we are going to extradite someone, it will go through the usual and proper procedures under the Extradition Act 2003.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, Interpol has suffered for some years, or perhaps for 100 years, from two structural problems. First, it is an organisation that every country in the world, including some very unpleasant ones, can become members of and share intelligence, and secondly, cases like this one arise from time to time.

At the moment both Interpol and Europol work out of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, which is to be abolished. Will Her Majesty’s Government, and the Minister, be able to reassure the House that when this function moves to the National Crime Agency, a little more attention will be given to both Interpol and Europol as their powers gradually expand?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the remarks from the noble Lord, who brings enormous experience to these matters, and I can assure him that we will be taking particular notice of this as SOCA moves into the NCA, over the coming months and years, and will make sure that these points are taken up.

I also note what he said about Interpol covering a very large number of countries, some of which we would recognise as having systems similar to our own, while some have systems that are somewhat dubious. Nevertheless, as I made clear earlier, its constitution does enshrine its neutrality. That is very important and we will continue to try to get that across. The United Kingdom Government will make their views clear in the appropriate manner, through the annual general assembly.

[Lord Judd]

My Lords, while completely associating myself with the concern about this particular case, would the Minister not agree that when we talk about the need for the international rule of law in international justice, we need to be very certain that when action involving individuals is taken, we do not lose sight of holding to account the Governments and people who were responsible for the events which led this man to make his stand?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I repeat that I do not want to comment on this particular case but I think we all know which case it is, because the noble and right reverend Lord has already referred to it. As I said, it is very important to recognise that no one can be extradited solely on the basis of a red notice that has been issued by the Indonesian Government through Interpol. I repeat everything that I said earlier about it being important to keep under review how we work with Interpol, and as an Interpol member the United Kingdom Government will continue to do that.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, as an extension to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, are the Government satisfied that our own structures are such as to make the best use of the resources available through Interpol, and will be so when we have the reorganisation? I am thinking in particular of missing persons. The cross-matching with unidentified bodies is a very important activity, and currently the Missing Persons Bureau is in the NPIA which will be subject to changes.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, Interpol is largely about exchanging information between the member countries, and that is virtually all countries in the world. However, my noble friend makes a very valuable point about the changes that are coming about through the removal of SOCA and its replacement by the NCA. I take on board what she said; it is very important that we ensure that with those changes, we still have the appropriate relationship with Interpol.

Prevent Strategy

Lord Henley Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, before I deal with the major part of this debate, there are three points I want to make. The first is that my noble friend Lady Hamwee, looking at the names on the list of speakers, possibly said that I was a very ancient Briton. The important thing to explain at this stage is not that I am an ancient Briton, but I am about as Anglo-Saxon as you can get. I will go on to say that I live in a village which I think has a Norse name; my nearest town, the county town of Carlisle, has an old British name; and I live in the county of Cumbria. As the late Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos—a great friend of mine and of noble Lords opposite—always reminded me, Cumbria is exactly the same word as Cymru. They are of the same etymological origin.

I make this point not for any flippant reasons, but to point out that in the United Kingdom we have experienced immigration of one sort or another for many, many years. We have adapted and have place names that reflect the vast array of different people who have come here at different stages and different times. We have gone on accepting immigrants from year to year and over the years. This is something that we should be proud of: the Huguenots who came here, the Jews who had been expelled, and others such as the Normans who came here under rather different circumstances. Possibly we objected to that at the time, but we got used to it later on. These things have been going on for some time. We are all mongrels in this country, and it is something that possibly we should all be proud of. I hope that we can all continue to integrate in the best possible way.

The second point that I want to make before I get on to the substance of the debate relates to the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, about the need for more freedom of speech, particularly in universities. This touched me particularly as a former spokesman for higher education in this House, both quite recently and before 1997. I certainly agree with her that at times the universities should be faintly embarrassed by what they have or have not allowed to happen in terms of freedom of speech. We should all take note of that point, and I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding us of it.

The third introductory point that I want to make refers to the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Noon, when he talked about that 1,000-year tradition of the rule of law. Whether it is a 1,000-year tradition I am not sure. Sometimes that has wavered a bit, and there have been weaknesses here and errors there. However, I think that he is right to point out that there is something that we can be proud of, something that we should sing about and shout about, and something that, certainly in promoting this country and everything that goes with it, we should talk about and be proud about.

The substance of the debate from the noble Lord, Lord Noon, is on integration and extremism and how they will be affected by the Prevent strategy. There is good evidence that, by international standards, the United Kingdom has a relatively well integrated strategy. That is why I wanted to start with what might have seemed flippant remarks about where I lived in Cumbria and the mixed nature of that over the last 1,000 years; that will happen again in the future. We are told that 92 per cent of people across all ethnic groups say that they feel part of British society; 86 per cent feel that people from different backgrounds get on well in their area; 88 per cent say that they get on well with their neighbours; and 97 per cent agree that it is everybody’s responsibility to obey the law. These figures show that we have much to be thankful for and that the Government’s approach to integration is building on solid foundations that, again, we can be proud of in the citizenship of this country.

Of course, those figures do not tell the whole story. There are differences from area to area and within areas. For example, a high proportion of people in country towns are likely to say that they get on well with their neighbours, but in some inner-city boroughs the proportion can fall below half. Again, that obviously needs to be addressed. It is in those areas with a lower level of integration that the greatest challenges have to be faced.

It is also in these less well integrated areas that the advocates of extremism are often most active. Groups like the English Defence League and the recently proscribed Muslims Against Crusades seek to spread fear and mistrust in order to generate and perpetuate division and separation rather than integration. Successful policies to promote integration must also, therefore, be capable of countering extremism, in non-violent as well as violent forms.

My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government plans to make a Statement to Parliament and publish a document setting out the Government’s approach to integration later this year. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be able to wait for that Statement. In the mean time, the elements of that approach are beginning to take shape. It will be an approach that emphasises what we have in common rather than what is different; draws out the responsibilities that we have to each other and to society; enables people to realise their potential to get on in life; gives people opportunities to work together and to take decisions for themselves; and ensures a firm response to threats to integration like discrimination, extremism and disorder.

These objectives cannot be achieved by top-down design by the Government. Government can create the conditions which enable integration but it is for people themselves in neighbourhoods and in voluntary and community organisations to take responsibility for making it happen in their areas.

To illustrate what Government are doing to create the conditions that support integration, let me give three examples, which have also been touched on by a number of other noble Lords in this debate. First, without a common language, integration will always be constrained and so we are looking at what additional support we can offer to local areas to help isolated women in particular and other priority groups to learn English. Secondly, understanding and co-operation between people of different faiths is pivotal to integration and that is why the Government awarded £5 million to the Church Urban Fund’s Near Neighbours scheme, which fosters precisely these ends. Thirdly, we have made integration one of the three objectives of the National Citizen Service. In 2012 this will enable up to 30,000 16 year-olds from different backgrounds to meet each other, to break down the misconceptions that put up barriers between them and to get on together.

As I have said, intolerance and extremism are a threat to integration and to initiatives that support it, such as those I have described. Therefore we must challenge extremism in all its forms, both violent and non-violent, and whether manifested through propaganda, public disorder or incitement to hatred and violence.

If extremists break the law they will feel the force of the law, but even if they keep within the law we shall not stand by. Extremists will be challenged if they use public spaces to promote their ideology and if they publish offensive material on the internet members of the public will be able to ask the police to investigate.

Integration and the Prevent strategy are not the same thing. They are linked but distinct. In the past the distinction between them became blurred and that is partly why the Government initiated a review of the Prevent strategy late last year. The review found that the old Prevent strategy was too far-reaching. It confused counter-terrorism with social cohesion and “securitised” social policy. It was in danger of stigmatising Muslims—a point made by various noble Lords—and reinforced a misperception that all Muslims could be extremists. It created division between Muslims and other communities. It was unfocussed and wasteful of resources. It was concerned only with Islamist terrorism and not other forms. It generated allegations of being a cover for spying on communities. It treated some extremists as allies rather than as part of the problem. It was unable to show that it was effective in preventing terrorism.

The new strategy published in June this year deals with these shortcomings by reaffirming Prevent’s place within CONTEST, as part of the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy. In common with the rest of CONTEST, Prevent now deals with all forms of terrorism and extremism, whether violent or non-violent, that contribute to support for terrorism. This includes extreme right-wing and Northern Ireland-related as well as al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. At the same time, the Department for Communities and Local Government has taken responsibility for integration and non-terrorist related extremism.

These changes mean that Prevent should no longer be seen as “securitising” integration. Rather than ranging far and wide, as it did previously, it is now more tightly focused, proportionate and prioritised. It is a national programme concentrated on certain localities and sectors, concerned with extremism conducive to terrorism, including non-violent forms as well as terrorism itself, is based on allocation of resources according to risk and will use law enforcement, regulation, civil challenge and support as appropriate.

I will conclude, as my Whip is beginning to kick my legs to indicate that time is running out. Although they are linked, we make it quite clear that integration and prevention of terrorism must not be conflated. With the new Prevent strategy the Government have taken decisive action to ensure that they are not. Prevent is now able to concentrate on what it is supposed to do, to stop people from becoming or supporting terrorists, while the Department for Communities and Local Government is enabled to get on with creating the conditions in which integration can grow and extremism can be challenged and reduced.

Police: Custody

Lord Henley Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, the Government hold data only on those taken into police custody at the point of arrest. According to the latest statistics from the Home Office Statistical Bulletin, of the nearly 1.4 million people arrested in 2009-10, 8 per cent identified themselves as black and 6 per cent identified themselves as Asian.

[Lord Sheldon]

The Guardian’s analysis of 1 million court records shows that black offenders are 44 per cent more likely than white offenders to be sent to prison for driving offences and Asian offenders are 41 per cent more likely than white offenders to be sent to prison for drug offences. Why should black and Asian offenders be so much more frequently imprisoned than white offenders?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, one has to accept that the figures are not exactly proportionate; neither are the figures cited by the noble Lord. They are not proportionate to the population as a whole. Similarly, they would not be proportionate by age profile, gender or any other measure. Having said that, we are very keen that the criminal justice system should be neutral in these matters as far as possible, and I hope that it is. However, there is scope for others to undertake more in-depth analysis of why that should be. I cannot comment on the figures that the noble Lord has given me but, as I said, arrests are broadly, although not quite, proportionate. They are disproportionate in many other ways, depending on how one looks at them.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece]

My Lords, at last week’s excellent Scarman lecture, the Deputy Prime Minister highlighted that there are more than 400 more young black British men in prison than at the Russell group universities. Does the Minister share my concern that, with the vast majority of young black people unemployed, this is an indictment of years of failure to tackle poor education, employment and opportunities for young black men in our society? What action is being taken to address this?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I accept my noble friend’s point and share her concerns on these matters. On policing, for which the Home Office is responsible, we are committed to delivering a police service that promotes equality, does not discriminate against anyone because of their race and is effective in rooting out and tackling racism. Where there are disproportionate numbers in one group as opposed to another, that invites further research. That is something we should do. However, at this stage I would not want to comment on why there are, as my noble friend puts it, more black people in prison than there are at the Russell group universities.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

Would the Minister say that racism of any kind is unacceptable in our society, especially as far as the police are concerned? Would he distance the Government from the racism practised by certain sections of the police today?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not accept that the police act in a racist manner. I do accept that where one group is disproportionately involved in crime it deserves some degree of analysis and is something that we need to look at. However, I totally reject the noble Lord’s complaint about racism in the police force. That allegation has been made in the past. It is something that the police have addressed over the years and something that they have dealt with themselves.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that it is just as wrong to apprehend or arrest a person because of the colour of his skin as it is to exonerate somebody who is quite clearly guilty for the same reason?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as I made clear, I do not believe that the police are guilty of racism. The police should, quite rightly, arrest those they think are committing offences and the criminal justice system should prosecute those people, irrespective of the colour of their skin, their gender or anything else.

[Baroness Howells of St Davids]

My Lords, since the closure of the CRE, what steps have been taken to assist the police in dealing with the institutional racism that was clearly declared in the Scarman report?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I think the noble Baroness is referring to the Macpherson report, not the Scarman report. Allegations were made about institutional racism at that time. The police have addressed that matter and I do not believe that there is racism within the police service as a whole.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister agree that confidence among ethnic minorities in the even-handedness of the police in keeping people in police custody would be greatly enhanced if we could improve our record of recruiting more black and Asian police officers?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again, that is something that I believe the police are managing to do in the 43 police forces up and down the country so that they better reflect the communities they serve. With the introduction of police commissioners, that, again, will be a matter that police forces will be able to continue to address in years to come.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that there is particular concern about deaths in police custody among members of black and minority ethnic communities. Often investigations fall to the IPCC to undertake. Can he tell me why, despite months of notice that a new chairman was required, the Government have yet to appoint a new chairman of the IPCC?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again, I note the concerns expressed by the noble Lord. I join him in agreeing that every death in police custody is a tragedy. If he looks at the figures that the IPCC published, he will find that the deaths in custody—sad though every single one of them was—are generally proportionate to the ethnic make-up of the detainees as a whole. As regards the appointment of a new chairman to the IPCC, I hope that we will be able to make an announcement shortly.

[Lord Morgan]

My Lords, the Minister has frequently referred to the need for more in-depth analysis and more research. However, we have had masses of it. The Runnymede Trust in the 1980s spelt out precisely this issue—the disproportionate amount of sentencing of people of Afro-Caribbean background. When on earth will the authorities take any action?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, a great deal of research has been done. The noble Lord refers to research that was done as long ago as the 1980s. We are talking about the figures we have at the moment, which deserve further in-depth analysis. However, I do not think that the mere fact that there are disproportionate numbers being either arrested or charged necessarily amounts to racism. That is wrong. They are disproportionate in a whole host of other ways, whether by age, gender, socio-economic factors or whatever.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Henley Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 7 and 8 standing in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe.

As all noble Lords will be aware, Chapter 1 of the Bill relates to the destruction, retention and use of fingerprints. For me, this is one of the most important parts of the Bill. As we agreed at Second Reading, there is a difficult balance to be struck between protecting people’s freedoms from police or government interference and protecting their freedom not to become victims of interference or violence from criminals or terrorists. These balances should be guided by evidence and by an assessment of risk and not by liberal or libertarian ideology. The changes proposed by the Government go too far in restricting the use of fingerprints and DNA profiles, and will make it harder for the police to solve and prevent serious crimes. It will also make their work more bureaucratic.

Amendment 1 would ensure that Chapter 1 took effect only after an evidence-based study had been completed analysing the risk of offending following an arrest which did not lead to a conviction of at least six years. The Minister may well tell me that such an evidence-based study would take too long. However, if such a study leads to saving lives, I for one strongly suggest that the time will be well spent. Why is this so important? It is important because the evidence base used by the Government to inform their decision to reduce the period of retention of DNA and fingerprint profiles is extremely weak. If we get this wrong, the implications for victims will be huge. There are countless examples of people who were arrested and not convicted but whose DNA retention was critical in catching them and convicting them of rape or murder at a later date. This is particularly important in relation to rape cases.

As the Minister will know, rape cases have not only a notoriously low conviction rate but a notoriously low charge rate. That is because the trauma for the victim is so great and because of problems with evidence. Many perpetrators of serious sexual crimes are not brought to justice for their first offence. In about 70 per cent of cases in which a rape suspect is arrested, there is no charge. According to Home Office papers, in cases where there is no charge, DNA will be kept in only very limited circumstances so that in many cases the DNA will be destroyed even though it might be critical in catching a repeat offender for a nasty and violent sexual offence.

The Minister will know that a considerable number of cases have been solved because of DNA. Kensley Larrier was arrested in 2002 for the possession of an offensive weapon. The case never reached court, but two years later he raped someone and was found because of a DNA match. Lee and Stephen Ainsby raped and kidnapped a 17 year-old girl in Barnsley. Lee Ainsby’s DNA was found years later in a case review. It had been taken because he had been arrested for being drunk and disorderly. Under the proposed system the DNA would not have been kept. Without that DNA those two men would still be free and justice for that young girl would not have been done. Abdul Azad was arrested for violent disorder in Birmingham in February 2005 but released without charge. In July 2005 he raped someone in Stafford and was identified only because the police had his DNA. The senior investigating officer for the case said:

“We would never have caught him had his DNA not already been on the database—he didn’t even live locally so we had no intelligence leads either”.

Case after case would have been much harder for the police to solve under the new rules. The Minister may well cite the S and Marper decision by the ECHR that blanket retention and storage of DNA and fingerprints contravenes Article 8 of ECHR. My Government responded with an extensive evidence-led consultation. However, the ECHR decision also recognised the importance of the retention of DNA in fingerprint profiles for individuals who have been arrested and/or charged but not convicted. It is the state’s primary duty to protect citizens’ fundamental rights to life, liberty and security under Articles 2 and 5. The ECHR objection was based on the blanket and indiscriminate approach to retention. Therefore, the argument is about minimising risk to the public of individuals committing an offence in the future and balancing that risk management against considerations of privacy. Evidence-led risk analysis was done two years ago by the Home Office which concluded that the effective length of the retention of DNA profiles was six years for both those arrested and/or charged for a serious offence, and for a minor offence. Conservatives were so convinced by this evidence that they voted in favour of its conclusions on a six-year retention limit contained in the Crime and Security Act 2010 when the noble Lord and his party were in opposition.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

Was that not part of the wash-up process, and was it not an improvement on the existing regime when it could be kept indefinitely? We were bringing it down to six years.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, as I explained, because we looked at the evidence we did indeed bring it down to six years. If the noble Lord looked at that evidence it would show that six years is the appropriate amount of time for DNA evidence to be kept.

Following the election, based on no new evidence, the Government announced that they would legislate to adopt the protections of the Scottish model. It was based on no evidence but was simply a judgment of the appropriate balance. A review of the Scottish system by Professor Fraser one year after it was introduced assessed the success only of the current system and did not compare whether a longer retention period would be beneficial or whether retention for three years was detrimental to solving serious crimes. The Government persist in seeking to apply the Scottish model in England and Wales when all the evidence and strong police advice from both sides of the border is that Scotland should instead apply the model of England and Wales. Scotland’s rape conviction rate is less than half that of England and Wales. The DNA database in Scotland is far less effective in solving crime than that in England and Wales. In 2009-10 a DNA profile loaded on to the DNA database in England and Wales had an 18 per cent higher chance of finding a match than was the case in Scotland. That is evidence that our system in England and Wales is far preferable and much more efficient and effective than the system in Scotland.

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[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

My Lords, before we go further with the fantasy of newborn babies being separated from their mothers to be swabbed, let us remember that all newborn babies have a pinprick test of their heels in order to get a blood sample for a Guthrie test to be sure that they do not suffer from a serious metabolic disorder—namely, PKU—and that these samples are retained. So a database, in that sense, exists. We should discuss the uses of databases rather than what exists or how samples are taken.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, I start by picking up on the point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee about Amendments 1, 7 and 8 not being consequential. I do not know what are the ultimate intentions of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, but I agree with my noble friend that Amendments 7 and 8 are not consequential on Amendment 1. Certainly if the noble Baroness was minded to divide the House on Amendment 1, I would not accept the consequences of the House’s decision as being binding on Amendments 7 and 8. However, I shall leave that to the noble Baroness when she gets to them.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, made clear, Amendment 1 would delay the implementation of these provisions by several months. I remind the House that the provisions in Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Bill represent the response of the Government to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the S and Marper case, to which the noble Baroness referred, which is already three years old. If the previous Government had implemented compliance legislation when they had the chance in 2009-10, we would not now have more than 1 million innocent people recorded on the DNA and fingerprint databases and we would not have had to legislate again on this subject in this Bill.

The previous Government’s proposals, to which the noble Baroness referred and which she obviously still supports, received at that time virtually no support at all beyond her own Front Bench. She has obviously since then dragged up a bit more support from her Back Benches. Our proposals, which very much adopt the Scottish model, have been welcomed by a wide variety of organisations such as Liberty, Justice, the Law Society, the Criminal Bar Association and GeneWatch. They all gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place and welcomed the Government’s general approach in this area. The Scottish model has also found favour with the Joint Committee on Human Rights and with the Constitution Committee, which have both referred to it.

The noble Baroness referred to evidence from the 2009 analysis, which was based on only three years of evidence, as I understand it, extrapolated to a point where it was essentially of, it could be argued, no real value. I refer the noble Baroness to our analysis, which was published in September and used five years of evidence, looking crucially at the likelihood of conviction. Therefore, further analysis is unnecessary.

However, I can tell my noble friend Lady Hamwee that there will be a post-implementation review, as there always is, and if we failed to include something in our impact assessment again I can only say that Homer nodded on this occasion and that we will make sure that that does not happen in future. I believe that further analysis is unnecessary and our proposals to retain unconvicted persons’ DNA for only three years are correct, and then only in respect of serious offences.

The analysis has been looked at by many independent experts, who have considered it closely. For example, as my honourable friend the Minister for Crime and Security, James Brokenshire, said in Committee in the other place,

“the Information Commissioner states that he ‘does not consider that the evidence presented supports a general period of anything like six years’”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 29/3/2011; col. 212.]

We have consistently supported the adoption of the protections of the Scottish model, and that was a central plank of our programme for government announced last May. We believe that our proposals represent an appropriate balance—and I was very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, for using the word balance—between the rights of those who have not been convicted by a court and the need to protect the public in some of the most difficult cases.

If the noble Baroness would like a little support from her own Back Benches, I can also refer her to the widely respected independent website Straight Statistics, whose board of directors is chaired by her noble friend Lord Lipsey. It has examined the research and reached the conclusion that:

“Despite the limitations of the analysis, acknowledged by its authors, it does suggest that the retention periods allowed under the 2001 and 2003 Acts were unduly long, as were those proposed in the 2010 Bill. The present bill, which is broadly similar to the law in Scotland, gets the balance more nearly right”.

The noble Baroness seemed to imply that we offered full support to the 2010 Bill. Again, I remind her, as I did in my intervention, that that Bill went through in the wash-up, very rapidly. Obviously, we offered it support in that six years was considered an improvement on the situation in the past, but we have not yet brought those provisions into effect and we have no intention of doing so. We think it better to bring forward these proposals, which are more likely to comply with the European Court of Human Rights judgment.

Again, I refer the noble Baroness to comments made by the then Policing Minister, when the noble Baroness’s party was in government, who said to the Public Bill Committee on the Crime and Security Bill that,

“we have obviously considered the judgment”—

that is, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights—

“and how far we can push the boundary of the judgment in relation to our wish to have protection for the public”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Security Bill Committee, 26/1/2010; col. 71.]

In our judgment, we should be seeking a balance, rather than riding roughshod over the rights of the million or more innocent people whose DNA profile is on the database despite them never having been convicted of any crime.

I turn to Amendments 7 and 8, which deal with the period for which we seek to retain the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people, which was discussed at some length in another place. These amendments would replace the Government’s provisions, which meet our coalition commitment to adopt the protections of the Scottish model, with the core of the last Government’s Crime and Security Act, which was rushed through in the run-up to the election. The party opposite persists in its approach to keep the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people for many years, no matter what those people have been accused of and no matter how little evidence was ever uncovered.

The noble Baroness referred to some 23,000 offenders. I was never quite sure where they had come from and whether they were alleged rapists, alleged something else or just people who had been arrested. Similarly, at the Labour Party conference in September, the shadow Home Secretary said that this Government will,

“take 17,000 suspected rapists off”

the DNA database, which,

“will make it even harder to bring rapists to justice”.

Of course, we all believe that increasing the conviction rate for rape and other serious offences is important. But are those on the Front Bench really saying that, in order to increase that conviction rate, we need to keep the details of thousands of innocent people on the DNA database because some of them in the future may go on to commit serious crimes?

I say to the noble Baroness that the conclusions of the report from the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, last year are far more important. She looked at the handling of rape by the police and by criminal justice and made some 23 recommendations in that area. While her terms of reference did not include the criminal law, her report recommended reassessing the essential elements of investigating rape cases, supporting victims to improve the handling of investigations and improving victim support, which would build stronger cases. Her recommendations on that occasion included ensuring that all police officers adopt ACPO’s Guidance on Investigating and Prosecuting Rape and adopting the protocol between the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and local authorities on exchange of information. I say to the Committee that these issues are more likely to be of assistance in increasing the conviction rate for rape than keeping 1 million—or whatever number we think it is—innocent people’s DNA on the national database.

In any event, the contention that every individual suspected of rape will instantly come off the database is just not true. Those charged with a qualifying offence, including rape, will have their DNA held for three years, and the police will be able to apply to the courts to extend that by a further two years. Those arrested for but not charged with a qualifying offence where the victim is vulnerable will also have their DNA held for three years, subject to the approval of the new independent commissioner. We have consistently taken the view, both during the passage of the Crime and Security Act and in advancing our proposals in this Bill, that the correct approach is to ensure that those convicted in the past of serious offences have their DNA added to the database, while those arrested for, but not convicted of, more minor offences should not have their biometrics held beyond the end of the investigation.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I wonder if the noble Lord would answer a question that was asked of me, and which came up in discussion when we were arguing about this the other evening. What is the difference between holding personal information in the form of a photograph—a simple photograph, such as a passport photograph—in a national database, as against holding DNA?

[Lord Henley]

I am trying to remember who it was, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, made the point that he found somewhat scary the idea that we should have a national database with everyone's DNA on it, which was being promoted by the noble Lord and others of his colleagues. I feel exactly the same as my noble friend and I hope that that is a suitable response to the noble Lord. As I said, the idea that you could hold all that information in the form of DNA is very different from holding photographs. The noble Lord is speaking from a sedentary position but, if I could continue to try to answer him, that is a great distinction from keeping a photograph. I find the idea scary; obviously, the noble Lord does not.

[Lord Soley]

If I might intervene, my noble friend is right. The database is holding our photographs from driving licences and passports. The noble Lord’s blood group, and mine, will be on the database too. It will virtually be a national one for the National Health Service. What we do with the data and how we control their use is what matters, but I ask the noble Lord to remember that he is talking about something here that may well prevent many people being killed or raped, or suffering serious abuse. There is not enough thinking here going on about the victims and potential victims.

[Lord Henley]

As I said, my Lords, there is a balance. What the noble Lord is advocating could also lead to a great many miscarriages of justice, as the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, pointed out. I appreciate that noble Lords opposite would like to bring in identity cards and a national database of the DNA of every person in the country. We do not go down that route; we feel that there should be an appropriate balance between what is kept and what is not. That is why I would reject the amendments.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

I would like to return to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, which is a serious one. The information that is retained from a genetic profile for the purposes of the forensic database is not revealing information, such as susceptibility to disease or other genetic factors. It is a selection of the DNA evidence that used to be referred to as “junk DNA”, which is not known to code for any personally sensitive feature of persons. In that respect it is what in other aspects of privacy legislation is called an identifier. That suggests that in some ways it is less personal than a photograph of someone’s face.

[Lord Henley]

Sorry, but I do not accept that. I refer the noble Baroness to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, that we are in the early days of knowing what DNA can and might achieve in the future. We are offering a very large amount of information to be stored in that DNA. I find that idea scary. Obviously some noble Lords, such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, do not; indeed, they positively welcome it. On this, there will have to be a philosophical divide between the noble Lord and myself.

For the reasons that I have given, I would certainly not support the amendment and I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will feel able to withdraw it because I do not think it would command the support of the House.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to all noble Lords who have participated in this short but excellent debate. I do not really understand what the Minister is saying about the wash-up. He seems to imply that if a Bill is agreed to in the wash-up, it does not have as much authority as other Bills.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I was not saying that at all, though sometimes Bills are rushed through without quite the same scrutiny that they normally deserve. The noble Baroness was trying to imply that that Act had the full support of the Official Opposition. My point was that, yes, we signed up to it because it was an improvement on what was there before, but we still felt that it did not go far enough in that it left the term at six years. We are proposing something different: three years, with the possible extension of another two years.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 3. These are among a number of probing amendments that I tabled following receipt of a briefing from the Information Commissioner, which I am aware has been sent quite widely to your Lordships. Therefore, I hope I do not need to spend too long on any of the individual items. It seems that I need not consider with too much suspicion or cynicism whether the Information Commissioner might have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. I am very happy to rely on a briefing from him.

Amendments 2 and 3 would add references to biographical information relating to the material dealt with by Clause 1. The commissioner is concerned that, although there is provision to delete fingerprints and DNA profiles, allied biographical information that is held on the police national computer or the police national database is not referred to. Perhaps the Minister can help me with the basis of these amendments. Is the PNC record also deleted when the DNA profile is removed? At present, records held on the PNC are readily accessible. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, may tell me that I am wrong, but it has been suggested that because that information is there access is frequently used to run a name check on individuals who come into contact with the police. Noble Lords will understand the inaccurate assumptions that may be made as a result of this.

The fifth principle of data protection states:

“Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes”.

It seems to me that we should be looking at biographical information alongside the technical information. I beg to move.

[Lord Henley]

As my noble friend has explained, these amendments were tabled following receipt of a letter from the Information Commissioner, which I think a large number of us have seen. They seek to amend Clause 1 by extending the scope of the provisions for deleting fingerprints and DNA of those arrested but not charged or subsequently not convicted to all police records held on that individual. For ease, I shall refer to these records as “arrest-only records”. In our view there is no need to extend the scope of the clause to cover arrest-only records. What is retained on police records should continue to be an operational matter for chief police officers to decide.

As your Lordships may be aware, the Association of Chief Police Officers has already issued guidance to forces in the light of the Supreme Court judgment earlier this year in the case of GC & C v the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. ACPO issued a letter on 16 June to chief officers which said that,

“if the biometric data is deleted or destroyed, then there is no need—and therefore no justification—for the retention of the arrest record on the Police National Computer. Therefore, if the biometric data is to be deleted or destroyed, then so must be the arrest record on the PNC”.

Therefore, in effect, ACPO has already put a deletion process into effect for arrest-only records held on the PNC. To go further and then delete all records from every other police database, whether national or local, would, in our view, be a step too far. On balance we think that the approach taken in the ACPO letter is the correct and appropriate one. It creates the correct balance—I apologise again for using the word “balance”—between civil liberties and public protection. It also creates consistency between the retention of arrest-only records on the PNC and the treatment of fingerprints and DNA profiles in the Bill.

We have to appreciate that, once the details are removed from the PNC, front-line operational officers will not be able to tell whether an individual has previously been arrested and not subsequently cautioned or convicted. They will not have access at that point to the police national database nor will they necessarily be able to check local records. That, we believe, provides the necessary safeguards for individuals. The fact that a person was arrested or went to trial is a matter of fact and keeping those details on databases that are not readily available to all police officers means that that information will not be visible to the officer making the stop.

Going further and deleting all arrest-only records from all databases means that the police would have no way of knowing that an individual had come to their attention before. It would also mean that the enhanced criminal record checks could not show details of those arrests where they are relevant to a particular application. Such an approach would significantly weaken the public protection afforded by the criminal record regime. I hesitate to refer to it, but it could result in another Huntley-type case where relevant information about previous suspicious behaviour is not disclosed. I accept that in that particular case the records were not effective in preventing what subsequently happened, but that does not alter the fact that the records were there to show a history of arrest linked to a certain type of offending.

I appreciate that at this stage they are probing amendments, but their effect would be that all police databases would be reduced simply to holding details of cautions and convictions. All other intelligence would be removed. In our view, that would hamper the ability of the police properly to protect the public, and for that reason I cannot support the amendments. I therefore hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.

[The Earl of Erroll]

I am quite intrigued by this. The police have a policy in some cases of arrest first and ask questions later, particularly when householders are defending their property, and so on. These people will therefore effectively be regarded in perpetuity—or at least for as long as they live—as having behaved undesirably, even though they have never been in front of a judge or the courts and we should therefore deem them to be innocent. I am worried by the attitude that that should stay on file. I fully realise that we must watch out for cases such as that of Huntley, but they are surely dealt with by the other provisions, whereby you are allowed to retain the records in certain circumstances.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again I repeat the word “balance”. It is a question of balance as to what is appropriate. Again I stress that it is a matter of fact, referring to the noble Earl’s example, that that person has been arrested. He might not have been appropriately arrested and the noble Earl might feel that that should not have happened. However, the simple fact is that he was arrested and there are occasions when keeping that information may be of some use.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, like the noble Earl, I blinked at the words “a step too far” and I appreciate that the Minister went on to try to explain that. It would be only right to read his explanation in order to seek to understand it. However, I have more questions now than when I introduced these amendments.

I should also say that I have a little difficulty in relying on ACPO guidance, if I have correctly understood its status. There is no question about whether it is proper. However, it is one thing for a statute to allow something and for ACPO then to withdraw a little from it, but that is not as good as the statute being clear. I was also not sure how that lay with the Minister’s comment about this being an operational matter for the police. Having added to the list of questions in my head, I will of course withdraw the amendment. This issue may be something that I can discuss with the Minister between this stage and the next. A lot of complications and procedures are not evident in the Bill, which of course deals with just one aspect of the way that the police organise themselves. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 22. These amendments deal with two provisions about speculative searches. Clause 1, on the destruction of fingerprints and the DNA profile, and Clause 22, on the destruction of samples, state that they do not prevent a speculative search,

“within such time as may reasonably be required for the search if the responsible chief officer of police considers the search to be desirable”.

My amendments relate to the term “desirable” and propose wording taken from Clause 15, whereby, instead of when it is “desirable”, fingerprints and DNA can be kept when,

“necessary for the prevention or detection of crime, or the investigation of an offence”.

Without wanting unduly to hinder the police's discretion, it seems to me that those two provisions are very wide. The Explanatory Notes states that the material could be retained for a “short period”. I do not read that into the two clauses. Perhaps the Minister can help me with that and about what limitations there might be on this apparently wide provision. I beg to move.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with what I think the noble Baroness is trying to get at with the amendments, certainly from my understanding of the letter from the Information Commissioner, but we believe that her amendments would both seriously undermine the effectiveness of the national DNA database and significantly increase the cost of the administration of the system at a time when police budgets are under significant pressure.

In terms of effectiveness, we are advised by the police service that the key point in the taking and retention cycle for DNA and fingerprints is the carrying out of a speculative search immediately following arrest and sampling. For those of your Lordships who are not familiar with this process, it involves the comparison of the newly-taken DNA and fingerprints with material from previous crime scenes and with those whose biometrics are retained following conviction or, in the limited circumstances that we will be discussing shortly, from those suspected but not convicted of serious offences.

It is that speculative searching process which results in the identification of those who have already committed crimes, which I would hope that all of your Lordships would agree is a vital public protection measure. To give an example, a speculative search was undertaken on the DNA profile of Mark Dixie in June 2006, when he was arrested following a fight at the pub where he worked. He was not charged with that offence, but his DNA was matched to biological material left at the scene of the murder of Sally Anne Bowman the previous September. As a result, he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Government consider that carrying out a speculative search in each case where DNA and fingerprints have been taken on arrest is vital to the effectiveness of the database in identifying such crimes and far outweighs any additional intrusion in Article 8 terms. Indeed, in its recent report on the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights commented at paragraph 45 of its report that,

“an additional final search before destruction is unlikely to pose such an additional interference to create a separate violation of Article 8 … which could not be justified”.

I appreciate that my noble friend does not want to stop such searches, merely to require the circumstances to be considered before a search is carried out. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, it would add to the delay and cost of each arrest for such consideration to be given. There were nearly 1.4 million arrests for recordable offences in 2009-10, a figure I gave to the House earlier today at Question Time. Thus, the additional time required for police officers to consider whether searches were necessary would run to many thousands of hours and could well result in many thousands of additional hours spent in detention by those being investigated.

I can assure my noble friend that we considered this issue carefully in bringing forward our proposals and we consider that carrying out a speculative search in every case is an appropriate use of the DNA and fingerprints taken on arrest. For those reasons, I cannot support Amendments 4 and 22 and I therefore hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, indeed I shall do so. When the Minister said “cost”, I wrote the word “balance” because, as he said, it has come up in every line of every clause and on every page. I think I am left with understanding that the short period to which the Explanatory Notes refer—I appreciate that they are not binding—is the period for which the material is retained. The Minister is nodding at that. Having clarified that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

These amendments will help to reduce the number of victims of serious crime by increasing the likelihood of perpetrators of serious crimes being apprehended and taken off the streets, to the benefit of the public as a whole. I beg to move.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, it seems that with this group of amendments the noble Lord first wishes to, in effect, remove the independent biometrics commissioner and then, as we discussed earlier, extend the period of DNA retention automatically to six years for virtually all offences. Amendments 6, 9 and 10 would leave the decision entirely in the hands of the police. Obviously I can see the attraction of effectively automating the process to reduce the administrative burden placed on the police in those cases. However, the Government consider this to be completely outweighed by the additional protection given to the arrested person by the safeguard of the commissioner’s consideration. We considered this issue very carefully in drawing up our proposals.

We accept that it is appropriate in limited circumstances to retain material where a person has been arrested for a qualifying offence but not subsequently charged, and those circumstances are set out in new Section 63G(2) and (3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which would be inserted by Clause 3 of this Bill. However, given that in such cases the charging standard has not been met, we believe that further safeguards are necessary, and the independent scrutiny of the commissioner provides that safeguard.

In support of his arguments, the noble Lord produced the case of Kensley Larrier, whose DNA, he claimed, was vital in getting him convicted of rape. My advice is that the DNA was not the key to his subsequent conviction for rape and on that occasion it was the complainant who took the police to the block of flats where he lived and described him in such detail that he could easily be identified. No doubt the noble Lord will say that that is just one example and will produce others, but it was not a very good example and it does not particularly support his case. Again, it is a question of finding the right balance.

I also remind your Lordships that the evidential charging standard is that there is a “realistic prospect of conviction”, which is defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors as,

“an objective, impartial and reasonable jury or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and acting in accordance with the law”,

that,

“is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged”.

Where the charging standard has not been met but the police believe there are valid reasons to retain the material, we believe that the process of applying to the commissioner, which we are determined to make as straightforward, simple and unbureaucratic as possible, provides an important safeguard.

As I have indicated, we believe that the police should be able to retain biometric material in limited circumstances. In this respect, therefore, the Bill goes beyond the Scottish system in allowing for the retention of material from persons who have been arrested but not charged, which is why we believe that there should be the safeguard that we have set out to form the biometric commissioner. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said at Second Reading in another place:

“We must protect the most vulnerable in society, so when the victim of the alleged offence is under 18, vulnerable or in a close personal relationship with the arrested person … the police will apply to the commissioner for retention. I believe that these rules give the police the tools they need without putting the DNA of a large number of innocent people on the database”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/11; col. 207.]

For that reason, I cannot offer a crumb of comfort to the noble Lord in his Amendments 6, 9 and 10.

Amendment 13 would provide for a six-year retention period in the case of a person arrested for or charged with, but not convicted of, a minor offence. Clause 4 delivers another of the key protections of the Scottish model. Read with Clause 1 it provides for the destruction of the DNA profiles and fingerprints of anyone who has been arrested for or charged with a recordable offence that is not a qualifying offence but who is not subsequently convicted. The Government’s view is that not retaining that material taken from those arrested for or charged with a minor offence but not subsequently convicted strikes the right balance between public protection and individual freedoms.

The European Court of Human Rights was clear on this point. A key passage of the Marper judgment, the case to which we referred earlier and which this Bill implements, stated that it was struck by the indiscriminate nature of the power of retention then in force, and highlighted the fact that,

“material may be retained irrespective of the gravity of the offence with which the individual was originally suspected”.

Obviously, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, takes a contrary view. He says that we should retain as much of this DNA material as possible for as long as possible. Some of his noble friends, such as the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Soley, want ultimately to have everyone’s DNA on the register. The party opposite says that retaining someone’s DNA profile on a database is not much of an intrusion. It compared it to keeping a photograph and said that it is not much of an intrusion compared with the risk of even one rape or serious assault left unsolved. I do not accept that.

We have argued consistently, both before the election and since, that the previous Government’s models went too far. We think that the Scottish model strikes a far better balance between the competing interests, as the Joint Committee concluded when it examined the previous Government’s proposals. As I made clear in the debate on the earlier amendment, I believe that a great many others support us on this issue.

As for the research conducted by the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, the noble Lord should remember that its director later noted that it was incomplete and based on data to which it was not given direct access. In September 2009, Gloria Laycock, director at the institute, said of the research study:

“That was probably a mistake with hindsight. We should have just said ‘you might as well just stick your finger in the air and think of a number’”.

I took that from a briefing provided by Liberty, for which I am most grateful. The noble Lord also might have looked at that and might have found it of some use in his arguments. We are trying to find the right balance and we believe that we have. I hope therefore that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for his response. It throws into sharp contrast the fundamental difference of view between this side and the Government over the length of time that DNA samples should be retained, and the types of cases for which they should be retained. I do not think the Minister has sought to argue that retaining them for the longer period of time, which is what we are advocating, would not lead to more people who have committed serious offences being apprehended. He gets around replying to that argument simply by talking of a so-called balance. On this side we have made it clear that we are in favour of a balance that seeks to apprehend those who have committed serious offences and one that reduces the number of people who are likely to be the victims of serious crime.

However, there is obviously a fundamental difference on this view, which was expressed by the Minister during our discussion on the previous amendment. I will withdraw this amendment for the moment, but we will consider whether to bring back a similar amendment on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 15, 16 and 17. These are identical amendments to Clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7, which permit the continued retention of material in specified circumstances indefinitely, irrespective—at any rate in statutory terms—of any ongoing necessity for crime prevention and detection purposes.

I have referred before to the fifth principle of data protection, which I have quoted, and my amendments would permit retention for as long as is necessary for the prevention and detection of crime, investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. That is the wording used in Clause 16, which I am not seeking to amend, and which the Information Commissioner has told us more closely accords with the requirements of the Data Protection Act.

I may be told that there is too much bureaucracy involved in this but it would be appropriate for the Committee to hear an explanation from the Minister as to why indefinite retention is allowed in the context of the generally wholly welcomed provisions limiting retention. I beg to move.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I hope to deal with this issue relatively briefly. My noble friend has got it right when she refers to additional bureaucracy. If we move from unconditional indefinite retention to a necessity test, as is suggested in her amendments, this would require the police to keep under continual review some 4.5 million or so convicted individuals whose DNA is retained on the national DNA database, as well as the 3 million or more whose fingerprints are held without a DNA profile. That would be a huge administrative exercise which the police would not be happy to take on.

My noble friend made a point about why we are retaining it indefinitely for certain people and not for others. Recently published research notes that, at least on average, conviction rates for individuals with no prior convictions will be lower than for individuals who are proven offenders. That is why we believe we are right in retaining material from the unconvicted only in certain specific circumstances, as we discussed earlier, while retaining the material from all those with convictions for recordable offences. Such retention is preventive, not punitive. It is done in respect of a group of individuals who pose a considerably higher risk of future offending—significantly higher than that of the general population—because of their past proven criminality.

I hope that with those assurances—that it is a group more likely to offend in future and that it would be a massive bureaucratic exercise for the police to undertake—my noble friend will accept that her amendments are unnecessary.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not sure about their not being necessary, but I can see they may be undesirable. I shall not comment on police happiness.

[Lord Henley]

It is not purely police happiness—it is also police cost. If my noble friend’s amendment were accepted, looking at 4.5 million entries on an annual basis would divert an awful lot of police man hours away from the job.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am being inappropriately flippant in a serious context. Perhaps I had better just beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, this is quite an important principle. I notice that when it comes to cautions and reprimands, particularly reprimands, the police certainly do not warn youngsters of the full implications of accepting one. They do not realise that it is a plea of guilt to a criminal offence, which will stay on their record for certain purposes throughout their life. In fact, I have discovered that even some solicitors in the county courts do not realise that. Therefore, it is important that the police have a duty to advise people properly of the full implications of these things, partly so that the police realise them as well. I support this amendment.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about her desire to give DNA voluntarily. I take note of that. There is nothing to stop her. I was going to suggest that a special database could be set up, possibly named after her noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who seemed so keen on the idea. However, we will now have to call it the Baroness Royall database, and it can collect the DNA of all those members of the party opposite who want to hand it over voluntarily, and all those others who want to deal with the problem of stigma that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, talked about earlier.

There is, however, a much more serious point here: the informed consent of individuals when they come to give their DNA. They might be doing so as part of some operation that the police are mounting where they deliberately want to exclude certain people from their investigations and, therefore, want to take fingerprints or DNA. It is right that we get the appropriate consent set out. That is why comprehensive guidance on the operation of these powers is set out in PACE Code of Practice D, which was revised in March this year to take account of the 2010 Act. It will need to be revised again once the Bill receives Royal Assent. Code D sets out the information that needs to be provided to a person before their fingerprints and/or DNA are taken. Annexe F of the code specifically sets out the requirements to be followed. Note for Guidance F1—to confuse noble Lords even further—underlines the importance of true informed consent. I shall read an extract from it to give assurance that appropriate guidance is offered. It will be revised in the appropriate manner after the passage of the Bill. It states:

“Fingerprints, footwear impressions and samples given voluntarily for the purposes of elimination play an important part in many police investigations. It is, therefore, important to make sure innocent volunteers are not deterred from participating and their consent to their fingerprints, footwear impressions and DNA being used for the purposes of a specific investigation is fully informed and voluntary. If the police or volunteer seek to have the fingerprints, footwear impressions or samples retained for use after the specific investigation ends, it is important the volunteer’s consent to this is also fully informed and voluntary”.

It is very important that the people covered by the new details in Clause 10, particularly new subsection (3), which refers to people who have,

“previously been convicted of a recordable offence”,

are properly informed, under the code of practice, of just what they are consenting to and for how long their DNA will be retained. Therefore, I think my noble friend will accept that her amendment is not necessary. We will make sure that the code of practice is revised in the appropriate manner and that will be done at an appropriate moment after the passage of the Bill. I hope therefore that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the destruction of material by way of batches, and what the material was which was to be destroyed, was dealt with in Committee in the Commons. Reading the debate of 5 April after I had received the Information Commissioner’s briefing, it seemed to me that the discussion slightly petered out. My Amendment 21, which would provide for copies to be processed individually, is tabled to enable the Minister to give assurances—no doubt he will seek to do so—that the deletion of all DNA profile information will be the norm and that retention will occur only in exceptional circumstances. I understand from the debate in the Commons that there are some practical issues around how destruction is dealt with. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the Committee in regard to the subject of the amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, my noble friend is again right when she says that there are some technical problems with this issue. I shall say a little about that in a moment once I have set out the position. It might help if I set out a little of the background in this area. Because of the way in which DNA samples have historically been processed in batches—typically of 96, I am told—it is impractical to delete all processing records held within a forensic science laboratory, as batches will inevitably contain a mixture of profiles from convicted and unconvicted individuals, and records must be retained for evidential purposes of convicted individuals, not least in the event of a subsequent appeal or referral to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission.

Action is already under way, led by the National DNA Database Strategy Board and the Protection of Freedoms Bill Implementation Project Board, chaired by Chief Constable Chris Sims on behalf of ACPO, to address the potential for relinking records by removing any link between police barcode numbers and laboratory processing records. One forensic science provider already does this. The strategy board is already working with the laboratories to make this change by the middle of next year. This will break the link between the police and laboratory records and prevent any illicit relinking of names to profiles. The revised procedures will apply to both new and existing samples. From mid-2012, it will be impossible to carry out this relinking. Once the forensic science provider is informed that an individual’s DNA profile has been removed from the database, the link between the police barcode and the laboratory reference will be broken and restoration will not be possible.

None the less, we understand the concerns that have been expressed in this area, and my honourable friend the Minister for Crime and Security recently met representatives of the company which supplies the DNA profiling machines which produce these interim records. They are working on a proposal to enable the deletion of these records rather than merely breaking the links as I have described. If the cost of doing so is not wholly excessive, we will require the destruction of these records. I hope that my noble friend will bear with me for a while until those discussions have been completed and the company can tell us what will be physically possible and what will not be possible. In the mean time, I hope that she will be satisfied by the fact that we feel that we can break the link between the police barcode and the laboratory reference. Once we have broken that link, it will not be restored. Therefore, Amendment 21 will not be necessary.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is very helpful information and updating. I suppose the obvious question is whether the Minister is asking me to bear with him for a period which may be longer than that between Committee and Report stage. I do not know whether he has been informed of how long the investigations may take.

[Lord Henley]

I certainly cannot guarantee to do anything between Committee and Report and I doubt even necessarily between Committee and Third Reading. We will do what we can. If I can bring any further intelligence to the House in the Bill’s later stages, I will certainly do so. However, it would be wrong for me to give any assurances at this stage. The important thing to say is that we can at least break the link between the police barcode and the laboratory. Whether we can do something better will depend on what the company manufacturing these machines manages to do.

[Baroness Berridge]

My Lords, I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could confirm that the anonymising of these profiles in the batches of innocent people’s material is compatible with our duties as outlined by the European Court in relation to the retention of innocent people’s material. When speaking to the people in charge of this procedure in various companies, will he bear in mind the fact that the Government might in the future legislate to prevent innocent people’s DNA being deleted from the database? If that should occur, what is the possibility of relinking people’s profiles with the police national computer? Is there any way in which their names, addresses and identifying details on the national computer can be got rid of to prevent that eventuality ever happening so that the samples remain completely anonymous and can never be reconnected to a name and address?

[Lord Henley]

I will have to take advice on this but my understanding is—I will write to my noble friend if I am wrong about this—that once we have broken the link between the police barcode and the samples, it is broken and cannot be repaired. However, if I am wrong on that, I will let my noble friend know. As regards whether we can get improvements made to the machines so that we can properly delete these things, that will have to wait on the discussions to which I referred earlier.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

Perhaps I may make some observations on the amendment that are very much in the nature of trying to understand what it is intended to do, and I am sorry if I have misunderstood it.

As I read the Bill, there are two circumstances in which material that has been taken in relation to a person who has been detained under Schedule 7 may be retained. In one case, it is retained indefinitely in circumstances where that person has previously been convicted of a recordable offence, other than a single exempt conviction, or is so convicted before the end of a further period. Therefore, if a person has been convicted previously of a recordable offence, DNA or material taken under Schedule 7 may be retained indefinitely. There is a second circumstance in which the material can be retained for six months, which is where the person has no previous convictions or only a single exempt conviction.

I regret that I do not understand at the moment what the noble Baroness’s amendment would do. It would add the words,

“and subsequently arrested for an offence directly related to the reasons for detention”.

For example, if this was the case as regards a person who had previously been convicted of a recordable offence, one would somehow have to wait to see whether that person was subsequently arrested—and I do not know within what period that would apply—for an offence that would also have to qualify as being directly related to the reasons for detention. Only in those circumstances could the material be retained. I do not understand how anyone will know at any point whether that person is going to be subsequently arrested. Nor do I understand why they should be,

“arrested for an offence directly related to the reasons for detention”.

I have to some extent demonstrated my colours in relation to DNA but, at least in the case of a person who has previously been convicted of a recordable offence, I see no reason at all why the material should not be retained. I do not see why one should add a condition whereby somehow you are going to be able to discover subsequently that a person would be arrested for an offence and, furthermore, that that offence is directly related to the reasons for the original detention—whatever, with respect, that means.

At the moment, I do not understand the amendment and, for those reasons, I could not support it.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not know whether I can bring light to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, but I will see what I can manage. I will speak to my noble friend’s amendments and, because they have been grouped together, in due course speak to the government amendments in my name—Amendments 24 to 37.

My noble friend helpfully set out her views on the provisions in Schedule 1 in respect of the retention of material taken as a result of a Schedule 7 examination. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is a national security border power that enables examining officers to stop, search and question a person at a port or in a border area to determine whether they are someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, without reasonable suspicion that they are so concerned. Given that most major terrorist plots have involved individuals travelling across international borders to plan and prepare their attacks, it is only right that the police are given appropriate powers to examine persons, including through the taking and retention of biometric material—in this context, in order to identify and disrupt such individuals.

Imposing a requirement to arrest an individual for terrorism offences as a condition for retention and use of material taken under these powers, would fundamentally undermine their use as a means to identify those involved in terrorist activity and to gather intelligence. Such intelligence can provide vital contributions towards wider intelligence-based investigations in respect of national security. Terrorism investigations are, by their very nature, long and complex, and at the end of a Schedule 7 examination it may not be immediately apparent that an arrest is appropriate.

Attaching a requirement for arrest would furthermore offer no additional safeguards. The Bill already provides safeguards for material taken from a person detained under Schedule 7. There is a defined retention period of six months, which is considerably shorter than the three years’ retention period that applies where a person has been arrested for a terrorist offence under Section 41 of the 2000 Act. The new biometric commissioner will also have a general oversight role in respect of the retention and use of biometric material taken under Schedule 7.

I hope that that helps partially to explain matters to the noble and learned Lord and reassures my noble friend that the provisions in the Bill are transparent and will provide strong protection against unnecessary retention of material taken from individuals detained under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act.

Turning now to the governance arrangements for the DNA databases, the subject of Amendment 41, I think it is important to note that all DNA material retained by the police will as a result of the Bill be subject to comprehensive regulation, irrespective of the databases on which it is held. Indeed, although the overwhelming majority of DNA information retained by the police will continue to be held on the National DNA Database, where this is not the case, such material will be subject to the requirements of the regimes set out in the Bill, and covered by all the relevant safeguards.

Regarding the counterterrorism database, only DNA profiles obtained by the police in relation to national security—including counterterrorism investigations—will be held on the database. It has already, in effect, been placed on a statutory footing by virtue of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which provides for all material not otherwise subject to statutory restriction, and is already overseen by the National DNA Strategy Board in respect of compliance with agreed national standards and protocols.

The Forensic Science Regulator is also closely involved in ensuring that DNA analysis and validation meet acceptable standards, as he is with the National DNA Database. In addition, we should not forget the new biometrics commissioner’s general oversight function under Clause 20. If the commissioner had concerns about the governance arrangements, I am confident that he or she would not be reticent in bringing such concerns to the attention of the Home Secretary.

Perhaps I may briefly address the government amendments, starting with Amendments 24 to 28. These address three separate matters. First, Amendments 24 to 28 to Part 3 of Schedule 1 are intended to clarify the application and scope of the provisions for the retention and destruction of biometric material to which Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies. Section 18 mostly covers biometric material acquired covertly and material supplied by overseas authorities.

The Government are clear that material obtained under Section 18 of the 2008 Act should be subject to a clear and robust regime for the destruction and retention of such material. As such, we have proposed limiting retention to three years—on the basis of a national security determination extendable for renewable two-year periods—after which it must be destroyed.

However, the proposed destruction requirements in Section 18 are not expressly limited to material obtained from known persons. We are concerned that this will lead to anonymous material and, in particular, material taken from crime scenes, having to be destroyed at the three-year point. Indeed, as currently drafted the Bill requires just that. This unintended consequence would result in the destruction of material before the police were able to identify the individual to whom it belonged, complete an investigation of an offence—potentially compromising prosecutions in the process—or make a case for its retention on national security grounds. For these reasons, the amendments are designed to prevent the automatic and premature destruction after three years of anonymous and unidentified crime scene material obtained by the police.

We do not consider that anonymous material or material taken from a crime scene—where it is also anonymous—should be subject to the same destruction requirements as material obtained from known individuals. Rather, it should still be possible for the police and other law enforcement authorities to retain such material indefinitely. However, we recognise that not all crime scene material will be anonymous in nature and as such want to make clear that where there is provision for indefinite retention of unidentified material, once identified, such material will be subject to the same retention and destruction requirements of material where the identity of its owner is known on acquisition.

Amendment 26 will exclude from Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act material taken under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, as it will become shortly. This is consistent with the exclusion of other existing statutory regimes from the scope of Section 18 to avoid enacting overlapping and conflicting provisions. We consider that all these amendments enhance the provisions in Schedule 1 by making clear how they are intended to operate.

Amendment 29 would omit paragraphs 6(4) and 7 from Schedule 1 to the Bill. Those paragraphs, which contain provisions in respect of the retention and use of biometric material in Scotland for national security purposes have, in effect, been made redundant by the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2011, which itself gave effect to the changes that those provisions would have made. Simply put, the provisions are no longer needed and can therefore be removed from the Bill. There are three consequential amendments to Clause 113 and Schedule 10 which we will need to come back to later in the passage of the Bill.

Finally, Amendments 30 to 37 to Parts 7 and 8 of Schedule 1 extend the list of purposes to which material taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 and held pursuant to a national security determination may be used. They further ensure that the order-making powers conferred on the Secretary of State to amend the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order applies in respect of provisions regarding a transferred matter where it is ancillary to an excepted or reserved matter.

Amendments 30 to 33 provide that the purposes for which material retained pursuant to a national security determination which was taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order may be used are the same as for the rest of the UK. That is, that such material can be used for the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or for identification purposes, in addition to that for national security and terrorist investigations.

Amendments 34 to 37 are technical amendments. They amend the Secretary of State’s order-making powers so that the Secretary of State is able to make provision in respect of transferred matters where such provision is ancillary to excepted or reserved matters.

I apologise for taking so much time on those government amendments, but I hope that my noble friend will be content with the explanation I have given of her Amendments 41 and 23. I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment, and I will move mine in their proper place.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, forgive my intervening at this stage. I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. From what I heard of his response, I think that I would agree with him that her amendments should not be pressed, but I imagine that they are probing amendments.

As I mentioned earlier this afternoon, I intend to bring forward amendments on Report relating both to a period during which evidence can be collected before the Government’s proposals were introduced and to the period for which DNA samples and fingerprints could be retained—for six years rather than three years. If my amendments are accepted, a consequential amendment will be required to subsection (6) proposed in government Amendment 28, but that is for a later stage. For the moment, I am content to accept the noble Lord’s amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

24: Schedule 1, page 109, line 19, after “sections” insert “22,”

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

Does a case collapse just because one bit of evidence is not quite right? I cannot believe that that one bit of evidence would be the only thing to bring about a conviction, in which case why on earth do we let people off? That seems quite dotty to me, as a lay man, unless the whole thing hinged on that one bit of evidence, in which case there could be some ambiguity about it.

[Lord Henley]

I suppose that a case could collapse just because one bit of evidence fell apart, although in the main there would be other bits of evidence. However, the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is right to make that point.

My noble friend, in moving the amendment, is obviously concerned about the costs of the Bill to the police and what that might do in diverting resources away from front-line policing. That has also been a concern of mine, and it is why, for example, I resisted an amendment from my noble friend Lady Hamwee suggesting that we should be looking at all the entries on the database on an annual basis. That certainly would have had major cost implications.

The reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendment is to ask the commissioner to look at a number of issues, including the cost of implementing the Government’s proposals. I can see why she wants to do that—I understand that she is a member of the GLA—particularly in view of the costs for the Metropolitan Police Authority, which, by virtue of its size, will have the largest single bill for implementing the proposals set out in this chapter.

I have to say to my noble friend that the Government have been working very closely with ACPO, the National Policing Improvement Agency and private sector forensic science providers to keep the cost of our proposals as low as possible. We published a very full impact assessment of these proposals in February this year, setting out a transition cost of just over £10 million. I appreciate that my noble friend Lady Hamwee had some criticisms of one part of the impact assessment, and I said that even Homer nods from time to time. I contrast that figure of £10 million with the previous Government’s impact assessment for, say, the provisions in the Crime and Security Act, which had an estimated transitional cost of over £50 million. Therefore, I think that the Committee will see that we have done much work in this area.

We are not convinced that the proposed post-implementation review by the new commissioner would add significantly to our understanding of this issue, and it would impose an additional bureaucratic burden not only on him but on hard-pressed police forces. I also say to my noble friend that I believe the commissioner’s first six months in office are going to be very busy indeed in terms of examining a number of applications for extended retention and setting out guidance under Clause 22 of the Bill, without giving the new officeholder the additional task of a financial review.

That said, Clause 20(6) confers on the commissioner a general function of keeping under review the retention and use of biometric material, so it would be within his remit to examine the impact of the retention periods provided for in the Bill without the constraints imposed by the amendment. I certainly reassure my noble friend that we take very seriously the issues highlighted by her amendment but we do not think that it is necessary.

My noble friend also touched on some of the issues relating to the batch processing of DNA samples, with which I think we dealt on an earlier amendment. Again, I reassure her that we think it will be physically impossible to relink anything held on a police file, including the original DNA sample barcode, with any information stored in a forensic laboratory. However, as I said, more work needs to be done in that area, and we will certainly do that in due course. I hope to be able to let the House know more about that at a later stage if at all possible.

Therefore, I hope that my noble friend will feel that there are sufficient protections in the Bill and that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, perhaps I may say to the Minister that he really should not take every question from me as being a criticism. Questions are sometimes completely straight questions.

[Lord Henley]

Of course questions from my noble friend are not criticisms. I hope that I answer them as well as I am able to do.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, which goes some way to reassure me but I still have major concerns, particularly about the financial implications on the Met. I would like to address these and the other issues that I raised perhaps outside the Chamber. At this stage, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Before we agree this I wonder whether the Minister can give us advice on the costs of the collection of DNA and its retention. Will the Minister tell us the costs involved in the existing arrangements?

[Lord Henley]

I gave a figure earlier from the impact assessment that the costs on the police were some £10 million. I stick by that. If the noble Lord would like a copy of the impact assessment, I will make sure that he has it.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

What is the actual cost of taking DNA from an individual person?

[Lord Henley]

I have not the first idea of the individual cost but I will take advice and write to the noble Lord.

Clause 25 agreed.

UK Border Security: 30 November

Lord Henley Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dholakia]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, the security of the UK border remains our top priority. Contingency plans are in place and we are satisfied that security will be maintained. We started training additional staff for contingency arrangements in April and adequate resources are now available. Any staff deployed to the front line will have received the training required to operate effectively. Arriving passengers will remain subject to checks at the border by appropriately trained staff.

[Lord Dholakia]

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that none of the checks highlighted in the recent controversy surrounding the UK Border Agency will be relaxed for the purpose of reducing queues at the point of entry? Given that the UK Border Force has many powers, as defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, would a no-strike agreement with the force be appropriate on future occasions?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as regards the second part of my noble friend’s question, that is obviously something we would have to consider after 30 November and after we have seen how we manage on that day. But I can give my noble friend an assurance that none of the checks he mentioned will be relaxed.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, the Government have sponsored speculation about what they will, may or might do to maintain UK security, especially at the borders, on 30 November—everything from bringing in the Army to the idea of staff from the Prime Minister’s Office manning passport control points. However, people need and deserve stability. If they have booked a holiday that day, they need to know whether they can get away. If businesses have important customers coming to the UK, they need to know that their businesses will not be damaged. I should therefore be grateful if the Government would publish, clearly and fully, for the benefit of the country as a whole, what in detail they intend to do on Wednesday in relation to border security.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition did not take the opportunity to condemn the strikes that are taking place on Wednesday, which would have been helpful. If all parties agreed that those strikes should not happen we would not have this problem. We shall be operating the appropriate checks with the appropriate people, appropriately trained to make sure that visitors—whether they are coming here as tourists, whether they are coming here for business or whether they are returning UK citizens—can get in without any disruption or with disruption minimised as much as possible. The noble Baroness will also be aware that this is an operational matter and for security reasons it would not be appropriate to comment in detail, as she wishes, on the arrangements.

[Lord Tomlinson]

Will the Minister comment on reports in today’s press that part of the police force is being drafted in to take over the role of the UK Border Agency at our borders and that their training is alleged to be merely 90 minutes? Is that adequate?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I would not believe—and I would recommend that the noble Lord should not believe—everything I read in the press. I can assure him and the House that everyone assisting on this matter will have the appropriate training necessary to do the job. Yes, some police will be involved but they will have the appropriate training to do the job that they need to do.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, the Minister said that staff started training in April. What were they training for in April?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, any sensible organisation, knowing there was a risk of such things happening—something which has still not been condemned by noble Lords opposite and I am waiting for that condemnation to occur—would make the appropriate arrangements. The border agency started that last April.

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, given that the security of our country is not just dependent on border security but that unfortunately there are risks internally within our United Kingdom, can the Minister reassure us there will be no diversion of security resources to the border checks that will in any way diminish the other security measures that are necessary internally?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I can give my noble friend that assurance and he is right to point out that it is not just the borders we need to look at. No concerns have been expressed by the police and others that any diversion to the borders will impair our security arrangements in other matters.

[Lord Grocott]

Given that the Minister has repeatedly asked people on this side of the House to talk in terms of condemnation, can we take it as read that the Government condemn the cleaners, the dinner ladies, the low-paid workers and those threatened with a weakening of their pension entitlements and an increase in their contributions? Is the Government’s position that they condemn these people for trying in any way to defend their position?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I condemn the strike as it affects our security and the arrangements we are having to make. That is the condemnation I am still waiting to hear from the party opposite.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House what assurances, if any, we have from schools about the protection of the safety of children, particularly when their parents are at work or may find it difficult to return from work because of the effects of the demonstration? Can he say whether there have been consultations with the Department for Education on this point?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am not aware of any consultations with the Department for Education. I will certainly make inquiries and get back to my noble friend later this afternoon. I am sure there will have been discussions for the very reasons my noble friend raises.

[Lord Davies of Coity]

My Lords, the Minister has repeatedly referred to this side of the House not condemning the strike. What I want to ask him is this—can he give a categorical assurance that the motivation of the coalition Government is security and not strike breaking?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as I made clear in my original Answer, our first priority, our highest priority, our top priority is the security of the United Kingdom. If the noble Lord thinks that we are involved in strike breaking he should think again. We want to make sure that our borders are kept secure. We think that the unions are endangering that security by the actions they are taking. The offer is still open to talk to the Government and others and we wish they would take that up.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, of course our borders should be kept secure, but are the Government doing enough to negotiate with the unions on this point? Are the Government in fact making every effort to try to resolve this dispute rather than, as the Minister has told us, having been preparing since April for just this eventuality? Is it not that they actually wanted to provoke a strike, for whatever political reasons they may have?

[Lord Henley]

Come on, my Lords. The noble Lord knows perfectly well that the Government’s doors remain open and that the Government are prepared to negotiate. It is the unions who are being intransigent and it is the party opposite which is refusing to condemn an action that will possibly endanger our security. Because of the actions we have taken, and have been taking since April of this year, we think that we will be able to keep security at the appropriate level at the borders on Wednesday.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, is my noble friend not aware that most people in this country will be glad that the Government attach the highest priority to our national security?

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful for the support of my noble friend. I wish I could get similar support from noble Lords opposite.

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall]

My Lords, given that the Minister is so fixated on the possibility of getting the kind of statement that he would like to hear from these Benches, does he imagine that the people out there who are contemplating going on strike are mostly or even to a small extent members of the party I support? I submit that not only are they not, they are members of all parties and none, and what is preoccupying them is not the question of whether the Labour Party supports them but their concern for their future pension rights.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Baroness accuses me of being fixated on this issue and perhaps I am somewhat naive to be so fixated on this issue. I do not know in which way the members of the unions involved happen to vote. I happen to know that those unions support the party opposite. That is why we are still waiting for that condemnation from the party opposite.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that any strike is a demonstration of failure? Does he further agree that the Government themselves have failed to resolve this strike?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I totally and utterly reject what the noble Baroness has said and again invite her, as the Leader of the Opposition in this House, to condemn this strike.

Human Trafficking (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill [HL]

Lord Henley Excerpts

Friday 25th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, bearing in mind the strictures of my noble friend the Deputy Chief Whip, I will endeavour to be brief. I therefore from the start offer to write to noble Lords if I fail to answer some of their points.

I begin by welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, to what she described as her guest appearance. I hope that there will be many more such guest appearances, and we look forward to them. I also thank my noble friend Lord McColl for introducing the Bill and providing the opportunity for a debate that has raised a wide number of issues, reflecting the complex nature of the problems of tackling human trafficking. It is clear from the strength of feeling throughout this debate that human trafficking is an issue that profoundly affects us all—of course, no one more so than the victims of this appalling crime.

Human trafficking is a complex and covert crime that demands an international response. In the UK, we have a very good story to tell, but that does not mean that we can rest, and we obviously have a responsibility to lead the way in the fight against trafficking and to develop increasingly sophisticated responses to the changing nature of the organised crime landscape.

The Government’s decision in May this year to opt in to the EU directive confirmed our commitment to this goal. It might be useful if I set out in a few words a little about the directive and our response. Noble Lords will be aware that we chose not to opt into the directive when the draft proposal was initially published last year. We knew that the draft text would go through an extensive period of negotiation between the European Council and the European Parliament, and we wanted to be absolutely sure that the text would in no way be detrimental to the integrity of the United Kingdom’s criminal justice system. The feared widening of the text of the directive did not happen and we examined in great detail the final text and its impacts on the UK, and concluded that applying to opt in would benefit the United Kingdom.

We must now ensure that we achieve compliance with the requirements of the directive by April 2013. Failure to do so would be very damaging to the United Kingdom’s reputation in this area, as well as open up the possibility of infraction proceedings. While we are, I must stress, already compliant with the majority of the articles within the directive, we have identified two existing areas of primary legislation that must be amended within this short timescale. The remainder of the directive can be implemented in full through secondary legislation and through various operational measures and operational routes.

My noble friend’s Bill is obviously to be commended—it is a very good, detailed and thoughtful piece of work. It sets out to transpose the directive fully into United Kingdom domestic primary legislation and brings together a range of human trafficking provisions into a single piece of legislation. Again, I congratulate my noble friend on his commitment to this important issue. As I said, we are obviously fully committed to implementing the directive, but it must be emphasised that the United Kingdom already complies with the majority of the measures in the directive and will bring forward the necessary primary legislation required for its implementation as necessary.

To comply with the directive, we will establish extra-territorial jurisdiction where the offender is a United Kingdom national, and I hope that that deals partly with one of the noble Baroness’s questions. We will also widen one existing offence of trafficking for forced labour so that it is an offence where trafficking takes place wholly within the United Kingdom.

However, we believe that, in seeking to implement the directive, the Bill introduces unnecessary legislation and implements measures beyond what is required in the directive. For that reason and others relating to timing and other matters, I obviously cannot give it my wholehearted support today. However, I recognise that it provides a very welcome opportunity to debate these matters.

I want to be clear that implementing the directive is only one part of the wide range of work that we are carrying out to tackle trafficking. In July this year, the Government published a new strategy on human trafficking. The strategy has a clear and single aim: to stop trafficking being a viable and profitable crime and to end the harm that it causes. We want to tackle the problem at source, improve intelligence-sharing and the co-ordination of law enforcement in the United Kingdom, and address the demand that fuels this appalling crime, as well as improve victim identification and care.

My noble friends Lord McColl and Lady Berridge and others raised the question of the national rapporteur. My noble friend Lady Berridge did not believe that the expression “inter-departmental ministerial group for oversight” exactly rolled off the tongue and caused much joy. I assure her that we have a number of inter-departmental ministerial groups. However, the idea of a national rapporteur has generated a great deal of interest. We believe that with our group, even with its fairly inelegant name, we have an equivalent mechanism in place, and that its remit, which includes the assessment of trends in human trafficking, will be sufficient to comply with the EU directive. We have recently revised our arrangements to better support the Government’s work on human trafficking and to ensure effective oversight of the human trafficking strategy and implementation of the directive.

The question of child guardians was raised by a number of noble Lords, and I understand the concerns. The directive contains a number of important provisions about assistance and support for child victims. Again, we are confident that the United Kingdom is compliant with these measures. As noble Lords will be aware, local authorities have a statutory duty to ensure that they safeguard and promote the welfare of all children, regardless of their immigration status or nationality. We believe that this responsibility should remain with the local authorities, which co-ordinate the arrangements for each child to ensure that they are safe and to promote their welfare. Local authorities obviously have comprehensive systems in place to do this. Adding a “guardian” to this framework risks creating yet another level of complexity to these arrangements, which are already strong and ensure the best interests of the child. Even worse, it risks creating confusion for children if plans for their care are not effectively co-ordinated.

There was also considerable concern, quite rightly, about the number of children who are going missing from local authority care. As I stressed, local authorities have an overall statutory duty to safeguard children and that includes responsibility for preventing and mitigating the risk of them going missing from care. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, raised concerns about the numbers of such children going missing. There are good examples of measures that have been put in place by various local authorities to reduce the number of children going missing, such as the installation of CCTV, the greater use of interpreters and ensuring that children are aware of the situation and the risks. A number of local authorities have ensured that there are placements for potentially trafficked children and that they are protected by maintaining confidentiality about the location of the placement and by limiting the direct contact of the young people with adults who have not been formally assessed or vetted. Recently published guidance on the safeguarding of trafficked children highlights these models and seeks to encourage agencies to adopt similar approaches.

In addition, we will continue to work with CEOP and I was very grateful for all the references that noble Lords have made to the work of that agency, which I visited only last week. It takes the national lead for missing children and combating that issue and it has issued the guidance to promote the spread of good practice. Our forthcoming strategy on missing children and adults will also help to provide a framework for local areas to put in place a more effective arrangement to tackle this issue.

Bearing in mind the time, and the fact that I shall write to noble Lords on some more detailed comments that have been made, I hope that they will understand if I cannot answer, at this stage, all the questions that have been put. We believe that it is intolerable that in 2011 human trafficking still plagues this country and the whole world and that we should not rest until we have it under control. I am very grateful to my noble friend for providing us with the opportunity to debate these matters. I look forward to the support of the House as we continue to strengthen United Kingdom’s response to human trafficking.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Henley Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

1: Clause 17, page 11, line 24, after “measure)” insert “or paragraph 10(1)(b) of that Schedule (reporting measure)”

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I shall speak to Amendments 2, 3, and 4, which are also in my name. I can give an assurance to the House that those are the only amendments on the Marshalled List. These are a small number of necessary technical amendments to the Bill, which fulfil commitments I gave at Report stage in relation to the transitional period. I shall briefly explain why we need to make these amendments.

Amendment 1 is consequential to the amendment that was passed at Report to the reporting measure in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1. Paragraph 10, as amended, provides that in addition to requiring the individual to report to a police station at specified times and in a specified manner, the Secretary of State may require the individual to comply with directions given by a police constable in relation to such reporting. This technical amendment is necessary to ensure that the definition of “TPIM decision” in Clause 17(3) includes a direction given by a constable in relation to a reporting measure.

Government Amendment 2 is, again, consequential to an amendment that was made to Schedule 1 at Report. Paragraph 1, as amended, provides that an individual subject to an overnight residence measure may be required to remain at, or within, their residence. This technical amendment makes an equivalent change in relation to a residence measure imposed on a person subject to an enhanced TPIM notice, imposed by virtue of a temporary enhanced TPIM order made under Clause 26 of the Bill.

Government Amendment 3, again, is necessary in consequence of an amendment made at Report. That amendment made it clear that an individual subject to a reporting measure under paragraph 10 may be required to comply with directions given by the police in relation to reporting. However, it introduced a small drafting inconsistency as it referred to directions given by a police officer rather than a constable, which is the term used elsewhere in the Bill. The two terms are intended to have the same meaning and the purpose of this amendment is to remove the inconsistency by substituting “constable” for “police officer”.

The final amendment, Amendment 4, returns to an issue on which I made an undertaking at Report. It will extend the transitional period provided by the Bill from 28 to 42 days. This is the period, following the coming into force of the Bill, during which the control orders in force immediately before commencement of the Bill will remain in force unless revoked or quashed before the end of that period. It is intended to ensure that there can be a safe, orderly and managed transition from the old to the new system. As the Government have consistently made clear, the police have confirmed that extensive preparations are being made and that arrangements will be in place effectively to manage the move from the control order system to the TPIM system. However, as I made clear at Report, we have received advice from the police that as the transitional period will fall over Christmas and new year, a small extension to that period is necessary. This will assist the effective management of the process of transition over the holiday period. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, I have made it clear that the sooner control orders end the better. Will the Minister confirm that the extension to 42 days is not a matter of giving the police another two weeks to get their arrangements in order but because it became clear that the period of commencement would be within the Christmas and new year holiday period, which was not wholly convenient? Forty-two days would take the period into the new year as a matter of convenience. That is what I understood to be the explanation when we heard about this last week.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I shall start with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. As always, my first advice to him would be not to believe everything that he reads in the papers. Having said that, I am grateful to him for raising the point. It is very important and it gives me the opportunity to explain why we are doing this. I set out what is behind Amendment 4 when I dealt with that.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked whether we were extending the detention period to 42 days just because the police asked for it or because the police asked for it because it was over Christmas and new year. I can assure her that that was the point that the police made to us: things will be slightly harder if this happens then than they would be if it happened on some other occasion.

The police service has worked very closely with both the Security Service and the Home Office throughout the legislative process to ensure that all the plans and preparations that are being made are tailored to the Bill in the appropriate manner and to ensure that everything is as it should be. The Metropolitan Police has also confirmed to the Home Secretary that it has put in place arrangements to manage that transition from control orders to TPIMs. Indeed, the Home Secretary received detailed briefing as recently as Monday from the Metropolitan Police on the transitional plans that had been drawn up. The Home Secretary is fully aware of what is going on. As I made clear on Report, we recently received advice from the Metropolitan Police that, in reviewing its plans as they were being developed, the extension of that period over Christmas and new year from 28 days to 42 days would be required to ensure that the necessary arrangements could be put in place. It is simply a safeguard to ensure that smooth transition.

In relation to paragraph 2 of Schedule 8, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, asked whether the controlees themselves would ask questions about how they were being affected. I would prefer to write to the noble and learned Lord, if I may, to make sure that I get that absolutely right.

I end by giving an absolute assurance to the noble and learned Lord, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the entire House that all we are doing is absolutely necessary. Whatever happens, we will not put the security of the country at risk. We have taken advice from the police and the security services on this matter. It was suggested that we should make this extension from 28 days to 42 days. That is what we are doing.

Amendment 1 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

2: Clause 26, page 16, line 22, at end insert “, or within,”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

3: Schedule 1, page 29, line 14, leave out “police officer” and insert “constable”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

4: Schedule 8, page 56, line 26, leave out “28” and insert “42”

Immigration: Students

Lord Henley Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what evaluation they have made of the impact of the new student visa rules on the intake of overseas students in United Kingdom universities for the academic year 2011–12.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, the Government’s impact assessment concludes that the student visa reforms will have no impact on the number of visas issued to international students to attend UK universities either in the academic year 2011-12 or in subsequent years.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, that shows that the impact assessment must be flawed. The early indications are that they are being heavily impacted, particularly from India, where the number of students is 20 per cent to 50 per cent down, as a result probably of the withdrawal of the post-study work route visa. Will the Government reconsider their policy before treating students as economic migrants and irreparable damage is done both to the finances and the reputation of UK universities?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not accept what my noble friend had to say, and I would refer him to the comments made by Universities UK about the reforms, saying that they will allow British universities to remain at the forefront of international student recruitment. I also refer my noble friend to the latest figures for non-EU university student applications for the 2012 academic year which are mostly for medical, dentistry, veterinary and Oxbridge courses, and those show an 8.8 per cent rise.

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the Government should introduce a transitional measure for those students already in the UK whose colleges closed either as a result of action taken by the UK Border Agency or because many private and public sector providers voluntarily relinquished their licence because the system became too burdensome? It is estimated that there are some 5,000 internal students with no course, no sponsor and the majority have lost their fees. Would it not be more humane and less damaging for the reputation of the UK if those already here could retain their current visas and work entitlements while moving to an alternative sponsor? This would avoid students, particularly those from poor countries, staying here illegally.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we want to make sure that we continue to have high-quality students coming to the UK, and that is why I am very grateful for the support of Universities UK for the reforms that we are proposing. What we do not want are bogus students coming over for what might be called rather dubious or possibly non-existent institutions. As I have made clear, what we have done certainly has the support of Universities UK and will benefit universities in the UK, although it might not benefit what I would describe as the somewhat dubious institutions that have been acting in this field. We want to clamp down on the abuses of the immigration system that have crept in here.

[The Lord Bishop of Norwich]

My Lords, theological and bible colleges are generally small institutions but highly cross-cultural in character because of their international students. The chances of these international students abusing their immigration status seems tiny, yet these institutions have to go through the same procedures as large universities at a very high and unsustainable per capita cost. Can the Minister suggest how we might have a size-sensitive system which prevents these institutions operating with no international students at all?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I would hope, as I think would the whole House, that most theological colleges are reputable institutions. However, if some of them are facing problems because of their size, I will take away the right reverend Prelate’s point and have a look at it. As I said, we want to make sure that we get the right students into the right institutions but get rid of the abuse that has crept into the system.

[Lord Turnberg]

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the particular problems faced by overseas medical students? There are more than 3,000 of them in the UK at the moment and they have problems when they want to bring a spouse or children here. That is to say nothing of the fact that we have included these 3,000 in the calculation of the number of doctors that we are likely to need. Is this not counterproductive?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we have tightened up on dependants coming in, but only dependants wishing to study for first degrees. Dependants will still be able to come in for postgraduate courses. I will look at the point that the noble Lord makes in relation to medical students but I am not aware of a fall in the number of medical applications. As I said in answer to the first supplementary question, we seem to have seen a rise over the past year.

[Baroness Brinton]

The UK Border Agency has recently decided that it will no longer accept guarantees from UK higher education institutions for UK-based packages, including part-time work and bursaries. We do not understand the reason for this. Can the Minister explain why the rules have changed, especially given the soundness of most universities in this country?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we accept that most of our universities are proper, reputable institutions, and that is why we have given universities additional flexibility in some matters. However, I will look at the specific point that my noble friend has raised. In the main, UK universities are fine on this; the abuse occurs elsewhere.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, the new student visa rules have placed a further responsibility on the UK Border Agency at the same time as it has received a 20 per cent cut in its budget for a four-year period. Is the noble Lord confident that the UKBA has the resources to do the job that it has been given?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, yet again the noble Lord seems to be denying the need to make cuts as a result of the profligacy of the party opposite. Yes, we are confident that the UKBA has, and will continue to have, sufficient resources to deal with the job that it has. No doubt I shall be dealing with these matters later when the noble Lord raises a somewhat spurious amendment to the terrorism Bill.

[Lord Naseby]

Is it not enormously welcome that Her Majesty’s Government have taken action to close these bogus colleges, which defrauded young students and were useless so far as the UK was concerned? Perhaps I may suggest to my noble friend that he contacts the high commissioners for the genuine Indian sub-continent students to see whether over the next year we can help those genuine students to come here.

[Lord Henley]

I thank my noble friend for that contribution. I remind him that, as a result of this measure, we will see a reduction in net migration numbers of some 60,000 a year. We are committed to this and will want to go further in due course.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Henley Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for those remarks, just as I thank my noble friend Lord Faulks for his remarks. I believe that we are not alone in objecting to the amendments put forward so ably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for whom I have the utmost respect. We have been debating matters of this sort, sometimes on the same side, sometimes on different sides, for many years. I acknowledge his expertise, but I have to say that I do not agree with the gist behind this large group of amendments that he has tabled with support from my noble friend Lord Goodhart, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and others.

Put simply, the key change under these amendments would be that TPIM notices would be imposed by a judge rather than by the Secretary of State. We have heard a great many legal arguments put forward by a great many extraordinary and eminent noble Lords—some learned, some not learned, but many are more learned than even the most learned of learned Lords. If we can take an Occam’s razor to this point, the question is: do we think that this it right for the Home Secretary to make this decision or should it be a matter for the courts? It is as simple as that.

It is no secret that the Government take a different approach to that proposed by the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords, be they learned or not. It is no secret that we take a different approach from that recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others who have spoken in this debate. These are matters that we have debated in the House during the Bill’s passage and to which the Government have responded, in full, to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, including their response to the report of 19 October issued earlier this month.

The arguments are well rehearsed. I appreciate that noble Lords have again set out their views that such restrictions that may be imposed under this Bill—and which I emphasise are preventive, not necessarily punitive—should only ever be imposed by a judge. It is a respectful and principled decision. It has consistently been held by some in this House in relation to control orders in the past and now to TPIMs, but we cannot agree with it. We do not accept, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, would put it, that it is unprecedented for decisions of this sort, based on national security cases or on sensitive material, to be taken by the Executive. As he is aware, there are a number of occasions when executive decisions are made by the Home Secretary and others.

The noble and learned Lord was wrong to suggest that deprivation of British citizenship applies only to citizenship obtained by fraud. It can also be used on grounds of being conducive to the public good if the citizen is of dual nationality, which the noble and learned Lord did not mention in his response. He did mention that it can also be used under asset freezing, under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. Again I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord did not accept that Bill, but it is now an Act. It can be used on financial restrictions under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It can also be used—and has been very recently—regarding decisions to proscribe organisations that the Home Secretary believes are involved in terrorism. It is a well established principle that it is the relevant Secretary of State who can take such decisions in, for example, cases of asset freezing and others such as immigration cases with a national security dimension, with subsequent judicial oversight. That is the important point to remember. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary will make that decision. She is the right person to make it, but it will be reviewed by the courts in due course. I give way to the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Does the noble Lord accept that the only precedents on which he relies, other than the very recent terrorist asset-freezing legislation, are immigration decisions which have nothing whatever to do with what is before us? They deal basically with foreigners, not with British-born subjects.

[Lord Henley]

It is still a matter of national security. That is why we believe that it is for the Home Secretary to make the appropriate decision and for that to be reviewed by the courts. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the 2010 Act, with which he did not agree and which he opposed. I mentioned that but I also mentioned the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and the financial restrictions under that. That is another example. I accept that the other matters concern immigration decisions but they are important. I also mentioned the fact that the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe organisations which she believes are involved in terrorism. Again, that matter can be reviewed by the courts, as can the one we are discussing. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the earlier matters concerned only immigration, as the noble and learned Lord put it. These matters go beyond that. They involve national security. I will give way to the noble Baroness in a minute when I have finished this point. Therefore, I think it is right that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary should be involved in those decisions.

[Baroness Hayman]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Until I listened to the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, I had not been aware of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, as regards the executive nature of the terrorist freezing orders to be made, that there was a distinction and that these were justifiable because they dealt with financial matters, not individual liberties. Will he comment on that argument?

[Lord Henley]

The noble Baroness is right to mention what my noble friend Lord Sassoon said on that occasion. He drew a distinction between financial matters—that is, property—and individual liberties. However, both are matters that affect one’s human rights. Despite the noble Baroness’s socialist background —I am sorry if I make her laugh—I presume she would accept that the rights to property are matters which involve one’s human rights, just as the rights to liberty do. My noble friend Lord Sassoon drew the distinction that both of them are matters relating to one’s human rights.

[Baroness Hayman]

I would not wish the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to be tarred with the brush of having a socialist background because he seemed to distinguish between the two sorts of intrusions on individual liberty.

[Lord Henley]

There is obviously a distinction but both involve one’s human rights. That is the importance. The noble Baroness may have noticed that when my noble friend Lord Sassoon noticed on the television that the noble and learned Lord was making these points, he came in to have a quick word with me to make clear what he had discussed, and I will try to convey those feelings to the House. I hope that I have understood what my noble friend whispered to me on the Front Bench, and I hope that the noble Baroness will accept it.

As we also made clear, we believe that it is not just the view of the Executive that is crucial in these matters. That is why I quoted earlier the view expressed by the courts. It is consistent with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in the case of MB, which the noble and learned Lord also referred to, in which the court said that,

“the Secretary of State is better placed than the court to decide the measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a terrorist suspect”.

In the same judgment the Court of Appeal also noted that the principle that the courts should pay deference to the Executive on matters relating to state security has long been recognised by the courts in this country, including the Law Lords, and by the European Court of Human Rights.

As I said at the beginning of my speech—in asking, as it were, for something approaching an Occam’s razor to be put to this argument—it is just getting it down to the simple question: which do you think is the appropriate body to make this decision?

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Henley]

I am not going to give way until I finish this point, and then I will give way to the noble Lord.

We believe that it is for the Home Secretary to make the decision, and for this decision to be subsequently reviewed, because the Home Secretary is a politician who is answerable to Parliament. I appreciate that some will knock the role of politicians but I would remind noble Lords of the very powerful speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Reid, at Second Reading, where he reminded us that most of our freedoms are the result of politicians and their acts, and not of the courts. The Home Secretary, as a politician answerable to Parliament, will make that decision and that decision will then be reviewed by the courts in due course. It is that very simple decision that we want to make. Should it be the Home Secretary or should it be the courts? We believe that it should be the Home Secretary. I will now give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am puzzled by why he thinks that judicial control at the outset would undermine ministerial responsibility when he accepts that there should be judicial review on a merits approach at a later stage if the order is challenged. Why is the latter equally not an undermining of ministerial responsibility?

[Lord Henley]

Because my right honourable friend is responsible for security and, as I said, she is answerable to Parliament. We believe that she should make that initial decision and that later on it can be looked at by the courts. However, we think it right and proper that she should make it. That is the reason why, as I said, I am trying to strip this amendment down to its simplest point: do you want the decision made by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary or do you want it made by the courts? We believe it right that it should be made by my right honourable friend and then reviewed by the courts. For that reason I cannot support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

The Minister has not dealt at all with the point on Section 4 of the 2005 Act. There is a clear case, as I am sure he realises, where the initial order is made by the court and not by the Secretary of State. Why should that not apply here? It is not an answer to say that that is a derogation order—or if that is an answer, why is it an answer?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, if I had wanted to use up a great deal of the House’s time, I could have answered a great many points, and indeed the House may wish me to answer them. I was trying to bring this matter down to a simple question for the House: who would be the appropriate person to make this decision?

Section 4 was raised. The Government’s counter-terrorism review looked at that but did not consider that derogating control orders provided an appropriate parallel. No derogating control orders have ever been made and the context here would be different. Derogating control orders would impose obligations so stringent that the Government would, as I understand it, need to derogate from Article 5—that is, the right to liberty—of the European Convention on Human Rights before such orders could be imposed. Non-derogating control orders—the only kind ever used—can, by definition, impose only less restrictive obligations, and Parliament agreed that these should be made by the Secretary of State.

I go back to the very simple point that I want the House to address in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment: who do you think is the right person to make this order? We believe that the right person is the Home Secretary because the Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament and is responsible for national security. That will then be looked at by the courts, but we do not believe that it should be the courts ab initio. For that reason, I cannot support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I regret that I find the noble Lord’s reply to the debate pretty unsatisfactory. I have as great a respect for him as he says he has for me, and I just wish that he could have made a better case for the Government than he has. I think that the case is as weak as it could possibly be. I do not suppose that this amendment is likely to succeed, but it should and I therefore propose to divide the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we have a curious group, as some noble Lords have put it, with the amendments relating to relocation, and Amendment 44A, put down by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, I believe late last night.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, who is a pretty experienced politician, curiously came over rather naïve about this and could not quite understand why these two amendments had been grouped together. That point was answered by my noble friend Lady Hamwee when she pointed out that it was possibly a somewhat opportunistic amendment to put down. I give way, as always, to the noble Lord.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I know this is fearful—every time the noble Lord mentions my name I stand up, and I will endeavour not to do that.

My puzzlement was associated with the grouping. Had this been freestanding as Amendment 44A, we could have had a nice little debate about that and about its place in the Bill. I was puzzled that it was grouped with these other amendments on the relocation powers.

[Lord Henley]

Given that the noble Lord is quite an experienced Member of this House, he will know that the grouping is not a matter, sadly, that the Government have any control over, and that it would be a matter for the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, to decide that he wished to have this amendment grouped with the other amendments. Of course, the Government are more than happy to go along with that.

If I may, I will deal with that amendment very briefly. It is an amendment that asks for yet another report and I have to say that it is not necessary. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, knows, there is ample provision already in place for independent review. We have the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism, currently David Anderson QC, and for 10 years before him we had my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who did that job exceedingly well. The independent chief inspector of the United Kingdom Border Agency, currently John Vine, is also required to review the operation and effectiveness of the measures in place at our ports and airports. They both report annually to the Home Secretary and their findings and reports are laid in Parliament.

I will not go much further than that and I will not deal with the specific points that noble Lords have raised in relation to recent events, partly because John Vine has been asked by the Home Secretary to make a report into these matters. There are also two other internal reports that deal with these issues—again, which have been promised by my right honourable friend—that will be made available when they come out. It would therefore not be right or proper to deal with those matters.

Referring on to the question of private planes coming in and what controls we have there, as my honourable friend in another place, Damian Green, made clear, we have absolutely nothing to hide. We have in fact strengthened the procedures there compared to what they were pre-2010 and we have made sure that we prioritise and make appropriate risk-based assessments on any planes that come in. A Statement was offered to the party opposite but for reasons of its own it wished not to take it.

I turn to relocation. Again, I accept that this is an issue that has been debated extensively throughout the Bill’s passage both in this House and in another place. Obviously there are strong views on all sides. We accept that relocation has proved effective in disrupting terrorism-related activities, but it does, as my noble friend Lord Macdonald made clear, raise particularly difficult questions of proportionality. The question is therefore, as I put it at Second Reading and which I repeat now, one of balance. Our review of counter-terrorism acknowledged these difficult questions and considered them carefully. The review concluded that the best balance lies in a more focused use of the robust restrictions that will be available under the Bill together with the increased resources that will be available for covert investigation. It concluded that it will be possible to protect the public without the powers of relocation being routinely available.

We must always remember not to look at this Bill on its own. It is part of that wider package of changes, including those in the counterterrorism review, aimed at striking a better balance across the whole range of counterterrorism and security powers, and it will be complemented by the significantly increased funding that we are providing for those purposes. We have also published the Draft Enhanced TPIM Bill, which will be introduced if necessary, in exceptional circumstances, after some degree of prelegislative scrutiny, as is found appropriate by the authorities in this House and another place. It would provide more stringent restrictions, including that power of relocation, if necessary.

I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has concerns over timing, particularly in relation to the Olympics. Again, he ought to listen to what my noble friend Lord Newton had to say about that, and possibly the Olympics is the one occasion when we would not want to be showcasing to the world the fact that we have measures of this sort. However, I take his concerns about the Olympics. The Government have made very clear that arrangements will be in place to manage effectively the transition from control orders to TPIM notices. Security arrangements for the Olympics are being planned on the basis that the TPIM Bill, and the powers available under it, will be in force. These plans are also proceeding on the basis that the additional powers contained in the Draft Enhanced TPIM Bill will, we hope, not be needed or be necessary. As is right and proper, our planning for the Olympics is both flexible and risk-based, and we will continue to monitor the threat to ensure that we adopt the most appropriate response, including keeping this issue under review as necessary in the light of developments.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Faulks raised a detailed and very important question about the transition period when this Bill comes in, which will be over Christmas. He asked whether I could provide some reassurance that the police would be able to manage this transition during that period. As the House will be aware, the Bill includes provision for a transition period during which control orders will remain in force to enable the necessary arrangements for TPIMs to be put in place where appropriate. The Christmas and New Year holidays are likely to fall within that period because we are approaching the time when the Bill will complete its passage through both Houses, assuming that the Bill receives Royal Assent before the Christmas period. We have recently received advice from the Metropolitan Police that while extensive preparations are being made for the transition to the new regime, an extension to the transition period from 28 days to 42 days would be required to ensure that operational risks are minimised over the holiday period. I give an assurance to the House and to my noble friend that I undertake to bring forward an amendment to the Bill at Third Reading that will make that necessary change in Schedule 8 to the Bill—I think it is more or less the last sentence of the Bill.

I hope that with those explanations, and stressing again the need for balance and proportionality, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, could not respond somewhat more positively to my Amendment 44A. My noble friend Lord Harris asked a number of pertinent questions. No doubt when the official inquiries report, we will get answers to them. There is an underlying concern about the security of our borders and the resources available to the UK Border Agency. I hope that we will have another opportunity to return to this in due course.

As for my other amendments, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that at Second Reading I recognised the exceptional and intrusive measures that control orders imply and I do not at all detract from that. I just happen to think that they are one of the tools that should be open to the Government, with ample judicial review where they happen to be used.

I very rarely disagree with my noble friend. I was surprised at what the noble Lord, Lord Newton, said. After all, if the Opposition had indeed voted with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, the Government would have been defeated. Government defeats are something that I usually rejoice in, but the fact is that I feel that it is right that we are consistent with the position that we took in Government and our view that, in the end, it is for the Home Secretary to make that judgment, rightly or wrongly. I do not think that it is a sad day for the Opposition. It would have been a sad day if we had taken an opportunist position.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, asked a very good question and I think that he got a very good answer. Forty-two days has a certain ring about it in the history of debating this legislation and I look forward to the debate at Third Reading when the noble Lord, Lord Henley, brings forward his amendment. At the end of the day, my noble friend Lord Harris and the noble Lord, Lord Bew, had it right: the amendments I am putting forward are modest ones. All they do is give the Government the opportunity to use exclusion orders for a very limited period to take us through a challenging period, with the option at the end—within just over a year—to come to this House with an order to remove those provisions from legislation and let this Bill follow its course. I still believe that that is, and would be, a sensible way forward, and I am disappointed that the Government are not going to take it.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that we are either equipped or we are not equipped. That is the Government’s position, to be either equipped or not equipped. They have made a great song and dance of getting rid of exclusion orders but have then said, “Just in case, we will have emergency legislation up our sleeve, and, by the way, there are certain circumstances when Parliament cannot be recalled, so we had better have it in this Bill as well”. We can talk about being equipped or not equipped: it is absolutely clear that the Government know that they might need these provisions in the future. That is why they are legislating for them, either through the emergency legislation, which is going through pre-legislative scrutiny at some point, or in this Bill. They ought to have welcomed the flexibility that my amendments would give them.

However, the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York has advised me not to move the amendment on this occasion. He was a wonderful Bishop of Birmingham when I first met him. In this case, I will take spiritual advice and will not seek to press the House on this any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Henley]

8: Schedule 1, page 22, line 15, after “at” insert “, or within,”

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 8, in my name. In doing so, I shall speak to Amendments 13, 30, 31, 45, 46, 47 and 48, all of which are in my name. Also in this group, I will touch upon Amendment 14, in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, which is an amendment to my Amendment 13. These are a number of necessary technical amendments to the Bill. I hope that some noble Lords will have had the opportunity to read the letter that I sent last week explaining what each amendment achieves. However, for the benefit of the House and for the record, I should briefly explain why we need to make these amendments.

I shall start with Amendments 8 and 13. These amendments make two small but important changes to clarify the drafting of the residence and police reporting measures. The residence measure is intended to ensure that the individual can be required to reside at a specified address, and to remain there for specified periods overnight. The clear purpose of this is to manage risk. As part of this measure it may be necessary to require the individual to remain within the residence itself. This means that it could be necessary to prohibit them from entering any garden or outside area forming part of the property, or any communal areas in a shared property. As currently drafted, the provision does not necessarily make clear that the measure can be applied in this way. It is potentially ambiguous as to whether the requirement to remain at the residence includes any outside or communal areas. Therefore, it may be open to legal challenge on its meanings.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendment 14 which is an amendment to the Minister’s Amendment 13. I am grateful for his confirmation that the wording that I have proposed is not necessary. I did not think that it was. I was relying on the word “and” at the end of the new paragraph (a), but I am glad to have that on the record.

Will it be open to an officer to direct reporting times? That presumably will be the case if the Secretary of State does not give a notice covering the matter. Will it always be the Secretary of State who gives that notice? The Minister will recall my concern that reporting should be required at a time which in general terms is reasonable and would particularly allow for the individual to carry out a course of study or to undertake work. As I probably said on the last occasion, one could not quite envisage applying for a job and saying to a prospective employer, “I am sorry, I am going to have to take two and half hours off three times a week in order to report in to a rather inconveniently located police station”. That was the reason for my amendment and if he can give any further assurances I will welcome them.

I welcome his amendment generally, because I think that it is helpful, and I also welcome Amendment 47. I did not have the technical considerations in my mind when I tabled this amendment at Committee stage. It was a much broader matter, but whatever the reason I am glad to see the paragraph going.

Can I ask the Minister a little more about Amendment 8? In the letter that he sent to your Lordships following the last stage giving the thinking behind all these amendments, which was very helpful, he said that in providing that an individual must stay within the premises,

“This is therefore a clarifying amendment. This is important for monitoring, enforcement and disruption purposes”.

Can I ask what is meant by “disruption” in this context? I would have expected that surveillance would be adequate to cover an individual being in the back garden. Presumably surveillance is going to be done largely through technology rather than through a pair of binoculars. Is there not electronic surveillance? Is it a matter of disrupting communications? If he is able to add a little flesh to that I would welcome it.

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments on my Amendment 14, which I will not seek to move when the time comes.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I hope that I can deal with my noble friend’s points. I am grateful to her for her comments. She asked whether it would be open to the police officer to direct reporting times. The point behind my amendments was that the Secretary of State would deal with such times. That would be in the order. Further directions may be given by the police in relation to someone coming to the police station but the times would be a matter for the Secretary of State.

As regards Amendment 8, we need to be able to disrupt any potential terrorist activities. For that reason one would not wish the individual to be able to leave the house and enter the garden at certain times as it might allow communication to take place on which it is not so easy to keep an eye. That was the reasoning behind government Amendment 8. I hope I have explained that clearly. If I have not, I will write to my noble friend in due course.

Amendment 8 agreed.

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The Government would maintain their good record on OPCAT and on inspection of places of detention if they accepted these amendments. There is now independent oversight not only of prisons and immigration removal centres but of police cells, some military detention establishments, all places where children are detained and hospitals. These amendments extend that provision to people restricted by these measures, and I hope that the Minister will be able to consider this idea favourably.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, for speaking to this fairly varied group of amendments. My noble friend said that she had grouped them together because the Whips were very keen on that process. I think that the Government are often keen on grouping things together because that can speed up debate, particularly when the amendments are essentially probing.

The noble Baroness is quite rightly seeking some reassurances and statements from the Government on what certain things mean. I shall work through the amendments in the order that they are tabled and shall try to satisfy my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, about what is meant and shall try to deal with their concerns.

I start with Amendment 9. My noble friend asked for clarification on what is meant by an “area of a specified description”. I confirm that allowing the Secretary of State—the Home Secretary—to impose restrictions in relation to both places and areas of a specified description is necessary to avoid unhelpful uncertainty about whether somewhere is most accurately defined as a place or an area. For example, it may be clear that airports qualify as places of a specified description, but it may be less clear that all the areas surrounding an airport, such as car parks, drop-off points or other areas connected to or adjacent to an airport, are captured. In conjunction with the rest of paragraph 3, the provision therefore gives the Secretary of State the required powers to restrict individuals entering places or areas where this is necessary for reasons of national security. Again, I can assure my noble friend that the scope of that area will not be what she described as a huge geographical area.

Turning to Amendment 10, I am happy to confirm that the power for a constable to give directions, as provided by the movement directions measure in Schedule 1, extends only to directions in relation to measures imposed under this Bill. This is because of the effect of Clause 30(1) and Clause 2. The result of these provisions is that the reference to “specified measures” in the movement directions measure is a reference to the terrorism prevention and investigation measures imposed under this Bill and specified in the TPIM notice.

In relation to Amendment 11, I can confirm that, for the purposes of the financial services measures in Schedule 1, “financial services” means any service of a financial nature. This includes banking and other financial services, but is not limited to them. Where paragraph 5 provides that the restriction on the possession of cash does not extend to cash held by a person providing financial services, it therefore includes financial services provided by members of other professions such as the noble Baroness herself, lawyers or estate agents. That would involve them holding money on behalf of an individual.

Amendment 12 would mean that the Secretary of State could not restrict the individual’s ability to associate or communicate with “specified descriptions of persons”. This provision is necessary because, in appropriate cases, it may be necessary, for example, to prevent the individual communicating, without prior permission, with persons living outside the United Kingdom. In such a case, it is not practicable or possible to specify all the named individuals to whom this applies. In the case of this particular example, I can reassure my noble friend that this would not prevent the individual seeking permission to speak to particular individuals, such as family members, who are abroad. The effect of the provision would be that the individual would need to provide further details about individuals with whom he wished to communicate in order to allow the Secretary of State to make an informed decision about whether to permit the communication.

In relation to Amendment 20—an amendment to Condition D in Clause 3—I can confirm that, as currently drafted, the legislation will require the Secretary of State to consider issues of proportionality as part of the consideration of the necessity of individual measures to be imposed under a TPIM notice. I can therefore assure my noble friend that the additional words that she suggests are not necessary in order to achieve the desired effect.

I turn now to Amendment 40. The noble Baroness’s amendment would add two new subsections to Clause 11. That clause currently simply requires the Secretary of State to keep under review whether Condition C—the necessity for measures—and Condition D—the necessity for specific measures—continue to be met. Amendment 40 would put on a statutory footing the requirement for a review group of officials to consider cases on a quarterly basis and to report to the Secretary of State. This review function is undertaken in the control order context by the Control Order Review Group. I can confirm that a TPIM review group will be established for the new regime to perform this function on a quarterly basis.

I turn finally to Amendments 42, 43 and 44. They build on proposals that my noble friend put forward in Committee. When debating my noble friend’s previous set of amendments in this area, I made the point that the measures that can be imposed under TPIM notices are intentionally more limited in nature than those that can be imposed under control orders, with lengthy curfews, compulsory relocation to another part of the country and total bans on communication equipment no longer allowed. I also made clear that the Bill as drafted—together with the relevant control order case law and the duty of the Secretary of State to act compatibly with convention rights—already ensures that the Secretary of State will give careful consideration to the impact of the measures on individuals and their families, including the impact on their mental health, before imposing the TPIM notice and while it remains in force. There will be, as of course it is right that there should be, careful and ongoing consideration of the impact of the measures on the individuals subject to them and on their families, including any impact on their mental health. This will be thoroughly considered as part of the regular reviews that will take place under Clause 11.

There is an extensive framework of judicial oversight and full appeal rights in relation to the TPIM notice, the measures specified in it and their impact. The individual will have the opportunity to make their own representations on these matters, including submitting assessments prepared by any person they wish. If a measure is considered to have a disproportionate impact, it will be revoked by the Secretary of State, and if it is determined by the courts to have such an impact, the courts will be able to quash it or direct its revocation or variation. We should also remind ourselves that the overriding purpose of the Bill is to protect the public from a serious and sustained risk of terrorism. It is therefore right that the Government should weigh their responsibility to protect the public heavily when considering the proportionality of their decisions.

The Home Secretary can be faced with difficult decisions when considering what restrictions are necessary and where to strike the balance of proportionality between the rights of the individual and the rights of the wider public to be protected from that person. The High Court has specifically accepted that an individual’s mental health does not automatically trump the national security case against him and the right of the public to be protected from the risk of terrorism. This serves to underline the difficult balancing act that will have to be conducted by the Home Secretary in each and every case.

The Home Secretary’s decisions are necessarily informed by sensitive information about individuals’ involvement in terrorism-related activity and the threat they pose to the public. It is this information that tips the other side of the scales and against which the impact of the measures must be weighed in order to arrive at a reasonable and balanced decision that accords sufficient weight to the need to protect the public. This information would not be available to the commission proposed by these amendments, but it will be fully taken into account by the courts and the Home Secretary when reviewing the ongoing necessity and the impact of the measures.

It therefore seems that the amendments put forward by my noble friend do not provide exactly the right balance. The approach I have outlined of careful ongoing review and rigorous judicial oversight strikes the right balance between protection of the rights of the individual and protection of the public from a risk of terrorism. It will ensure that the measures imposed are both necessary and proportionate. I hope the explanations of the earlier amendments and reassurances on the last three will be sufficient for my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Stern. I hope my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, can he say whether the Government propose to publish the terms of reference of the TPIM review group? He may not be able to answer that.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will write to my noble friend on that issue.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I certainly do not intend to press any of these amendments and I am grateful to the Minister for his explanations. I will comment on three of them. I am interested that a solicitor holding his client’s money might be providing financial services but am happy to accept that interpretation. On the first of the amendments, I take the Minister’s point about needing to use the correct terms, but I hope that every measure will be absolutely clear about the area as well as the place which is included—not, for instance, an “area around” or the “environs of” Heathrow Airport. If necessary, it would be proper for a map to be produced so that the individual as well as everybody else can be absolutely certain about what area is designated for this purpose. On the proposal for an independent commission, I am not seeking to challenge the architecture of the Bill and I am well aware of the court’s ruling that national security is not to be trumped. However, I hope that the Government and the new review group will take into account the points I have made, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, has made so powerfully, about, among other things, the need for an independent take on what is going on and to involve in the assessments people of experience and, where appropriate, non-members of the review group with that relevant experience. Having said that, and having thanked the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 9.

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Moved by

[Lord Henley]

13: Schedule 1, page 28, line 11, leave out from “individual” to end of line 13 and insert “—
(a) to report to such a police station, at such times and in such manner, as the Secretary of State may by notice require, and(b) to comply with any directions given by a police officer in relation to such reporting.”

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[Lord Henley]

I am just wondering whether the Opposition want to comment on this matter.

It is very important to start by reminding the House what we have under control orders, what we are proposing and what the amendment proposes. Under the control orders, the standard of proof was a “reasonable suspicion” by the Secretary of State. We considered this, as your Lordships are well aware, in the counterterrorism review, and it was concluded that it was necessary to raise the test of involvement in terrorism-related activity from “reasonable suspicion” to “reasonable belief”. Reasonable belief is considerably stronger than reasonable suspicion, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay has said. We have raised that standard, as is right and proper. It will provide an additional safeguard, and is consistent with the approach taken in the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.

It is obviously a matter where we have to consider proportionality and the appropriate balance. Again, I have to weary the House by stressing the need for that balance. We consider that a change to reasonable belief will not be prejudicial to national security. It is right that the Secretary of State should be able to take action to protect the public in circumstances where she reasonably believes that an individual has been involved in terrorism-related activity and the measures are necessary. I was grateful for the support of my noble and learned friend in this matter.

It was right to raise the standard of proof to reasonable belief, but we do not believe that it is necessary to go as far as a balance of probabilities, which might be a more appropriate action if this amendment had been considered at the same time as the first amendment we debated and if this were a matter for the courts to decide. As it is, this is a matter for the Home Secretary to decide, and we believe that this is the right action and that a move to a balance of probabilities would provide the wrong balance for the main TPIM regime in terms of ensuring that the public will be protected.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee went on to mention the enhanced TPIM Bill. That is a different matter where we are obviously considering much more draconian measures should they ever, sadly, be necessary. That is something that will be considered in due course by this House and another place as part of the scrutiny of the draft legislation. For this Bill, we believe that getting the balance right means sticking with reasonable belief, which is a considerable improvement on reasonable suspicion. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will feel able to withdraw his amendment on this occasion.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lord, I do feel able to withdraw this amendment. I do so in particular because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, tells the House that reasonable belief, in the circumstances, is a stronger test than balance of probabilities. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Henley]

30: Clause 8, page 4, line 14, after “which” insert “, unless the court otherwise directs (whether in those directions or subsequently),”

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with Amendment 8. I beg to move.

Amendment 30 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Henley]

31: Clause 8, page 4, line 17, leave out subsection (3)

[Lord Henley]

Again, I spoke to this amendment with Amendment 8. I beg to move.

Amendment 31 agreed.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I get the impression that the House wishes to move on. I never understand these things—I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, wishes to go out for dinner or whatever—but I will endeavour to be relatively brief.

I was amused for the second consecutive amendment as first the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, cited my absent noble friend Lord Carlile as being a likely supporter of their amendments. It is easier to make these assertions in his absence. We will invite my noble friend to look at Hansard in due course and decide whether he necessarily agreed with the noble Lord or the noble and learned Lord. I just say that in passing.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his explanation, which would obviously change the provisions relating to the period for which a TPIM notice can have effect. I will set out our thinking on this issue. In his model, there would be a requirement for new terrorism-related activity to have taken place while a TPIM notice is in force, in order to allow that TPIM notice to be extended into a second year. Again I must dare to use the word “balance”. We do not think that this strikes the right balance in the context of preventive orders of this kind. Indeed it would undermine the ability of the Government to protect the people of this country from a risk of terrorism.

The counterterrorism review carefully considered the issue of time limits and how long restrictions such as these should remain in force on the basis of the same evidence. It concluded that extension of a TPIM notice for a further year should only be allowed on one occasion if the notice continues to be necessary in order to protect the public. After that one extension—up to two years—new evidence would be required to impose a new TPIM notice. That is a significant move away from the position in control orders, which can potentially be renewed indefinitely on the basis of the same evidence where the control order remains necessary.

We are of the view that the ongoing necessity for the notice can be made out for a second year on the basis of the original terrorism-related activity. This is particularly so where that activity is very serious, suggesting that the individual’s mindset and intentions, perhaps to do serious harm, will not have changed after just one year subject to restrictive measures. Indeed, there are many court judgments in the control order context confirming that, for the purposes of public protection, ongoing necessity is not dependent on new terrorism-related activity since the imposition of the control order. We do not believe that the new terrorism-related activity should be required in order to extend the original TPIM notice for that one year.

While the Government’s view is that TPIM notices should not be used to warehouse people, and should not be imposed indefinitely on the basis of the same evidence—as can happen under control orders if the statutory test continues to be met—a notice that can only last one year without evidence of new activity undertaken while subject to the measures will not be sufficient to disrupt the threat posed by the individuals concerned in many cases.

Again I come back to the question of balance. We believe that the balance is about right in what we propose—that is, one year with the ability to extend it for another year. If there is to be any extension beyond that, we need new evidence of terrorist-related activity of one sort of another, as set out in the Bill. The limits proposed by the noble and learned Lord’s amendment shift the balance too far the other. I hope that he will be happy to withdraw his amendment on the basis of that explanation of balance.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I am sad, but nevertheless I withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Henley]

45: Clause 23, page 15, line 8, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;(ba) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;”

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Moved by

[Lord Henley]

47: Clause 26, page 17, line 32, leave out paragraph (a)

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will be brief. Our own Joint Committee on Human Rights said that the TPIMs remain,

“an extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process”.

It went on to recommend that the Bill should also,

“require annual renewal, and so ensure there is an annual opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise and debate the continued necessity for such exceptional measures and the way in which they are working in practice”.

Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, also questioned whether it was constitutionally appropriate for the extraordinary executive powers involved in TPIMs to remain in being for a lengthy period of time. Whatever one’s views on the need for TPIMs, these are considerable and exceptional measures, and it is surely right and appropriate that Parliament should—as happens currently with control orders—continue to have the opportunity and the duty to decide each year whether the situation remains such that the measures in this Bill and the associated powers should continue in being or instead be allowed to expire.

The fact that debates on the Bill are taking place now does not affect the necessity and appropriateness of proper consideration each year by Parliament of whether the circumstances remain such that these powers, and the way in which they are used and operated, are still needed for a further period of time. It remains to be seen whether the Minister’s position has changed on this issue, but if the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, decides in the light of the Minister’s reply to test the opinion of the House, we should support his amendment.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, perhaps I may say how grateful I am to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for setting out his amendment and explaining it so carefully. I am also grateful that he set out the arguments I put forward both in Committee and at Second Reading. I will go through them again because I think that the House would like to hear them, and I might be able to persuade noble Lords of the merits of my position. I will not follow the second speaker in the debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in her strictures to her own former Front Bench about consistency. I will leave that as an internal family matter that they can sort out among themselves. Consistency is important on some occasions, but that is a matter for the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Rosser, to consider in due course.

It is important that I set out the Government’s views on why we think it is not necessary to go to an annual review, as opposed to the five-year review that we are proposing. I will set out the argument on three major grounds, more or less as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick did. First—that dread word—we believe that renewal every five years strikes the right balance. It reflects the need to build in effective safeguards to ensure that powers do not remain in force longer than is necessary. It also reflects the competence of Parliament to apply intense scrutiny to legislation—no one can say that this legislation has not had intense scrutiny, and it has not been emergency legislation as on previous occasions—and to arrive at a position that will not need to be reviewed annually. Each new Parliament will have the opportunity to debate this view in the context of the situation at the time and to take its own view. This is in line with the length of Parliaments provided by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

Secondly, we believe that annual renewal is unnecessary. The Bill has been subject to full parliamentary scrutiny with the usual timetable allowing for a settled position to be reached. As I stressed earlier, by contrast the control order legislation had to be, necessarily, rushed through with very little opportunity for debate, although there was considerable debate in this House. That made annual renewal an appropriate safeguard for the 2005 Act. Admittedly it was a safeguard that was initially opposed—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, reminded us—by the Government at the time, but it is one that is not necessary in respect of this Bill.

I stress that there are other significant forms of oversight and scrutiny. There will be the annual report by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation; there will be quarterly reports to Parliament by the Secretary of State—she must report quarterly on the exercise of these powers under the Act—and there will be the usual post-legislative scrutiny which requires a detailed memorandum on the operation of the Act to be submitted to the relevant departmental Select Committee and laid before Parliament. As we discussed when debating many of the earlier amendments and all earlier stages of the Bill, every individual TPIM notice will be carefully scrutinised by the courts.

Thirdly, I stress again—this point was raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and others—that there are other means by which the Bill can be amended or repealed. There is an order-making power to repeal the TPIM powers, and if it becomes clear that the powers are no longer needed—we would all welcome that occasion if it should happen—it will be possible at any time during each five-year period for the Home Secretary to repeal the powers by order. If it becomes clear that the powers should be changed, the legislation can be amended by Parliament at any time in the usual way.

We do not, therefore, believe that an annual renewal is necessary. We think a five-year review of these matters strikes the right balance. I appreciate that other noble Lords who have taken part in the debate have strong views on the matter and I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. However, I hope—although I doubt very much—that what I have said might persuade him on this occasion to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, first, is it fundamental to the Bill being put before Parliament that the Secretary of State believes, at this moment and in the light of the information that she has, that the Bill is essential? Secondly, if that is the basis of the Bill being put before Parliament, can she say whether in a year’s time, after it passes, the situation will be the same?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the important point is that the Bill is the result of the counterterrorism review that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary initiated and which she reported on earlier this year. Following the review of counterterrorism legislation we came forward with the Bill and other parts of the package that we discussed at earlier stages. My right honourable friend therefore believes, as do I, that the Bill is fundamentally necessary at the moment. However, she has given herself a power, if she feels that the Bill is no longer necessary, to withdraw it. That power is set out in the Bill; I suppose that it is a Henry VIII power which many people would welcome on this occasion, but we would only withdraw the Bill if we felt that it was no longer necessary.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords—

[Lord Henley]

What I was saying, if the noble Lord will allow me to continue my argument before he intervenes, is that we do not think that an annual review of this by Parliament is necessary: once during each Parliament should be sufficient. However, as I made clear, other reports from the independent reviewer and from my right honourable friend will come before Parliament to inform debate on these matters.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

All I wanted to say to the Minister was that while he referred to a Henry VIII clause, he might also have reminded his noble and learned friend of the other Henry VIII clause, which allows the Home Secretary in certain circumstances to go back to control orders.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Lord said it for me. All I am saying is that the Bill can be withdrawn by my right honourable friend, should she so wish. Those powers are set out in the Bill.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am disappointed by the Minister’s response, although I admire his powers of advocacy in what I regard as a hopeless cause. This is an exceptional Bill. I am sorry that the Minister feels unable to respond to the wisdom and experience of other noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, spoke of eternal vigilance. I hope that your Lordships will at least agree that annual vigilance is essential in relation to this Bill. I wish to test the opinion of the House.