King’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, today’s debate takes place against a grim international backdrop: Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the appalling events in and around Gaza, mounting evidence that the policy commitments on climate change entered into in Paris and Glasgow are not being operationalised in a timely manner, and a massive shortfall in progress towards the sustainable development goals set in 2015. There can be no doubting that the international community, and the UN which is its principal embodiment, have taken some hard knocks. Should we, as a middle-ranking power with an important position in many multilateral institutions give way to despair, just wring our hands and let the fragmentation continue, or should we apply ourselves more purposefully and more effectively than we have done in the past few years to countering these shortcomings, reversing aggressions, reforming international organisations where they need it, and reducing the gap between the West and what is called the global South? I think that to pose that question is also to answer it.

Ministers have said time and again that it is in our national interest to sustain and strengthen the rules-based international order, and they are surely right when they say this. They talk the talk, but do they walk the walk? I fear not. The massive cuts in our overseas aid, the slowing down of progress towards net zero and the Prime Minister’s absence from two important summit meetings at the UN in New York in September all tell a different story. So too do the domestic laws coming all too frequently before this House which are inconsistent with our international obligations and are called out by those most qualified to consider these matters. Some, but not all, of these measures have been modified. We risk facing others if and when the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill reaches us and whatever plan B emerges from the wreckage of the Rwanda policy. This is a recipe for being a world leader with very few followers.

Then there is the often fraught relationship with the EU, our biggest trading partner in a grouping that contains like-minded countries that share our values and interests. The improvements in that relationship this year—the Windsor Framework, the deal on Horizon and the memorandum of understanding on financial services—were welcome if belated, but far more remains to be done. Much of it was set out in your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee’s report in April. The Government’s response to its recommendations was in most respects general to the point of meaninglessness. Not one of those recommendations has been acted on, if one excepts the improvement in school visit arrangements with France nine months after it was agreed between the Prime Minister and the President.

Here is what remains: linking our carbon price to that of the EU through our emission trading schemes or at least keeping any gap between them to a minimum, although in fact prices are drifting far apart; having similar carbon border adjustment mechanisms, although the Government are still thinking while the EU goes ahead; taking up the long-abandoned agreement to have a structured framework for co-operation on foreign policy, security and defence issues, now even more needed in the light of events in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea than when it was originally included in the political declaration at the time of Brexit; reversing the collapse in school visits to all EU countries, not just one of them; restoring cultural and educational links by exploring co-operation between the Turing and Erasmus schemes; repairing the damaged conditions for performing artists to work across Europe; and exploring the scope for youth mobility schemes. All this and more is an agenda crying out for action, but there is little sign of that in the immediate future unless the Minister intends to surprise us in his response to this debate.

It would be comforting but utterly unrealistic to expect calmer waters in 2024. It is more likely to be the contrary. Replacing the policy of neglect on the issue of Palestine will itself be a daunting undertaking. Sustaining Ukraine in its heroic resistance against aggression will be another. Plugging the gap between warm words on climate change and actual performance in fulfilling them is a third. The outcome of next November’s presidential election in the US will—like every such election, but perhaps more so on this occasion—be consequential for our own foreign policy. It will not be sufficient simply to reach for the comfort blanket of what we call the special relationship. We will need to work in NATO and with the EU to respond to whatever the result of that election may prove to be.

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: China Report

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 23rd October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is very much better informed than I am but as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord West, that location is of strategic significance to both the United Kingdom and the United States and we continue to do whatever we can to preserve that strategic presence.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister say whether, in relation to the Chagos Islands, the Government are giving any consideration to a solution which would involve Diego Garcia becoming a sovereign base area of the United Kingdom while the rest of the Chagos Islands is returned to Mauritius?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

These details are somewhat beyond my field of knowledge. This principally rests with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office but I shall certainly make inquiries. If I elicit any information I shall write to the noble Lord.

Ukraine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow two speakers with whom I am in such complete agreement, and who have stated the reasons for supporting Ukraine so eloquently. I begin by declaring an interest because your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee has just begun a new inquiry into the implications of everything that is happening in Ukraine on the UK’s relationship with the European Union. I am not speaking on behalf of that committee, as we have only just begun our report, but I assure the House that what is said in this debate will be a valuable contribution to what we are putting our minds to between now and the end of the year.

The debate we held in this House the day after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 was a memorable one. It was memorable because it demonstrated from the outset that there were going to be no party divisions in this country in our response to that aggression and our support for Ukraine. It was memorable too because that unity was based on a clear-eyed recognition that Russia’s aggression was not only a contravention of international rules as fundamental as those in the UN charter and the 1990 Paris accords on European security, but because it would directly threaten our own security should Russia succeed in its attempt to overthrow the Ukrainian state. Those fundamentals remain as true today as they were then, and the Government and opposition parties deserve credit for standing by them and taking effective action to sustain them.

What has changed since our debate on the first day after the aggression began is the realisation of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience and success in repelling an onslaught from apparently superior military capabilities. This is all the more reason to stand firm now, even if the costs in both military and economic terms are inevitably painful—even more so in human terms for the Ukrainians.

Part of our response has been the array of sanctions on exports to and imports from Russia. We must recognise that, with Russia showing no signs of relenting in its aggression, these sanctions will be needed for the foreseeable future, and should be progressively strengthened in both their scope and, most particularly, their implementation. We need a more structured frame- work for co-operation in these tasks with the European Union and its member states, whose actions on sanctions have far exceeded what might previously have been expected. I hope, in replying, that the Minister will be less reticent about the need for such a framework, such as we have already with the United States.

We also need to co-operate with the EU and its member states in the planning and first stages of Ukraine’s reconstruction. One conference, welcome though it was, is not enough. The European Union, within the ambit of negotiating Ukraine’s accession, which I believe will be decided at the end of this year, will inevitably be the largest donor in civil terms—I am not talking about military support. It is only in our interest to work closely with it and to avoid any scope for being played off against each other.

We also need to find ways of giving effect to our commitment in the NATO summit communiqué last July for non-EU members of NATO—we are one of those—to contribute positively to the strengthening of EU defence and security policies. Our score on that is pretty skimpy so far: a bid to join the mobility partnership and only after the US and Canada have already done so. Is there not more in the pipeline, or are we content for EU-NATO co-operation to proceed without our direct involvement? I think that would be a mistake.

While we need to recognise that we have so far been less successful than we might have hoped in enlisting what is now known as the global South in support of sanctions and reconstruction, we must not accept that shortfall as inevitable or irremediable. The hard fact is that there are many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which are put at risk by Putin riding roughshod over the UN charter and which will be even more at risk if Russia succeeds in its aggression. We should not be too hesitant about explaining those points, although we should do so in polite and non-aggressive terms. I suggest that we also need to recognise that, if we are to list more countries in the global South, more attention must be paid to and action taken on the priorities of those countries, most particularly on climate change, health, the handling of debt and the supply of essential foodstuffs.

It is not the time now, while the war is still raging, to address decisively Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, but we will need to in due course. Talk of separate, non-NATO security guarantees does not seem terribly convincing, given that their deterrent effect will inevitably be less than that of NATO membership. So, when the time comes—and it will come one day, but not now—we should be ready to give a positive response to Ukraine’s bid.

So much for some of the diplomatic challenges we face in this new Cold War which Russia triggered by its aggression. It could well last as long as the previous one, and we should be prepared for that. What we cannot afford to do is flinch from the prospect because it will bring some unwelcome military and economic burdens.

UK Undersea Infrastructure: Hostile Activity

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 25th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that yesterday’s Ostend meeting showed how much overlap there is between EU and NATO responsibilities, particularly in the North Sea? Does she not feel that the NATO strategy adopted last summer—that non-EU members of NATO and EU members should be working together—applies precisely to this field? If it does apply to this field, what are the Government doing to take that forward in advance of the NATO summit in Vilnius?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We have to be clear that NATO exists for a specific purpose. It is a very effective defensive alliance. It is a militarily supported alliance. What I can say to the noble Lord is that I entirely agree with the kernel of his point: the more co-operation we have, the better. That will be more likely to secure a coherent approach to these threats. I am pleased to say that certainly the MoD enjoys extremely good relationships with other European countries, even those not in NATO.

Ukraine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Soames, on his maiden speech. I recall that I worked for his father for four years, in the first four years of our membership of the European Communities. I can just imagine his pleasure and pride at his son being the second Lord Soames in this House, in recent times.

It seems a little counterintuitive to identify any positives from the appalling events that have unfolded since Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago, yet such positives do exist and many noble Lords have referred to them. The first and foremost is the heroic and successful response of the people of Ukraine, symbolically epitomised by yesterday’s visit and speech from President Zelensky and by their response to aggression that aimed to wipe them from the map or turn them into a Russian satellite.

Secondly, the robust and effective decisions taken by NATO, ourselves, the US, Germany, France, the EU, the G7 and many others all went far beyond what might have been anticipated.

Thirdly, even our polarised politics have not stood in the way of a united, cross-party and no-party response to the aggression. I add to that the suggestion that the most effective contribution this country can make to deter any aggression against Taiwan is to ensure that Putin’s aggression in Ukraine does not succeed.

I make no apology for returning to some issues that I raised in the debate we held the day after Russia invaded, because they are still very active. Since then, an impressive array of sanctions has been imposed against Russia and there could be more to come, but it has all been done in a piecemeal and ad hoc way. We can be sure that massive efforts are now being made in Moscow, and in Beijing and Tehran, to find ways round or through those sanctions. The future success of this policy depends on effective implementation much more than on finding new sanctions—ones we have not yet found.

We need solid and structured co-operation to counter the efforts of those we are sanctioning to cut off Russia not only from gas, oil and commodity export revenues—they are very important, of course—but from access to sophisticated technology, without which its military-industrial complex will be severely handicapped. During the first Cold War, the West operated effective controls on exports of such technology through a system called CoCom. I would like to ask the Minister what structured systems we are putting in place now, with the EU, the US and the G7, because we need something more than mere improvisation if sanctions are to be fully and effectively implemented.

Secondly, what are we doing to counter the waves of disinformation being put out by the Kremlin and to ensure that ordinary people worldwide, even those under oppressive regimes that limit their access to information, get a chance to hear another version of events?

Well, cutting the resources of the BBC World Service hardly sounds the best move in the current circumstances. I would argue—I have argued this before in your Lordships’ House, and will repeat it now—that it would surely be better for the FCDO to take full responsibility for the World Service, recognising that this is a national foreign policy priority, and to augment its resources. I should add that it is not just a question of saying, as I am sure the Minister will, that they have found a little bit of money here for the Russian service or a little bit there for the Ukrainian service; I am talking about the BBC World Service and language versions which go worldwide, because that is where the damage is being done.

Thirdly, I wonder if the Minister could say what progress is being made to support the efforts of the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to gather evidence which could lead to the indictment of Russians, high and low, for the crimes being committed by their troops in Ukraine. Can he confirm that that remains our own top priority in pursuing such crimes?

I have to say that I am not very convinced by the arguments in favour of a new and separate tribunal which we have heard expressed in this debate. I believe that it is unnecessary, because the International Criminal Court has demonstrated that it is capable of pursuing command responsibility for crimes that are on its statute book. It is also, I think, undesirable because it will be intensely divisive. There is absolutely no doubt that if we try to establish a new tribunal, we will split the rest of the world and many will not follow. But many of them are already signatories of the International Criminal Court statute, so they do not have to be asked whether they follow it; they are in it. So I do feel that that is not a good way; I would add that, unfortunately, the idea of a new separate tribunal directed against Russia’s undoubted aggression is precisely what Putin needs to feed the paranoia of his people. That is his way of keeping them on board, saying “The West is after me, and it’s after you.” Now, I do not think that it is very wise to feed that, and I think therefore that the pursuit of war crimes through the International Criminal Court is a much better route, but I would like to hear the Minister’s views on that.

Clearly, we have a worldwide challenge for hearts and minds on our hands. No one can have seen the reception of Sergei Lavrov last week in South Africa without realising that there is an awfully long way to go. One key player will be India, now in the chair of the G20, a grouping whose 2022 summit meeting in Indonesia issued a notable rebuke to Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling. What are we doing to consolidate support for Ukraine when the next G20 summit takes place later this year? What kind of approach are we and our allies pursuing throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa to counter the arguments that are enabling them to sit on the fence and say that it is something that they do not want to get involved in?

Now, this second Cold War—that is what we are in, and NATO is right, in my view, to do all it can to ensure that it is a cold and not a hot war—puts our own security and the defence of a rules-based international system based on the UN charter, over which Russia has ridden roughshod, right on the line, as so many noble Lords have said. The resulting stresses to our economy may be regrettable, but they do have to be borne, in my estimation. They need to be accepted and handled with calm determination not to let Russian aggression get its way.

Ukraine: Update

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think I can give that reassurance to my noble friend. Obviously, his question is more within the remit of my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, but as he will be aware, we have been very active on the diplomatic front. The United Nations General Assembly vote on 12 October last year was a powerful demonstration of the international community’s widespread condemnation of Russia’s outrageous and illegal attempt to annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

That global pressure is continuing. I had the privilege of meeting a group of United States Congressmen and Congresswomen earlier this week. I was very struck by the unanimity of acceptance that what is happening is wrong and has to be resisted. This may be happening in Europe, but it is understood in the United States that if you do not address that wrong, there are consequences which could be global in their impact. I reassure my noble friend that diplomacy is a critical part of what we are doing to support Ukraine in its endeavour.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister say a word or two about how combating the Russian policy of disinformation and misinformation is going? The evidence is that, unfortunately, a large part of the Russian population remains prepared to tell someone who asks their opinion, at least, that they support President Putin, so there is obviously a long way to go. However, a lot of the lies they tell are easily refutable. What are we doing to boost the work of the BBC World Service, the language services and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office worldwide to deal with this disinformation?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord that the wilful disinformation and misinformation engaged in by Russia is absolutely appalling and very unwelcome. It is worth emphasising that it remains the case that the UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia. The conflict in Ukraine has confirmed the UK assessment as set out in the integrated review: that the current Russian Government remain, and will continue to pose, the most acute threat to the UK and the alliance for the foreseeable future. Our criticism and objections are directed to the behaviour of the Russian Government.

However, the noble Lord makes an important point. The UK, and particularly the MoD, made a courageous decision fairly early on to release more intelligence to the public. That was quite a culture change for the MoD; we are usually pretty protective of our intelligence information. We decided to do that to counter Russian disinformation by providing an accurate and truthful picture of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. To date, those intelligence updates, issued via social media, have proved very popular; they are reaching a large audience across the UK and internationally. There was some reference recently to a poll carried out in Russia—I was trying to find the specific information, but I do not seem to have it in my brief. My recollection is that the poll indicated that, in Russia, there has been a sharp decline in support for the war over a period of months. It seems that many people are becoming very unhappy and very questioning about what the Russian Government are doing in their name. We will continue to do what we can with the careful release of intelligence—the noble Lord is absolutely right—to neutralise lies and to provide a counternarrative which is correct.

Mali: UN Peacekeeping Mission

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am not sure that it is possible to give a specific response to my noble friend’s question; reverting to the Accra initiative, I think a great deal of discussion has to be had as to how we take forward a concerted desire to support these west African states, with a mixture of military intervention—or military support rather—if that is required, and advice and support for the political or economic regimes. A number of factors have to be taken into account. Mali is, of course, an observer member of the Accra initiative along with Niger. In total, the initiative represents a very healthy and promising group of countries. One of the strategic challenges to be hammered out is just what my noble friend referred to: at the end of the day, what is it that the African states are looking for, and what can we do to support that endeavour?

I am not being evasive; it is just that I think a great deal more discussion has to ensue before clarity begins to emerge about some of these strategic objectives. My noble friend will be aware that we already do a lot in west Africa. We provide support in Nigeria and in the Chad basin, we are supporting the armed forces of Cameroon and we are working closely with the Ghanaian armed forces to develop ongoing counterterrorism training packages. At the end of the day, the threat of terrorism in the Sahel has not disappeared; it is there. Sadly, the presence of Wagner is likely to exacerbate the situation rather than facilitate solutions; that is another important component of everything that has to be discussed.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, while joining those paying tribute to the work that our peacekeepers have done in what is obviously an extremely challenging and difficult mission, I have two questions for the Minister. First, did we have any consultations with the UN’s department of peacekeeping operations before the announcement that the Minister and her colleague in the other place have made—and, if so, how did it respond to our intention to withdraw? Secondly, can she say what number of UN peacekeepers we will have deployed after this withdrawal has taken place?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On the first question, I am not privy to what discussions took place. I shall make inquiries and respond to the noble Lord with more details if I am able to do so. As to the second point, I do not have specific information but, again, I will undertake to investigate and if I can provide more detail, I shall.

Ukraine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, one of my first professional involvements with Ukraine was in 1994 when, as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the UN, I was instructed, along with my Russian and US colleagues, as co-depositories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to transmit to the UN the Budapest memorandum, certifying it as a formal international agreement. The memorandum guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for handing over all the nuclear warheads and missiles that the Soviet Union had left behind. My Russian colleague was one Sergei Lavrov. I hope that touches his conscience—it certainly should do—but I rather doubt whether it does.

We need to realise, I believe, that the events of the last few days have triggered a second Cold War. Like the first, it will probably last quite a long time and impose costs on ourselves as well as others. It will be a necessary response to a war of choice, a war of aggression, and therefore a war crime.

How, in practical terms, should we react? We should surely give no international legitimacy to any puppet Government the Russians may try to install, nor to the Governments of the five illegal statelets they have installed in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine by the use of force. The elected Government of President Zelensky should remain our interlocutor and the holder of Ukraine’s UN seat.

On further sanctions, I hope that excluding Russia from the SWIFT payment system will figure. It is a pity we are not at the European Council table, or in the room at least, to advocate for that. Do we not, too, need to consider recreating something like the CoCom international system on strategic exports? Should we not also consider reviving in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office what used to be called the information research department to deal with disinformation and to undermine the false narrative being put about by the Kremlin, RT and trolls on social media? I very much welcomed the emphasis the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, gave to that issue in his remarkable maiden speech. Then there is the economic crime Bill, still to appear; surely that needs to go on to the statue book in this Session of Parliament and not the next one. Of course, Ukrainians will need all the humanitarian help we can give them, and Ukrainian asylum seekers must, and I hope will, be treated rapidly and sympathetically.

The Russians have thrown down the gauntlet against the European security order they themselves helped to create in 1990. We will need to respond to that challenge with patience and determination by boosting the defences of NATO allies most exposed to pressure; by recognising that the European region is now a higher priority for us than the Indo-Pacific region; and by keeping in lockstep with the US, our other NATO partners and the EU itself, which is already playing a key role over sanctions.

Yesterday was a grim day for all Europeans. But we rose successfully to the challenge after the Second World War, and we should be able to do so again now. It is our own security that is at stake.

Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I should at the outset make it clear that I welcome the agreement by the US and the UK to make naval nuclear propulsion information available to Australia, one of our oldest and most valuable allies. A step such as this, which will substantially enhance the deterrent capacity of an ally in a sensitive and strategically important region of the world where tensions and challenges are on the rise, makes good sense. When the dust has settled, one hopes that all western allies that have a stake in the security of Indo-Pacific region—including France, however much it was justifiably affronted by the way the announcement of this agreement was handled—will recognise that we all collectively have much to gain from Australia’s increased naval capability.

As to the announcement of the agreement, there, I am afraid, the positive tone changes. That was a travesty of diplomacy. In future years, I suspect this episode will be taught at diplomatic academies across the world as how quite unnecessarily to lose both friends and influence. Why did the Prime Minister think it was sensible to rub salt in French wounds by insulting President Macron with some ill-chosen Franglais, in sharp contrast to President Biden’s willingness to offer an apology and seek to put hard feeling behind us? Are we so pre-eminent in world affairs that we can hope to get away unscathed with that kind of performance? Perhaps the Minister can use the opportunity of replying to this debate to match President Biden’s example. I would greatly welcome it if she did.

Some important questions remain to be answered about the agreement, and I hope the Minister will be able to respond to them. Here are three. First, is this agreement in no sense a defence pact or treaty with objectives and obligations similar to those in the Atlantic alliance? I ask that because a great deal of the press comment has been extraordinarily wide of the mark, as I understand it. The words “pact”, “mutual defence treaty” and so on are thrown around, and it would be a great help if the Minister could correct that—if I am right in thinking that it needs correcting. I hope the answer is no, since I do not think that this is the moment to revive those Cold War relics SEATO and CENTO. To do so would risk opening up rifts in what we must hope will be the widest possible involvement of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, working together to deter any possible Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of influence. I doubt very much whether India, Japan, South Korea or even New Zealand would contemplate joining such a mutual defence organisation, and we surely do not want to slip into new a Cold War mentality when the solution of so many of the world’s problems, such as those relating to climate change, health, trade and nuclear non-proliferation, necessitate working with China.

Secondly, will Australia, a non-nuclear member state under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, be negotiating suitable safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that there are no proliferation risks from this exchange of information? Will that be a condition of supply?

Thirdly, would it be preferable if any technology transfer to Australia—here I speak about something that, I imagine, might not take place for some time, while design and competition between us and the United States take places—takes the form of propulsion units that will not require replenishment during the life of the submarine in question? That would thus avoid the greatest risk of fissionable material, in the form of high enriched uranium, getting into the wrong hands. It would be very useful if the noble Baroness addressed those three questions. I hope her replies strengthen my welcome for this agreement.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 19th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the Government have rightly considered the preservation and strengthening of the rules-based international order to be in the vital national interest of the UK. This is the thrust of the recent integrated review. Britain outside the EU needs these rules even more than before, when we could rely on the solidarity of our European neighbours as of right.

This rules-based order has just had a pretty narrow squeak. Another four years of President Trump’s disruptive policies towards it could have inflicted irreparable damage. Although it is welcome that the US is back, the Biden Administration have no magic wand. Britain, too, and other like-minded states around the world will need to play their role in repairing the damage, filling the gaps and reforming international institutions. This is not so much about drawing up some new overall grand design as about acting collectively where the needs are greatest—on health, trade, climate change, and on reducing the risks of nuclear war and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On health, as the world gradually emerges from the worst of the Covid-19 pandemic, it will be important to put the Clark-Johnson Sirleaf review of the World Health Organization to good use to ensure that the WHO and its members get more prompt and guaranteed access to new outbreaks of disease. The WHO must be provided with a higher proportion of the resources it needs by assured, assessed—not just voluntary—contributions to bring about a much closer working relationship between the global organisations which deal respectively with human and animal diseases. Global schemes such as Gavi and COVAX must be in better working order and better resourced for when the next pandemic comes along, as it surely will. The provision of vaccines to poorer countries must be achieved more effectively when the need arises.

The World Trade Organization, under its new, impressive director-general, is also in need of urgent repair. Its dispute settlement procedures should be brought back into full working order. A waiver on the system of trade-related patents for Covid vaccines should be agreed promptly. Its decision-making processes need to be less ponderous and less easy to block—perhaps by making more use of plurilateral agreements in areas such as digital trade and trade in services. The balance between bilateral and multilateral trade agreements needs careful watching, avoiding too much emphasis on the former at the expense of the latter.

Climate change is a short, medium and long-term challenge which requires both national and collective responses, as the two are closely linked. Paris was an achievement, but it has not stopped the world slipping in the wrong direction. Glasgow will need to do better. It will need to reverse the rise in the use of fossil fuels —coal in particular. If we are to persuade big coal users, such as China and India, to do this, we cannot do the opposite ourselves. Many developing countries will need help to fulfil the commitments they enter into. This will require substantial amounts of public and private finance.

The postponed nuclear non-proliferation review conference is now scheduled for later this year. It comes after a period of steady erosion of arms control measures between the nuclear weapon states. If that erosion is to be reversed and dialogue about strategic stability between the five recognised weapon states is to get under way—as it needs to do—we cannot simply set off in the opposite direction, increasing our stockpile of warheads and refusing even to discuss concepts such as sole purpose and no first use. We cannot do that without it having negative consequences and inhibiting our ability to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

The Government’s decision to reduce our aid spending from 0.7% of our GNI, as laid down in law, to 0.5% is inconsistent with our taking effective action to address any of the four sectors of the rules-based international order to which I have referred. I urge the Minister in replying to this debate to give a clear commitment that the Government will return to full compliance with 0.7% in the fiscal year following the resumption of growth in our economy. This would do something to repair the damage already done and to restore our ability to play a positive role in strengthening the rules- based international order.