Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord German and Lord Bach

Report stage
Wednesday 5th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister is quite right. I have a short but important amendment that is very fittingly in this group. It is unusual in that lawyers who act in immigration cases and the Home Office itself are at one on the issue. Both sides agree that in paragraph 9(1)(a) of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016, “specified in the condition” should be widely interpreted to mean

“that is known at the time of the grant or variation of immigration bail, or”—

and this is the important point—

“an address that is yet to be specified”.

This has been the Home Office’s interpretation of that paragraph for a number of years. There is evidence from 2018 that that is the Home Office’s view. It has occurred in cases, and guidance was issued as recently as this summer. In my submission, it is a practical and sensible way of interpreting it.

Why, then, does this amendment, with its proposed change of words in paragraph 9(1), need to be laid and discussed in your Lordships’ House at all? The reason is that there is a Court of Appeal case in Northern Ireland called Bounar, which was decided not many years ago, in which their Lordships in that court took a different view and decided on a much stricter interpretation of the words of the schedule: for a person to be given bail by the Secretary of State, they must already have been granted immigration bail—and here are the words that matter—with a condition to reside at a specific address. So one has on the one hand the decision of the court in Northern Ireland and, on the other, I submit, a practical, sensible way of dealing with a situation that arises more often than the House might think. The Home Office has dealt with it in that way, as have the lawyers on the other side.

Why does it matter that there are these two conflicting decisions about and ways of looking at this element of this schedule? It matters, first, because it is unsatisfactory in principle to have legislation that has been interpreted quite differently in the courts and in practice in government when dealing with this issue. Secondly, who knows what situations may arise where a court, for example, would prefer the Northern Ireland precedent. Thus, a bail claimant—someone who the Home Office wants to give bail to—might lose his or her bail merely because, for good, practical reasons, the specific address is not yet known. This is what happens in a number of cases.

There are already significant delays between grant of bail in principle and people being released to Home Office-sourced accommodation. In recent months, 21 people have faced a delay of more than three months. The Home Office wanted to bail them and was happy to, but there was no specified address at that moment so everything had to start all over again. Without amending the statutory provision relied on in the case of Bounar, every individual would need an address provided by the Secretary of State prior to applying for bail, resulting in wasted places and longer delays. My invitation to my noble friend, to whom I very grateful for having taken the trouble to meet me on this issue, is to accept this amendment to the schedule. I very much hope that he feels that he can do that today.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I shall address the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, just raised. It seems to me, from having visited Harmondsworth IRC, met people who are ready for bail and seen them held back because of the bureaucracy, that what is being described is a bit of bureaucracy that ought not to be there. I hope the Minister will be able to say that he can deal with this matter. Unfortunately, it appears that it has to be in statute rather than simply a ministerial decision. Perhaps he will tell us how best this matter can be dealt with swiftly, because it is in no one’s interest for people who have the right to immigration bail to be kept at taxpayers’ expense in immigration detention when they need not be there.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord German and Lord Bach

Committee stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I put my name to this clause stand part notice, which was originally in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He, alas, cannot be here this afternoon as he is on parliamentary business abroad, and he has asked me to open this short debate. I do not think that the Committee will be that surprised to hear me say that what I am about to say owes much to the noble Lord.

Clauses 55 and 56 prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or civil partnership with another person, without the written permission of the Secretary of State, to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. At Second Reading, on 18 December, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, referred to

“a recent case in which surviving families of the victim of a most serious murder were openly mocked by the convicted offender, who trumpeted his right to marry, causing distress to many”.—[Official Report, 18/12/23; col. 2056.]

It is my view, and I suspect the view of many on the Committee, that it is deeply unsatisfactory to legislate on the basis of one such incident, however upsetting it was for the victim’s family, as it undoubtedly must have been. That point was made at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Is this one incident, serious though it was, the only basis for seeking to legislate in this context?

Beyond that, there is a question of principle. However repellent their crimes, whole-life prisoners are allowed to eat, exercise, read books, watch television and send and receive letters, so why are they to be denied the basic right to marry a consenting adult? I say “basic right” because Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:

“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry”.


What the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which considered how this applies to prisoners, in particular in the case of Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court stated in its judgment that an effective bar on any exercise of a prisoner’s right to marry is a breach of Article 12. The court added:

“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and … of some civil rights and privileges”.


The authorities are, of course, permitted to impose restrictions on civil rights to protect the security of the prison regime, but:

“This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.


The court added that the state cannot prevent a prisoner enjoying the right to marry because of the authorities’ views as to what

“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.

That is the basis, it seems, of Clauses 55 and 56. It is very doubtful whether these clauses are wise in any event. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby made the important point at Second Reading that if we are to lock people up for very lengthy periods, perhaps the whole of their lives, we must surely give them some positive purpose in life: some hope, some encouragement to maintain relationships with the outside world, not just for their own self-respect or mental health but because it will help those who have to manage the prison regime and prevent the inevitable frustrations of long-term prisoners erupting in violence against prison officers or other prisoners.

Clauses 55 and 56 have, in my view, no sensible justification. They are objectionable in principle and they will impede good management of the prison system. They seem to have more to do with populism than with any sensible policy. I submit that if these clauses become law, this is an example of bad legislation that an experienced Parliament such as this should not pass. I invite the Minister, when he replies to this debate, to say that the Government will think again about this issue and, I hope, come to the conclusion that it is not worthy of this important Bill.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to both stand part notices. The first question I asked myself way back before Second Reading, and I still need to ask myself, is why on earth the Government put these two clauses in the Bill. They do not seem to do anything to make the prison regime any better or to make the work that goes on in supporting people in prison any easier. In fact, they appear to be cruel in a variety of ways.

The Secretary of State being able to approve a marriage or civil partnership only based on exceptional circumstances, even if you felt there was a rationale or a reason, is surely the wrong way around. Surely, the Secretary of State should be able to deny them only if there are exceptional circumstances. This measure will apply regardless of the way in which anybody in future seeks a partnership or marriage.

It worries me, as I am sure it does many others in this Committee, how much placing people in prison for their lives will add to—or detract from—what happens inside the prison. It is going beyond punishment. Whatever anybody feels about what happens in a prison establishment, providing some hope for the future of their lives, understanding how their lives work and making sure they feel a sense of purpose in remaining alive is part of the job of the state, which must retain that ability.

These clauses, once again, chip away at those fundamental human rights, disapplying human rights to a specific cohort of people. The universality of human rights in this circumstance is doubly important because, of course, the state is totally responsible for whatever rights and purposes prisoners have. It has to manage them. It is precisely in custodial institutions such as prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because the individuals are under the control of the state.

It would appear, as in the Illegal Migration Act and the safety of Rwanda Bill, that we are beginning to see a testing period for making controversial changes to our human rights framework. It seems to me and those on these Benches that this particular measure is offensive to that spirit of how the state should manage the lives of people in this circumstance. If there were to be a case for saying that somebody cannot get married or have a civil partnership, that is surely by exception rather than by practice.

It appears to me that these clauses do not really fit into this Bill, because of that sense of things being done in the wrong direction. More than anything else, I seek to understand from the Government why they have put this in place. If it is because of a single case, as we have just heard, to write law on the basis of a single case is surely not the correct way to go about it.