Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak having taken some advice from the Clerks—I am grateful to them. The first two items in this group are notices of my intention to oppose Clauses 53 and 54. We debated the amendments in both clauses in our previous Committee sitting on 12 March and the Minister, whom I have spoken to this afternoon before coming to Committee, gave certain undertakings following that debate about discussing further the issues raised with his fellow Minister, who sits by his side, and with the Ministry of Justice. In all the circumstances, I will not press the stand part notices in my name on either Clause 53 or Clause 54. That is why I have got to my feet at this stage.

Clause 53 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 55 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I put my name to this clause stand part notice, which was originally in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He, alas, cannot be here this afternoon as he is on parliamentary business abroad, and he has asked me to open this short debate. I do not think that the Committee will be that surprised to hear me say that what I am about to say owes much to the noble Lord.

Clauses 55 and 56 prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or civil partnership with another person, without the written permission of the Secretary of State, to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. At Second Reading, on 18 December, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, referred to

“a recent case in which surviving families of the victim of a most serious murder were openly mocked by the convicted offender, who trumpeted his right to marry, causing distress to many”.—[Official Report, 18/12/23; col. 2056.]

It is my view, and I suspect the view of many on the Committee, that it is deeply unsatisfactory to legislate on the basis of one such incident, however upsetting it was for the victim’s family, as it undoubtedly must have been. That point was made at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Is this one incident, serious though it was, the only basis for seeking to legislate in this context?

Beyond that, there is a question of principle. However repellent their crimes, whole-life prisoners are allowed to eat, exercise, read books, watch television and send and receive letters, so why are they to be denied the basic right to marry a consenting adult? I say “basic right” because Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:

“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry”.


What the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which considered how this applies to prisoners, in particular in the case of Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court stated in its judgment that an effective bar on any exercise of a prisoner’s right to marry is a breach of Article 12. The court added:

“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and … of some civil rights and privileges”.


The authorities are, of course, permitted to impose restrictions on civil rights to protect the security of the prison regime, but:

“This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.


The court added that the state cannot prevent a prisoner enjoying the right to marry because of the authorities’ views as to what

“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.

That is the basis, it seems, of Clauses 55 and 56. It is very doubtful whether these clauses are wise in any event. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby made the important point at Second Reading that if we are to lock people up for very lengthy periods, perhaps the whole of their lives, we must surely give them some positive purpose in life: some hope, some encouragement to maintain relationships with the outside world, not just for their own self-respect or mental health but because it will help those who have to manage the prison regime and prevent the inevitable frustrations of long-term prisoners erupting in violence against prison officers or other prisoners.

Clauses 55 and 56 have, in my view, no sensible justification. They are objectionable in principle and they will impede good management of the prison system. They seem to have more to do with populism than with any sensible policy. I submit that if these clauses become law, this is an example of bad legislation that an experienced Parliament such as this should not pass. I invite the Minister, when he replies to this debate, to say that the Government will think again about this issue and, I hope, come to the conclusion that it is not worthy of this important Bill.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to both stand part notices. The first question I asked myself way back before Second Reading, and I still need to ask myself, is why on earth the Government put these two clauses in the Bill. They do not seem to do anything to make the prison regime any better or to make the work that goes on in supporting people in prison any easier. In fact, they appear to be cruel in a variety of ways.

The Secretary of State being able to approve a marriage or civil partnership only based on exceptional circumstances, even if you felt there was a rationale or a reason, is surely the wrong way around. Surely, the Secretary of State should be able to deny them only if there are exceptional circumstances. This measure will apply regardless of the way in which anybody in future seeks a partnership or marriage.

It worries me, as I am sure it does many others in this Committee, how much placing people in prison for their lives will add to—or detract from—what happens inside the prison. It is going beyond punishment. Whatever anybody feels about what happens in a prison establishment, providing some hope for the future of their lives, understanding how their lives work and making sure they feel a sense of purpose in remaining alive is part of the job of the state, which must retain that ability.

These clauses, once again, chip away at those fundamental human rights, disapplying human rights to a specific cohort of people. The universality of human rights in this circumstance is doubly important because, of course, the state is totally responsible for whatever rights and purposes prisoners have. It has to manage them. It is precisely in custodial institutions such as prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because the individuals are under the control of the state.

It would appear, as in the Illegal Migration Act and the safety of Rwanda Bill, that we are beginning to see a testing period for making controversial changes to our human rights framework. It seems to me and those on these Benches that this particular measure is offensive to that spirit of how the state should manage the lives of people in this circumstance. If there were to be a case for saying that somebody cannot get married or have a civil partnership, that is surely by exception rather than by practice.

It appears to me that these clauses do not really fit into this Bill, because of that sense of things being done in the wrong direction. More than anything else, I seek to understand from the Government why they have put this in place. If it is because of a single case, as we have just heard, to write law on the basis of a single case is surely not the correct way to go about it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments in this short debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for setting out his intention to oppose that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for his comments in support of that.

It is important that the Committee examines the rationale behind these clauses. Clauses 55 and 56 will prohibit prisoners in England and Wales who are subject to a whole-life order from marrying or forming a civil partnership while in prison or another place of detention. The Secretary of State may grant an exemption in truly exceptional circumstances. A whole-life order is the most severe punishment in the criminal law of England and Wales. It is reserved for exceptionally serious offences, such as serial or child murders which involve a substantial degree of premeditation or sexual or sadistic conduct. Unlike other life sentences, offenders subject to a whole-life order can expect never to be released. Their tariff will never expire and they will not be considered for parole at any point.

As the law stands, a prison governor cannot reject a prisoner’s application to marry or form a civil partnership unless the ceremony creates a security risk for the prison. This includes whole-life prisoners. Those subject to whole-life orders can expect never to be released. As they are not working towards life on the outside and the prospect of being able to enjoy married life, any rehabilitative effect of a potential marriage is likely to be significantly reduced. Being married or in a civil partnership does not have any practical impact on an individual’s ability to maintain a relationship with a prisoner. Prisoners are not entitled to conjugal visits and rights to access fertility treatment do not require the prisoner to be married to or in a civil partnership with their partner. Neither do spouses, civil partners or their children have any additional right to visits, telephone calls or video calls. Whole-life prisoners can therefore benefit from supportive relationships while in custody in the same way as other prisoners. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, this is not cruel—they can maintain relationships.

While the right is protected under Article 12 of the ECHR, the convention allows states to impose restrictions in a proportionate way for a legitimate purpose. In line with the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in Draper v the United Kingdom, we consider that a restriction on whole-life prisoners’ right to marry can be justified on the basis of public interest. The public set great store by our response to the most heinous crimes. The current position undermines confidence in our criminal justice system and its ability to deliver justice and protect the public. These clauses allow the Secretary of State to make exemptions on a case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances. Any discretion available to a Secretary of State would itself be exercised compatibly with ECHR obligations.

We have taken a proportionate approach in applying these measures to only a small cohort of offenders who are already singled out in our domestic framework due to the exceptionally serious nature of their offences. As of December 2023, there were only 67 whole-life prisoners in England and Wales, representing less than 0.1% of the total prison population—less than one in 1,000.

To answer the question from all noble Lords, this is not about a single case. While it was a particular case that brought this issue to the Government’s attention, this is not about any individual; it is a broader point of principle. The justice system must be able to deal appropriately with the worst offenders, to drive up public confidence in the justice system. We consider that these measures are justified on the basis of that public interest. This is not just due to the distress that such an event may cause to the families of victims, whose lives these prisoners have cut short in heinous ways, but, more fundamentally, because of the real risk of damage to public confidence in the criminal justice system if it cannot deal appropriately with the most serious offenders. The Government are resolved that this is an appropriate measure. I therefore propose that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Lord, Lord German, for his support in this matter.

I have two points for the Minister, if I may. Is it really considered proportionate as an answer to Article 12 to say that these measures would be allowed only in exceptional circumstances? That seems not very proportionate at all. Secondly, I personally do not see the relevance, when we are talking about a matter of principle such as this, of what percentage of prisoners are in this category. It does not matter what percentage are. If it is right, it is right, and if it is wrong, it is wrong. In my view, it is a matter of some principle that this should not be imposed upon people who have done absolutely terrible things and are paying the price for it. This is a step too far and, as I say, not worthy of Parliament. Having said that, I am not going to take this matter any further today.

Clause 55 agreed.