Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak quickly, because I am speaking on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. It is wonderful to see such a huge coalition of Peers tabling amendments and speaking on this issue. I imagine that Gypsy and Roma Travellers, peaceful protesters, van-lifers, wild campers and anyone else threatened by this proposed legislation will be glad to see the opposition that is coalescing in your Lordships' House, and I foresee a struggle for the Government on this. Far from criminalising trespass, we should be opening up more land for access to the public and enhancing our enjoyment of our magnificent countryside.

We should remove these clauses completely. It is a nasty section of the Bill. It is discriminatory and dangerous. It will be to the detriment of the reputation of the Government—if it can be any more damaged—if they struggle to keep these clauses in. There are many other useful amendments in this group that we support, but the Government would be very wise to compromise on this issue.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, it may well be that the Government are wise to compromise on this issue. There is a fair amount in Part 4 that has excited controversy in this House, in the other place and among the wider public. But I would not want it to be thought that, because Part 4 and the clauses that may be subjected to these amendments—which have been articulately and powerfully advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and those who have spoken after her—are rightly subject to trenchant criticism, for all the reasons that have been advanced so far, the solution that appears in the amendment paper is necessarily the right one. The proponents of the amendment may well be right, but the solution they put forward to deal with the legitimate problem they have identified may not be. Unquestionably, the number of Traveller sites provided by local authorities is woefully small and may well be one of the great reasons for Gypsies, Roma and Travellers trespassing.

I just want to gently put a slightly different line of thinking. Twenty-five years ago, as a Member of Parliament, I was rung by a very distressed farmer in my constituency, whose land was being trespassed on. I do not know if they were people who come within some statutory definition of Traveller, though they certainly were not Gypsies or Roma. They had a host of trucks, most of which were unlicensed. There must have been about 40 individuals—men, women and children—trespassing with these vehicles. They also had dogs, and these dogs were running wild and disturbing, damaging and, in a few cases, killing my constituent farmer’s sheep. I fully appreciate that requiring one of the conditions in this clause through the amendment to be triggered by the presence or the say-so of a police officer would provide greater certainty that something unlawful was happening. I say unlawful, because that covers the civil aspect of this as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Earl for that. Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people are a tiny percentage of our population in the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly, they are one of the most demonised minorities, not just in our nations, but historically and in Europe. We would not have a post-World War II human rights framework but for atrocities perpetrated against minorities, including Gypsy and Roma people.

It is very upsetting to look at Part 4 of the Bill. It is a disgrace. I am sorry to have to say this, but Part 4 is an inherently discriminatory piece of legislation. It is as discriminatory as previous ignominious legislation targeting east African Asians or gay people. If it passes in its present form it will be notorious. I have no doubt at all that it violates Articles 8 and 14 of the convention, at the very least, as other noble Lords have said. I praise the eloquence and perseverance of my noble friend Lady Whitaker in particular, and of many noble Lords and right reverent Prelates.

They know whereof they speak: to persecute people for their nomadic lifestyle—to criminalise the Traveller way of life—is the equivalent, I have no hesitation in saying, of criminalising people for their dress, their food or their prayers. It is a significant attack on their way of life to criminalise them for stopping in places when they have nowhere else to stop. Part 4 is that despicable. I signed one of the amendments; I could have signed any of them. This part, however, should not stand in any primary legislation in a civilised country.

This bit of the Bill is being put forward as part of a very populist and nasty culture war, to use the phrase of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. It is very dangerous. As the honourable Member for Maidstone, who has not been in this Chamber—perhaps one day she will come—but whose name has been mentioned at many points today, said, be careful about the difference, the fine line, between being popular and being populist. We might well remember that when we consider this part on Report.

My final thought is that in a former role I once had the privilege of chairing a meeting—it was, as I recall, at the Conservative Party conference. The audience was very sceptical about the value of human rights, and the Human Rights Act in particular. It was, potentially, a tricky meeting. I chaired a speaker who was addressing concerns in the audience about prisoners having human rights. Again, that is not a popular group in our society—prisoners and human rights is a bad cocktail. He was saying that prisoners have human rights and that some of them even thought that they had a right to a flushing toilet. What a disgrace that was—the audience was very upset and wanted to scrap the Human Rights Act, as some people still do. This eloquent and learned speaker said that it was very simple to deal with the problem: just fix the loo.

Fix the loo—do not demonise the prisoner, do not scrap the Human Rights Act, just fix the problem that is giving rise to the concern. In this case the fix would be to give people stopping places and the support that they need. The criminal law will deal with burglary and with people using their dogs to terrorise people, and will protect the innocent farmer. I wonder whether the eloquent speaker and passionate defender of the Human Rights Act who spoke at that meeting will remember the occasion, as I always have. He was, of course, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I remember that remark very well, and I adhere to everything that I said then. I hope that the noble Baroness is not setting up an Aunt Sally. The speech that I gave a moment ago did not criticise the proponents of these amendments. It criticised much of the content of Part 4 of the Bill. All I asked was that in seeking to provide a solution for one group of people we did not create a problem for another group.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for that. There is ample criminal law and ample tort law for nuisance. There are ample laws to protect people from burglary, nuisance and so on. This measure, however, is targeted. The euphemism is so thin: “without permission, with vehicles”. I wonder who we are talking about there. The euphemism makes this racial discrimination even more obscene.

Iraqi Interpreters

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I have just given the figures for both ARAP and the LESAS in Iraq. I do not think it could be said that we hang out to dry those people who help this country; I think we are very generous. It is true that in the theatre of war and the aftermath things often do not go as smoothly as they could, but we have done all we can and more.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, the fate of the Afghan interpreters and other people who have assisted us there has already fallen off the news agenda and our front pages. That applies with greater force, I suspect, to those from Iraq. Do Her Majesty’s Government have a policy of actively looking for people who need our help, or is a passive approach taken to this question?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, we have communication lines for people to access. Clearly, Afghanistan is a far more difficult environment than Iraq at this time, but, yes, we reach out to people.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for performing what I think must have been quite a difficult task in explaining so clearly this long and complicated Bill. In referring to my interest as a barrister in private practice, as set out in the register, I also say how much I am looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of another barrister, my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, who will bring his experience and wisdom to our proceedings, to our collective advantage.

I entirely agree with the Constitution Committee’s report on the Bill, published on 9 September, and with earlier speakers—I have said as much myself in relation to other Home Office and Ministry of Justice Bills over the last 30 years—that the Bill is far too big. I have seen worse examples of this habit of introducing excessively large Bills, but it seems to be a habit ingrained in these two departments. At least this Bill has only one volume, but it has 177 clauses, 20 large schedules, extends to almost 300 pages and covers a large number of disparate subjects. I make no personal criticism of my noble friend on the Front Bench, or other Ministers in this House who have the conduct of this Bill, because I doubt whether they have any say in the matter, but this insidious habit affects Cabinet Ministers from all parties as soon they are appointed to office in these two departments.

I am not sure whether it comes from a desire to appear to be actively responding to what is often mistakenly thought to be some acutely felt public need or to persuade colleagues on the Cabinet sub-committee on legislation that because the Bill is so big, it must be important and should come higher up the programme than other Bills vying for recognition and parliamentary time. Having attended that sub-committee, I know there is always strong competition for a place in the parliamentary legislative programme every Session, but it sometimes looked as though someone had swept an entirely random collection of ideas from Home Office or MoJ shelves into the Bill. Not for the first time, we are presented with a criminal justice Bill that contains some good and worthwhile provisions, others of lesser value or utility and, judging from my right honourable friend George Eustice’s recent press article, will soon have a plainly unnecessary additional provision to criminalise something that is already a crime—namely, dog theft. I think that in this House we can tell the difference between an Early Day Motion or virtue-signalling and a useful addition to the criminal law.

Bills that are too big do not receive proper scrutiny in the other place, where Governments strictly guillotine Bill Committee and Report stage schedules. This Bill is hugely controversial on several fronts and your Lordships’ House will want to give it the attention it deserves. There is no time in a crowded Second Reading debate to set out detailed arguments, but there is much wisdom in the Delegated Powers Committee’s report published yesterday. Many of us would like to see the Bill amended—some of us to take things out, some of us to put things in, and some of us to do both. There is much to be considered in the provisions of the Bill on public order, data gathering, life and minimum sentences, and delegated powers. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in relation to IPPs. While having concerns about those matters, and respecting the long-standing right to protest, I would like to alter the law on aggravated trespass so that those who disrupt a lawful activity should have the burden of proving, as opposed merely to asserting, that the activity they would like to disrupt, or have already disrupted, is unlawful.

Large criminal justice Bills cause unintended consequences, and I trust that the Committee and later stages of the Bill will not be rushed or truncated. Bills of this sort do not make easy work for the judges and lawyers who have the job of applying their provisions, once enacted, in real cases involving real people. When shadow Home Affairs and Justice Minister, I used to ask Labour Home and Justice Secretaries, including the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, how many of the provisions in the approximately 60 criminal justice statutes enacted by their Governments since 1997 were respectively still in force, had not been implemented or had been repealed before implementation. The answer was roughly one-third in each category. Let us therefore try to enact about 33% of this Bill well and coherently and just write newspaper articles about the rest.

Operation Midland

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, its primary focus was to learn the lessons of what went wrong during that period so that those mistakes would never be repeated. Obviously, the IOPC then declined to investigate further.

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, Lord Brittan demonstrated that it is possible to maintain one’s dignity in adversity. In the last months of his life, he was cruelly assailed by baseless allegations made by malicious users that would have broken healthy men. It is sad that he did not to live to witness his own exoneration and that his widow is still troubled by the acts and omissions of the police identified by the Henriques report. Does my noble friend agree that police officers who have taken an oath to uphold the law but who suborn it by perverting the course of justice by deliberately misleading a judge should not just be investigated for misconduct but prosecuted?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as I said, the IOPC has declined to investigate in certain areas. I know that certain cases have been given to Merseyside, as a separate force, to investigate, but it is sad that Lord Brittan did not get to see his name cleared and I understand the grief that his widow will be going through.

Antique Firearms Regulations 2020

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I recommend the article by Rupert Jones, “Firearms and Fury: The Rise of Gun Crime in the UK”, published in Counsel magazine for June 2018 and helpfully drawn to the Committee’s attention by the Library in advance of this debate. Together with the clear explanation by my noble friend the Minister, it makes the case for these regulations unanswerable. Were it permissible to do so, it should be annexed to the Official Report for this debate.

The penalties for gun crime are almost invariably severe. Mr Jones wrote about a registered firearms dealer who was sentenced to 30 years in prison for transferring illegal firearms and ammunition. He had Home Office authority not only to possess prohibited handguns but also to sell them. His criminal sideline involved making ammunition to fit antique guns. Despite being in prison since 2015, this man’s ammunition was being discharged by criminals on our streets and recovered by the police long afterwards. It very probably still is. It seems that one can lawfully buy a working handgun without any record of the transaction.

Despite the post-Dunblane restrictions, for some reason it was not thought that antique firearms, for which ammunition was no longer commercially manufactured, would be seen other than as items to be admired in collections. The non-commercial manufacture of ammunition is as old as gun-making itself. I have known people like me, who are legitimate and licensed owners of pre-1939 shotguns used only for game shooting, who used to make their own shotgun cartridges either to save money or as a hobby. That skill is well beyond me. However, my great-great uncle, the sixth Lord Walsingham—a trustee of the Natural History Museum until his death in 1919, perhaps one of the greatest game shots of his generation and a world-renowned ornithologist and lepidopterist—used to make paper cartridges filled with dust for a gun with a barrel no bigger than a pencil. He used them carefully to stun hummingbirds in the tropics so that he could study them close up.

Unfortunately, the private manufacture of modern ammunition specifically designed to be fired from otherwise lawful antique weapons in the course of crime is all too common. When I was Solicitor-General a decade ago, I learned that remarkably few handguns were used in a great many criminal shootings. A small number of illegally held handguns are available for hire to criminals and passed around from gang to gang. What I had not realised until I prepared for this debate is that the market is not limited to modern handguns and longer-barrelled weapons. Antique weapons are also used to commit crimes. If they are—I am sure that they are—we must do all that we can to prevent it. If these regulations help with that, so much the better.

Before concluding, I will say one more thing. At the time of the Dunblane reforms, ill-considered damage was done to the legitimate, competitive, Olympic sport of target shooting and its innocent participants. I join my noble friends Lord Shrewsbury and Lord Lucas in hoping that these otherwise commendable regulations cause nothing similar to law-abiding collectors of antique guns.

Law Enforcement and Security (Separation Issues etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 26th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, always informs our debates. One of the fears that I had during the Brexit debate before the referendum was that if we left the EU, we would damage the co-operation, and its speed and effectiveness, between the law enforcement and investigatory agencies of the United Kingdom and the remaining 27 states. Since we joined the EU, the bilateral assistance that our agencies have given individual EU countries and vice versa has only improved. Although there have been some glitches and a few eccentric decisions flowing from the use of European arrest warrants, the EAW system, as well as the wider international assistance in law enforcement and co-operation between the security services, has worked well to our mutual benefit.

I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern; my noble friend the Minister has clearly explained the ambit and purpose of these regulations. They should ensure that, when translated into our national law, they will be every bit as effective as before and deal with any deficiencies in retained EU law. There is a list of about 20 separate areas of law enforcement activity covered by these regulations in which we have, as a member of the EU, co-operated with other EU countries. No one can doubt their continuing importance to our own and our shared protection from the activities of the most serious criminals.

It is clearly vital that these regulations should be in force before 31 December this year and I doubt that the regulations themselves are controversial. The Government’s intentions are clear and understood. That said, the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, has made some pertinent points. However, I should like my noble friend the Minister to reassure me that, even when we have finally left the EU in the new year, the practical and operational work covered by the current legal framework will not diminish in volume and quality.

Terrorists, money launderers, cyber criminals and human traffickers will exploit any lack of international co-operation. They do not care or mind whether we are in or out of the EU. Investigations into their activities, and their prosecution with evidence gathered from both sides of the channel, must carry on without reduction or legal impediment after 31 December with the same, and even increased, operational vigour as they have until now. Departure from the EU is no reason for any alteration in our approach or metaphorically to cut the wires between the United Kingdom and the EU 27.

Hate Crime: Misogyny

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I certainly agree that freedom of speech is one of the most precious things we preserve in this country, but it comes with responsibility. Where freedom of speech is used as an excuse to inflict a hate crime on someone else, that line has been crossed.

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend’s last answer. We are all against the hatred of women, but does my noble friend agree that we do not need to create more offences when there are already laws dealing with misogyny? Is it not already a crime, for example, to breach the peace, to threaten violence against a woman, physically to attack a woman, both sexually and non-sexually, and to incite violence against a woman? Where those crimes are aggravated by hatred of the victim or women generally, the court will take that into account when sentencing the defendant. If the evidence is there, we can and should prosecute. We do not need more offences.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

We will keep an open mind until the Law Commission reports but my noble and learned friend is absolutely right in some of the things that he says. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, if we created a hate crime in relation to gender, we would have to think very carefully about whether it would apply to the entire population or just women. That is what the Law Commission is considering.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart has made both his first appearance at the Dispatch Box and his maiden speech. He spoke kindly and accurately of our noble and learned friend Lord Keen and modestly of himself, but we have already benefited from his being here with us. He is most welcome, and I look forward to meeting him in person before too long. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord McLoughlin on his maiden speech. His work in the other place in government and in opposition over many years, the way he performed it and the content and manner of his speech today suggest to me that we will have much to gain from his arrival here.

This Bill is being debated after the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal last December in the third direction case but before its consideration by the Court of Appeal. Although it has no retrospective effect, it will clear up some of the questions left hanging by that case, which concerned the lawfulness of a secret national security policy apparently authorising Security Service agents to engage in criminal activity, including, according to the claimants, torture and murder.

The facts of any particular operation involving the use of covert human intelligence sources are necessarily kept from the public and even from Parliament. That mystery creates mystique for some and suspicion in others. While the security services can cope with the mystique, some suspicions are better allayed than fomented. I used to think that there was an advantage in keeping things vague so that the Foreign Secretary or Home Secretary and their security advisers could pragmatically, but legitimately, apply their discretion and common sense to the difficult legal and operational problems that come with deploying agents at home or abroad.

In my experience of the senior officers of the security and armed services when I was Solicitor-General, they never wanted to bend or break the law, be it the criminal law, the law governing military action or the laws concerning surveillance and counterterrorism. Indeed, they were meticulous about staying within it, and I really do not think they were just telling me things they thought I wanted or ought to hear. Putting the law into statute would, I once believed, inhibit their ability to take quick decisions and create sclerosis within the chain of command. No one needed reminding not to murder or torture people because it would be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Intercepting suspected terrorists’ electronic communications was clearly a proportionate interference with their convention rights.

Part of me still thinks that keeping things pragmatically vague is sensible, but I am now persuaded that, even if the operations themselves and the identities of those providing vital information to the security or other services may often have to remain confidential for ever, the law governing their work should not be hidden, largely within the common law, to be revealed only when a judge’s interpretation of the law, often arrived at by necessary implication, is made public, as in the third direction case. It is also right that the government agencies to be covered by this Bill, and some other important questions, are thoroughly scrutinised in Committee.

The security services were put on a statutory footing in the 1990s, and other statutes have followed, but we now need to know what the rules are and to be able to say whether, in a democratic society, we approve of them. Some things must be kept secret, so we need to have confidence in the people who do this work in order that we can trust them, even if we do not know exactly what they are doing. Knowing what is permitted by statute, even if distasteful to some, helps to enhance that confidence. There are some things that, when known to the public, remove suspicion, even if they do not always lead to universal approval, but, in saying that, I do not expect the state to be absolved of all responsibility for its actions. The innocent bystander and his dependants, whose life, limb or livelihood are taken or damaged by someone whom this Bill absolves of particular criminal conduct, should not be left helpless and without remedy.

The preservation of our national well-being sometimes requires us to permit good people to do bad things. Today, especially, we remember that, in war, we justify the doing of terrible things by and to our Armed Forces to protect our freedoms and recognise that, in other fields of national conflict, we must permit that which, on other occasions, we would abhor.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill contains some necessary and useful provisions, but it may take some time to be sure. We are still assessing the good effects of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the several terrorism statutes passed since 2000.

Of course, this Government are reacting understandably to the attacks in London and Manchester, and perhaps even to those in Salisbury, and I fully accept the context laid out by my noble friend Lord Parkinson in his very clear opening to this debate. The security services are aware of hundreds of potential or actual plots, many of which, thankfully, they disrupt before any harm is done. They and the police are stretched but perform with great bravery and resilience to protect us from homegrown and foreign attacks, and nothing that I say detracts from my admiration and gratitude for what they do.

I refer to my registered interests as a practising member of the Bar and as a trustee of the Prison Reform Trust. I also welcome the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and congratulate him on his maiden speech, a thoughtful and considered contribution to our proceedings, which I hope will be the first of many. His home city recently suffered a terrorist attack, by no means the first in his diocese in his or my adult life, so he speaks with knowledge and insight. Our constitution is eccentric in permitting not only unelected Lords temporal, but also unelected Lords spiritual to legislate, but as he has just demonstrated, it is an eccentricity that we should celebrate.

My noble friend Lord Vaizey of Didcot has also given us a taste of things to come. He and I were not only Members of Parliament at the same time, but also Ministers at the same time. However, whereas I was in office for just over two years—metaphorically, 15 minutes—he served as Culture Minister for over six years, longer than any previous holder of that post. The son of Marina Vaizey, the writer and art critic, and the late Professor John Vaizey—Lord Vaizey, the academic and economist—my noble friend is not a man given to political hyperbole. He is a wise and thoughtful man. We will hear from him, often I hope, on subjects he has a deep knowledge of and great affection for. We are fortunate that he has joined us.

Regarding the Bill, I agree with lengthy sentences for those guilty of serious terrorist crimes, and whole-life terms if appropriate, but in the time available, I highlight just one subject, covered in Clauses 27 to 31: the release of terrorist offenders. This part of the Bill, which covers all three United Kingdom jurisdictions, will in essence remove from the Parole Board—I use that term generically—the power to direct the early release of certain dangerous terrorist offenders—that is, those terrorist offenders found to be dangerous by the sentencing court at the time they were sentenced, and where the offence carries a maximum of life imprisonment. These provisions apply to the most serious terrorist offences such as attack planning, directing a terrorist organisation, or giving and receiving terrorist training. They will also apply to manslaughter, kidnap and possession of explosives, when the court finds these were connected to terrorism.

I can understand that at first blush, and without giving the matter a great deal of thought, this might seem entirely reasonable. Why should offenders in that category be released at all, let alone early? There will, I accept, be some such offenders whose early release would not be recommended by the Parole Board because they remain as dangerous to the public after years in prison as they were when they were first sentenced. As always, I will defer, and have deferred, to the knowledge and expertise of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson.

However, before we remove the Parole Board from the picture, should we not pay attention to those noble Lords’ successor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC? In his note on this Bill, dated 1 June 2020, he described the removal of the Parole Board’s role of considering the early release of the most dangerous individuals convicted of terrorist offences as a “profound change”; clearly it is. He points to three immediate consequences: first, to the extent that the possibility of early release acts as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders who are going to spend the longest time in custody— that will now go; secondly, the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings will be removed; thirdly, child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults, will have lost the opportunity for early release.

The Government may very well have cogent reasons that justify Clauses 27 to 31, and if they do, I will pay close attention to them, as I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, will too. However, given that the independent reviewer is there to provide his considered opinion on the matter, we should perhaps pay careful attention to what he has had to say as well.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 2)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—

(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;

(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);

(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);

(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);

(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” has the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(4) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to certain offences listed in subsection (2).

New clause 4—Failure to prevent criminal financial offences in the UK—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a criminal financial offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with B.

(2) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the criminal financial offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(3) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing criminal financial offences.

(4) For the purposes of this clause—

“criminal financial offence” means an offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 [that could not be prosecuted under the offences created by sections 7 and 38 of this Act],

or, one of the offences listed below—

(a) an offence under section 1, 6 or 7 of the Fraud Act 2006;

(b) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968;

(c) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006;

(d) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

(e) the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

“relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 36.

(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”

This New Clause would create an offence of failing to prevent any financial offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 6—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in the Overseas Territories—

“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—

“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Overseas Territories

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—

(a) this Act; and

(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017

to take the steps set out in this section.

(2) The first step is, no later than 31 December 2018, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of the UK’s Overseas Territories to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.

(3) The second step is, no later than 31 December 2019, to prepare an Order in Council and take all reasonable steps to ensure its implementation, in respect of any Overseas Territory that has not yet introduced a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies within their jurisdiction. This Order would require the Overseas Territory to adopt such a register.

(4) In this section “a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.””

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take steps to provide that Overseas Territories establish publicly accessible registers of the beneficial ownership of companies, for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Part 3 of the Bill (corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion).

New clause 10—Duty to prevent use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity—

“(1) The Treasury may not lay regulations before Parliament on new Limited Partnerships before the Secretary of State has completed and published a review of the proposed regulations.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to review draft regulations which would allow the creations of new Limited Partnerships, in order to prevent the use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity.

(3) In performing that duty the Secretary of State must, in particular, have regard to the contribution transparency may make in tackling tax evasion, money laundering, national and cross border criminality, and terrorist financing.

(4) Following any review under subsection (2) the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament on what steps the Government will take to prevent new Limited Partnerships being used for criminal purposes.

(5) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Scottish Government,

(b) the National Crime Agency,

(c) the Serious Fraud Office,

(d) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(e) HMRC,

(f) interested third sector organisations, and

(g) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.”

This new clause sets a duty on the Secretary of State to review Treasury proposals for new Limited Partnerships to prevent their use for financial criminal activity, including tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing. In carrying out the review the Secretary of State will be required to consult those groups listed in subsection (5) and lay a report before Parliament.

New clause 11—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: consultation on other jurisdictions—

“(1) Within 12 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation on the issues listed in subsection (2).

(2) The issues are—

(a) the desirability of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories introducing equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act; and

(b) the steps that would need to be taken for the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to introduce equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act.

(3) As part of this consultation the Secretary of State must seek views from—

(a) the governments of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories,

(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or the governments specified in subsection (3)(a) consider appropriate,

(c) any other person or body who the Secretary of State deems relevant, with particular regard to non-governmental bodies and private sector entities.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report setting out the outcome of this consultation within 24 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

New clause 12—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: publication of convictions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report listing all bodies and organisations that have been found guilty of a failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence within the previous five years.”

New clause 13—Failure to prevent tax evasion offences: sentencing guideline—

“(1) The Secretary of State must produce sentencing guidelines for the level of fine to be imposed on bodies found guilty of failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence.

(2) Such guidance must stipulate that the maximum level of the fine cannot be greater than the total value of the tax whose evasion was facilitated.”

New clause 14—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 3)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means any of the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—

(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or

(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.

(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 15—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 4)—

“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).

(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—

“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—

(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;

(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;

(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);

(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);

(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);

(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).

“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.

(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—

(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or

(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.

(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—

(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or

(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.

(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.

(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—

(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or

(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”

This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

New clause 16—Conversion of platforms to centralised registers: review—

“(1) Within one year of this Act receiving Royal Assent the Secretary of State must establish a review of the operational efficacy of closed beneficial ownership platforms created by Crown Dependencies or British Overseas Territories that are subject to the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity.

(2) The aim of the review will be to gather information to equip Her Majesty’s Government to take all steps necessary to provide financial, administrative or any other support to assist Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in converting all such beneficial ownership platforms into closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.

(3) In the course of the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the governments of any Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories which have created closed beneficial ownership platforms and which are subject to the automatic exchange of information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity; and

(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or governments under subsection (3)(a) deem appropriate.

(4) The review shall be completed and laid before Parliament within one year of its establishment.

(5) No later than one year after the review has been laid before Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government must have taken all steps necessary to assist relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in the establishment of closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.

(6) Her Majesty’s Government shall supply quarterly reports to Parliament of the progress of steps taken under subsection (5), and such reports shall set out—

(a) concerns expressed by relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories about conversion of beneficial ownership platforms to centralised registers, and

(b) an assessment by Her Majesty’s Government of the extent to which objections to the creation of centralised registers can be justified on a constitutional, economic, administrative or any other operational basis.”

New clause 17—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies—

“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—

“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—

(a) this Act; and

(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017

to take the actions set out in this section.

(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.

(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019, to publish legislative proposals to require the Government of any Crown dependency that has not already established a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to do so.

(4) In this section—

“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.

“legislative proposals” means either—

(a) a draft Order in Council; or

(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.”

New clause 18—Whistleblowing in relation to failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector in relation to the disclosure of suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering.

(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to—

(a) arrangements to protect the anonymity of persons disclosing suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering;

(b) the efficacy of current penalties for institutions that treat whistleblowers unfairly, and proposals for future criminal penalties.

(3) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) whistleblowers in the banking and financial services sector,

(b) devolved administrations,

(c) interested charities,

(d) the relevant regulators, and

(e) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay the report to Parliament within six months of the passing of this Act.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector, in consultation with those groups listed in subsection (3), and then lay a report before Parliament on steps the Government will take to bring forward penalties for institutions that fail to protect whistleblowers.

New clause 19—The culture of the banking industry and failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion—

“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into the extent to which banking culture contributed to the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the banking sector.

(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to, the following issues—

(a) the impact of culture change on decision making senior executive and board level;

(b) the pressure on staff to meet performance targets;

(c) how allegations of tax evasion are reported and acted on.

(3) The review must set out what steps the UK Government intends to take to ensure that banking culture is not facilitating tax evasion.

(4) In carrying out this review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) devolved administrations;

(b) HMRC;

(c) the Serious Fraud Office;

(d) the Financial Conduct Authority;

(e) interested charities, and

(f) anyone else the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

(5) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the review before the House of Commons within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

New clause 20—Report on the impact of the criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the coming into force of the provisions in Tax Management Act 1970 relating to criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities introduced by section 165 of the Finance Act 2016 publish a report on the impact of the introduction of these offences.

(2) The report must include, but need not be limited to, information about—

(a) the number of persons who have been charged with offences under each of sections 106B, 106C and 106D of the Tax Management Act 1970;

(b) the number of persons who have been convicted of any such offence;

(c) the average fine imposed; and

(d) the number of people upon whom a custodial sentence has been imposed for any such offence.”

New clause 21—Report on income lost to tax evasion—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the passing of this Act, prepare and publish a report, in consultation with stakeholders, on the value of income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.

(2) The report must include the following—

(a) the value of the income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences in the financial years—

(i) 2015-16;

(ii) 2014-15;

(iii) 2013-14;

(iv) 2012-13; and

(v) 2011-12;

(b) a detailed summary of the model used by HMRC for estimating income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.

(c) an assessment of the efficacy of HMRC’s performance in relation to dealing with tax evasion, including—

(i) a breakdown of specific HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement of tax evasion matters;

(ii) details of the numbers of staff in each of the years listed in paragraph (a) who are located within departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion;

(iii) details of the budgets allocated to departments or units dealing with investigation above; and

(iv) details of the numbers of prosecutions or the amount of tax recovered in each financial year listed in paragraph (a) as a result of the work of HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion in those financial years.”

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I shall be relatively brief in introducing this group of new clauses. In moving new clause 2, which stands in my name and those of a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House and which mirrors new clauses 3, 4, 14 and 15, I want to introduce a debate about the future of corporate criminal liability in this jurisdiction. I must declare an interest, as over the past few years I have been instructed by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of cases involving the prosecution of large international companies. One of the problems that prosecutors and, no doubt, investigators have found in this jurisdiction when dealing with the modern corporate landscape—to use that hideous jargon—involves trying to fix liability on a company suspected of criminal activity, as a matter of criminal law. It is not difficult to fix criminal liability on an individual if the evidence is there: the person either did or did not do it, and they either did or did not have the necessary criminal intent.

Under current English law, however, fixing criminal liability on a corporation involves resorting to what is called the identification principle. This involves finding someone of sufficient seniority within a corporation who can act as or be described as the directing mind of the company. Through that identified person, we can then move on to fix criminal liability on the corporation. That was fine in the Victorian era, when most companies had one or two directors. An example would be a small business in a market town in the 1860s or 1870s, which would have been owned and directed by two or three men—it was always men in those days. If a fraud was committed on behalf of the company, it would have been perfectly easy to find the directing mind of that company among the small group of directors.

As the industrial revolution and corporate legal development proceeded during the late 19th century and early 20th century, however, it became clear that companies were getting bigger. An increase in international trade meant that companies based in this country had offices, and directing minds, in other parts of the world. In 1912, the United States dealt with this by doing away with the identification principle involving the directing mind and, through case law, by developing a principle in criminal law that a company could be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its employees on the basis that they were conducting criminal activities for the benefit and on behalf of the company.

We in this country reached the stage long ago at which we needed to reform the way in which we look at corporate criminal liability. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless), with his Scottish legal experience, will no doubt inform us whether the situation is the same in Scotland as it is in England, but I believe that it is uncontroversial to say that the Victorian identification principle is no longer apt to deal with international corporations. I am not picking on the company that I am about to mention because I think it has committed a criminal offence; quite the contrary—I just want to use it as an example of a large international company. British Telecommunications is a huge company that employs hundreds of thousands of people all around the globe doing various things in the telecoms world, all of them entirely legitimate and beneficial to the company, its shareholders and our national economy. Surely, however, it is a matter of common sense to say that it would be extremely difficult nowadays to fix upon an individual or small group of individuals as representing the directing mind of that company if it was suspected that an offence had been committed many miles away from the main board and the headquarters of the company in London. I repeat that I have used British Telecommunications simply as an example of a large international company with operations right around the world.

Of course it would be perfectly possible to fix upon an individual, a human being, who had committed an offence. It might well be that that individual had committed an offence for the benefit of the international corporation, but unless that person was of sufficient seniority within the hierarchy of that great big international company, it would be very difficult to fix criminal liability for that person’s offence on the corporation as well. As I have said, the United States has been getting round that problem for more than 100 years by using the principle of vicarious liability, which we are used to dealing with in this country in civil law but not in criminal law.

I believe that there are two ways in which we can approach this question, and this is the whole point of the new clauses that I and others have tabled. First, we could use the American system of vicarious liability, and there are plenty of good arguments for doing so. Secondly, we could approach the problem—as we have done in the new clauses—by using the failure to prevent regime, in which, when a company fails to prevent someone or another body associated with it from committing a specified offence, it thereby becomes liable for the criminal offence itself. We already have that provision on the statute book in section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, and it is about to be added to the statute book through the existing provisions in this Bill relating to tax offences. That follows David Cameron’s speech to the corruption summit at Lancaster House last summer.

In pushing forward these new clauses, I want to invite Parliament, in this House and the other place, and the Government—by which I mean not only the political Government but the non-political Government: the officials who run the Government day by day and advise on matters of policy—to consider whether extending the failure to prevent regime would be an easier and better way to deal with this than turning the whole thing on its head by adopting the vicarious liability principle wholesale.

There are plenty of arguments for and against the extension of the section 7 failure to prevent bribery model. I have attended a number of meetings with criminal lawyers who are far more experienced than I am. Indeed, I see one sitting just two Benches in front of me, behind the Minister. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) will know, as I have come to learn over the past few years since I have taken an interest in corporate crime, that a number of difficulties are created by the failure to prevent model. I will not rehearse them all now, but some of those difficulties were set out on Friday 13 January 2017 in the Ministry of Justice’s “Call for evidence” paper, which sets out five options for a failure to prevent regime.

I favour the failure to prevent model over the vicarious liability model because it is already set within our system. The new clauses would not extend the principle but merely extend the ambit of the criminal offences that could come within a failure to prevent system. The provisions will not be brought into this Bill because it is highly unlikely that the Government would accept any of them—albeit they may nod politely at them—when the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence process is still open. However, I hope that the Government will look carefully at the shape and design of the new clauses with a view to considering vigorously whether what we have proposed as a matter of principle is worthy of greater thought.

The intention of new clause 2 is to create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, as defined by reference to the offences listed in part 2 of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Again, I will do my best to be brief. That schedule brought in the deferred prosecution agreement system for dealing with errant companies. I declare an interest, with both capital and small letters, in that not only have I been instructed by the SFO in two of the three deferred prosecution agreements that have so far taken place, but I brought the system into law when I was Solicitor General—at least I began it before I got the sack. There is a cloud in every silver lining, is there not?

[Sir Henry Bellingham (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Very few in this case.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

Very few. I am diverting myself, because I deliberately said “a cloud in every silver lining” not “a silver lining in every cloud.”

The short point is that schedule 17 to the 2013 Act contains about 50 economic and financial criminal offences that can be dealt with through deferred prosecution agreements between either the Crown Prosecution Service or the SFO on the one hand and corporations—that is to say respondents and defendants that are not human beings—on the other. Those offences are perfectly capable of being moved across into the failure to prevent regime. As I said, section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 makes it an offence to fail to prevent bribery, and we are about to have an offence of failing to prevent a tax offence, so why not—I ask rhetorically on this occasion—extend the failure to prevent regime across to these other offences? New clause 3 does exactly the same, save that it limits the offences to those set out in its subsection (2).

New clauses 4, 14 and 15 contain provisions suggested by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) that broadly address the same issue that I am discussing. I will not press new clause 2 to a Division, because these are probing amendments designed to create a public discussion, and I hope that they will inform the Ministry of Justice’s discussion paper. I also hope that they will encourage the Home Office and the Minister, with whom I have had some useful discussions about this and other matters to do with the Bill, to consider carefully and positively the extension of the failure to prevent regime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Flint]

I will not press new clause 6 to a vote. I do not believe that the Minister has really answered the points that have been made by hon. Members across the House. I am sure that this matter will be picked up in the other place, and I reserve the right to pick it up once again with my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) when it returns to this place.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

My new clause 2 was drafted and tabled before Christmas. Since then, I have had a number of meetings with my hon. Friend the Minister and we have also seen the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence in relation to corporate criminal liability. In the light of what he has said this afternoon, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Public Registers of Beneficial Ownership of Companies registered in Crown Dependencies

‘(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—

“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—

(a) this Act; and

(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017

to take the actions set out in this section.

(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.

(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019, to publish legislative proposals to require the Government of any Crown dependency that has not already established a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to do so.

(4) In this section—

“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.

“legislative proposals” means either—

(a) a draft Order in Council; or

(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.” —(Dr Huq.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.