Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

19: Clause 10, page 7, line 5, at end insert “, or
(c) that—(i) it is necessary to make the services available to the individual under this Part to prevent specific injustice in a particular case; and(ii) it is appropriate to do so, in order to prevent such injustice, from the funds (if any) which the Lord Chancellor in his discretion makes available to the Director for the purposes of this paragraph.”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton. Its purpose is simple—to implement more effectively the Government’s proposal to include an exceptional cases category for legal aid as set out in Clause 10. The problem which this amendment seeks to address is that Clause 10 is too narrowly drafted and will prevent the very flexibility that it is designed to provide. That is because the exceptional cases category set out in the clause applies only if the refusal of legal aid would amount to a breach of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights or would create a risk of doing so.

The difficulty, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, stated when moving his amendment at the Report stage, is that it is inevitable that:

“All of a sudden a case will obviously require, in the interests of justice, to be supported by legal aid because of the wider interest that is involved”.—[Official Report, 12/3/12; col. 119.]

The case may concern a difficult and important question of statutory interpretation in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court in a type of case generally excluded from the scope of legal aid. This amendment would confer a power on the director of legal aid to fund litigation if both of two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the director considers that funding the litigation is necessary—a strong term—to avoid injustice. I have adopted in the amendment the suggestion made in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the discretion should be defined not as a power to promote justice, but as a power to avoid specific injustice, a much narrower concept. The noble and learned Lord has asked me to express to the House his apologies for not being able to be here today.

The second condition which would need to be satisfied before the power could be exercised by the director is that the director considers that the case is an appropriate one for use of the funds, if any, made available for this purpose by the Lord Chancellor. That wording is designed to ensure that funding remains entirely within the discretion of the Lord Chancellor. The amendment, I emphasise, does not require additional funds to be found. The amendment leaves it to the Lord Chancellor to decide what funds, if any, to provide for this purpose.

If then the Lord Chancellor is not required to provide funds for this exceptional category of cases, your Lordships will wish to know what is the purpose of the amendment. The answer is that even if the Lord Chancellor were to say that no money is currently available for this exceptional category of cases—I hope that that would not be the case—it is vital to include a discretion in the Bill so that a statutory power exists to fund exceptional cases which can be exercised with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor when the economy improves.

Noble Lords should not approve a Bill confining legal aid in the manner proposed by the Government without including in it a provision which at least allows the Lord Chancellor, in his discretion, to provide some funding for the exceptional cases about which I am concerned. Parliament may not have a chance to address legal aid issues again for some time. I very much hope that even at this late stage the Minister will be able to accept the amendment, which confers power on the Lord Chancellor to allow funding for exceptional cases but imposes no duty on him to do so. I beg to move.

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

I support the amendment, which is also in my name. Interested bodies such as Citizens Advice, Justice for All and the Law Society have all pointed out that the Government’s exceptional funding safety net does not stretch wide enough for the reasons so clearly given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I emphasise that the amendment of itself imposes no extra financial burden on the Lord Chancellor; it simply provides an opportunity for a discretion to be exercised if it is necessary—I emphasise the word “necessary”—to prevent a specific injustice occurring. If it was decided to use this power, the costs would be provided from discretionary funds made available to the director by the Lord Chancellor.

The amendment should be seen as a simple, practical and positive act of assistance to the Government, who, if they accept it, will have the flexibility to act in the circumstances provided for. Legislative opportunities for any Government are few and far between. In my view, this opportunity should be seized and the helpful amendment accepted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his consideration of this matter and to other noble Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord raised two points, as I understood him. His first concern was that this amendment would somehow politicise the functions of the director. It would not. The Lord Chancellor would remain responsible for funding questions and would decide whether it was appropriate to provide additional funding. It would be entirely a matter for the director to decide on the allocation of such funding, if any. There is no question of any politicisation of these responsibilities.

The noble and learned Lord also suggested that it was satisfactory for the exceptional cases category to be confined to those cases in which an issue arises pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights. In my view, that is not adequate. The exceptional cases category should be sufficiently broad to cover exceptional cases whether or not an issue is engaged under the European convention.

I suggest to noble Lords that there is no basis for resisting this amendment. The Government agree that there should be an exceptional cases category—and they are right. This amendment would ensure that the exceptional cases category is sufficiently broad to enable the director to deal with exceptional cases, if and when the Lord Chancellor provides funding. This amendment imposes no duty whatever on the Lord Chancellor and requires no funding to be provided. It is purely permissive, and I invite noble Lords to support it on that basis. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

24: Clause 46, page 33, line 18, at end insert—
“(7) To the extent specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor by statutory instrument, the amendments made by subsection (4) and section 48 and the repeal made by section 49(1), do not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings of a description specified in the regulations.
(8) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (7) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. It seeks to confer on the Lord Chancellor a power to disapply provisions of Part 2 in particular categories of case. Noble Lords will know that Part 2 removes the power of the court to make unsuccessful defendants pay success fees and “after the event” insurance. Successful claimants would need to make these payments out of their damages. Concern has been expressed in your Lordships’ House that this may deter or prevent claimants bringing meritorious claims and may operate unfairly by effectively reducing the damages which they obtain. This concern has been expressed in a wide variety of legal contexts from industrial injuries to insolvency claims.

The Minister’s response to these criticisms has been to express the hope, and sometimes the belief, that Part 2 will not have the adverse consequences for access to justice which critics of these provisions fear. The reality is that neither the Government nor the critics of Part 2 can be sure what effect it will have on access to justice in practice. The Minister will, I hope, accept that it is possible that after the Bill is enacted and comes into effect, experience may show that in specific contexts the concerns expressed by those of us who are worried about the implications of Part 2 are justified, and that access to justice is being impeded.

This amendment would confer a discretion on the Lord Chancellor to respond to any problems that are seen to occur after enactment by excluding defined categories of case from the statutory provisions if he thinks it appropriate to do so. The new provision would confer a power in Part 2 equivalent to the Lord Chancellor’s power in Part 1 under Clause 9(2) to modify Schedule 1 in relation to the scope of legal aid—a power for the Lord Chancellor which the Government accepted was appropriate in Part 1. I cannot see why the Lord Chancellor would not wish to have such a discretion in Part 2 equivalent to that which is given by the Bill in Part 1. In neither context does the discretion impose any duty on him.

Parliament is unlikely for some time to have another opportunity to look at these important matters. Given the importance of the changes that we are making in Part 2, given the concerns that have been expressed about their impact on access to justice, and given that these matters may look very different indeed in some legal contexts in the light of experience after these changes are made, it is surely wise to add to the Bill a power for the Lord Chancellor whereby it would be entirely within his discretion to modify the effect by excluding categories of cases. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, I shall be brief. I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Pannick. Just over a week ago, your Lordships were reminded by no less a person than Her Majesty the Queen that during her time as monarch she had signed more than 3,000 pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament. All of us who have been Members of this House and the other place know that we have a penchant for passing vast swathes of legislation that we never revisit subsequently. We all know that we sometimes legislate in haste and repent at leisure. I have had the feeling during the passage of this legislation that we will later regret some of the measures we have passed.

The problem then is what we are able to do about it. Although we sometimes add sunset clauses, and Select Committees can revisit legislation and make recommendations, we often do not put in the kind of belt-and-braces provision that my noble friend Lord Pannick has placed before your Lordships’ House this evening. It is eminently reasonable. It is perfectly good for Parliament to say that if things were to work out in the worst-case scenarios in the way that your Lordships at various stages in Committee and on Report have suggested may happen, and if the Minister is proved not to be correct in what I am sure he sincerely believes regarding the way in which this legislation will be interpreted in due course, there ought to be some way of doing something about it if it is to be found wanting.

Giving this discretionary power to the Lord Chancellor and making it consistent with Part 1, as my noble friend has just described, seems to be the perfect way of dealing with the problem. It is eminently reasonable and, like my noble friend, I cannot see any good reason why the Government would want to resist something that requires no expenditure and does not place on them any duty but simply gives them a discretionary power. I hope that the amendment will commend itself to your Lordships.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has tabled his amendment along the lines he suggested on Report. He suggested then that it might be sensible to have a power to disapply the effects of Part 2 in relation to the abolition of recoverability of success fees and insurance premiums in respect of particular categories of case. The amendment now seeks to achieve that.

I have referred on several occasions during the passage of the Bill to its central architecture. The Government’s view, quite simply, is that the current recoverability regime is wrong in principle. It is wrong in principle to impose substantial additional costs on losing parties, whether in relation to success fees or insurance premiums. Those costs add to the already significant costs of civil litigation and allow for risk-free litigation by claimants and what I earlier described as inflation in our legal system.

I have explained the rationale for our proposals and why we consider that they should apply across the board without exception, and I do not propose to repeat those arguments now. The amendment seeks to allow different recoverability in different classes of case. We are implementing a package of reforms, not all of which are contained in the Bill. This package has been carefully put together to be fair between claimants and defendants.

I understand the noble Lord’s intentions. I understand that he thinks it sensible to allow for exceptions to be made at a later date. However, we are legislating now on what we consider to be a fair and overdue basis. Funding arrangements need a degree of certainty. Claimants and defendants need to be able to plan and adapt to the new regime. The amendment would only create uncertainty. Will an exception be created? For what and when? Rather than settling the issue of CFAs, as this Bill seeks to do, the amendment would open the door to constant campaigning and calls for individual exceptions. The amendment may be well intentioned but it is fraught with difficulty. It would provide uncertainty and confusion where we are seeking to introduce clarity. It would provide increased costs where we are seeking to reduce costs. It is wrong in principle and unnecessary. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I simply do not understand how the amendment undermines certainty any more than does the equivalent provision in Part 1. I repeat that it would simply confer a discretionary power on the Lord Chancellor. I understand that the Government believe that the architecture in Part 2 is correct, but the Minister should accept that experience may show that in some contexts, the architecture does not work. The amendment would, importantly, ensure that if those concerns prove to be justified, the Lord Chancellor will have a power to do something about it.

This is an important matter. I wish to test the opinion of the House.