(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I appreciate that the Committee dealt with some clauses regarding polygraphs on the previous day in Committee, to the extent of filleting the Bill so that certain provisions do not extend beyond England and Wales. I apologise to the Committee that I did not retrieve Amendments 19A and 19B, which were tabled at that time. I shall save my more general remarks about polygraphs for the next grouping, as this is a narrow point.
Section 30 of the Offender Management Act excludes the use of two matters as evidence in any proceedings against a released person. Those matters are physiological reactions and a statement made during participation in a polygraph session. The amendment would make it clear that those matters could not be used as evidence in proceedings against a third party, its purpose being to ask whether that is now the case. When dealing with terrorism offences, there must be a lot of interest in the contacts of individuals—and, perhaps, a lot of interest in finding evidence that can be used against those other people.
I was very grateful for the teach-in arranged by the MoJ on how these sessions are currently run for sex offenders. During that briefing, it was explained to us that the sessions are not fishing or trawling for information; they are not wide-ranging discussions to see what an offender might let slip. They use closed questions, to which the answer will primarily be yes or no. It seems to me that some questions can lend themselves to inquiries about situations which may be relevant to other persons: for instance, “Since our last session, have you had any contact with, direct or indirect, or any news of X?” or “Has your wife had any news of X’s family?” My amendment is to probe whether the answers can be used in evidence against X. I beg to move.
My Lords, I regard this group and the next as essentially probing the Government on the use of polygraphs in relation to those convicted of serious terrorism offences. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I attended the briefing last week, during which the potential use of polygraphs was explained; I also found it useful. As I understand it, polygraphs will be a tool—not instead of anything else—to assist in monitoring by the National Probation Service of offenders who have been convicted of serious terrorist offences and are considered at high risk of causing further serious harm.
I need a little convincing that their use in monitoring sexual offenders is really a terribly useful precedent for the challenge presented by serious terrorist offenders, who often have particular ideological convictions which may make detecting lies or inconsistences rather a different challenge from serious sexual offenders, although I understand that polygraphs have been used by the National Probation Service since about 2013.
I suspect piloting may not be particularly easy, given the numbers involved. We all know from the terrible events following, for example, what happened at Fishmongers’ Hall how challenging it is to assess whether someone has been successfully rehabilitated or not. During the last group, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, stressed how important it was for there to be “effective deradicalisation”. I am sure all noble Lords agree that is a desirable aim, but it is something of a holy grail. As we discussed in Committee last week, effective deradicalisation has been a significant challenge for those responsible for managing offenders, not just in this country but in many others where Islamic terrorists and other extremists have presented problems.
I understand the primary purpose of this Bill to be protecting the public from the very serious consequences of offences committed by these offenders. That does not preclude the possibility of rehabilitation, but I think the balance in the public’s view is very much in favour of protecting them.
I understand that there will be an internal review of this polygraph testing—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, said so in response to a previous group—and that it is considered that it may involve something like 150 offenders, a relatively small cohort. He also said the responsibility for these offenders might, as I understand it, eventually be transferred to a specialist branch of the National Probation Service—the NSD. Experience of handling terrorist offenders in particular would certainly be desirable.
Although I look forward to the Minister’s response, this process of assessing how best to assist in monitoring serious offenders seems very challenging. Those with that responsibility need all the help they can get, given the difficulties they will encounter. At the moment, I see considerable advantage in using these polygraphs.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It would have been added to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, but I was caught out by the speed at which we suddenly arrived at these proceedings. I appreciate that there are differences between the amendments, including the time period for review, and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is not confined to prisoners sentenced under Part 1. In particular, there is the criteria for assessment to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred.
Like others, I have been struck by Ian Acheson’s work. One of the many things that he has said that has been quoted widely is that:
“We cannot speak to dead terrorists. We can speak for dead victims. They demand that policymakers take risks to ensure that the people who wish to harm us through a corrupt ideology are engaged, not shunned. This should happen not because states are weak, but because they are confident the strength of their values will ultimately prevail.”
He has, of course, described prisons as incubators of radical behaviour. They are incubators of crime of all sorts: Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, drug crime and other organised crime. Are there hothouses within the incubators? Given that resources are not infinite, what is the best balance between work in prison and work in the community? To pick up a point made earlier this afternoon, I do not regard the rights of offenders versus the public as being the issue; both are about effective means of achieving the safety of the public.
Programmes must be assessed and, no doubt, evaluation and adaptation is not a one-off but a continuing process. All this has a context: the conditions in our prisons. That is hardly a novel point. How suitable are those places for rehabilitation? How well trained are staff? Do they have the capacity to spot the signs of how prisoners are affected by other prisoners and by their experience of imprisonment?
I have not seen mention, though I am sure it has been addressed, of the recruitment of staff from Muslim communities, who may be alert to what non-Muslims would not see. In the interests of balance, I should refer—although I am not sure how—to those who might be thought of, in a prejudiced, caricatured way, as having right-wing sympathies. I am not sure how you would do that, but I want to make it clear that this is not a single issue.
If terrorists are segregated from the rest of the prison population, does that reinforce their beliefs and attitudes? Is there a cumulative experience? What if the terrorism is rooted in different, opposing ideologies? What are the vulnerabilities of prisoners to becoming radicalised? How different is that process from being drawn further into, say, drugs crime or other violent crime? Indeed, may it not require more sophistication and knowledge to draw someone into Islamist extremism, which, as I understand it—others will know much more about it—involves much teaching and studying of the Koran?
None of this can be separated from what goes on outside prison, including when a prisoner is on licence. The skills required by the probation service are considerable, especially in the face of what I understand to be increasing sophistication on the part of prisoners on licence regarding how to game the system—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, may have referred obliquely to that. I cannot begin to answer my questions, and there are not nearly enough of them, but this is the moment to ask them.
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming my noble friend Lord Wolfson to his position. I can say from experience that it is a challenging but rewarding post.
It is well understood that deradicalisation programmes are particularly challenging to evaluate. There is nothing new about this. I remember attending meetings in Brussels to discuss with my fellow Justice Ministers the problem of radicalisation in prison and the best response to it. There was no real agreement on that but my clear impression was that in 2015, we were already adopting a much more sophisticated approach to the problem than were other countries within the European Union. This is not some tedious pro-Brexit point: the whole purpose of our meeting was to try to share intelligence and work out the best response. However, even the most enthusiastic supporter of the various deradicalisation initiatives would acknowledge the difficulty of assessing their success or otherwise.
As I understand it, there are already a number of programmes deployed in prisons that are targeted at terrorist offenders, and I expect the Minister to tell us a great deal more about them. I have read what Jonathan Hall said about what are, effectively, offences that are committed in prison by the radicalisation of prisoners by other prisoners. This may well have happened in the case of the murder of three men in Forbury Gardens in Reading, which many noble Lords will remember all too clearly.
In 2016, Ian Acheson made a number of recommendations. A number of noble Lords have said that little progress has been made. I await the Minister’s comments on that, but I understood that quite a few initiatives had been taken, including training officers to spot signs of extremism and increasing the number of staff with specific counter-terrorism experience or knowledge.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have various amendments in this group, but I start with a general point: all the amendments in the Marshalled List where mine is the first name were proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, and I have been tasked by the committee to raise them with your Lordships. I take this opportunity to thank not only the committee but its officials, who have done a huge amount of work on the Bill, particularly Samantha Godec. Having said that, I have no doubt that my noble friends will agree with much that I have to say, but I leave that to them. I suspect that I will not be able to refrain from commenting on some other amendments.
The committee has put forward amendments that seek to ensure that the Bill restricts rights only to the extent necessary and proportionate—terms with which noble Lords will be very familiar. I make it clear, though I hope it does not need saying, that this is by no means wholesale opposition to the Bill. We recognise that the Government need powers to defend national security, but when powers engage human rights or interfere with them, they must be clearly prescribed, necessary in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim. The committee was concerned that the Bill legislates close to the line and sometimes crosses it, taking the criminal law further into private spaces. It looked, as noble Lords would expect, for the right balance between liberty and security.
Among the evidence that we received was a long paper from Professor Clive Walker, adviser to successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, who commented:
“It can readily be demonstrated that the United Kingdom already has the most extensive counter terrorism code in Europe if not the world”.
That was a point made by Max Hill before he became the independent reviewer; he has said several times that we have sufficient offences, we do not need any more. The obligation on us is obviously to identify whether there are gaps that need to be filled, and whether we agree with the Government about that. Professor Walker also made the point, which I think is worth repeating at this point—I am not seeking to make a Second Reading speech—that,
“criticism should be made of the failure on the part of Home Office to issue any consultation paper prior to the CT&BS Bill”.
He wrote about the value of a pre-legislation phase, allowing not only for public scrutiny but for other independent proposals, and said how well that worked in the case of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act.
My name is attached to Amendments 3 and 5 in this group and I have also given notice that I oppose Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.
The noble Baroness has indicated to the House that she speaks, in effect, on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we are all grateful for its report. Can she help the House in that context with one thing? The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of course, has particular reference to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. Does she and her committee consider it important also to consider the rights of citizens affected by, or potentially affected by, acts of terrorism or encouragement to terrorism, whether it be their rights under Article 2 or Article 8 of the convention? These are, of course, also human rights.
Indeed they are, my Lords, and that was why I very deliberately mentioned security as well as liberty in my opening words. It would be wrong to give the noble Lord an assurance that we specifically discussed those rights in the same way or at the same length as other rights, but I have been in enough meetings of the committee to know that that is a backdrop to the other rights we address. I hope that reassures him. It may not, but I did say that we were not opposing this Bill in any wholesale way.
Amendment 3 would leave out paragraph (b) and instead insert a reference to intention,
“to encourage support for a proscribed organisation”.
Other noble Lords have referred to that at some length. I agree with the point about context made by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza—whether this is the point at which to agree with her or not, I do not know. But I do think context assists one to understand what is in the mind of a person making a statement or undertaking an act.
Regarding Amendment 5, I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. His point about open discussion is an important one. I know that he balances the importance of transparency and free debate on these matters. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about “support” and “supportive”. In debate and correspondence, the Government have relied on Section 4 of the 2000 Act as providing a route to apply to the Home Secretary for de-proscription. I do not challenge that, but do not think it is by any means a complete answer to this. The defence in the 2000 Act only protects statements of support related to a de-proscription application. It is not a defence for those taking part in debate outside those proceedings.
The clause creates a new offence, and the Minister in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons said:
“Dealing effectively with the power of inspiration or incitement is not new”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 28/6/18; col. 71.]
I do not read this clause as being about incitement or inspiration. Recklessness is lesser than that.
I have a specific question for the Minister about new subsection 1A(b), which refers to a person to whom a statement, or whatever, is directed. I would like to understand the term “directed”. Are you directing something if it is not addressed to a named person or an identifiable/identified group? If you tweet or post something on Facebook, accessible to the world, are you directing that? The Minister in the Commons made a point similar to the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He gave the example of walking down a high street swinging a baseball bat. Are the people who might see a tweet equivalent to the pedestrians in the high street?
My Lords, I accept entirely that it is better, if at all possible, to clarify what constitutes not so much a defence but in which circumstances there will not be an offence, which I think is the way Amendment 17 is framed. If I understand it correctly, the answer to most of the objections lies in the word “solely” because, of course, if there is evidence of mixed reasons for someone being in an area, these provisions would not have a proper ambit at all. However, I share the reservations of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier about visiting a dependent family member.
I want to raise a more general point about what Clause 4 intends to do. It is concerned with the designated area and the Government are not concerned primarily about protecting people visiting the area and ensuring their safety. Of course, journalists and those working for humanitarian purposes risk their own safety very considerably by going into such areas. The Government are concerned—perhaps my noble friend the Minister will confirm this—to prevent the risk of terrorism, as the Bill is headed. When looking at the risk of terrorism, the Explanatory Notes state:
“Such a risk may arise, in particular, if a conflict in a foreign country, potentially involving a proscribed terrorist organisation, acted as a draw to UK nationals or residents to travel to that country to take part in the conflict or otherwise support those engaged in the conflict”.
In other words, we want to stop people fighting against the United Kingdom. That, I suggest, is what this is really about, although my noble friend may disabuse me of that. If so, this is quite a convoluted way of achieving the aim of preventing an individual or individuals assisting or fighting against the United Kingdom. I shall raise this point again on Wednesday under my own amendment concerning the possible introduction of the offence of treason, because that is what it would be. Although this is a useful provision and I can see what it is driving at, I respectfully wonder whether it is really the answer to the evil it is aimed at in this case.
My Lords, I tabled Amendments 21 and 22 in this group. I was not surprised, given the authors, to be more attracted to Amendment 17 than to my own amendment, but I have a couple of questions related to points already raised. I too wonder about the word “solely”. If, for one or more of the reasons listed, someone went for a reason authorised by the legislation or in regulations but did something outside them, might that cause a problem? Perhaps more importantly, I also have a question about the registered charity, regarding the jurisdiction in which it would have to be registered. It is important to address the position of charities, not just for charity workers but because the trustees will have a duty of care towards their staff. They will have an important interest in ensuring that what their staff are doing is appropriate within what the law allows.
I turn to the phrase,
“visiting a dependent family member”.
I wonder about the word “dependent”. A sick mother would be unlikely to be dependent if the son or daughter is not there supporting the family member. Perhaps one might look at extending that. However, I like the approach. I do not think it is an alternative to what is set out in Amendment 22. That would provide for regulations for authorisation—not just the grounds for applying for authorisation but also the “procedure for applying”, the “timescales for determining” it, which might be important in particular circumstances, and “rights of appeal”, which should be dealt with by some means or other. As I say, this is not an alternative; rather, there are procedural points in this that should be addressed.
I am grateful to the organisation Bond for briefing me about the position in Australia and Denmark, to which the noble Lord referred. It has put a note at the end of its briefing to remind me that the proposal for the restrictions was promoted at the exact time that nine people were arrested for travelling to Syria to become foreign fighters—proving that the existing legal provisions are “rather effective”, to use its words.
I am aware that in Australia there is an overarching exemption for the International Committee of the Red Cross, but I understand that it can be extended to other humanitarian organisations. I do not know whether any noble Lord taking part in this Committee knows how far that has been extended. I take the points about monitoring and, while putting forward these provisions, I am aware that we must balance that against the administrative burden, to which I suspect the Minister may refer. There will be an administrative burden but the benefits that could be achieved by amendments such as the ones we have been debating outweigh that. I simply wanted to anticipate that argument.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is a range of available options. For example, there is a youth conditional caution, where a caution can have conditions attached. These conditions must be rehabilitative, reparative and punitive; punitive conditions can include unpaid work and a financial penalty. However, the most widely used community sentence for those under 18 is a referral order which has a clear basis in restorative justice. A youth rehabilitation order, which can include as many as 18 different requirements, is also an alternative to custody.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that what is important, as well as the aspects he has shared with the House, it that there should be consistency across police forces in the use of cautions?
I do agree with my noble friend. The Ministry of Justice has hitherto given administrative guidance but, in order to provide transparency and clarity for both the police and public, we are legislating. Clause 14 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill sets out restrictions on the use of cautions and makes quite clear the circumstances in which cautions are appropriate, to encourage the very consistency to which the noble Baroness refers.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to our short debate on this and for the thorough contributions to the Bill Committee which discussed these important, although relatively obscure to some, provisions.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred to the fact that Professor Cooke had not specifically considered the question of the 15% trigger. I can assure him, and the House, that she has now considered it and approves the amendment, which has her blessing as well as that of the Government. The Government think the 15% trigger is high enough to ensure that the level of the statutory legacy is adjusted only where there has been enough of a rise in inflation to warrant it. I, too, remember the days referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
In answer to the question raised by the noble Baroness about the word “available” in new paragraph 3A of the amendment, this refers to the Statistics Board publication of the consumer prices index for a particular month. The index is published on the website of the Office for National Statistics. The monthly publication dates are published a year in advance.
I turn to the query of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Clause 1 refers to the interest payable on an unpaid statutory legacy. New Schedule 1A refers to the level of the statutory legacy overall. I understand that the different rates apply in different circumstances and are compatible. We will take cognisance of this matter and refer it back at Third Reading if there is any residual doubt on it.
My Lords, before the Minister finishes, I will test the patience of the House and say that I understand his common-sense answer, which was what I expected. However, I am not completely convinced that the Bill, incorporating this amendment, actually says that. I will leave that with him, as it is not very sensible for the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, to go to and from the Box to answer a rather technical question. However, we are all such pedants in this Chamber that I know we all want it to be correct.
I follow the noble Baroness to take a little further our discussion on the impact of Clause 1 and the amendments. If I understand the noble Lord correctly, there are two situations. One will be governed by one rate of interest, as specified in Clause 1, and the other will be covered by these amendments. This raises a further question of why there should not be consistency, in terms of the interest to be calculated, in respect of what appear to be two separate situations. If they are not separate situations, there is a degree of confusion; if they are separate, there needs to be a rationale for having two different rates of interests. I invite the noble Lord to consider that before Third Reading. It may or may not need tidying up. On the face of it, there seems to be something slightly awry with the position we will be in when the amendment is passed.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reassuring noises; he has shown himself, as usual, to be a listening Minister. The expression “nuisance or annoyance” has a pedigree, as I think he said, in the housing context. It is almost a term of art, so widely has it been used over the years in the context of breach of covenant in common law, and it has found its way into statute.
Of course, a particular housing situation is not precisely analogous to anti-social behaviour. Nonetheless, there is a substantial accumulation of case law that the judges will understand and, I suggest, they will interpret it accordingly. I repeat what I said earlier: it seems that in any event the reasonableness is part of the judge’s task in deciding whether or not it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Reasonableness will be the watchword, as will the obligations that the court has under the Human Rights Act.
Where I suggest it is important to import reasonableness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, is at the stage of defining with some degree of objectivity the nuisance and annoyance so that neither the agencies nor the court are in any way diverted by simply having to accept a subjective interpretation of what counts as anti-social behaviour. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that. I appreciate that this does not in any way weaken the power, but it should reassure those who are naturally concerned about the potential for this power to be used oppressively, and that reassurance would be at least provided, I hope, by an appropriate amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was quite right to wait for others to table the amendment before adding my name, so that they could all go first with the arguments. I tried to canter through them at Second Reading in considerable haste and will try to be quick now. I accept that the new clause is to do with compensation, not the criminal law, otherwise every overturned conviction would lead to a right to compensation and Section 133 makes it clear that that is not the case. However, what has been troubling me is that if you do not have to prove innocence at the original trial and then the matter turns on a new or a newly discovered fact, surely you would not have had to prove that. If the fact had been available at the time of the trial, this would not have changed whether you would have to have proved your innocence, which you did not have to do. I do not see that bringing in a new fact should change that at all. I do not see why that is necessary now.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has said that this is about who should be entitled to compensation. The Government say that it is about clarity. They do not argue in any effective way that the amounts involved are such as to require a change in the law in order to save the taxpayer. The impact assessment on this clause says:
“The intended effect is to lessen the burden on taxpayers and reduce unnecessary and expensive legal challenges to Government decisions to refuse compensation”.
Those are two quite separate points. The lessening of the burden on taxpayers is very small, but legal challenges to government decisions are another matter. That goes to clarity and it seems to me—I am not nearly as well qualified as everyone else who has spoken—that the chain of cases we have has produced the clarity. The impact assessment says that we need the provisions to be unambiguous and decisions on eligibility to be more transparent. I should have thought that the cases have taken us to that point.
My Lords, I fear that I do not share the view just expressed by my noble friend Lady Hamwee that the law is clear at the moment. The number of decisions, one following another, with disagreements between judges in the same tribunal indicates the difficulty of the question and, I conclude, the lack of clarity in the test that should be applied. One of the reasons for this provision is in order to provide clarity. That, I believe, it does. The second question is whether it is appropriate and whether it offends the presumption of innocence. I am part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and originally I took the view that it did offend the presumption of innocence. I have changed my mind, having thought about it. Although I was not often able to persuade the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, of anything, he has contributed to persuading me, on the other hand, of the merits of the arguments he advanced, both at Second Reading and today.
I have also had the opportunity of reading the cases of Allen v the United Kingdom and KF v the United Kingdom and I agree with the noble and learned Lord that they do not in any way require the retention of the law in its current state, or that they offend the presumption of innocence—provided, it seems, that some judge, in declining to award compensation, does not make any comment to the effect that there is any doubt about someone’s innocence.
I also respectfully disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, that the point of these applications for compensation is to hold the state to account. The point of the applications is to obtain compensation, and the difficult question is that of who is entitled to it. It is not an easy question, but in my submission the Government have come to the correct answer. Sadly, a few people who are genuinely innocent will not obtain compensation, which in my view, for the reasons given, is an unsatisfactory element. However, it does not involve people being deprived of their liberty; it is simply a question of compensation.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, warned the Minister that those directly behind him were not unanimously supportive of the Government’s position. I have previously warned the Minister that those at a bit of an angle to him are, similarly, not wholly with him.
I wish I had used the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when I recently brought some young cousins into the Chamber and attempted to explain the separation of powers. That is exactly what this is about. Recently the Government have sometimes responded to judgments of the courts as though the courts sought to usurp policy-making powers. They are not the first Government to do so. That very response demonstrates the importance of the role of the courts, and the need to demonstrate our integrity as a country for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, has just explained.
My Lords, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his experience and the consistency of his approach to this issue. I also acknowledge how delicate the situation is, how important the liberty of the individual is and that any powers of this nature ought to be hedged by a great many safeguards. However, a decision of this nature is one that falls to the Home Secretary to take. So far, the judges who have these powers have exercised the right to scrutinise thoroughly in a way that we cannot feel is short of what might be desired. I respectfully submit that it is a power that should belong to the Home Secretary, who makes these decisions, no doubt with great anxiety and the consciousness that any decision that she makes will be looked at very carefully.
A judge will have an opportunity to look at a particular case on an ad hoc basis. However, we should not underestimate the strategic role of the Home Secretary to see an act or potential act of terrorism, or a terrorist, in the wider scope. Notwithstanding all the powerful speeches that have been made, I respectfully submit that this is a question that belongs to the Home Secretary and her alone.
My Lords, consistency has become something and since I opposed this amendment on the last occasion I intend to be consistent in opposing it on this occasion.
Of course, the arguments are extremely beguiling in favour of an annual review. Any provision which threatens the liberty of the subject demands anxious consideration at every level. But there is a difference between what happened in 2005 and what we are confronted with today. I am sure that those who brought in those provisions—those exceptional and extraordinary measures—hoped that they would not be necessary for more than a short period. Unfortunately, that has not proved to be the case. This Bill is the result of a careful and thorough review of counterterrorism and of mature reflection by a number of people that, sadly, powers of this nature need to remain. There have been important modifications to these powers, including the higher threshold for the Secretary of State before deciding that there should be such provisions and the removal of the relocation measures. There has been a degree of sensitivity over how potentially extreme the provisions are, but the legislation has been the result of a mature consideration and has been scrutinised in a thoroughly orthodox way through both Houses of Parliament. It has not been the result of an accelerated procedure.
I respectfully suggest, although entirely appreciating the arguments that such provisions need regular review, this has had a thoroughgoing review. It can be reviewed again after the end of this Parliament, and I respectfully ask the House to consider rejecting the amendment.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, expressed a certain weariness when he spoke on this issue in Committee. I do not think that he used the words “ritualistic” or “formulaic” but that may have been what he had in mind when he referred to the way some of the control order debates seemed to be going. I share that concern, but it leads me to say that we should make sure that renewal of this provision is not ritualistic or formulaic. We should take care to avoid that. However, it is not an argument for saying that we should not undertake that renewal.
We will, I am sure, be told by the Minister that we can debate the issue at any time that any of us succeeds in putting down a debate, and that the Government could repeal TPIMs at any time. Neither of those claims is an answer to the points that have been made. I urge the Government, if they lose the Division that is about to come, to turn it into a virtue and explain annually why it is that any renewal is required. The term “trust” was used quite a lot at an earlier stage in this Bill. Trust does need to be renewed, as well as everything else, to take both your Lordships’ and the country with them. The Government should regard this as an opportunity, not something that should be pictured in any way as a defeat.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhat I endeavoured to say was that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate were the courts to be taking that initial decision in place of the Secretary of State, which I understand to be the burden of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, whereas I understand that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that the initial stage and the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State should be on the balance of probabilities, and there I suggest that the current test is more suitable.
Does the noble Lord have any comments on the provisions in Clause 26, which provide for the Secretary of State to take a decision based on the balance of probabilities in the position where the more stringent measures might be applied?
I have no immediate answer to that, but at this juncture I would suggest that the initial decision-making process is far better on that basis because that is the most important stage: whether or not you decide that it is appropriate to impose, or seek to impose, a TPIM—with the approval of the court, it must be said.