Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hart of Chilton (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly. I was going to save myself until Report, but this afternoon I was provoked into speaking by the reference by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to Andrew Congreve. Andrew Congreve is a partner of mine at Herbert Smith. We both went to the post office to get our TV licences when we heard that the fee was going to be increased. Andrew Congreve was provoked by the threat that his second TV licence was to be revoked by the BBC. That threat stirred him into action. He has not been very well recently. It is only to be applauded that he should be referred to this afternoon: he is now in the Law Reports and will appear in Hansard.

I wish to make a second point. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, referred to delay, as did the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Steps are being taken at the moment to speed up the process of judicial review. Only six weeks are allowed now to bring the case—to make the application. That is a substantial cut to the period of time that was allowed before. The new planning courts, filled with judges who are experienced in this area, now sit to hear these cases. They come on very quickly. In my recent involvement, the six weeks application was made, the leave was granted quickly and the hearing took place a week ago. That was dealt with with enormous speed. If that is the process that is to be fulfilled in the future, a lot of the problems about delay will vanish.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for missing the opening minutes of his speech this afternoon—indeed, I apologise to all noble Lords—as I attempted unsuccessfully to break the world record for running here from the Supreme Court.

When proposals for amendment of judicial review are brought forward by the Government—who are, of course, the main defendant in such litigation—they require the most careful scrutiny to identify whether they are indeed in the public interest and whether there is any good reason for Parliament to intervene in an area that has previously—and rightly—been left to judicial discretion. Clause 64 seems to me to fail to meet those criteria.

I have three objections to Clause 64. First, it focuses on whether it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different. I emphasise the words “for the applicant”. The clause fails to recognise that judicial review is not concerned just with the narrow interests of the applicant. Judicial review serves the public interest, as the Committee has heard, by exposing systematic breaches of legal requirements by defendants. The court’s judgment—often a declaration—tells the Administration that what has been done is unlawful. Changes are then made; unlawful practices stop. Clause 64 will constitute a major impediment to that vital function of judicial review.

My second objection to Clause 64 is that a remedy may be appropriate in the interests of the individual claimant even in cases where the legal wrong may have made no difference. Last year, Lord Reed emphasised in the Supreme Court in a case concerning the Parole Board—the Osborn case of 2013, in volume three of the Weekly Law Reports, at page 1020, paragraphs 67 to 68—that the law requires public bodies to adopt a fair procedure to ensure not just that the right conclusion is reached on the merits of the individual case but that the subject of such a decision is not left with a sense of injustice that a wrong approach has been adopted in their case. Again, Clause 64 would prevent judicial reviews going forward for that purpose.

My third objection to Clause 64 is that it would require the court at the preliminary stage to conduct a detailed review of what would have happened had circumstances been different. That will of itself be time-consuming and expensive, and will inevitably promote satellite litigation. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, expressed concern about delay, and we are all concerned about speeding up legal procedures. Several steps have been taken; the noble Lord, Lord Hart, referred to them a moment ago.

It is important to say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that Clause 64 simply does not address the objective of speeding up procedures; nor will it achieve any such objective. One could have shorter time limits and arrange for speedier, expedited or shorter hearings—those are all processes that are being adopted. The Fordham inquiry for the Bingham Centre has made a number of valuable proposals.

Clause 64 simply does not address the topic; it is a blunt weapon, if removing delay is its objective. It is, for reasons that I have sought to explain, counterproductive, because it will lead to longer hearings at the leave stage and more appeals on the grounds of what would have been the result had a different approach been adopted.

Your Lordships have heard that Clause 64 has been criticised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee referred to the concern expressed by the senior judiciary during consultation that Clause 64 may well lead to unlawful administrative action going unremedied. The Constitution Committee therefore advised this Committee and the House to consider whether Clause 64 risks undermining the rule of law. I think that Clause 64 will impede the effective exercise of judicial review, and will do so for no good reason. I very much hope that the Government will think again before Report.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 27th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, and two former Lord Chancellors, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Irvine of Lairg and Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It concerns the retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court. The Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 lowered the retirement age for the judiciary from 75 to 70, with an exception for those first appointed to judicial office before 31 March 1995. There is a strong case for raising the retirement age back to 75 for Supreme Court judges.

Judges are joining the Bench at a later age than their predecessors. It then takes time for them to rise up the career ladder to reach the Supreme Court, typically in their early to mid-60s. Since those appointed to the Supreme Court are, by definition, the very best of our judges, it is particularly unfortunate that we are disposing of such valuable resources after they have served a short time in office. This argument is specific to the Supreme Court. It is not the case that if the retirement age for Justices of the Supreme Court was to be raised to 75, the same must follow for the magistracy and for all levels of the judiciary in-between. The fact of the matter is that judicial wisdom and experience at the highest level is being lost to our courts, although not to the field of arbitration where retired judges from the Supreme Court are very much in demand for much higher fees than the Lord Chancellor’s department is prepared to pay.

There is no basis for concern that judges tend to lose their mental and physical powers after the age of 70 and up to the age of 75. It is important to recall that these judges are not hearing exhausting witness trials but considering stimulating points of law. Nor is there any basis for concern that a retirement age of 75 in the Supreme Court would result in a court that is less attuned to modern society. Experience is to the contrary. The Appellate Committee of this House and now the Supreme Court are far more innovative than the Court of Appeal, where the average age of the judges tends to be a decade younger.

Nor is there any basis for concern that a retirement age of 75 would hinder the promotion of diversity, an important value that we discussed last Monday. Despite most of the members of the Supreme Court retiring at 75 in recent years—the same was true of the Appellate Committee—there has been a steady flow of vacancies. The appointment of only one woman to the Appellate Committee and to the Supreme Court and of no one from the ethnic minorities, regrettable though that is, has been caused by the perceived lack of suitable candidates and not by any lack of vacancies. Indeed, increasing the age limit to 75 may well enhance the prospects for appointing more women, as so many female judges and lawyers have taken many years out of their careers for family care reasons and may find it more difficult than men to rise to the top by their early 60s.

In our report in March, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee recommended that the retirement age be increased to 75 for Supreme Court judges and for Court of Appeal judges. We advised increasing the retirement age because,

“proven judicial quality and experience are at a premium in the development of the law”.

This amendment focuses only on the Supreme Court because the arguments are especially strong at that level. I look forward to hearing from the Minister the Government’s view on this important topic. I beg to move.

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

I support the amendment for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I must declare two interests. First, I was a member of the Constitution Committee and heard the evidence and, secondly, some of my best friends are between the ages of 70 and 75. The evidence showed that there was a real risk that we were losing substantial talent from the Supreme Court. There was one particular example of losing someone just at his prime. It would be wrong for the Supreme Court to lose people of enormous proven energy and ability when they have just got into the driving seat of their full power, and to lose talent of that sort when people have risen to that point with only a limited time available to them in the Supreme Court itself.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton. Its purpose is simple—to implement more effectively the Government’s proposal to include an exceptional cases category for legal aid as set out in Clause 10. The problem which this amendment seeks to address is that Clause 10 is too narrowly drafted and will prevent the very flexibility that it is designed to provide. That is because the exceptional cases category set out in the clause applies only if the refusal of legal aid would amount to a breach of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights or would create a risk of doing so.

The difficulty, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, stated when moving his amendment at the Report stage, is that it is inevitable that:

“All of a sudden a case will obviously require, in the interests of justice, to be supported by legal aid because of the wider interest that is involved”.—[Official Report, 12/3/12; col. 119.]

The case may concern a difficult and important question of statutory interpretation in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court in a type of case generally excluded from the scope of legal aid. This amendment would confer a power on the director of legal aid to fund litigation if both of two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the director considers that funding the litigation is necessary—a strong term—to avoid injustice. I have adopted in the amendment the suggestion made in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the discretion should be defined not as a power to promote justice, but as a power to avoid specific injustice, a much narrower concept. The noble and learned Lord has asked me to express to the House his apologies for not being able to be here today.

The second condition which would need to be satisfied before the power could be exercised by the director is that the director considers that the case is an appropriate one for use of the funds, if any, made available for this purpose by the Lord Chancellor. That wording is designed to ensure that funding remains entirely within the discretion of the Lord Chancellor. The amendment, I emphasise, does not require additional funds to be found. The amendment leaves it to the Lord Chancellor to decide what funds, if any, to provide for this purpose.

If then the Lord Chancellor is not required to provide funds for this exceptional category of cases, your Lordships will wish to know what is the purpose of the amendment. The answer is that even if the Lord Chancellor were to say that no money is currently available for this exceptional category of cases—I hope that that would not be the case—it is vital to include a discretion in the Bill so that a statutory power exists to fund exceptional cases which can be exercised with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor when the economy improves.

Noble Lords should not approve a Bill confining legal aid in the manner proposed by the Government without including in it a provision which at least allows the Lord Chancellor, in his discretion, to provide some funding for the exceptional cases about which I am concerned. Parliament may not have a chance to address legal aid issues again for some time. I very much hope that even at this late stage the Minister will be able to accept the amendment, which confers power on the Lord Chancellor to allow funding for exceptional cases but imposes no duty on him to do so. I beg to move.

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

I support the amendment, which is also in my name. Interested bodies such as Citizens Advice, Justice for All and the Law Society have all pointed out that the Government’s exceptional funding safety net does not stretch wide enough for the reasons so clearly given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I emphasise that the amendment of itself imposes no extra financial burden on the Lord Chancellor; it simply provides an opportunity for a discretion to be exercised if it is necessary—I emphasise the word “necessary”—to prevent a specific injustice occurring. If it was decided to use this power, the costs would be provided from discretionary funds made available to the director by the Lord Chancellor.

The amendment should be seen as a simple, practical and positive act of assistance to the Government, who, if they accept it, will have the flexibility to act in the circumstances provided for. Legislative opportunities for any Government are few and far between. In my view, this opportunity should be seized and the helpful amendment accepted.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick

Monday 5th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. It arises out of concern expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I are members.

The Bill will transfer responsibility for the allocation of legal aid from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor’s Department. The allocation of legal aid will be the responsibility of a civil servant within the department who will be designated as the director of legal aid casework. The Minister made it clear in Committee that the intention is that the director should be independent in the performance of his or her functions, save that the director must comply with directions under Clause 4(3)(a) and must have regard to guidance under Clause 4(3)(b). The performance of the function will indeed require independence, given that many of the applications for funding will be in respect of claims, or potential claims, against government departments, including, of course, the Ministry of Justice itself. It is striking, then, that Clause 4 says nothing about independence.

At paragraph 15 of the Constitution Committee’s report we expressed concern as to whether sufficient guarantees of independence are provided in the Bill for the director of legal aid casework, who will have the responsibility within the department. Given the central importance of the functions of the director, it is appropriate to include in Clause 4 a recognition of this principle of independence. This will encourage the Lord Chancellor to focus his mind on this important question and ensure there is no doubt as to the role of the director. The amendment is not prescriptive. It leaves the detail to the Lord Chancellor. It recognises that independence is subject to directions and guidance. But it would, I think, be an improvement to say something about these vital matters on the face of the Bill itself. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton, said, and I should like to add just two points. First, this amendment requires no expenditure of public funds. It is a constitutional amendment designed to ensure that a statement of the vital principle of independence is in the Bill. Independence is of central importance for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Hart, gave. Under the Bill we will have someone within the Ministry of Justice, a civil servant, who will perform the sensitive function of deciding when legal aid is allocated, even in relation to claims against government departments, including the justice ministry.

Secondly, I very much welcome Amendment 5, which has been tabled by the Minister. If noble Lords approve it, this amendment will require the director to produce an annual report which will be laid before Parliament. However, welcome as that amendment is, it does not address, far less rectify, the absence of any statement in the Bill about the independence of the director. Amendment 3 would meet the vital need for such a clear statement in the Bill.

Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick

Monday 31st October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, Clause 25 is directed at the concern that local councillors must be able to express views on controversial local issues such as, for example, whether to give planning permission for a bail hostel without being accused of bias when the issue comes up for a vote at the council meeting. There are two main objections to the drafting of Clause 25 which the amendment seeks to rectify. The courts have adopted a sensible approach in this context and a local councillor can express strong views on an issue prior to the council meeting as long as he maintains an open mind in the sense that he is willing to listen to the competing arguments and the advice of officials at the council meeting before casting his vote. The courts have explained that the common law allows strong predisposition and the holding of strong prior opinions; it prohibits only predetermination, the closing of the mind and the unwillingness to listen to the debate before casting a vote. It is extremely unclear whether this distinction between predisposition and unlawful predetermination is being maintained by Clause 25 or whether it is, in some respects, being amended. It is so unclear that it will inevitably lead to protracted and expensive litigation, a process that will undermine rather than advance the Government’s objective. That is the first objection.

The second objection to Clause 25 which the amendment seeks to rectify is that it appears—I say “appears” because the clause is very difficult to interpret—to provide that as long as the local councillor says or does nothing at the council meeting to indicate a closed mind it is legally irrelevant what he or she may have said or done before the meeting to demonstrate a closed mind—that is, predetermination. For example, if at the council meeting the councillor says nothing during the debate but votes against the bail hostel, under Clause 25 there could be no legal complaint of predetermination. That would be so even though, on the way into the council meeting, he announces to the television news cameras outside that he is not interested in what is going to be said at the debate. That would be a substantial change in the law and one very much to be regretted.

The two concerns that I have outlined are exacerbated because Clause 25 will apply not only to controversial political decisions in local government but to all functions, including, for example, employment and contracting decisions. In those other areas, in particular, it is of great importance that local councillors have an open mind; that they hear the arguments at the council meeting and listen to the advice of officials before they make up their mind.

I have received a letter from Mr Clive Lewis QC, who is the chairman of the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association, a copy of which I sent to the Minister, expressing concerns very similar to those I have set out. I have also been informed by the Association of Council Secretaries and Solicitors that it, too, is very concerned that Clause 25 as currently drafted will lead to uncertainty and run the risk that serious cases of alleged bias could not be challenged in the courts.

I am very grateful to the Minister’s officials for taking time to seek to explain to me the reasoning behind Clause 25 at a meeting last month. However, my concerns remain. This amendment would set out—I hope clearly—the principles stated by the courts so that local councillors and their advisers would be in no doubt that the prior expression of strong opinions is not prohibited by law. Even at this late stage of consideration of the Bill I hope the Minister will think again on this subject. I beg to move.

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

My Lords, my name is associated with this amendment and I support it for the following reasons. I believe it is common ground that councillors should not be prevented from or penalised for speaking their minds on the hustings. I do not accept the anecdotal evidence that if councillors speak out on an issue then they are banned from voting at a committee. If they are being given that advice then it is bad advice and it should be clarified. You do not need a statutory provision to do that.

A predisposition has always been permitted but not a predetermination. I think it is also common ground that decision-makers must approach their task with an open mind. They must listen and consider all the arguments and then reach a conclusion. It is self-evident, for example, that a Secretary of State who as a local MP has crusaded passionately against wind farms saying there are no arguments in their favour cannot decide an appeal against the refusal of a wind farm planning application. He must—and I am sure he would—recuse himself.

In the present case, in a much less exalted position but important nonetheless, a councillor who declares himself opposed to an application and states he is determined to vote it down ought not to pursue such a course up to and including the planning meeting. However, the Bill appears to provide a loophole for this by affording an opportunity for a councillor to state wholesale opposition right up to the door of the planning meeting and then to remain silent at the meeting itself nevertheless casting his vote. In such a case the provisions of the clause mean that clear evidence of bias, which that is, is impermissible evidence. That cannot be right. At worst this clause could, I fear, become a bigot’s charter, which cannot be in the public interest.

The amendment offers a solution. It confirms the present position of predisposition but provides a potential sanction for predetermination if the circumstances permit. I emphasise that this does not prevent the crusader councillor from crusading. He can attend usbthe council meeting to represent his views but he must not, if his mind is made up before the meeting, participate in the voting on the decision itself. That must be left to those who come with an open mind to listen to all the arguments before finally coming to a decision. That is the law and it is in the public interest that it be upheld.

The current wording of the Bill does not do so. It could well be used as shield or a licence for bias and is bad policy because the clause applies not just to planning but to all functions of authorities, some even more sensitive, where greater restraint on strong expressions of view is called for. Cases of bias are extremely difficult to get on their feet. This clause makes it almost impossible because those who are biased will now remain silent during the committee’s deliberations.