(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness is very much better informed than I am but as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord West, that location is of strategic significance to both the United Kingdom and the United States and we continue to do whatever we can to preserve that strategic presence.
My Lords, can the Minister say whether, in relation to the Chagos Islands, the Government are giving any consideration to a solution which would involve Diego Garcia becoming a sovereign base area of the United Kingdom while the rest of the Chagos Islands is returned to Mauritius?
These details are somewhat beyond my field of knowledge. This principally rests with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office but I shall certainly make inquiries. If I elicit any information I shall write to the noble Lord.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great privilege to follow two speakers with whom I am in such complete agreement, and who have stated the reasons for supporting Ukraine so eloquently. I begin by declaring an interest because your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee has just begun a new inquiry into the implications of everything that is happening in Ukraine on the UK’s relationship with the European Union. I am not speaking on behalf of that committee, as we have only just begun our report, but I assure the House that what is said in this debate will be a valuable contribution to what we are putting our minds to between now and the end of the year.
The debate we held in this House the day after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 was a memorable one. It was memorable because it demonstrated from the outset that there were going to be no party divisions in this country in our response to that aggression and our support for Ukraine. It was memorable too because that unity was based on a clear-eyed recognition that Russia’s aggression was not only a contravention of international rules as fundamental as those in the UN charter and the 1990 Paris accords on European security, but because it would directly threaten our own security should Russia succeed in its attempt to overthrow the Ukrainian state. Those fundamentals remain as true today as they were then, and the Government and opposition parties deserve credit for standing by them and taking effective action to sustain them.
What has changed since our debate on the first day after the aggression began is the realisation of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience and success in repelling an onslaught from apparently superior military capabilities. This is all the more reason to stand firm now, even if the costs in both military and economic terms are inevitably painful—even more so in human terms for the Ukrainians.
Part of our response has been the array of sanctions on exports to and imports from Russia. We must recognise that, with Russia showing no signs of relenting in its aggression, these sanctions will be needed for the foreseeable future, and should be progressively strengthened in both their scope and, most particularly, their implementation. We need a more structured frame- work for co-operation in these tasks with the European Union and its member states, whose actions on sanctions have far exceeded what might previously have been expected. I hope, in replying, that the Minister will be less reticent about the need for such a framework, such as we have already with the United States.
We also need to co-operate with the EU and its member states in the planning and first stages of Ukraine’s reconstruction. One conference, welcome though it was, is not enough. The European Union, within the ambit of negotiating Ukraine’s accession, which I believe will be decided at the end of this year, will inevitably be the largest donor in civil terms—I am not talking about military support. It is only in our interest to work closely with it and to avoid any scope for being played off against each other.
We also need to find ways of giving effect to our commitment in the NATO summit communiqué last July for non-EU members of NATO—we are one of those—to contribute positively to the strengthening of EU defence and security policies. Our score on that is pretty skimpy so far: a bid to join the mobility partnership and only after the US and Canada have already done so. Is there not more in the pipeline, or are we content for EU-NATO co-operation to proceed without our direct involvement? I think that would be a mistake.
While we need to recognise that we have so far been less successful than we might have hoped in enlisting what is now known as the global South in support of sanctions and reconstruction, we must not accept that shortfall as inevitable or irremediable. The hard fact is that there are many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which are put at risk by Putin riding roughshod over the UN charter and which will be even more at risk if Russia succeeds in its aggression. We should not be too hesitant about explaining those points, although we should do so in polite and non-aggressive terms. I suggest that we also need to recognise that, if we are to list more countries in the global South, more attention must be paid to and action taken on the priorities of those countries, most particularly on climate change, health, the handling of debt and the supply of essential foodstuffs.
It is not the time now, while the war is still raging, to address decisively Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, but we will need to in due course. Talk of separate, non-NATO security guarantees does not seem terribly convincing, given that their deterrent effect will inevitably be less than that of NATO membership. So, when the time comes—and it will come one day, but not now—we should be ready to give a positive response to Ukraine’s bid.
So much for some of the diplomatic challenges we face in this new Cold War which Russia triggered by its aggression. It could well last as long as the previous one, and we should be prepared for that. What we cannot afford to do is flinch from the prospect because it will bring some unwelcome military and economic burdens.
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, does the Minister recognise that yesterday’s Ostend meeting showed how much overlap there is between EU and NATO responsibilities, particularly in the North Sea? Does she not feel that the NATO strategy adopted last summer—that non-EU members of NATO and EU members should be working together—applies precisely to this field? If it does apply to this field, what are the Government doing to take that forward in advance of the NATO summit in Vilnius?
We have to be clear that NATO exists for a specific purpose. It is a very effective defensive alliance. It is a militarily supported alliance. What I can say to the noble Lord is that I entirely agree with the kernel of his point: the more co-operation we have, the better. That will be more likely to secure a coherent approach to these threats. I am pleased to say that certainly the MoD enjoys extremely good relationships with other European countries, even those not in NATO.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Soames, on his maiden speech. I recall that I worked for his father for four years, in the first four years of our membership of the European Communities. I can just imagine his pleasure and pride at his son being the second Lord Soames in this House, in recent times.
It seems a little counterintuitive to identify any positives from the appalling events that have unfolded since Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago, yet such positives do exist and many noble Lords have referred to them. The first and foremost is the heroic and successful response of the people of Ukraine, symbolically epitomised by yesterday’s visit and speech from President Zelensky and by their response to aggression that aimed to wipe them from the map or turn them into a Russian satellite.
Secondly, the robust and effective decisions taken by NATO, ourselves, the US, Germany, France, the EU, the G7 and many others all went far beyond what might have been anticipated.
Thirdly, even our polarised politics have not stood in the way of a united, cross-party and no-party response to the aggression. I add to that the suggestion that the most effective contribution this country can make to deter any aggression against Taiwan is to ensure that Putin’s aggression in Ukraine does not succeed.
I make no apology for returning to some issues that I raised in the debate we held the day after Russia invaded, because they are still very active. Since then, an impressive array of sanctions has been imposed against Russia and there could be more to come, but it has all been done in a piecemeal and ad hoc way. We can be sure that massive efforts are now being made in Moscow, and in Beijing and Tehran, to find ways round or through those sanctions. The future success of this policy depends on effective implementation much more than on finding new sanctions—ones we have not yet found.
We need solid and structured co-operation to counter the efforts of those we are sanctioning to cut off Russia not only from gas, oil and commodity export revenues—they are very important, of course—but from access to sophisticated technology, without which its military-industrial complex will be severely handicapped. During the first Cold War, the West operated effective controls on exports of such technology through a system called CoCom. I would like to ask the Minister what structured systems we are putting in place now, with the EU, the US and the G7, because we need something more than mere improvisation if sanctions are to be fully and effectively implemented.
Secondly, what are we doing to counter the waves of disinformation being put out by the Kremlin and to ensure that ordinary people worldwide, even those under oppressive regimes that limit their access to information, get a chance to hear another version of events?
Well, cutting the resources of the BBC World Service hardly sounds the best move in the current circumstances. I would argue—I have argued this before in your Lordships’ House, and will repeat it now—that it would surely be better for the FCDO to take full responsibility for the World Service, recognising that this is a national foreign policy priority, and to augment its resources. I should add that it is not just a question of saying, as I am sure the Minister will, that they have found a little bit of money here for the Russian service or a little bit there for the Ukrainian service; I am talking about the BBC World Service and language versions which go worldwide, because that is where the damage is being done.
Thirdly, I wonder if the Minister could say what progress is being made to support the efforts of the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to gather evidence which could lead to the indictment of Russians, high and low, for the crimes being committed by their troops in Ukraine. Can he confirm that that remains our own top priority in pursuing such crimes?
I have to say that I am not very convinced by the arguments in favour of a new and separate tribunal which we have heard expressed in this debate. I believe that it is unnecessary, because the International Criminal Court has demonstrated that it is capable of pursuing command responsibility for crimes that are on its statute book. It is also, I think, undesirable because it will be intensely divisive. There is absolutely no doubt that if we try to establish a new tribunal, we will split the rest of the world and many will not follow. But many of them are already signatories of the International Criminal Court statute, so they do not have to be asked whether they follow it; they are in it. So I do feel that that is not a good way; I would add that, unfortunately, the idea of a new separate tribunal directed against Russia’s undoubted aggression is precisely what Putin needs to feed the paranoia of his people. That is his way of keeping them on board, saying “The West is after me, and it’s after you.” Now, I do not think that it is very wise to feed that, and I think therefore that the pursuit of war crimes through the International Criminal Court is a much better route, but I would like to hear the Minister’s views on that.
Clearly, we have a worldwide challenge for hearts and minds on our hands. No one can have seen the reception of Sergei Lavrov last week in South Africa without realising that there is an awfully long way to go. One key player will be India, now in the chair of the G20, a grouping whose 2022 summit meeting in Indonesia issued a notable rebuke to Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling. What are we doing to consolidate support for Ukraine when the next G20 summit takes place later this year? What kind of approach are we and our allies pursuing throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa to counter the arguments that are enabling them to sit on the fence and say that it is something that they do not want to get involved in?
Now, this second Cold War—that is what we are in, and NATO is right, in my view, to do all it can to ensure that it is a cold and not a hot war—puts our own security and the defence of a rules-based international system based on the UN charter, over which Russia has ridden roughshod, right on the line, as so many noble Lords have said. The resulting stresses to our economy may be regrettable, but they do have to be borne, in my estimation. They need to be accepted and handled with calm determination not to let Russian aggression get its way.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think I can give that reassurance to my noble friend. Obviously, his question is more within the remit of my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, but as he will be aware, we have been very active on the diplomatic front. The United Nations General Assembly vote on 12 October last year was a powerful demonstration of the international community’s widespread condemnation of Russia’s outrageous and illegal attempt to annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
That global pressure is continuing. I had the privilege of meeting a group of United States Congressmen and Congresswomen earlier this week. I was very struck by the unanimity of acceptance that what is happening is wrong and has to be resisted. This may be happening in Europe, but it is understood in the United States that if you do not address that wrong, there are consequences which could be global in their impact. I reassure my noble friend that diplomacy is a critical part of what we are doing to support Ukraine in its endeavour.
My Lords, can the Minister say a word or two about how combating the Russian policy of disinformation and misinformation is going? The evidence is that, unfortunately, a large part of the Russian population remains prepared to tell someone who asks their opinion, at least, that they support President Putin, so there is obviously a long way to go. However, a lot of the lies they tell are easily refutable. What are we doing to boost the work of the BBC World Service, the language services and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office worldwide to deal with this disinformation?
I agree with the noble Lord that the wilful disinformation and misinformation engaged in by Russia is absolutely appalling and very unwelcome. It is worth emphasising that it remains the case that the UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia. The conflict in Ukraine has confirmed the UK assessment as set out in the integrated review: that the current Russian Government remain, and will continue to pose, the most acute threat to the UK and the alliance for the foreseeable future. Our criticism and objections are directed to the behaviour of the Russian Government.
However, the noble Lord makes an important point. The UK, and particularly the MoD, made a courageous decision fairly early on to release more intelligence to the public. That was quite a culture change for the MoD; we are usually pretty protective of our intelligence information. We decided to do that to counter Russian disinformation by providing an accurate and truthful picture of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. To date, those intelligence updates, issued via social media, have proved very popular; they are reaching a large audience across the UK and internationally. There was some reference recently to a poll carried out in Russia—I was trying to find the specific information, but I do not seem to have it in my brief. My recollection is that the poll indicated that, in Russia, there has been a sharp decline in support for the war over a period of months. It seems that many people are becoming very unhappy and very questioning about what the Russian Government are doing in their name. We will continue to do what we can with the careful release of intelligence—the noble Lord is absolutely right—to neutralise lies and to provide a counternarrative which is correct.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not sure that it is possible to give a specific response to my noble friend’s question; reverting to the Accra initiative, I think a great deal of discussion has to be had as to how we take forward a concerted desire to support these west African states, with a mixture of military intervention—or military support rather—if that is required, and advice and support for the political or economic regimes. A number of factors have to be taken into account. Mali is, of course, an observer member of the Accra initiative along with Niger. In total, the initiative represents a very healthy and promising group of countries. One of the strategic challenges to be hammered out is just what my noble friend referred to: at the end of the day, what is it that the African states are looking for, and what can we do to support that endeavour?
I am not being evasive; it is just that I think a great deal more discussion has to ensue before clarity begins to emerge about some of these strategic objectives. My noble friend will be aware that we already do a lot in west Africa. We provide support in Nigeria and in the Chad basin, we are supporting the armed forces of Cameroon and we are working closely with the Ghanaian armed forces to develop ongoing counterterrorism training packages. At the end of the day, the threat of terrorism in the Sahel has not disappeared; it is there. Sadly, the presence of Wagner is likely to exacerbate the situation rather than facilitate solutions; that is another important component of everything that has to be discussed.
My Lords, while joining those paying tribute to the work that our peacekeepers have done in what is obviously an extremely challenging and difficult mission, I have two questions for the Minister. First, did we have any consultations with the UN’s department of peacekeeping operations before the announcement that the Minister and her colleague in the other place have made—and, if so, how did it respond to our intention to withdraw? Secondly, can she say what number of UN peacekeepers we will have deployed after this withdrawal has taken place?
On the first question, I am not privy to what discussions took place. I shall make inquiries and respond to the noble Lord with more details if I am able to do so. As to the second point, I do not have specific information but, again, I will undertake to investigate and if I can provide more detail, I shall.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, one of my first professional involvements with Ukraine was in 1994 when, as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the UN, I was instructed, along with my Russian and US colleagues, as co-depositories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to transmit to the UN the Budapest memorandum, certifying it as a formal international agreement. The memorandum guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for handing over all the nuclear warheads and missiles that the Soviet Union had left behind. My Russian colleague was one Sergei Lavrov. I hope that touches his conscience—it certainly should do—but I rather doubt whether it does.
We need to realise, I believe, that the events of the last few days have triggered a second Cold War. Like the first, it will probably last quite a long time and impose costs on ourselves as well as others. It will be a necessary response to a war of choice, a war of aggression, and therefore a war crime.
How, in practical terms, should we react? We should surely give no international legitimacy to any puppet Government the Russians may try to install, nor to the Governments of the five illegal statelets they have installed in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine by the use of force. The elected Government of President Zelensky should remain our interlocutor and the holder of Ukraine’s UN seat.
On further sanctions, I hope that excluding Russia from the SWIFT payment system will figure. It is a pity we are not at the European Council table, or in the room at least, to advocate for that. Do we not, too, need to consider recreating something like the CoCom international system on strategic exports? Should we not also consider reviving in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office what used to be called the information research department to deal with disinformation and to undermine the false narrative being put about by the Kremlin, RT and trolls on social media? I very much welcomed the emphasis the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, gave to that issue in his remarkable maiden speech. Then there is the economic crime Bill, still to appear; surely that needs to go on to the statue book in this Session of Parliament and not the next one. Of course, Ukrainians will need all the humanitarian help we can give them, and Ukrainian asylum seekers must, and I hope will, be treated rapidly and sympathetically.
The Russians have thrown down the gauntlet against the European security order they themselves helped to create in 1990. We will need to respond to that challenge with patience and determination by boosting the defences of NATO allies most exposed to pressure; by recognising that the European region is now a higher priority for us than the Indo-Pacific region; and by keeping in lockstep with the US, our other NATO partners and the EU itself, which is already playing a key role over sanctions.
Yesterday was a grim day for all Europeans. But we rose successfully to the challenge after the Second World War, and we should be able to do so again now. It is our own security that is at stake.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I should at the outset make it clear that I welcome the agreement by the US and the UK to make naval nuclear propulsion information available to Australia, one of our oldest and most valuable allies. A step such as this, which will substantially enhance the deterrent capacity of an ally in a sensitive and strategically important region of the world where tensions and challenges are on the rise, makes good sense. When the dust has settled, one hopes that all western allies that have a stake in the security of Indo-Pacific region—including France, however much it was justifiably affronted by the way the announcement of this agreement was handled—will recognise that we all collectively have much to gain from Australia’s increased naval capability.
As to the announcement of the agreement, there, I am afraid, the positive tone changes. That was a travesty of diplomacy. In future years, I suspect this episode will be taught at diplomatic academies across the world as how quite unnecessarily to lose both friends and influence. Why did the Prime Minister think it was sensible to rub salt in French wounds by insulting President Macron with some ill-chosen Franglais, in sharp contrast to President Biden’s willingness to offer an apology and seek to put hard feeling behind us? Are we so pre-eminent in world affairs that we can hope to get away unscathed with that kind of performance? Perhaps the Minister can use the opportunity of replying to this debate to match President Biden’s example. I would greatly welcome it if she did.
Some important questions remain to be answered about the agreement, and I hope the Minister will be able to respond to them. Here are three. First, is this agreement in no sense a defence pact or treaty with objectives and obligations similar to those in the Atlantic alliance? I ask that because a great deal of the press comment has been extraordinarily wide of the mark, as I understand it. The words “pact”, “mutual defence treaty” and so on are thrown around, and it would be a great help if the Minister could correct that—if I am right in thinking that it needs correcting. I hope the answer is no, since I do not think that this is the moment to revive those Cold War relics SEATO and CENTO. To do so would risk opening up rifts in what we must hope will be the widest possible involvement of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, working together to deter any possible Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of influence. I doubt very much whether India, Japan, South Korea or even New Zealand would contemplate joining such a mutual defence organisation, and we surely do not want to slip into new a Cold War mentality when the solution of so many of the world’s problems, such as those relating to climate change, health, trade and nuclear non-proliferation, necessitate working with China.
Secondly, will Australia, a non-nuclear member state under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, be negotiating suitable safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that there are no proliferation risks from this exchange of information? Will that be a condition of supply?
Thirdly, would it be preferable if any technology transfer to Australia—here I speak about something that, I imagine, might not take place for some time, while design and competition between us and the United States take places—takes the form of propulsion units that will not require replenishment during the life of the submarine in question? That would thus avoid the greatest risk of fissionable material, in the form of high enriched uranium, getting into the wrong hands. It would be very useful if the noble Baroness addressed those three questions. I hope her replies strengthen my welcome for this agreement.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government have rightly considered the preservation and strengthening of the rules-based international order to be in the vital national interest of the UK. This is the thrust of the recent integrated review. Britain outside the EU needs these rules even more than before, when we could rely on the solidarity of our European neighbours as of right.
This rules-based order has just had a pretty narrow squeak. Another four years of President Trump’s disruptive policies towards it could have inflicted irreparable damage. Although it is welcome that the US is back, the Biden Administration have no magic wand. Britain, too, and other like-minded states around the world will need to play their role in repairing the damage, filling the gaps and reforming international institutions. This is not so much about drawing up some new overall grand design as about acting collectively where the needs are greatest—on health, trade, climate change, and on reducing the risks of nuclear war and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
On health, as the world gradually emerges from the worst of the Covid-19 pandemic, it will be important to put the Clark-Johnson Sirleaf review of the World Health Organization to good use to ensure that the WHO and its members get more prompt and guaranteed access to new outbreaks of disease. The WHO must be provided with a higher proportion of the resources it needs by assured, assessed—not just voluntary—contributions to bring about a much closer working relationship between the global organisations which deal respectively with human and animal diseases. Global schemes such as Gavi and COVAX must be in better working order and better resourced for when the next pandemic comes along, as it surely will. The provision of vaccines to poorer countries must be achieved more effectively when the need arises.
The World Trade Organization, under its new, impressive director-general, is also in need of urgent repair. Its dispute settlement procedures should be brought back into full working order. A waiver on the system of trade-related patents for Covid vaccines should be agreed promptly. Its decision-making processes need to be less ponderous and less easy to block—perhaps by making more use of plurilateral agreements in areas such as digital trade and trade in services. The balance between bilateral and multilateral trade agreements needs careful watching, avoiding too much emphasis on the former at the expense of the latter.
Climate change is a short, medium and long-term challenge which requires both national and collective responses, as the two are closely linked. Paris was an achievement, but it has not stopped the world slipping in the wrong direction. Glasgow will need to do better. It will need to reverse the rise in the use of fossil fuels —coal in particular. If we are to persuade big coal users, such as China and India, to do this, we cannot do the opposite ourselves. Many developing countries will need help to fulfil the commitments they enter into. This will require substantial amounts of public and private finance.
The postponed nuclear non-proliferation review conference is now scheduled for later this year. It comes after a period of steady erosion of arms control measures between the nuclear weapon states. If that erosion is to be reversed and dialogue about strategic stability between the five recognised weapon states is to get under way—as it needs to do—we cannot simply set off in the opposite direction, increasing our stockpile of warheads and refusing even to discuss concepts such as sole purpose and no first use. We cannot do that without it having negative consequences and inhibiting our ability to reduce the risks of nuclear war.
The Government’s decision to reduce our aid spending from 0.7% of our GNI, as laid down in law, to 0.5% is inconsistent with our taking effective action to address any of the four sectors of the rules-based international order to which I have referred. I urge the Minister in replying to this debate to give a clear commitment that the Government will return to full compliance with 0.7% in the fiscal year following the resumption of growth in our economy. This would do something to repair the damage already done and to restore our ability to play a positive role in strengthening the rules- based international order.
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 3 and have added my name to it. I have the advantage of having heard the last two contributions to this debate, which is, to some extent, a rehearsal of that which we held in Committee. I will take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, on one point—I have often known him to be hopeful but never naive.
I am tempted to adopt a speech that I made in Committee and sit down, but I will not do that because, like those who have spoken already, I do not understand the intransigence of this Government. I do not recall any noble Lord, other than the noble Baroness herself, making any speech in favour of the Government’s position either at Second Reading or in Committee. How much does it take? How much evidence is necessary to persuade this Government to change their mind?
Of course, we have heard the weight and the quality of the evidence of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, with his extensive experience. We heard, essentially, the forensic destruction of the government case, line by line, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in Committee, and we continue to hear the well-known and, one might think, well-informed opposition of Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank and General Sir Nick Parker. Some of these have been mentioned already, but no one has mentioned Elizabeth Wilmshurst —that most courageous opponent of the legality of military action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, who resigned from her position in the Foreign Office—and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who has been both Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. How is it that, in the face of the mounting volume of evidence against them, the Government insist on holding to this position? I fail to understand.
In Committee, I quoted from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. At that stage, its approach to this was to provide an executive summary, in the course of which it said that
“murder, torture and other grave war crimes face substantial legal barriers before there can be a prosecution … The Bill undermines our obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention Against Torture”.
Again, I ask: what further evidence is required to persuade the Government that they are in the wrong place? Since then, the Bingham centre has produced a more detailed analysis of this proposed legislation. If your Lordships wish to see it reinforce what it has previously said, you will find that on page 16 of that analysis.
What do we know now? The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has made pretty clear a view that might result in a British citizen, a member of the British Armed Forces, possibly being taken to the International Criminal Court—can you imagine it? This country takes pride in our being advocates for the rules-based order in the face of other countries that simply want to ignore it or toss it aside.
I refer to the interests of the United Nations and the official responsible for human rights. Can you imagine the embarrassment of a prominent member of the Security Council asserting the rules-based order, in the teeth of Russian and Chinese unwillingness? I would love to know what the permanent representative of the British mission at the United Nations thinks about the position now being adopted.
Perhaps we should not be surprised. To plagiarise Lewis Carroll, laws mean what we want them to mean. That is certainly the position that was adopted when we came to Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill. What does this do for our standing and influence? How can we make those who breach international law understand the consequences of what they are doing if we are, on the face of it, doing exactly the same ourselves?
I have some sympathy for the noble Baroness because she has gallantly sought to defend the Government’s position. However, I finish by offering her some advice: Oliver Cromwell, in a substantial disagreement with the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, wrote on 3 August 1650—the language is perhaps of its time:
“I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.”
The language may no longer be appropriate, but the sentiment is surely something to which she should give effect.
I wish to speak briefly in support of Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, and others. I say at the outset that I will not be able to match the eloquence of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, who preceded me and whose views I totally share.
I speak in support of this amendment, as I did in Committee, on the grounds of both principle and pragmatism. The arguments of principle that underpin this amendment are clear. Unamended, the Bill would effectively—de facto if not de jure—open the door to a time limitation on the inquiry into and, where justified, the prosecution of the most heinous of crimes set out in the Rome statute, establishing the International Criminal Court—war crimes and genocide—and those set out in the convention against torture.
I say gently to the Minister that I was a bit disappointed that, in one of her replies to earlier amendments, she suggested that the suggestion that this was a de facto limitation was quite wrong. I question what she said then because if it is not a de facto limitation, what on earth is the point of the Bill? I really do not understand it. I happen to support the main thrust of the Bill.
Neither the Rome statute nor the torture convention provides for any such time limitation on the crimes covered by them, nor in my view should they do so for crimes of that extraordinary seriousness. I suggest that to allow such a limitation into our domestic legislation is not consistent with this Parliament’s ratification of the Rome statute and of our acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC. At a time when there is so much evidence worldwide of these sorts of crimes being committed—the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has spoken movingly about them—we should not be playing fast and loose with our own obligations to inquire into them and to prosecute.
The arguments of pragmatism are equally compelling. Unamended, the Bill will actually increase, not decrease, the chances of British service personnel falling within the purview of the ICC. We know that because we have been explicitly warned of it by the court’s prosecutor, who has hitherto relied on our willingness to prosecute crimes under the Rome statute as a sufficient reason not to pursue such cases through the ICC machinery. If that commitment were in any way removed or questioned, the chances of action by the ICC would sharply increase. I was glad to hear the Minister, in responding to earlier amendments, recognise that that risk really exists. It would be a supreme and shameful irony if action by the ICC had to be taken by the recently appointed ICC prosecutor, a British national.
I hope that the House will amend the Bill in the sense proposed to remove from it any limitations of time for crimes set out in the Rome statute and the torture convention and will do so without in any way calling into question the original objective of the Bill: to lift the shadow of vexatious inquiries and prosecutions for lesser offences from our service personnel.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick. I support Amendment 3. As your Lordships may know, I have no legal or military experience and therefore enter this debate today as someone who has listened to and participated in all previous stages of the Bill, and has been powerfully persuaded that my own concerns about the Bill at the outset were rightly felt.
As did the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, I shall quote from the conclusion of the recent executive summary of the briefing from the Bingham Centre:
“The UK has a long and proud reputation of decisive action against war crimes. This Bill weakens that reputation. It makes it harder, not easier to stamp out abuses that our own troops have committed. We do not protect British troops and British values by hiding from the truth or acting with impunity.”
Although it invokes “British values”, surely these are international values, based on the international rule of law.
The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, quoted previously by my noble friend Lord Robertson, this week urged the UK Government to heed the warnings that the Bill in its current form risks undermining the human rights obligations that the UK has committed itself to respecting. As a former teacher, when people make a commitment to respect something, I expect them to follow through.
The UN press release says:
“In its present form, the proposed legislation raises substantial questions about the UK’s future compliance with its international obligations, particularly under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment … as well as the … Geneva Conventions. These include obligations to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts such as torture and unlawful killing, and make no distinction as to when the offences were committed … ‘The prohibition of torture in international law is both clear and absolute,’ Bachelet said. ‘Article 2 of the Convention against Torture is unequivocal, stating that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”’ The obligations in the Convention to investigate and prosecute such allegations recognize none of the new distinctions that the Bill would now bring into law.”
Surely that is a reason for amendment.