Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Empey
Main Page: Lord Empey (Ulster Unionist Party - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Empey's debates with the Wales Office
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the purpose of the amendment is very simple. Basically, Members will recall that in 1998, in the Act that implemented the Belfast agreement, a rather complicated form of mandatory coalition Government was introduced to provide for the return of devolution to Northern Ireland. Let me say at once that, while it is a complicated and unusual system, I support that system and that nothing in the amendment before the House alters it in any way at all. In other words, if parties achieve at the election sufficient support to entitle them to sit in the Northern Ireland Executive and exercise executive powers and occupy ministries, then that is entirely a matter for them. At present, if a party decides not to sit in the Executive or does not have sufficient numbers to qualify for a seat in the Executive, it has the option either of not taking its seat in the Executive or of remaining on the Back Benches. However, the missing link here is that those who are not in the Executive have no status as regards the Assembly’s proceedings.
Amendment 1 seeks to give the option to allow the Assembly, should it so wish, to apply to the Secretary of State, who would respond. That would allow the Assembly to draw up Standing Orders, under characteristics that she would determine, which would provide parties that wish to seek opposition status with the opportunity to seek that status from the Speaker. That would give people who took that position basic rights such as speaking rights, where the Speaker would call a member of the Opposition in response to a government amendment or a government proposal, but in proportion to the size of the parties. It would give the opposition the power to have supply day debates, which I think would be accepted in any reasonable jurisdiction. Finally, it would ensure that someone not from a Government-supporting party chaired the Public Accounts Committee and occupied the deputy chair of that committee. We must be the only jurisdiction in these islands where government party representatives also chair the Public Accounts Committee; that is a severe weakness of our current system.
Much has been made of the Assembly perhaps already having sufficient powers to create an Opposition, and there is no doubt that there are Standing Orders that the Assembly could make which could provide for such a facility. However, what the Assembly gives, the Assembly can take away. The main purpose of doing this through London is to ensure the independence of that Opposition and that it is not dependent on the good will of whichever parties happen to dominate the Assembly at any point in time, so that it does not have to rely on other parties for its supply days, speaking rights or any resources that might be made available. That would be one small step on the road to a more normal political set of arrangements. Given the fact that the vast majority of the 108 MLAs in the Stormont Assembly are supporters of the Government in one form or another, we do not believe that this is anything but a minor step in the road to making the Executive more accountable for their actions or inactions.
Some folk have said, “Would we be interfering in any way with the current arrangements and the rights and entitlements of parties under the Belfast agreement?”. The answer is an emphatic no. The time is neither right nor appropriate for any significant change in how the Executive are constructed, albeit I am sure that many of us wish to look forward to a day when we have a more normal arrangement for a Government, such as we have in Scotland or Wales. However, we are not there and perhaps will not get there during the lifetimes of most of us in this Chamber. We can, however, make one small step to give those who do not occupy positions in the Government the opportunity to hold that Government to account. No rights would be removed; I see this as an additional right that currently does not exist.
When this amendment was tabled a number of comments were made at home in the local press. I must say that I have not yet heard anybody come out and say that they are opposed to the concept of an Opposition. It is a very hard thing to stand against. I noticed in the Irish news that on 24 January, a spokesman for the Social Democratic and Labour Party said that the SDLP believes that the British Government should make provision for legislation for opposition in the next mandate in a way that protects partnership working under d’Hondt and is in line with the spirit of the Good Friday agreement. That is precisely what this amendment is designed to achieve, and it sums up clearly exactly what I and my colleagues wish to see.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, makes, and has made in discussions with us, a reasonable case for this principle. Like the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, we can see where the pressure for this is coming from. Words such as “unique” have been used several times to describe the situation in Northern Ireland, and that is still the abiding mantra that we need to take into account. However, devolution is devolution, and this is a matter for MLAs to consult and decide upon. Should any newer reforms be proposed which require necessary legislation to be brought before this House, we should fully consider them.
The issue of an Opposition is not mentioned within the Northern Ireland Act 1998. It is therefore a devolved matter that can and should be dealt with at Stormont. Despite the Irish News, and despite positive statements that have been made, there is no detectable overall consensus among MLAs on a move towards a formal opposition model such as exists here at Westminster. The point has been made that the Assembly is the only legislature not to have these powers, but there are people here who know better than me and who have more experience of the situation in which the 1998 agreement came about. It divided a society. As was so eloquently put by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, the problem of a permanent Opposition was that it never had a chance of getting power and felt it had no say. The Belfast agreement was designed to deal with exactly that situation.
In June 2013, the Assembly and Executive Review Committee concluded that it was possible to grant informal recognition to non-executive parties in the Assembly on a proportional basis. As has been mentioned, this could be achieved through additional speaking rights, recognition of non-executive status in the order of speaking and the allocation of time for non-executive party business. All this lies within the purview of the Assembly; it requires no legislation in Westminster. There has been a widespread desire expressed to see a situation such as this come about. Surely the true test will be when the Assembly brings forward a unanimous recommendation along these lines and takes action within the powers that it already has. The structure of the committees within the Assembly already provides a vehicle for regular accountability. They are organised so that Ministers face a committee within their jurisdiction which is headed by a representative of another party.
The 1998 agreement established an Executive in Northern Ireland which would be inclusive. In the same way, the responsibility for accountability must be exercised in an inclusive manner. The committees of the Assembly already allow the Executive to be held to account, commensurate with the fundamental principle of inclusivity. Furthermore, there is a broad consensus about giving non-executive parties informal recognition. This could be given by the Assembly itself. It would have much more power behind it if it came about in that way. There does not appear to be a full consensus among MLAs about reforming the structure to create an Official Opposition. It is essential that all the structures within the Assembly operate in an inclusive manner and are supported by broad cross-party consensus. The question is: do these conditions exist or not? It is the responsibility of MLAs to consult and agree upon newer structural reforms for an Opposition. This is an ongoing process. If, once consensus is reached, it is necessary for legislation to be brought before the House, we shall fully consider it.
We are very responsive to and aware of the sentiments that have been expressed, but the Assembly is on a journey. Unfortunately, we do not yet seem to have reached the stage where it can take the next step, but we believe that it is getting there and the move must come from there, although at present the necessary conditions do not seem to exist. For this reason, although we understand the amendment of the noble Lord, we cannot support it.
My Lords, perhaps I may first respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. He made the point that he felt the amendment would not achieve the purpose being advocated for it. I understand that, but there is a clash between the issue of imposition and the issue of consent. While the mandatory coalition has been set out in statute, during those negotiations we did not set out in statute proposals for an Opposition because, to be honest, the main objective at the time was to get agreement on devolution. That was seen to be the way we could move on from where we were, in those bad dark days, to where we wanted to be. But, as the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, has just said, it is a journey.
I am not, and I know that my noble friend Lord Lexden is not, totally wedded to the language of the amendment, but perhaps I can elaborate on why we feel that something needs to be done here as opposed to leaving it to Belfast alone. The reason is simple: we have to remove ourselves from the current political arrangements and look ahead a number of years. If we are going to establish an institution or see it modified, we cannot confine ourselves to the current politics; we have to look at the long term. I will tell the Committee, and in particular the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, why we feel it is necessary to have a dimension of this set out here. First, we happen to have a legislative vehicle in front of us, and that does not often occur. The second reason is this. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, mentioned that the First Minister had said that he would be happy to facilitate any party at Stormont that wished to take up the opposition role. However, that is not the point I am getting at because it would apply only if a particular party, at this point in time, wanted to fill that role. Of course it would be up to any party to say so, but so far no party has said that it wants to. The point, though, is that it would be at the grace and favour of whoever was in place at the time, and that is the difficulty.
I can give an example that happened last year in the Assembly. At a very late stage in the Planning Bill, at the very last moment an eight-page amendment came in from the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister which would have had the effect of taking power away from the existing Minister. The amendment had not gone through the Committee procedure because it came in late. It was bounced on to the Floor of the Assembly at the last moment and it was put through. It failed to be implemented only because of legal activity by the Minister and it has not come into effect, but the example illustrates why it is necessary to have an element of independence. For instance, as my noble friend Lord Lexden said, under Schedules 3, 5 and 6 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, even a simple body like the NI Assembly Commission, dealing with property issues, grass cutting and appointments of staff, is set out in statute. Standing orders are indicated so that they set out the characteristics of the committees. It is not impossible, therefore, to marry these two things.
I accept entirely the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, that the weakness lies in the fact that you still have to get consent, but I feel that having the trigger at Stormont to implement something that is enabling—this is an enabling amendment—and thus having it on the stocks so that it is ready to go, would shorten the time the Assembly would require to move forward and take the next step. There would be no imposition.
I still think that this is the best way forward, albeit I accept that there could be a stalemate. The fact is that the Assembly and Executive Review Committee has been sitting for years. It has talked about everything, but nothing has actually emerged. For that reason, I believe it is necessary to move forward with these proposals. I would certainly request the Minister to consider them, that we should have discussions with the Opposition and the other parties between now and the Report stage, and that we should see whether we can find a mechanism to square this circle and achieve our objectives.
The noble Lord is absolutely correct. He is emphasising the point that I made that the Government are well aware that there should be no direction from outside. It is absolutely fundamental that the Assembly itself reaches this agreement. The Government see their role as that of facilitating the operation of the opposition parties within the Assembly when the Assembly reaches that decision for itself.
There will clearly be views on this from well beyond this Chamber today, including from Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and I emphasise that the Government are interested in hearing those views. I hope that, in view of the indications that I have given, the noble Lord will agree at this point to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her decision that the Government will reflect on this. It is interesting that everyone around the Chamber agrees the basic principles. Perhaps we should invite Mr Richard Haass to come in and help us between now and Report. Failing that, if the Minister and other parties—
My Lords, if cross-community agreement were the key element in reaching an Executive, some kind of cross-community negotiation of those parties that could reasonably be expected to be in opposition might be a very fruitful way forward for consideration.
I do not think that it would be appropriate to turn down any suggestion. However, we must not look at this purely in the current context of who happens to be around at this point in time. We must look years ahead. This is a structural issue. The Minister got the main points in her summing-up. The tensions here are that, first, we do not want to impose and, secondly, we must be consistent with the Belfast agreement. However, if you have to ask somebody for the right to be in opposition then there is a flaw. That is why one further step is required. Nevertheless, on the basis of the Government’s announcement that they will reflect on these issues and, I hope, discuss them with those who have participated in this debate today, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, for his amendment. It is always worth considering whether the arrangements in place for devolution are as effective as they might be and whether there is anything we can do to improve the way in which we work with devolved Administrations.
The noble Lord referred to the role of the Secretary of State and to the Haass talks. I reflect back to his speech on the previous amendment, in which he made it absolutely clear—and rightly so—that it was vital that we respect devolution and that the Government do not intervene where it is a matter for the devolved Assembly. I remind the noble Lord that the Government on occasions walk a narrow line between encouraging and leading in relation to the development and the firming-up of devolution in Northern Ireland. They walk a narrow line between that and interfering.
As noble Lords have already pointed out, interfering is a major mistake. The Secretary of State is very aware of this, in relation to the Haass talks in particular, because those talks were convened by the leaders of the political parties in Northern Ireland. It is a sign of the development and firming-up of politics and political institutions in Northern Ireland that these leaders felt confident enough to put hugely complex and difficult issues—the most difficult ones they face—into the discussions led by Dr Richard Haass. I am delighted to see that those discussions are still going on, with two meetings of the leaders of the political parties scheduled for this week. It is therefore absolutely essential, at this moment, that we trust them to take those issues forward and avoid the temptation to interfere. That does not mean that the Secretary of State is not watching this moment by moment and day by day or that she is not anxious for the Haass talks to succeed and for there to be progress on those difficult issues.
The noble Lord made it clear that this was a probing amendment, but it is essential that I address the details of it. Amendment 2 relates to ministerial functions. It is already the case that, if the Assembly wants to legislate to alter the functions of a UK Minister, or confer functions on a UK Minister, all it needs to do is ask for the Secretary of State’s consent. The formal consent process takes about 10 days. The amendment would, therefore, have a very limited impact because it would only remove that consent process in a small number of cases specified by the Secretary of State in advance.
The current process is not onerous and there have been no complaints from the Northern Ireland parties about the way that procedures have operated in this area to date. It is also notable that the consent process is very rarely used. Only one Assembly Bill—the marine Bill—has so far required the Secretary of State’s consent since the current Assembly was elected in 2011. Consent in relation to that Bill did not relate to ministerial functions, so it would not have been affected by the proposed amendment. Although I am grateful for the opportunity for debate that this amendment has brought, I do not believe that we should legislate for a problem that does not exist. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, before the Minister sits down I apologise: I should have been in a moment earlier. I want to reflect on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. Clause 6 deals with the reduction in size of the Assembly being a reserved matter. There is a general view that, at 108 Members, the Assembly is too big. Compared with the Welsh and Scottish assemblies it is proportionately far bigger, but the reason for this was a deliberate decision to try and make it as inclusive as possible. Some two years ago we thought that a solution would be brought upon us with the change in parliamentary constituencies, because reducing the number of parliamentary constituencies would automatically reduce the size of the Assembly—QED. However, one or two people around your Lordships’ House and in other places had different views, and consequently that did not come to pass. However, it would have been an important step.
I have to caution the House that the Assembly deciding on how to reduce its numbers is as important as actually reducing the numbers. Using the existing system, if you reduced the numbers and left the existing constituencies the same, it would be perfectly possible to have a major political impact. It is a bit like the American states: the winning party then determines the boundaries of the new congressional districts, and so it goes on. This is a similar type of issue, and we have to be very cautious as to how we deal with it.
There is a general sense overall that the operation of the Northern Ireland institution is far too complicated and expensive, and everyone has the general view that it should be reduced. How you do that is very important and can have a significant political outcome, so I caution your Lordships that if we agree to this, it will hand the ability to whoever happens to be in charge when this happens to draw up the numbers to suit themselves, because proportional representation under the single transferable vote is very sensitive to the number of seats in each constituency that are contested.
My Lords, I spoke to this question at Second Reading. I have a concern about the question of the reduction in the numbers of Members of the Assembly. I do not share the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and others in other places that the Northern Ireland Assembly is too big. I think that there is a certain minimum size; I hear from colleagues in Wales that the Welsh Assembly is too small, and that it is actually very difficult for it to accommodate all the requirements for committees to scrutinise Ministers, for internal committees and to do all the necessary things. There is a certain minimum size below which it is difficult to address all the required functions. Of course, in the case of Northern Ireland, unlike in Wales and Scotland, there is a very significant cross-border responsibility that is present in dealing with another state, which is not something that has to be done in quite the same way by other devolved institutions.
I am not convinced about the question of the reduction of the size of the Assembly, particularly since, after the Belfast agreement, there has been a decision to bring a major reduction in the number of local authorities and the number of elected representatives. We are going to move from a substantial number of elected local representatives to a much smaller number, while at the same time talking about a possible reduction of Assembly Members. I am not persuaded by that.
The second issue is the question that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, picked up: the people who will deliver on a decision will be the majority. In the old days the majority was from one side of the community, and the manipulation of electoral boundaries and votes was not at all unknown—in fact, it was quite a significant issue. One of the problems that I find, looking back at it from this side of the water, is that people over here sometimes assume that if major parties on both sides of the community agree, that is all you need to know. It is perfectly possible for two large parties, one on either side of the community, to agree to do something that is a major and inappropriate disadvantage to minority parties on both sides of the community or from neither.
There is a real danger that if this became a reserved matter, the two largest parties, one on either side of the community, could come forward with an agreed set of proposals that would advantage them electorally and politically in a way that was inappropriate but would be very difficult to resist because of, if we take the argument that the Minister made, the danger of a Secretary of State or people from this side of the water imposing their will. What does that mean? It means that if the two largest parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly came forward with a proposal, it would be rather difficult for a Secretary of States to withstand it and not be accused of inappropriately affecting affairs when there would be a cross-community agreement to move on that front. So there is a real danger, and I have to say that I am not at all enthusiastic about giving powers to the two large parties in the Assembly—that is what this amounts to—to affect the number of elected representatives per constituency. That would have a major impact, and we could live to rue the day if it were able to proceed.
My Lords, I know that a number of your Lordships have been contacted by the Civil Service Commissioners for Northern Ireland. While the commissioners do not oppose the devolution of their functions, they are very concerned that they at present do not have the benefit of formal legislative provisions. This distinguishes them from their counterparts here in Whitehall. Civil servants generally are sometimes, like politicians, the butt of jokes, and I am sure many a cartoonist has made a living out of it, but the Northern Ireland Civil Service over many difficult years ensured a degree of civilisation where proper governance continued, despite threats, both personal and real. It is important that its impartiality in serving whatever Administration it happens to serve is maintained.
I see one distinguished former Secretary of State in his seat. He will know the importance of having that impartial advice available. I believe that the Civil Service Commissioners want to ensure that that remains the case. They would like the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—it puts the Home Civil Service Commission on a statutory footing and enshrines in law the requirement that selection of appointment to the Civil Service should be on merit, following fair and open competition—to apply to the Northern Ireland Civil Service. I think that they are very anxious that devolution of this function should not take place until that is achieved.
That is not a very difficult issue. We have seen in the past 24 hours what can happen when people have to say things about public appointments. Given the circumstances which we come from, and the history, background and substantial achievements of the Northern Ireland Civil Service under difficult circumstances, it is important that we take any and every measure we can to ensure that that impartiality is guaranteed, is in statute, that there is no ambiguity and that no political influence could subsequently be brought to bear were attempts to be made over the years to try to interfere in who was appointed to which posts.
This is a sensitive issue throughout the United Kingdom. The amendment is just another small step in attempting to ensure that that impartiality is guaranteed long into the future, and that it, and the respect in which the Civil Service is widely held in Northern Ireland, is retained. I beg to move.
My Lords, I was happy to put my name to the amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Empey, pioneered. I support many of the things that he said.
I will give two examples; a modest one, and one perhaps more substantial and persuasive. This question of maintaining the non-partisan stance and community appreciation of the Northern Ireland Civil Service is of enormous importance. Quite a lot has been written about the peace process in Northern Ireland, and most of it concentrates on negotiations between politicians, the people who are brought in from outside to assist, the role played by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach and, in some cases, the impact of the United States, the European Union, the NGOs and so on. Very few of those papers point up the importance of civil servants in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, yet they were absolutely critical. A few of those civil servants—nominated by the Secretary of State and his successors—basically spent all their time engaging with politicians right across, and in some cases beyond, the spectrum to keep the process alive. Whether Governments changed, whether leaders of the political parties changed, with all the ups and down of elections those civil servants continued to meet. They would make minutes. They would ensure that meetings were held. They would keep people in touch with each other.
Very little is written about it. It was absolutely essential. As I have involved myself in peace processes in various other parts of the world, I have come to realise how important it was. In many places, almost right across the Middle East, for example, this is not a tradition in the civil service. It is difficult to make peace processes work in some of these places precisely because there is no civil service there of that kind—no non-political, non-partisan civil service.
I give another example. One of the problems I had when I became the first Speaker of the Assembly was how to staff it. Nobody had been there for decades, running, as clerks or other officials, an Assembly. There was only one body of people who could be called upon in sufficient numbers: the Northern Ireland Civil Service. People, particularly on the nationalist and republican side, were very anxious about this. They had come to a view, for particular reasons, some of them based on experience and some of them on suspicion, that the Northern Ireland civil servants would be biased towards unionists. We had a lot of negotiation about it, but we all came to the conclusion that there was no alternative, so the agreement was that we would take these people in—however, on only a three-year contract. During that period, there would be open advertisement, and people would come in from other places in society and outside Northern Ireland. There would have to be this transitional process.
The fascinating thing was this: as that period of three years went on, it became increasingly apparent to nationalists and republicans that the concerns they had had about the non-partisan nature of the Northern Ireland Civil Service were actually pretty groundless. As we came near the end of the time, people from those communities wanted to keep on many of the staff who had proved themselves perfectly capable of being loyal to a power-sharing cross-community Executive and Assembly. That was the quality of people and, to some extent, the culture, which was a more non-partisan one than was realised.
I have a real anxiety—in this situation, I do not think that examples on this side of the water are necessarily perfect—that Members of the Government on both sides in Northern Ireland might well be tempted to influence the appointment of some senior civil servants in a way that would not ultimately be in the interests of any of us in Northern Ireland. I ask the Minister to take very seriously the amendment put forward in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and myself, and to take it away and look at whether it is possible to accommodate the very legitimate concerns—not concerns about devolution of the function but about protection of the devolution of this function from adverse and partisan impact.
It is the Government’s intention that we would be moving to devolution with safeguards that would have the kind of statutory enforcement that exists for England. I hope that satisfies the noble Lord.
My Lords, when we started out on this amendment, I thought it was a very simple matter that would not be at all controversial. It just shows you that you never can tell around these parts. First, nobody in Northern Ireland has asked for this. The Assembly certainly has not made an approach. To some extent, the issue has come as a bit of a surprise. As I said—I think there is widespread acceptance round the House—the Northern Ireland Civil Service did a good and impartial job. There are a number of former Ministers in their places to confirm that, including the noble Baroness on the Opposition Front Bench, who ran a number of departments and has many years of experience. I accept that there may well be technical deficiencies in the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and I have tabled. We are very happy for the amendment to be taken away and those technical deficiencies resolved. However, the Minister referred on a number of occasions to consultation. It is not clear to me what the consultation is on—whether it is the principle of devolution or not. To have a consultation on the merit principle would take us back to ground zero. If we do not or cannot accept that, we will pretty well have thrown in the towel.
I suggest that the Minister should look at this before Report because it is an issue to which we may well have to return. Everybody in the Chamber agrees, so it ought to be possible to resolve it. In that spirit, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. Clause 11 embodies a significant step towards the devolution of function in relation to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.
I do not want to leap ahead to the amendment in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Black. That will be discussed in its own time. There is, however, a particular irony here. The key issue in that amendment is the continuing reluctance of the Northern Ireland Assembly to accord to the citizens of Northern Ireland the same level of freedom of expression that exists in the rest of the United Kingdom since the recent passing of the Defamation Act 2013. It seems a heavy irony that we should be proposing to devolve functions related to human rights precisely at the same time as we have a denial by the same Assembly of what is a pretty sensitive question in this particular respect. I do not want to anticipate a later discussion but it is relevant to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. The timing of this seems at least a little odd.
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. This kept coming up time and again in the Haass process—and I am sorry that I did not have the opportunity to sell tickets for it at an earlier stage; I know it would have been a sell-out for many noble Lords. It goes to the core of what people feel about their cultural identity and how they express that identity. Everybody talks about human rights in that context. What might seem a relatively modest administrative change does have significant consequences, and it could not have been put better than by the noble Lord, Lord Bew.
My Lords, there is no question that, from an administrative point of view, having the district electoral areas dealt with by the same commissioner who deals with each individual ward makes sense. However, as has been mentioned in the context of other issues, this is a very significant development under proportional representation, because the drawing up of district electoral areas out of wards has two consequences. The decision on how many seats to award for each district electoral area has consequences under proportional representation, and which particular wards make up that DEA is also an extremely sensitive issue. There are grey areas in many respects.
You cannot of course go around in life with a conspiracy theory always at the front of your mind, but I have to say that current experience—within the past couple of years—is not encouraging. I refer to the recent reorganisation of local government, which I have previously referred to elsewhere. The recommendation of the commissioner was overruled in one case. In my opinion, a scandalous gerrymander has occurred in the city of Belfast, and barely a word is said. I have absolutely no confidence that the time is right for this particular function to be considered for devolution. A lot of people say they want the single transferable vote system of proportional representation but fewer people perhaps have had full experience of it. We have had 40 years of experience and understand the significance of deciding on the number of seats. For each local government area, you have a number of district electoral areas, each of which is a collection of wards. Those areas can include, in our case, five, six or seven; in the Irish Republic it could be four or three. Those decisions on the number are very significant. Equally, deciding which particular group of wards form the DEA is also significant.
In many respects, that can lead to putting the cat in charge of the cream, to be perfectly blunt. At this stage, I feel that this is not an appropriate thing to do. Recent experience, as I said, is not encouraging and we could start to create the particular problem which, as referred to, was a problem in the past. Do we really want to go back down there again? It is not a big deal—I have to tell noble Lords that the people on the streets are not talking of little else—and not a source of difficulty, so why move to a position where that could happen? The point might well be made that we have done our local government DEAs—we have just passed the order today—so this is not something that will arise in the near future. That is indeed true, but so what? If it will not arise, and will not be necessary right now or in the foreseeable future, we can wait. Whenever it does come round, and when is needed, we can hope things will have sufficiently matured politically so that anxieties such as the ones I am expressing today are no longer held by individuals. It is for that reason that I put down this proposal.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, suggested that this is not a matter that is talked of every Friday and Saturday night in the pubs of Belfast. He is right about that, at this point, because it is not an issue. However, I have found in conversations with political friends and colleagues in the United States that districting is very much a matter of debate, because it is actually in place. You do not need to be a particular student of Northern Ireland history to know that manipulation of electoral boundaries and arrangements was a fundamental problem which led to many of our difficulties. I am a little puzzled as to why this has come up at this stage. I am delighted that we are 15 or 16 years on from the agreement, but we are not 15 or 16 years more mature than at the time of the agreement and it is quite clear that it is very difficult to reach agreement on a whole raft of issues in the Northern Ireland Assembly. I would feel much more relaxed about this if, over the past 15 or 16 years, we had passed a whole series of constructive pieces of legislation in the Northern Ireland Assembly and agreed on all sorts of community initiatives that had to be done, and if the walls of partition were coming down in the city of Belfast and the word “dissident”—whether loyalist or republican—was consigned to history and so on. In that case, I would probably not be standing up here.
However, I am not persuaded that the situation has changed so dramatically. If issues of flags, parades and the legacy of the past are bringing people out onto the streets, I fear that applying districting to Northern Ireland could well become a matter of enormous contention. I am not persuaded that adding this to the pot at the moment assists the parties in Northern Ireland in reaching agreement. It adds a further complexity and difficulty, and I am not persuaded that we need or could benefit from that at the moment.
My Lords, there is no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, is correct that the Civic Forum was and is in the agreement. It fell into disuse in part because of the resentments that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, referred to. People said that many of these individuals were usurping the role of elected representatives, and that feeling persists. The other reason, though, was that it did not get off to a terribly good start. It did not distinguish itself during the relatively short period of its existence. That does not rule out having a look at it again, but I suspect that that was the reasoning.
Another issue, and we will be coming to this in the next amendment, is that if the agreement had been left as it was agreed, there would be strong pressure on those who signed up to it in principle to follow it. However, as we will be referring to in the next amendment, the Government unilaterally changed the agreement in 2006, so therefore a lot of people do not feel as obligated to the full agreement as they would have done prior to that happening.
Another point is that people are getting a constant stream of criticism about the costs of the Northern Ireland Assembly and its complications, and they felt, “Well, here we have another layer. Were we right to agree to this in the first place? Is it going to be too expensive? Do we really need it? With 108 MLAs representing the people, do we need this?”. That is the kind of argument, but there is no question of doubt about the fundamental point that the noble Lord Shutt, makes: it is in the agreement. It is not the only thing that is not implemented—I hear a sound from a sedentary position that I know may well emerge in a moment or two from this chrysalis and bring blinding light to the House. Those are some of the reasons why we are where we are.
My Lords, once again the Labour Front Bench will come to the rescue of a Minister who is under siege from her own side of the House. I do not usually see myself as a knight in shining armour coming to the rescue of a Conservative Government, but there is always hope for sinners repenting.
I will be repeating a familiar refrain. The Civic Forum is a matter for the Northern Ireland Assembly and does not require legislation in this House. The 1990 Act gave responsibility for the creation of the forum to the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and gave them the responsibility for scrutinising the body as well. Provisional arrangements for the Civic Forum were created and approved in this manner. These arrangements also established that there would be a review of the forum after one year of its operation. This was deferred until 2002, but unfortunately the suspension meant that that was not completed.
Since 2007 the Civic Forum has once again been under review, and surely a six-year to seven-year review tells a story of its own. The review was initiated by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. This decision and the review have rightly been approved, scrutinised and debated by the Assembly. The transitional Assembly’s Committee on the Preparation for Government concluded that a review of the mechanism for civic society to promote its views was necessary. Here, sad to say, the opinions expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, about the role in society of quite a large Assembly raise necessary doubts. It serves some nebulous cause to have a good thing in operation, but on the other hand we have to be professional and sharp about things and not just have bodies just for the sake of them. Anyway, as I said before, this comes under the aegis of the Assembly.
The best way in which to engage with the community in the political process is surely a matter for the Assembly and Northern Ireland politicians to decide upon. There are indications that there is a nationalist/unionist split—I use the terms roughly—about the worth of the forum and whether it should be reinstituted. As the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, in this era of austerity the costs of an extra, subsidiary body have resulted in some doubts about it as well. Once again, though, I say that the initiative must come from the Assembly. This is devolution in practice.
I regret that I have not been able to support the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, because he has a respectable record on Northern Ireland issues. No one doubts his concern about the Northern Ireland situation or his anxiety to contribute to that process. I respect his record on Northern Ireland and genuinely regret that we have not been able to support his amendment on this occasion.
My Lords, a few moments ago we were talking about the Belfast agreement and the obligation of those parties who supported it to uphold it. Undoubtedly, if you make an agreement you might subject it to a referendum, a subject regularly discussed in your Lordships’ House. We are getting in the mood now for all sorts of referendums. We had a referendum in 1998 and the agreement was agreed. However, that is not where it ended. One of the reasons we have difficulty is that that agreement was worked out after many months—in fact, years—of delicate negotiations. At the core is the concept of a partnership, which is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, made earlier. I understand his point about designation and that he has an issue, but at the core was the concept of a partnership. That partnership was such that those at the top of the Government each had a hand on the wheel. That obviously made decision-making much more difficult but it was the only way that we could figure of getting people to consent to the re-establishment of devolution.
The noble Lords, Lord Kilclooney and Lord Alderdice, and others, sat at the table when these matters were discussed; the noble Lord, Lord Maginnis of Drumglass, sat there with the rest of us. We looked at these issues and came to a conclusion. We set out, as was set out clearly in the 1998 Act, how we were going to identify the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. These are the people who are charged with the responsibility of oversight and for steering the business of the devolved Assembly. They jointly chair the Executive.
In legal terms, the two personages are absolutely equal; there is no distinction between them. I know that clearly because, when I occupied the post for a short time with Seamus Mallon, the first issue we had to agree was the notepaper: you could not send out a letter from the department without both signatures. Because Seamus Mallon was the Deputy First Minister and I was coming in in place of the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, who was the First Minister, he assumed that his name would go to the left-hand side of the notepaper, and that mine would go to the right-hand side. I said, “No. I am not substituting for you; I am substituting for him”. Consequently, we were unable to send a letter out for a week. The settlement was that I went on the left-hand side as Minister for Enterprise, a post which I held in parallel with First Minister, and his name stayed where it was. That was a classic case. The point is that it is a partnership.
Unilaterally, and behind our backs in 2006, this process was torn up. In the original agreement, the First and Deputy First Ministers’ names had to go before the Northern Ireland Assembly in a joint Motion that they both be appointed to their respective positions. That meant that the Northern Ireland Assembly had to agree, by cross-community consent, who the First and Deputy First Ministers would be. The Northern Ireland Assembly now has no say in that. That was removed at a stroke and replaced by the current system, which is that whichever party is the largest from one designation and whichever is the largest from the other designation between them occupy the two posts. The Assembly is not involved.
What has happened? This turns all subsequent elections into sectarian headcounts. People go around the country saying, “If you don’t vote for me, Martin McGuinness will be First Minister”. Somebody else says, “If you vote for me, I can put Peter Robinson out”. The fact that there is no difference in the powers that either of them exercises is set aside. If we made any mistake in 1998, perhaps the titles that we chose for these two offices were wrong. We have created a hierarchy where no hierarchy exists.
However, that is how the system works. How it came about is another bone of contention. The agreement was agreed by all parties sitting around the table with Senator Mitchell. On this change, which radically altered the dynamics of devolution, my party was not consulted, the Social Democratic and Labour Party was not consulted and I suspect that the Alliance Party was not consulted. It may have applied to others, too. It was just done, and appeared in the draft of the Bill. It was not part of the St Andrews agreement; while it was part of the St Andrews agreement Act, it was not dealt with at St Andrews. It came out of nowhere; it was just produced as a deal and appeared in the Bill. When I saw it, I knew exactly what was happening and why. It was a major mistake, and people say to us that every part of the agreement should be implemented, when a part of the agreement that was implemented in good faith was simply torn up before our eyes, without our consent or knowledge.
I cannot say how strongly many of us feel about this, and it has contributed very much to the stalemate that we have. I understand that the Government were doing their best to get the show back on the road. I do not impugn the motives of the Prime Minister of the time who did this. However, it was a significant and unfortunate course of events, first, to create a row over nothing—when there is no difference between the powers of the two persons elected—and, secondly, to change the dynamics of electoral politics in Assembly elections much more in favour of sectarian headcounts than ever was the case before. Under the original proposals in the Belfast agreement, you would not have had a situation where the First and Deputy First Minister were elected without the consent of the Assembly.
Once you lose the link between the Assembly and the First and Deputy First Minister, they inevitably feel less obligated. That is a mistake. It is interesting that, in the Irish Parliament, the Taoiseach is elected by the members of the Dáil. You might say that if that is the case, it is the very last thing that I would want in Northern Ireland but it is not, because the partnership principle is paramount. If we made a mistake, we did so in the titles of the two positions. However, who could have foreseen that somebody would go behind your back eight years later, without consulting you or participating in any process whatever, and just produce a clause in a Bill out of nowhere? I hear so many speakers—the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, and others—saying today, “Oh, this is the Assembly and we cannot do anything—it was part of the agreement”, or, “It was up to Stormont”, or whatever. That is true, but whenever it suited the Government they just made a change like that without a by-your-leave.
That is the rationale for the amendment. It is also almost, to the word, the same position that was adopted by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, who is not in her place at the moment. She pioneered a similar amendment in 2006, when the St Andrews agreement Bill was going through this House. She opposed the introduction of this proposal on the same grounds and I think that the then Opposition took the same view. That is the background, and why the amendment is before your Lordships.
My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, expects the amendment to be passed. He is raising it to make an important point.
I will briefly take his point from a slightly different angle, which is particularly important for people looking into Northern Ireland from outside. Everyone is familiar with the fact that the history of the 20th century in Northern Ireland was one in which a substantial minority felt that it was not fairly involved and a significant majority was constantly in control. That is largely true. However, from that came an assumption that if you could get an agreement that had support from the majority on the two sides of the community, it must be a good thing and should simply be accepted without too much argument.
That is a serious mistake. It is wholly possible to create an environment in which a majority rule in two sections of the community can be, if not as bad, certainly not very commendable. When we look at the majority in the community as a whole, we realise that that, on its own, is not satisfactory in a divided community. This is an issue way beyond just Northern Ireland. When people look into divided communities, whether in Syria, Israel/Palestine or other areas, they should not assume that just because you get a majority on each side that you have a satisfactory outcome. It may be more satisfactory than getting a majority from only one side, but it is not of itself a satisfactory outcome. When noble Lords look not just at this Bill but at other Bills, it is important to think about the implicit warning of the noble Lord, Lord Empey: solving the problem is not just a matter of satisfying a majority within each of the two pillars. On that, and on the principle behind it, he is right and not just for Northern Ireland.
I accept of course that the Belfast agreement was voted on on both sides of the border and, as the noble Lord has pointed out, the St Andrews agreement is in a different category. As the noble Baroness pointed out, it was a response to an urgent and difficult situation. It was not an agreement dealing with things as one would ideally wish them to be, but an agreement dealing with a very difficult situation. However, I take issue with the noble Lord that there has not been progress. I understand frustration at lack of progress—I think everyone who is involved with and visits Northern Ireland might feel that frustration—but there is progress. When I look back at what the Northern Irish devolved Government was like in about 2000, maybe 1999, they have moved on significantly in that time. With every year that passes, they become more secure. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, pointed out, this is the longest period of stable government we have seen in a generation.
At the moment, it would reopen old debates, risk destabilising politics in Northern Ireland and divert attention from the important challenges that Northern Ireland faces, if we were to revert to the old method for electing the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. I should like to concentrate noble Lords’ minds for a moment on the new challenges that Northern Ireland faces, which are the importance of rebalancing the economy, reducing social division and building a properly shared future. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord if he would be willing to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister but may I say several things because there is an issue of fact that needs clarity here? The current method of electing or identifying the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister does not come from the St Andrews agreement. It was not discussed at St Andrews—let us be very clear about that—but emerged after a deal between Sinn Fein and the Prime Minister of the day. I want to make it absolutely clear that it was not dealt with at St Andrews. Therefore, if we are to talk about unpicking, the unpicking was the removal of the process that was voted on by the people in 1998. However, it was never part of the St Andrews agreement, which was an agreement between two Governments, not between the parties. I want to make that absolutely clear, because if that is the case, it makes a major difference. It emerged as a deal subsequent to St Andrews.
Can the noble Lord say whether the current arrangements were debated at any stage by the Northern Ireland Assembly itself? If it held such a debate, did it endorse that which now exists, or did it reach some other conclusion about them?
I cannot recall a debate of that nature, but other noble Lords are present who were Members of the Assembly then. Perhaps they can jog my memory, but I do not recall it.
I repeat: this was never part of the St Andrews agreement. I understand and accept that Governments were faced with a terribly difficult situation: they had to get restoration. However, we must remember why there was instability in the first place. We still had people who were prepared to threaten us with terrorism, and other people who opposed the very agreement that established the Assembly. Leaving that to one side, the original unpicking was done by the removal of the original process in the agreement, and it was never part of the St Andrews agreement.
However, I have made my point. I welcome the longevity of the current Assembly, of which I was part, and I know that we are all glad that it has survived. That is not a mean achievement, and I would not take it away from anybody; it is a very significant achievement, which I welcome. However, survival is one thing but good governance is another, and we have to balance the two. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, during the passage of the then Crime and Courts Bill through this House I asked the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, who was answering that evening, what he would do in circumstances where the National Crime Agency did not extend to Northern Ireland. What would the Government do if they identified a national threat in the event that the National Crime Agency did not apply to Northern Ireland? His answer to me was that he would “act responsibly”. Quite a lot of time has passed, and I know that the Northern Ireland Office is in discussions with the Home Office and that they are working in consultation in Stormont with the parties that are objecting. I wish them well; I understand that it is a very delicate matter. However, let us be absolutely clear about the downstream consequences of this.
Not a large amount of time has passed since the establishment of the National Crime Agency, but to replicate the services that would be needed would cost the PSNI resources that it simply does not have and never will. Even if it was able to do that, it would lack the connectivity and intelligence that would be required in order for it to act effectively. I therefore put to your Lordships that while everybody has been prepared to be patient, to encourage and to wish the negotiations well—I hope that they are progressing—I would be very interested if the Minister could tell us what progress has been made. Are we any nearer to getting this dealt with? Just as we will deal with another amendment shortly, where Northern Ireland is becoming a vacuum as regards other issues, we cannot afford for it to become a vacuum where crime can establish itself and from which it can operate with impunity. I know that Customs officers and others have power to act and that they do, and that the border agency can act on the relevant matters—and that is fine. However, there are still whole areas outwith what the border agency and other intelligence services can deal with. It cannot be satisfactory to say that we have a National Crime Agency that is not national.
I thought I had done my best to answer that question but I will, of course, examine the record tomorrow and if I can provide noble Lords with further information I will be very happy to write and provide further detail.
My Lords, like most amendments at this stage in a Bill, this is a probing amendment. However, as I pointed out, this is a miscellaneous provisions Bill, and therefore noble Lords will seek to insert measures in it as the opportunity is available to do that. I think that is the tradition of the House and I am merely following in that wake.
In regard to this specific amendment, I will have to look at Hansard tomorrow but the Minister said, if I heard her correctly, that we could not, or would not, overrule the Northern Ireland Executive. Let us be very clear—Parliament can overrule any devolved Administration. Devolution means that part of our functions and powers are devolved, but it also means that they can be undevolved. We have a convention to which we normally stick, and I understand that. However, if the Minister is saying that the Government will not introduce any legislation on this matter in Northern Ireland, she is effectively giving Sinn Fein a veto over a crime issue. That is a very disturbing comment. I will check the record tomorrow and, if necessary, return to the issue at a later stage. However, when the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, answered my question on the Crime and Courts Bill, the clear implication of what he was saying was that, if progress was not made, the Government would have to take the national interest into account. That was the inevitable implication of what he said to me. If that is not the case and we are saying that whatever happens we are not going down this road, that in practice is a veto for Sinn Fein, which is not a very good thing to do in the interests of national security.
I hope that the Minister is listening. I wish the discussions that are taking place well. Those holding the discussions have not perhaps been dealt the best hand, and comment could fairly be made on that. However, let us not be under any illusions—the fact that we have an underperformance in this area in Northern Ireland, which is an inevitable outcome of the agency not operating totally and without limits, must mean, ultimately, that crime, like anything else—like nature itself—will fill a vacuum. We have enough people in Northern Ireland with certain skill sets. I need hardly finish the sentence as noble Lords know what I mean, but let us not encourage them. If there is no prospect whatever of our doing anything in this regard, that is not much of an incentive to those involved in the negotiations as we are throwing away their hand.
Is the reality not that by resisting this amendment and the suggestions in it, there is again—I choose my words carefully—a behind backs hope and ambition that strand 1 of the Northern Ireland agreement will, by necessity, be infringed? Is that not the inevitable outcome? It has not happened yet.
I know my noble friend Lord Maginnis is very sensitive that these matters have not been involved in negotiations. It just goes to show the interconnectivity between these different issues and how sensitive they are.
My objective here is not to make life more difficult for those holding the negotiations. I want them to succeed because I believe in the national interests. It is in the interests of everybody in the United Kingdom that they succeed. However, let us not throw away or indicate that under no circumstances would the United Kingdom Government take certain measures. If you do that you are giving people a guarantee that if they dig their heels in they can prevail. On that basis, and on the basis of checking the report and reflecting on what has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment in the names of my noble friends Lord Black, Lord Bew and Lord Lexden. This will come as no surprise. I believe that the consultation had more than 200 responses, which those familiar with this process will know is a big response. It was not only the quantity, but the quality and variety of those who responded that was very significant. The Minister has spoken about consultations today. I think the responses to the consultation on Mike Nesbitt’s Bill were greater than to the national consultation, because the penny has dropped and people have realised what the implications are. Some very serious players responded.
There has been a development in Northern Ireland which, on the surface, I welcomed at first. The Minister of Finance has asked the Law Commission to have a look at this. However, it has emerged that the timetable that the Law Commission is considering could take us into years. It is talking about another consultation, scoping studies, and so on. This could go on literally for years. In fact, it could supersede the lifetime of the current Assembly. In those circumstances, I think there is a lot of food for thought in this amendment, which I support wholeheartedly.
My Lords, I shall be brief. The power to appoint junior Ministers in Northern Ireland already exists. Junior Ministers are appointed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and, while only two have ever been appointed in each Assembly and they have always exclusively been in one department, the Department of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, that does not preclude them being in other departments. Indeed, it does not prevent the appointment of more than two. What I feel is lacking is that while junior Ministers could be appointed to more than one department simultaneously, I want to try to achieve in Northern Ireland the same thing as is available here, and even in Dáil Éireann. You can have a Minister who serves in more than one department, as we have in this House. The noble Lord, Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint, worked in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Office, and his successor does the same. Moreover, there are other examples in the Government.
The one thing that a junior Minister does not have is any executive authority. The junior Minister works exclusively for the Minister whose department he or she happens to serve in. What I am hoping to achieve is that, with the agreement of the relevant Minister, some power could be devolved to the junior Minister—they might be called a deputy Minister—so that that person can carry out a specifically indicated function. I shall give an example of what I am driving at. Years ago, we set up what was called the West Belfast and Greater Shankill Task Force, which was set up to deal with areas of deprivation. The thinking was that if you could prove to people in such an area that devolution worked, you would encourage support for it and you would improve the social and economic circumstances of that community. Invariably, a number of departments were involved. Two departments appointed the task force, one for which I was responsible and one for which, I think, Mr Nigel Dodds was then responsible. It meant that several departments were involved. What we had was a ring-around-the-roses of all these people being involved with the task force. While, obviously, the political situation over devolution did not help, the fact was that even after all those years, we were not able to get the outcome that we all wanted.
I thought it would be a good thing to be able to appoint a junior Minister in more than one department and, with the consent of the departmental Ministers, have some executive power in and of him or herself. Currently, such power is not available to a junior Minister. Executive power flows through the departmental Minister where the person is based. I want to find a practical solution by having someone in charge of tackling underachievement in particular areas, and for that individual to be able to deliver that responsibility rather than have it spread over a whole range of departments with different budgets, funding priorities and so on. I am sure that, having been there, the noble Baroness will know what I mean. That is the purpose of this amendment. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Lord for his amendment and I recognise the importance of cross-government co-operation in addressing certain challenges in which several departments have a role. Indeed, as he has just said, there are several examples here in Westminster such as the Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims and the Minister of State for Trade and Investment. It is plausible that we should consider a similar approach in Northern Ireland, and the noble Lord has already highlighted some of the areas in which it could be most effective.
The noble Lord will recall that this issue was debated when he was First Minister in the Assembly in 1999, and a determination was made to appoint the junior Ministers in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Section 19 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 already provides for what his amendment is intended to achieve. The section permits the First Minister and Deputy First Minister to issue a determination to appoint junior Ministers. It is conceivable that, in that determination, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister could specify that the junior Minister is appointed to lead on a particular issue and across more than one department. That determination could, for example, specify that a junior Minister would work alongside the Ministers for Regional Development, the Environment and Agriculture on issues such as—to take a very topical example—flooding.
Section 19 also provides sufficient safeguards around the appointments of junior Ministers. Subsection (4) requires that any determination on the part of the First and Deputy First Ministers be approved by a vote of the Assembly. As the Government read it, the amendment may open the way to encroachment by junior Ministers on the authority of departmental Ministers. That would be a significant departure from existing structures. As to junior Ministers contributing in other ways to the working of the Executive, the noble Lord’s points will have been heard. I hope that the noble Lord will agree that this is a debate that should now be taken forward in the Assembly. I hope that he will consider withdrawing his amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness for her response. Of course I want this to be debated in the Assembly, but I take issue with the substance of her point that what we have currently does what I seek to achieve. The point on which we differ is that you cannot unilaterally give departmental power to a junior Minister. Each departmental Minister has certain functions, and they cannot and should not be usurped. An example is the attempt last year to usurp the functions of the Minister for the Department of the Environment. It would have to be clearly spelt out that no encroachment could be made on the powers of a departmental Minister unless that Minister consented, because the politics of this are very important. You cannot have a Minister from one party come into a department and take part of the departmental Minister’s powers away. That would be very dangerous. So I interpret things slightly differently from the noble Baroness.
All I am trying to do is to find a solution to a problem that I have identified. I accept that the debate should move to Stormont but I wanted to highlight it because a problem exists. It is easily solved. Flooding was an excellent example, but I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, knows that the departmental system at home is very rigorous and substantial in number. Therefore, in trying to resolve some of these cross-cutting issues, we have to look for innovative and creative decisions. That is the rationale for my proposals. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a more sensitive issue. We have had much discussion on the fate of victims and survivors, and one theme has transcended virtually all attempts to resolve it: that many victims and survivors feel that a victim is almost equated with a perpetrator. This amendment seeks to make it clear that any person who has been,
“physically or psychologically injured as a result of or in consequence of their undertaking a criminal act in a conflict related incident”,
is not a victim. It is not clear that that is the present position. Similarly, somebody who was involved in the planning of a conflict-related incident is guilty of an unlawful act and therefore should not be treated as a victim.
From the experience of the Haass process in recent months, and in particular towards the end of last year as we came to the close of the process, it is clear that a huge constituency of people feels, after all this time, that they see on their screens relentless pressure for inquiries, for the state to explain its actions and for the security forces to explain their actions and be accountable for them. Yet the average individual who has been a silent victim feels that they are not valued accordingly. For example, recently some Sinn Fein figures who were actively engaged in the terrorist campaign said, “Well, we are not terrorists or guilty of terrorism”. The implication was that the fact that they shot somebody—as some of them openly admitted they did—does not mean that they were terrorists. I do not accept that. There is a fundamental divide on that issue.
I believe that if somebody voluntarily engaged in a conflict-related act of violence or was involved in the planning of such an act, they cannot be classified or regarded as a victim. This amendment seeks to make that absolutely clear. It is a very modest proposal to set out that there is a difference between those who were actively involved in terrorism as perpetrators and those who were the victims. I beg to move.
I think that noble Lords might agree with me when I say that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, has saved the most complex and intractable issue until last. In a sense, all the other issues we have discussed here today flow from the problems associated with the issue of victims.
The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, relates to the definition of a victim in the context of the role of the Commissioner for Victims and Survivors. Many noble Lords here today will have far more direct knowledge than I about the impact of the conflict in Northern Ireland on people’s lives over more than three decades. I recognise that those of us who do not have personal experience of the conflict must approach this debate with considerable humility and great care. I recognise the concerns that the noble Lord is making clear here today. Like the noble Baroness, I have met people in Northern Ireland who have explained to me the nature of the impact that the Troubles have had on their lives and the result of the conflict in terms of the damage that it has done to them. These are people who still suffer today.
Noble Lords will be aware of the recent talks chaired by Dr Richard Haass, where the right approach to dealing with Northern Ireland’s past was debated in detail. A key element of the approach taken during those talks was that victims and survivors should be central to any efforts to deal with the past. The Government commend the progress made by the parties in Northern Ireland in dealing with these issues during the Haass talks and I hope that progress will continue to be made in the future. As I said earlier in this debate, there are still meetings going on between the party leaders, and the Government remain hopeful that progress will be made.
The noble Lord, Lord Empey, has made a moving argument. However, the Commissioner for Victims and Survivors is the responsibility of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Any change to the definition would require cross-community support in the Assembly. The Government are particularly anxious not to cut across the initiatives in the Haass talks. To address the issue here, in this Bill, might have a negative impact on the ability of the parties in Northern Ireland to develop an inclusive process of dealing with the past. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that the all-party talks, building on progress made by Dr Haass, still represent the best chance of making progress on these matters. In the mean time, I hope that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.
My Lords, I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, made about the differences between the recognition of the individual and the provision of services that can be made available to that person as a victim. However, there is a growing recognition that that has been an issue. My party leader, Mike Nesbitt, proposed at the end of last year a new mental health initiative where we could perhaps teach the rest of the world the expertise that we have developed in treating people because, sadly, we will all be facing the downstream consequences of the trauma caused by Iraq and Afghanistan. That will be coming before us and I do not think that, as a country, we have any grasp as yet of the scale of what people will face. Even now, 30 or 40 years after they were involved in the conflict, people, including those in the security forces, are still presenting with trauma. The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, is a professional in this area and knows perfectly well what I mean.