Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Pannick
Main Page: Lord Pannick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Pannick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to speak briefly. I was going to save myself until Report, but this afternoon I was provoked into speaking by the reference by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to Andrew Congreve. Andrew Congreve is a partner of mine at Herbert Smith. We both went to the post office to get our TV licences when we heard that the fee was going to be increased. Andrew Congreve was provoked by the threat that his second TV licence was to be revoked by the BBC. That threat stirred him into action. He has not been very well recently. It is only to be applauded that he should be referred to this afternoon: he is now in the Law Reports and will appear in Hansard.
I wish to make a second point. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, referred to delay, as did the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Steps are being taken at the moment to speed up the process of judicial review. Only six weeks are allowed now to bring the case—to make the application. That is a substantial cut to the period of time that was allowed before. The new planning courts, filled with judges who are experienced in this area, now sit to hear these cases. They come on very quickly. In my recent involvement, the six weeks application was made, the leave was granted quickly and the hearing took place a week ago. That was dealt with with enormous speed. If that is the process that is to be fulfilled in the future, a lot of the problems about delay will vanish.
My Lords, I apologise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for missing the opening minutes of his speech this afternoon—indeed, I apologise to all noble Lords—as I attempted unsuccessfully to break the world record for running here from the Supreme Court.
When proposals for amendment of judicial review are brought forward by the Government—who are, of course, the main defendant in such litigation—they require the most careful scrutiny to identify whether they are indeed in the public interest and whether there is any good reason for Parliament to intervene in an area that has previously—and rightly—been left to judicial discretion. Clause 64 seems to me to fail to meet those criteria.
I have three objections to Clause 64. First, it focuses on whether it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different. I emphasise the words “for the applicant”. The clause fails to recognise that judicial review is not concerned just with the narrow interests of the applicant. Judicial review serves the public interest, as the Committee has heard, by exposing systematic breaches of legal requirements by defendants. The court’s judgment—often a declaration—tells the Administration that what has been done is unlawful. Changes are then made; unlawful practices stop. Clause 64 will constitute a major impediment to that vital function of judicial review.
My second objection to Clause 64 is that a remedy may be appropriate in the interests of the individual claimant even in cases where the legal wrong may have made no difference. Last year, Lord Reed emphasised in the Supreme Court in a case concerning the Parole Board—the Osborn case of 2013, in volume three of the Weekly Law Reports, at page 1020, paragraphs 67 to 68—that the law requires public bodies to adopt a fair procedure to ensure not just that the right conclusion is reached on the merits of the individual case but that the subject of such a decision is not left with a sense of injustice that a wrong approach has been adopted in their case. Again, Clause 64 would prevent judicial reviews going forward for that purpose.
My third objection to Clause 64 is that it would require the court at the preliminary stage to conduct a detailed review of what would have happened had circumstances been different. That will of itself be time-consuming and expensive, and will inevitably promote satellite litigation. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, expressed concern about delay, and we are all concerned about speeding up legal procedures. Several steps have been taken; the noble Lord, Lord Hart, referred to them a moment ago.
It is important to say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that Clause 64 simply does not address the objective of speeding up procedures; nor will it achieve any such objective. One could have shorter time limits and arrange for speedier, expedited or shorter hearings—those are all processes that are being adopted. The Fordham inquiry for the Bingham Centre has made a number of valuable proposals.
Clause 64 simply does not address the topic; it is a blunt weapon, if removing delay is its objective. It is, for reasons that I have sought to explain, counterproductive, because it will lead to longer hearings at the leave stage and more appeals on the grounds of what would have been the result had a different approach been adopted.
Your Lordships have heard that Clause 64 has been criticised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee referred to the concern expressed by the senior judiciary during consultation that Clause 64 may well lead to unlawful administrative action going unremedied. The Constitution Committee therefore advised this Committee and the House to consider whether Clause 64 risks undermining the rule of law. I think that Clause 64 will impede the effective exercise of judicial review, and will do so for no good reason. I very much hope that the Government will think again before Report.
I think that is very much the same comment the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made, although expressed in slightly different terms. As I will come on to explain, we suggest that the clause—if it is incorporated into the Act—would still give the judge discretion. We are simply making it clearer where the bar is placed.
At present the courts will find that there will be no difference where the end result was inevitably the same. Amendments 71B, 71C, 72B, 72C, 73C and 73D and the amendments consequential upon those would go further in adding additional requirements concerning the public interest and the overriding objective. Those additional requirements do not apply at present as the law is understood by the Government.
The current threshold is already extremely high. In the Government’s view, this means that judicial reviews can be grounded on technicalities which would in practice have made no difference to the end result, or, ultimately, the applicant. That is why it comes up so rarely, and that is why we wish to modify the current approach. In the Government’s view, scarce court resources would be better applied to cases in which a difference to the outcome is more likely. But I reassure noble Lords that, as drafted, what Clause 64 does not do is make the exercise of this power in any way routine. This is because the clause applies the standard of “highly likely”. This will remain a high threshold, and when there is any significant doubt that there could have been a difference for the applicant, the threshold will simply not be met.
Concerns have been raised that in applying this approach of diligence, the courts will be dragged into the forbidden ground of a merits-based review, where they insert themselves into the decision-maker’s shoes. I respectfully disagree with this. I am sure that the courts will continue with the established way in which judicial reviews progress; namely that they consider the process which led to, and not the merits of, the decision, the legality of the process being the essence of the challenge. They will perform this exercise even in the examples postulated by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Davies. It is inevitable that they will have to look at the facts there and then on the basis of the information. What we are suggesting is that a very low bar is raised slightly higher, but the exercise will be performed at the same stage.
Furthermore, there is an additional reason why this exercise should not create real difficulties for judges. Judges often have to make decisions on the basis of information available to them which is not complete. For example, in a civil claim where, let us say, a claimant is suing for negligence, the defendant may argue that the claim should be struck out on the basis that it discloses no cause of action. There the claimant’s case may be taken at its highest, and the argument proceeds that even if the claimant is right, the claim is not sound in law and must therefore be struck out, to which the answer often given by claimants is, “Well, my Lord, you haven’t heard the evidence. If you hear the evidence and get a clearer view of the matter, then our slightly adventurous case may be seen in a better light”. Sometimes that argument is persuasive, but very often judges are able to take the view that the position is sufficiently clear for it to be uneconomic and unnecessary to hear the case. This is the task they perform.
Nor do I think that the “highly likely” test should be beyond the agility of our very distinguished judges performing in the High Court, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, emphasised. It is not the balance of probabilities, but the “highly likely” test is something I feel confident that they will be able to apply.
Amendments 72E and 73A probe the scope of Clause 64 in practice following the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which the Government responded in July, over what types of flaw the clause will affect. In the Government’s view, the term “procedural defect” is too imprecise to be used in legislation. The grounds for judicial review are not defined in legislation; doing so in certain areas would be a significant step. “Procedural defect” has no accepted definition at present under case law, and it would be virtually impossible to arrive at one that would stand the test of time, given how judicial review evolves with each new decision. Furthermore, it would lead to the risk of satellite litigation, referred to by a number of noble Lords.
We have also heard concerns that the clause will cause administrators to act unlawfully, for sinister motives, safe in the knowledge that, if challenged, they will have a “get out of jail” card. No decision-maker is going to follow knowingly an unlawful process simply because they think that at some point in future they may be able to argue successfully that there would have been no difference to the outcome. This is particularly so, as I have already indicated to your Lordships’ House, because our reforms have maintained a very challenging threshold.
Lest it be thought that the Government have not listened and are ploughing on regardless of the views expressed by others, I say that the question of standing was one that was often considered controversial in the reform of judicial review, and the Government initially thought that there ought to be a real connection between the claim and the applicant. The applicant state is referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I looked at the White Book as to the summary of the development of the sufficient interest test for standing, and it contained this comment:
“The courts have adopted an increasingly liberal approach to questions of standing over recent years”.
Quite so—but the advantage of having a fairly elastic rule on standing was acknowledged by the Government on the basis that sometimes it is important that these cases are brought forward. It is an indication that the Government are making appropriate responses to the concern that has been expressed.
Some have argued that this clause will add delay to the consideration of judicial reviews by potentially requiring fuller argument at the permission stage. That is in part, as I apprehend it, the basis for Amendments 72 and 73, which would remove the requirement for the High Court or Upper Tribunal to consider a no-difference argument when it is raised by the defendant in the response to the application for permission. The Government consider that it is entirely proper that, when a no-difference argument is made by a defendant, it should be considered by a court or tribunal. I accept that when this argument is raised it requires courts to look at the case and the issues with care, but they do that at the moment. I do not think that that would mean that judicial reviews would become overlong. On the argument being raised more often, I say that it should be put only by defendants sure or confident of their arguments and position; if made without a sound basis, I would expect the courts to look to costs, which would act as a sufficient deterrent. In due course, we will invite the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to create a process that allows for oral arguments on this question at permission. While it would be wrong of me to pre-empt that committee, I am sure that it will be done in a way that makes the procedure straightforward and cost effective.
Amendments 72 and 73 would also remove the duty on the court to refuse permission when satisfied that it is highly likely that in the absence of the flaw complained of the outcome would not have been substantially different for the applicant. Those are, effectively, wrecking amendments. The Government’s view is that in those situations permission should not be granted.
Could the Minister clarify the Government’s position on the point that I understood was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern? As I understood him, the Minister suggested that even under Clause 64 the court could allow a judicial review claim to go forward and could grant a declaration of illegality, even if the outcome of the administrative process would have been the same for the claimant because the outcome of the litigation would be different. It would be a declaration. I see him nodding. For my part, I understand Clause 64 to refer to outcome as meaning the outcome of the administrative process. However, if I am wrong, could the Minister say so?