Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

A purpose clause will focus the mind of the Secretary of State to ensure that the regulations made and the activities of the regulator, whoever that may turn out to be, are truly relevant to the purposes of this legislation, namely: to protect against an attack, where practicable, and ensure that proper measures are in place in the event of an attack. However, they must be realistic and proportionate. We cannot make this a perfect world, and I have lived in London and worked here since 1971.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to admit to being unclear, after what I hope will be a short debate of 20 minutes, as to what exactly this amendment is for. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, wanted a mini-Second Reading debate, because that is what we have had. I remind him, and noble Lords who have spoken, that this is Committee and not Second Reading. The arguments should therefore be addressed to the amendment concerned.

I am also unclear, when I look at Amendment 1, what it actually adds. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said that the Long Title of the Bill really spells it out. If that is too much for anybody who is unclear what the Bill is about, simply look at its title: “Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill”. Does that not really rather sum it up? Why do we need this clarificatory line to say:

“The purpose of this Act is to protect premises from terrorism”?


You just have to read the title of the Bill; it says that already.

Noble Lords have talked about mission creep and the problems of defining terrorism. Can I just make one point quite clear? If, as a citizen, you become involved in an act of violence, you are not going to worry about whether the individual concerned meets a particular category of terrorism. What you want is immediate action and somebody coming to protect you. The Bill is about trying to prevent that initial act of violence. This amendment adds nothing and is pointless. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, whom I respect on so many issues, said that the Opposition’s purpose is to get the Bill implemented as soon as possible. I suggest that introducing amendments like this will not add to that cause.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made one point with which I agree. It is that there is a need for focus. Unfortunately, this amendment is not focused. He talks of the threat of terrorism: the Long Title and the text use the term “acts of terrorism”, and that is where the focus needs to be.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, whichever way we look at this, I suggest that it is absolutely plain that we need a clear definition of “building”. A number of good points have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, made a good suggestion. The amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is also a good one. There is merit also in taking at least part of the Building Act, but “building” needs to be defined. Thus, I think it must be clear, when one considers it, that Section 121(2) of the Building Act is not completely apposite, because it does include the words,

“a vehicle, vessel, hovercraft, aircraft”.

One could include the definition there but exclude expressly those words or any other bits. One could do it by reference to the Building Safety Act, or it may be that the best route is to go to the definitions section at the back, look at the two existing statutes that are in place and take a good definition combining those where appropriate. I suggest that we certainly need a proper definition of “building” at the back, which must include demountable, collapsible buildings—things that very often look almost like a tent. Are large tents to be included, or a circus site event which could hold 500 people? If we are going to protect people, let us get it right.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has put his finger on it. It seems to me that, if it is a large tent and 500 people are gathered within it, then somebody ought to be making arrangements to ensure that people are protected. That is what the Bill is about. I have listened with great fascination to the discussion about where we draw the definition of “building”. I always tend, because I am prejudiced that way, that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gives us a view on definitions, we should take serious note of that, because in my experience he is usually right. I leave it to the Government to come forward with what they think is a satisfactory definition that embraces what we need.

Ultimately, what we are trying to say with this legislation is that people who organise public events, whether they are formal events, community events, concerts or whatever else, should be thinking in advance, “Is this going to be secure?” That also means thinking about what I will do if somebody over there commits a terrorist act that has an implication for the people who are gathered in my event. I hope that my noble friend, when he replies, will say that the Government will look again, will gather together all those with strong views on the definition of “building”, temporary or otherwise, tents or not, and work out what works best. I think that our objective here is quite clear: that people should have a responsibility for the protection of people when they have gathered them together for whatever purpose.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20. First, I say in passing, on the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about the scope of the Bill, that terrorism is very well legally defined. It is either violence or the threat of violence for a political purpose. How that is interpreted depends on the political purpose and the act. It is a broad definition, and some may wish to change it, but it is well understood within the criminal law.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I too recognise that inevitably we have got to fix a figure, and that is for this House and/or another place to do. I would just like to say one thing about Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, where he says,

“if smaller, the Secretary of State determines”.

One has to see the reality of that, which is that this would probably happen anyway—although I support his amendment—to the extent that how or why would the Secretary of State intervene? He would intervene only because of intelligence.

We have to remember that it is not just what we all think in here. Our intelligence services have kept us safe—touch wood—we are told from many planned incidents over the last few years. Therefore, regardless of the number being six or 800, we rely on them to come through and tell us where the threat is. We have been talking about whether it is a small premises that is attractive to terrorists or a large one, or whether it is a significant name of an event or whether it is the people attending. They will go first to find a target that will gain them the maximum amount of attention. They then say, according to what happened with us and I am sorry to go back to it, “Which one is easy for us to go for?”.

We cannot decide that in here. But we must put the numbers down. I agree with Amendment 8 from the point of view that it recognises that the Secretary of State must have the power to intervene on any event, and not just necessarily the Secretary of State but the police and the intelligence that leads to some form of action on it. So I do support the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased that we are having this debate. I am not going to decry the three previous groups, but this actually comes to the nub of what I suspect what this Committee stage will be about.

I listened very carefully to what the noble Viscount just said. I have to say that it is quite possible that, under any set of circumstances, the police or the security service will have identified a high risk. Under those circumstances, I hope they would intervene and I hope the organisers would take it extremely seriously and respond—and actually, I suspect that in every single case they would. But the fundamental issue, which is raised by this set of amendments, is not what is the burden of this but what is the risk appetite that the people who are organising this event, and that we as a nation have, about the event concerned?

Every organisation, when it considers its risk register, will consider its risk appetite: what are we prepared or not prepared to tolerate? This figure is, of course, arbitrary. It could be 100; my personal belief is that it should have remained as 100, but the Government consulted very widely, listened to the views that were expressed and came up with this number. So we are presented with 200. A terrorist attacking a premises of 199 is potentially going to kill a very significant number—as many as were killed at the Manchester Arena. They may not be able to injure quite as many as at the Manchester Arena, but they could cause immense damage.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

What is the noble Lord’s risk appetite for closures of community venues and village halls as a consequence of these provisions if the threshold is set too low?

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

That is what it means to consider your risk appetite: you consider the risk of something dreadful happening and the risk and the consequences associated with trying to address it. That is the choice we must make. I suspect that ultimately we are going to disagree on this. My risk appetite, because I do not really like being killed in the name of some terrorist or other ideology, is that I would prefer the number to be smaller; I would prefer it to be 100. I accept that some noble Lords opposite would rather see the figure set higher. We have a different view of the risk appetite.

My answer to all these amendments is that the Government have consulted widely and responded to that consultation. They have increased the number from 100 to 200. Personally, I am prepared to accept the risk judgment made by Government Ministers on that basis. That is the way in which we should approach it. We will all have different numbers in mind and different views of risk appetite, but ultimately we expect our Government to take a sensible, balanced risk appetite, and I believe that this is it.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.

I will also start by paying tribute to Figen Murray: tempered by her own experience of the tragedy of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack, her work promoting the principles behind the Bill has been nothing short of extraordinary. Not only has she campaigned, but she has researched the subject and was awarded an MSc by the University of Central Lancashire in 2021. Her thesis, which I have read—particularly as I am quoted in it—argues that legislation needs to be part of a wider initiative to inform the public, so that people can be empowered to be more vigilant and more conscious of their personal safety. A legislative framework and public awareness not only have to go hand in hand but are mutually reinforcing.

In 2016, Mayor Sadiq Khan—I congratulate him on his knighthood in the New Year Honours List—asked me to report on London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. One of my recommendations, published six months before the Manchester Arena attack, was that, as a condition of licensing, venues should have to be reviewed by a police counterterrorism security adviser and to have taken the necessary action as a result of that review.

The point of this, which is implicit in the Bill before your Lordships’ House, is that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each venue is different and faces a different type of threat, but the principle of carrying out a basic assessment of the risk and taking sensible, proportionate security measures is simple, straightforward and should be unavoidable.

Concert halls, theatres and other venues must, by law, take fire precautions as well as meeting other regulatory requirements. It seems extraordinary, therefore, that, until the Bill passes, there is no requirement on them to take advice on reducing the risk of a terrorist attack and to take sensible precautions. In some instances, bag checks may be enough; in others, they may want to look at other measures. In extreme cases, metal detectors or knife arches may be more appropriate for the largest of venues. Similar rules should also apply to sports stadia, large shops and shopping malls.

This principle was accepted by the previous Government. The 2019 Conservative manifesto said:

“In the wake of the terrible events in Manchester in 2017, we will improve the safety and security of public venues”.


Last year’s manifesto was even more explicit:

“We will urgently introduce Martyn’s Law … This will ensure premises are better prepared for terrorist attacks by requiring them to take proportionate steps to mitigate risks”.


Thus, there is wide political consensus about this measure and, after the delays of the last few years, I am pleased that this new Government are at last taking action.

Let us be clear: terrorism has not gone away. Only last week, we saw the car ramming in New Orleans. Ken McCallum—also knighted in the New Year Honours List, and whom I also congratulate—warned in October that:

“Since March 2017, MI5 and the police have together disrupted 43 late-stage attack plots”.


“Some of those … were … in the final days of planning mass murder”,


at the point when the intervention took place.

The nature of the terrorist threat has changed. It no longer necessarily comes from organised groups. In my second report for the Mayor of London, completed three years ago, I warned that attacks are increasingly committed by individuals who operate alone, frequently self-radicalising and learning techniques online. Attacks of this nature are inevitably harder to detect and prevent in advance. They may also be opportunistic and mean that the range and nature of potential targets have widened to include far more venues that previously would not have been considered under any circumstances.

What is more, while the majority of those planning attacks would appear to be Islamist extremists, an increasing proportion are domestic and extreme right-wing. As Ken McCallum said, MI5 and the police are increasingly encountering would-be terrorists who are more volatile and with only a tenuous grasp of the ideologies they profess to follow, and it is becoming harder these days to determine whether a particular act or planned act of violence is ideologically motivated or driven by another factor such as mental health. It does not really matter what the ideation or motivation is: the effects are the same, and the needs for the sensible precautions being included in this Bill remain under all those circumstances, irrespective of whether it is traditional terrorism or something else.

Of course, as I warned three years ago, in online spaces, extremism is increasingly prevalent and, more worrying still, has become almost normalised; this point has just been made by the right reverend Prelate. This spills over into greater polarisation in the real world, which, in turn, can and does lead to violence. That is the context of modern terrorism, and that is why anyone can be a target. The first volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry reported:

“None of those directly concerned with security at the Arena … considered it a realistic possibility that a terrorist attack would happen there”.


Yet, as we know, it did, and 22 people were killed and 1,017 injured. That is why this Bill is needed.

Nowadays, it is taken as a given that the places we visit abide by health and safety regulations and will take appropriate fire precautions. It is surely not unreasonable to expect them also to take appropriate and proportionate protection measures against terrorist violence. Now, of course, better security checks and a Protect duty will not prevent terrorism, but they make soft targets harder. Where many people congregate together, they have a right to expect that the appropriate and proportionate measures to protect them will have been taken. The aim should be that all venues have their own Protect plan and, in the event of an incident, be geared up to guide and shelter those who visit. At the very least, those responsible should have considered the implications—how to evacuate, how to invacuate, what doors should be locked, and so on—and that this has been conveyed to those working in the location concerned. It is much better to have thought about it, even just a little bit, before an event happens than to be doing so in the heat of an attack.

The principle has to apply to other sectors as well. In the past, most places of worship—again, the right reverend Prelate has talked about this—have often seemed to operate on the basis that an attack would not happen to them because of their innate goodness, but they, too, need to plan and take sensible precautions. They have been the subject of attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Of course, it is difficult: places of worship are intended to be open places of sanctuary and peace, but that does not mean that they cannot be targets, and sensible and proportionate measures should be taken there too.

In my 2016 review, I made a series of recommendations on strengthening the Protect responsibilities, which I think remain valid today, including that the Home Office will need to provide more funding for CT security advisers around the country; that counterterrorism advice should automatically be taken by those applying for venue and event licences; that there should be short- form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses rolled out using local authority and neighbourhood policing networks, so that everyone has access to that sort of sensible advice; that owners and operators of shopping centres and other large venues should ensure that Project Griffin training is being given at regular enough intervals to deal with the high staff turnover that those businesses and organisations experience; and that there should be specific training for other sectors.

I also suggested that the Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding, to ensure that each school appoints a governor responsible for ensuring security and preparedness against an attack—to at least think about it in advance. Each school should have a preparedness plan, and those plans should be tested. Schools have fire drills where they evacuate pupils, so they perhaps need to have lockdown drills to invacuate pupils or at least to have considered how those might operate.

I hope that the Bill gets a smooth passage through your Lordships’ House. I believe that we owe it to the victims of the Manchester Arena attack, the two London Bridge attacks and all the other attacks of recent years. It is our responsibility to give them, and the public who visit those venues, the security that this offers.

Defending Democracy Taskforce

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 6th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is a continuing process and, as the noble Lord will know, the task force was established when his Government were in office and continues now. It is an ongoing process; we are looking at this and will produce lessons whenever they are forthcoming. In relation to the local elections in May, we have extended Operation Bridger, which gives support, if required, to Members of Parliament and Members of this House and key individuals who face elections in May. That operation, Operation Ford, is available to give support to individuals who face election at any time when parliamentary elections are not forthcoming.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister referred to the counterterrorism strategy. He will be aware that the Prevent strand of Contest has had very difficult and sometimes very poor press, perhaps as a result of misinterpretation of its objectives. Will the Minister tell us whether the intention is now to focus on safeguarding vulnerable individuals who are liable to be seduced by some of the materials that are available online and therefore prevent them being drawn into violent extremism of one sort or another? This should be a safeguarding approach rather than one that is seen as the pursuit of potential terrorists.

Guns Manufactured by 3D Printers

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the number of guns manufactured by 3D printers circulating in the United Kingdom.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am pleased to tell my noble friend that no viable fully 3D-printed firearms have been found by law enforcement in the United Kingdom. In 2023, there were 25 instances where police seized 3D-printed component parts or other items associated with 3D printing of firearms.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. He will have seen the reports this morning that the person who supposedly shot the insurance executive in New York was carrying a 3D-printed weapon. He will be aware that the firearm of choice for young men in Australia and New Zealand is now a 3D-printed weapon. He will be aware that it is possible, by searching for FGC-9 on the internet—I apologise for offending the sensibilities of anyone in the House, but FGC stands for “Fuck Gun Control”—to get detailed manuals of how to make a 3D-printed firearm. What is being done to stop the circulation of such manuals? Is it an offence to download such a manual, as it would be in other circumstances?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can tell my noble friend that it is an offence to manufacture and distribute a prohibited weapon, such as a handgun or semi-automatic rifle, however it is manufactured. That carries a sentence of life imprisonment. The maximum penalty for possessing such a prohibited weapon, including any 3D-printed prohibited weapon, is 10 years’ imprisonment with a minimum penalty of five years. We will keep legislation under review and there will be opportunities during the course of this Session to review that legislation in relation to any issues that might need to be brought forward.

Police Reform

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Trans people have a right to exist and be employed in communities to work with communities, and I will defend that right for trans people to hold responsible positions in society. If the noble Baroness wants to write to me with a specific example, we will look at that but, as far as I am concerned, let us get round to the basics that trans people are people.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register. Is it not the case that successive Governments have focused almost to the exclusion of all else on the question of police numbers? Does my noble friend agree that there is a case for allowing chief constables and police and crime commissioners much more flexibility about the way in which they use the total police workforce, perhaps not always using police officers but instead using PCSOs or police staff to carry out the functions that need to be carried out? It is not necessary to have a fully warranted, fully trained constable to carry out all the things that a police force needs to do.

Police: Junior Cadet Schemes

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I welcome the noble Lord to his new responsibilities. On behalf of myself and my team, I ask him to pass on my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for the work that he did. He was very welcoming to me in my first four months in this House; I will try to be welcoming to the noble Lord as well.

The noble Lord says that the last Government met their objectives of recruiting 20,000 police officers. That happened after a reduction of 20,000 from when I was Police Minister in 2010, and it happened under the Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition. Only latterly did the Government recognise the folly of that cut and slowly build those forces back up to their right size now. I agree with him that it would be very good to try to encourage police cadets to join the force. We want to build on the neighbourhood policing model, but I think it is a bit disingenuous on his first outing at the Dispatch Box to claim 20,000 new officers, when this number in fact replaced officers cut by his Government.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I declare my interest in that it was—I think—54 years ago that I was a volunteer police cadet.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I would be grateful if the Minister, in expressing his commitment both to volunteer police cadets but also to the voluntary roles of special constables, could consider whether there is in fact a role for the Home Office generally in promoting these schemes—of course, not abrogating the specific responsibilities of a chief constable or a police and crime commissioner, but I think it is something the Home Office could run a national scheme about.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his question. I find it impossible to believe that that was 54 years ago; he must have been a very young man at the time. He makes a very valuable point. We agree on the importance of the youth cadets, which is why Earl Ferrers, a former Home Office Minister, instituted the scheme to welcome and recognise good cadets. I presented the Lord Ferrers Awards with the Earl in 2009; he was very proud of the awards and should get credit for them. The Home Office wishes to continue that scheme and that recognition and will do all it can to encourage people to play their role as youth cadets, special constables and, indeed, proper constables.

Unaccompanied Migrant Children

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 30th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I was aware of that incident last week. The noble Lord will know that I do not wish to comment on its details because it is sub judice. There will be a trial and an individual will face charges; I do not wish to prejudice any trial. In light of that incident, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has made inquiries of the operator of the hotel in which it occurred and other hotels to ensure that women, in particular, and lone workers have support and a review of their safety. The family of the individual who died as a result of that incident are being kept informed and have our great sympathy.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, my noble friend talked about the special arrangements put in place for Kent. Is it not almost inevitable that some local authorities will deal with more such cases of unaccompanied children than others? What are the arrangements going forward to ensure that they are adequately supported? Is the money to provide that support going into some rather amorphous pan-local-government pot? In that case, you cannot guarantee the distribution formula for it to reach the local authorities which have to deal with the highest number of children.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

In addition to funding for children’s social care that local authorities receive anyway through the local government finance settlement —and devolved governments; they are equally liable—the Home Office provides additional funding contributions to support local authorities to meet the cost incurred in looking after unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and, indeed, former unaccompanied asylum-seeking childcare leavers. That figure is determined at a rate of around £143 per night per child. We need to continue to support that to make sure that local authorities meet their safeguarding obligations.

Police: Firearms Officers

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution. He will know that the jury in this case made its assessment and gave its verdict on the evidence presented before it. Other matters on which he has commented were not presented to the jury and, therefore, the acquittal in this case was determined by the information presented by the prosecution and the defence.

The noble Lord will also know that it is important to thank the officers, who are voluntarily doing the task of being armed officers. This Government are certainly aware that we need to examine the regime and discussions around it in the light of this case and others that he has mentioned. Police officers are accountable to the law for their use of force and it is right that their powers are scrutinised robustly. It is also important that we commit to working with the police to strengthen officers’ confidence that they have the support of the Home Office in undertaking their task.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register. Of course, it is appropriate in any case where lethal force is used by the police that it is properly looked at, accountability is maintained and everyone can be satisfied whether or not that force was used appropriately. But why does it have to take so long? These cases drag out, often for several years. That is not appropriate and not in the interests of the family of the person killed or anyone else. What could be done to expedite matters?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I agree with my noble friend that it is in the interests of society as a whole, and of both the community and officers, that when difficult decisions are taken around charging following killings by police officers, these matters are resolved as speedily as possible. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is reflecting on that; she and I will report to both Houses and consider those matters further.

Jewish Community in London: Safety

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Thursday 25th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend from the Department for Education assures me that there is protection on British campuses. However, I also acknowledge the points that the noble Baroness made and share her concerns; these trends are very disturbing.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister comment on the take-up of grants for the protection of religious premises from attacks? Is he aware of some of the concerns that the processes that his department requires from faith communities are extremely complicated for often quite small sums of money?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have any statistics to hand on that. But, again, the money that we were talking about making available in my initial Answer is administered by the Community Security Trust; there is no application process to access that pool of funds.

Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the public consultation on this process concluded only in November 2023, so we have not had a huge amount of time to consider all the responses. As I have explained, we will be reviewing how to take forward the recommendations and will update Parliament in due course.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, why would a public interest defence help cybercriminals?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is clearly among the things that are being considered.