Localism Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

3: Clause 25, page 36, line 37, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) In deciding whether a decision-maker had, or appeared to have had, a closed mind to any extent when making the decision—
(a) the relevant time at which that issue is to be assessed is when the decision of the relevant authority was formally taken;(b) an earlier statement or conduct by the decision-maker that amounts to predisposition is irrelevant; and(c) an earlier statement or conduct by the decision-maker that amounts to predetermination shall be taken into account and given such weight as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case.”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, Clause 25 is directed at the concern that local councillors must be able to express views on controversial local issues such as, for example, whether to give planning permission for a bail hostel without being accused of bias when the issue comes up for a vote at the council meeting. There are two main objections to the drafting of Clause 25 which the amendment seeks to rectify. The courts have adopted a sensible approach in this context and a local councillor can express strong views on an issue prior to the council meeting as long as he maintains an open mind in the sense that he is willing to listen to the competing arguments and the advice of officials at the council meeting before casting his vote. The courts have explained that the common law allows strong predisposition and the holding of strong prior opinions; it prohibits only predetermination, the closing of the mind and the unwillingness to listen to the debate before casting a vote. It is extremely unclear whether this distinction between predisposition and unlawful predetermination is being maintained by Clause 25 or whether it is, in some respects, being amended. It is so unclear that it will inevitably lead to protracted and expensive litigation, a process that will undermine rather than advance the Government’s objective. That is the first objection.

The second objection to Clause 25 which the amendment seeks to rectify is that it appears—I say “appears” because the clause is very difficult to interpret—to provide that as long as the local councillor says or does nothing at the council meeting to indicate a closed mind it is legally irrelevant what he or she may have said or done before the meeting to demonstrate a closed mind—that is, predetermination. For example, if at the council meeting the councillor says nothing during the debate but votes against the bail hostel, under Clause 25 there could be no legal complaint of predetermination. That would be so even though, on the way into the council meeting, he announces to the television news cameras outside that he is not interested in what is going to be said at the debate. That would be a substantial change in the law and one very much to be regretted.

The two concerns that I have outlined are exacerbated because Clause 25 will apply not only to controversial political decisions in local government but to all functions, including, for example, employment and contracting decisions. In those other areas, in particular, it is of great importance that local councillors have an open mind; that they hear the arguments at the council meeting and listen to the advice of officials before they make up their mind.

I have received a letter from Mr Clive Lewis QC, who is the chairman of the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association, a copy of which I sent to the Minister, expressing concerns very similar to those I have set out. I have also been informed by the Association of Council Secretaries and Solicitors that it, too, is very concerned that Clause 25 as currently drafted will lead to uncertainty and run the risk that serious cases of alleged bias could not be challenged in the courts.

I am very grateful to the Minister’s officials for taking time to seek to explain to me the reasoning behind Clause 25 at a meeting last month. However, my concerns remain. This amendment would set out—I hope clearly—the principles stated by the courts so that local councillors and their advisers would be in no doubt that the prior expression of strong opinions is not prohibited by law. Even at this late stage of consideration of the Bill I hope the Minister will think again on this subject. I beg to move.

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

My Lords, my name is associated with this amendment and I support it for the following reasons. I believe it is common ground that councillors should not be prevented from or penalised for speaking their minds on the hustings. I do not accept the anecdotal evidence that if councillors speak out on an issue then they are banned from voting at a committee. If they are being given that advice then it is bad advice and it should be clarified. You do not need a statutory provision to do that.

A predisposition has always been permitted but not a predetermination. I think it is also common ground that decision-makers must approach their task with an open mind. They must listen and consider all the arguments and then reach a conclusion. It is self-evident, for example, that a Secretary of State who as a local MP has crusaded passionately against wind farms saying there are no arguments in their favour cannot decide an appeal against the refusal of a wind farm planning application. He must—and I am sure he would—recuse himself.

In the present case, in a much less exalted position but important nonetheless, a councillor who declares himself opposed to an application and states he is determined to vote it down ought not to pursue such a course up to and including the planning meeting. However, the Bill appears to provide a loophole for this by affording an opportunity for a councillor to state wholesale opposition right up to the door of the planning meeting and then to remain silent at the meeting itself nevertheless casting his vote. In such a case the provisions of the clause mean that clear evidence of bias, which that is, is impermissible evidence. That cannot be right. At worst this clause could, I fear, become a bigot’s charter, which cannot be in the public interest.

The amendment offers a solution. It confirms the present position of predisposition but provides a potential sanction for predetermination if the circumstances permit. I emphasise that this does not prevent the crusader councillor from crusading. He can attend usbthe council meeting to represent his views but he must not, if his mind is made up before the meeting, participate in the voting on the decision itself. That must be left to those who come with an open mind to listen to all the arguments before finally coming to a decision. That is the law and it is in the public interest that it be upheld.

The current wording of the Bill does not do so. It could well be used as shield or a licence for bias and is bad policy because the clause applies not just to planning but to all functions of authorities, some even more sensitive, where greater restraint on strong expressions of view is called for. Cases of bias are extremely difficult to get on their feet. This clause makes it almost impossible because those who are biased will now remain silent during the committee’s deliberations.

--- Later in debate ---

With this explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this fascinating debate and to the Minister for his detailed response. I shall respond briefly, attempting to avoid any indication of exacting purity that may offend the noble Lord, Lord True, or indeed any other form of reprehensible purity on this matter.

The Minister indicated that there is nothing wrong with the common law rules, and I respectfully agree with him. The problem, the Minister said, is the erroneous advice that is being given to local councillors up and down the land. The problem with that analysis is that, if the advice is the erroneous advice, we should deal with that advice. Let us not amend the common law in a way that changes the current position—and changes it by excluding from relevance the legal material that can demonstrate that there is unlawful predetermination.

[Earl Attlee]

May I explain the advantage of Clause 25 and the way that it is drafted? If I was a councillor and engaging, as a layman, with officials who were giving me advice, I would be able to produce the words in Clause 25 and say, “It says here that I can express a view”, and there would be very little that officials could do to counteract that.

[Lord Pannick]

I understand the point and am grateful to the Minister. However, the clause introduces clarity by amending the common law, which the Minister is concerned to maintain. The clause does not maintain the existing common law rules, which the Minister considers entirely adequate. The clause excludes from consideration anything that is said or done prior to the council meeting at which the issue is to be discussed, however extreme the previous statement may be. I entirely accept that what the councillor said prior to the council meeting may not be determinative of whether there is unlawful predetermination, but it must be relevant. That is the objection to Clause 25: it purports, in the Minister’s words, to restate the common law, which the Minister regards as entirely appropriate and unexceptionable. What it actually does is amend the existing common law in a way that will prevent real cases of predetermination being brought and succeeding.

Real concern was expressed in this debate that it is absolutely vital that local councillors should be able to express their views on matters powerfully and strongly if they wish. The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, and the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Greaves, made this point. I entirely agree with them that that is the common law position. The cases make it absolutely clear that local councillors deciding any matter are not impartial in the sense required of a judge; they have political allegiances, their politics involve policies and they are entitled to express their views—of course they are. The case of Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council in 2009, covered from page 83 of Volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports, is the leading Court of Appeal judgment. It says that any local councillor who expresses his views powerfully and strongly on any view is not guilty of unlawful predetermination so long as he is prepared to keep an open mind when he goes to the council meeting.

The noble Lord, Lord Sewel, and the noble Lord, Lord Snape, asked for reassurance in relation to the role of party groups and party whips in local government. That, too, has been considered by the courts. In the same case of Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, the Court of Appeal approved an earlier judgment in 1985 by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—then Mr Justice Woolf—where he said:

“I would have thought that it was almost inevitable, now that party politics play so large a part in local government, that the majority group on a council would decide on the party line in respect of the proposal. If this was to be regarded as disqualifying the district council from dealing with the planning application, then if that disqualification is to be avoided, the members of the planning committee at any rate will have to adopt standards of conduct which I suspect will be almost impossible to achieve in practice”.

[Lord Greaves]

I apologise for intervening, but I wonder whether the noble Lord is aware that there is a very widespread view within local government, which in my view is widespread in its application, that on things that are thought to be quasi-judicial like licensing and planning applications there is no party whipping. There may be discussions, but no party whip is applied.

[Lord Pannick]

I understand that, of course; I am responding to the point made that if our amendment were to be carried, this would in some way affect the existence of that whipping that does take place in local government—those elements of party control that are effective. Let me just complete the citation from Mr Justice Woolf: he concluded that there is no objection to any of this so long as, when the councillors come to the council meetings, they have an open mind in the sense that they are prepared to listen to the competing arguments.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, was rightly concerned that we should do nothing that should enable lawyers to make lots of money out of all this. That is a very laudable objective. My concern is that Clause 25 is so unclear that it will inevitably provoke litigation, and it will do so because the Minister says that it is not changing the common law but merely expressing it, whereas its terms manifestly do change the common law.

[Lord True]

On the question of litigation, will the noble Lord answer the point that my noble friend Lord Greaves and I made? If we are concerned about litigation, surely the construction of his proposed new subsection (2)(c),

“as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case”,

which may, as construed with the rest of the section, apply to any decision of any form made by a councillor, is pretty ripe for litigation. Therefore, I do not think his argument that the Government may cause more litigation stands up. Let him answer on this one.

[Lord Pannick]

My answer to the noble Lord is that paragraph (c) is simply designed to maintain—as the Government say they wish to maintain—the existing common law principle, which is that the judge will indeed look at all the circumstances of the case and decide whether there has been unlawful predetermination. I am not seeking to change the common law position; I am seeking to maintain it. The Minister has the same objective; he does not have the objective—as I understood him—of changing the substance of the common law. The objection to Clause 25 is that, on its wording, that is precisely what it will do, or there is a real risk it will do that. That is why it needs further consideration.

In the hope that the result in your Lordships’ House is neither predetermined—

[Lord Sewel]

Could the noble Lord explain how his amendment would affect, for example, the situation where, a councillor at a committee meeting having argued very strongly on one side but the party group having met and decided collectively on a different position, the councillor then says, when approached immediately before the council meeting, “I am changing my vote”, and, when asked why, says, “That was the decision of the group and I accept it” and then goes into the council meeting and votes in accordance with the decision of the group? How would the amendment address that issue?

[Lord Pannick]

The amendment would address that issue by dealing with the question in the same way as the common law deals with it at the moment. No judge is going to accept that there is unlawful predetermination simply because a local councillor has followed the whip that is imposed by his own party or his own group. This happens day after day in local government, and there are no cases that can be pointed to in which the courts have said that that is unlawful predetermination. It is not unlawful predetermination because the local councillor has listened to the matters addressed in the local council meeting.

We are dealing with a phantom problem that is created by erroneous advice being given, or is said to be given, to local councillors up and down the land. We are dealing with it in Clause 25 in a way which is going to make the problem far, far worse; and it is for that reason that I wish to test the opinion of the House.