(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I ask the Government to think carefully about this clause—and I do so because they have pushed me into the very unlikely position of finding it impossible to support this proposal. The reason I find it impossible is that we already have more people in prison than any comparable country in the world. When we had a discussion about that, Ministers said, “Ah well, judges deem it right to send people to prison”. I do not see how you can say that and then say that in circumstances of this kind, judges should be told that they have to send people to prison. That is the first point that I find very difficult to take.
The second point is that judges are in a position to make proper decisions about very vulnerable young people. When I had a young persons’ prison in my constituency, to go there was one of the most depressing moments of the month because you met all sorts of young men who could so easily have been your own children, if they had not been brought up in circumstances of such horror and in such appalling situations that you were surprised that anybody could have turned out other than criminal. You cannot excuse people by their background or environment but you have to make your judgments on punishment with a full understanding of the circumstances and likely effects of the punishment that you make.
The third reason is this. If you can think of a way most likely to ensure that someone who has broken the law will continue to do so, a short prison sentence must be it. It is manifestly true that it does not work; it is even more true that it normally can make things worse. If other countries manage to have a different system without having some enormous increase in crime, the Government really have to think again. After all, if you walk in the streets of Paris or Berlin, or indeed in Dusseldorf or Lille, do you feel less safe because there are half as many people in prison? Of course you do not. They have found better ways of doing this. I am citing not Scandinavian countries but those countries with which we would normally compare ourselves.
There is a further reason, too, which is this. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not be embarrassed by this but I do not like the way that this got into the Bill. It was not in the Bill originally; the Government did not think that it was the answer. What happened was that people outside, not known for their concern for young people or their concern for moderation and real facts, started a campaign to say that this was the answer. But that is the same campaign that we have had for years and years, which is: “Be tougher, lock up more people and really show which side you are on”.
I do not think that anyone could claim that I am on any side other than having the toughest belief in the rule of law and the most concern to protect people. However, I do not like it when the law is changed, or proposed to be changed, not by the sober reflection of those who have to carry the consequences but by the noisy statement of those who will move on to another campaign the moment that that one ceases to sell newspapers or gain support. That for me is the reason why this is intolerable. We must make our laws because we know that they are right and have thought about them; otherwise, we will go backwards in so many ways.
I end by saying to my noble friend that one of the things that characterises this Government—and, indeed, this moment in our history—is that we have become more understanding about things and less damagingly demonstrative about our attitude to other people. We have become more willing to say that there must be another way. As we are going to discuss the appalling situations created by those who think that the only way forward is to use force against others, we ought also to think about ourselves. We do not have this right. We have not made our whole punishment system work as well as those of many of our neighbours. Is not this the moment to say that we are not going to keep going down this route but are genuinely going to see whether we can learn more from other people and, having done so, change our system so that we can get the results we need without the knee-jerk reaction of “lock ’em up”?
My Lords, I strongly oppose the proposal that Clause 25 should not stand part of the Bill and it appears that commissioners may think in the same way, according to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Since the early 19th century, it has been the received wisdom that people are deterred from committing crime by the likelihood of detection rather than the length of sentence. I agree with that in general.
As a former Metropolitan Police commissioner and deputy-commissioner, I have experience of two categories of crime that proved the rule by being exceptions to it. The first is the one that Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe has apparently already mentioned: that is, the reduction in shootings that occurred in London after a five-year mandatory sentence was announced. That occurred because communication among the criminal fraternity is good. It is particularly good among the women of that group, who stopped carrying the guns in their handbags. Therefore the guns are not as much in evidence as they were.
I imagine that many noble Lords will recall my second example, which was a response to the marked rise in fatal and near fatal stabbings of teenagers in London a few years ago. The most important factor in reducing that was the issue of a practice direction from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I do not think that he is in his place—when he was Lord Chief Justice, that a first offence of unlawful possession of a knife should normally be considered for a custodial sentence. Knife crime started to fall and I believe that is because people knew that that message was passing around the streets of London.
I believe that, with knife crime falling, a custodial sentence for a second offence of carrying these weapons makes much better sense than for a first offence. The reason for that is it provides people with a chance. A sentencer now sentencing someone for a first offence can give them a very simple message which is very easy to understand—“Don’t do this again or you will go to jail”. Normally, I am in favour of leaving judges and magistrates free to exercise their judgment but this crime has an additional catastrophe attached to it. It ruins the life not only of the person who is seriously injured or killed but also the life of the offender in those circumstances.
I had to talk to the families of people who had been murdered in these circumstances. We have not heard enough from those who oppose the clause or, with respect, from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the victims of knife crime. Knife crime can change lives catastrophically. One of the awful things about that period when teenagers were killing each other in London was how often there was only one knife wound. A single blow had caused these deaths, as if these young people had no idea that that action would kill someone. It seems to me sensible to pass a message to stop the thing happening that will then allow someone to be murdered. One cannot murder someone very easily if one does not have a knife or a gun. I strongly oppose the proposal.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, was not going to add my voice to this debate, but I feel compelled to do so for two reasons. The first is because this is an issue which has been troubling the House for quite some time and we have had a number of debates about it over the years. There is an issue about whether we believe that judges, when they issue sentencing guidelines, are able to do that which a number of Members of this House want in terms of deterrence. A judge’s guideline which indicates that for a second offence the expectation will be imprisonment does have a profound effect.
Secondly, I refer to the period of imprisonment, which is to be four to six months. Those of us who have been burdened with the joy of helping to deliver the criminal justice system know that a period of imprisonment of four to six months is the least effective term there is. Very little opportunity arises in which to do a needs-based assessment with the offender, to do a skills analysis, and then to be able to ascertain how best to intervene and interrupt the pattern of criminality, if one has already been established. If we are thinking about the efficacy of a sentence, this, I must respectfully say to the Committee, seems to be the least efficacious. I would hope that we can trust the judgment of our judges and invite them, if there is not now a strong guideline in relation to sentencing, to provide us with one.
Will the noble and learned Baroness confirm for the Committee that neither she nor I have any intention of supporting a Liberal Democrat plot on this subject?
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
My Lords, I can assure the Committee that this has been a sober debate on the issues and that it is clear that there is no unanimity of view on any Bench. I believe that the House of Lords is demonstrating its independence and doing what it does best, which is to argue and disagree, and then, it is hoped, to come to a consensus.
I am putting this before the Committee in circumstances in which, as I think the noble Lord well knows, a compromise has been reached.
Does my noble friend agree that this is too important an issue for it to become a kind of joke measure for those who wish to make other party-political points? We ought to consider this seriously, in the way it ought to be considered, and make our own decisions according to the facts.
I agree with my noble friend that it should be considered seriously and a judgment exercised by the Committee as to what it thinks the appropriate response to this particular clause is.
The Committee is looking carefully at the clause. I have endeavoured to assist with various questions to indicate that certain technical amendments would have to be made, which would not alter the fundamental purpose behind the clause, but would nevertheless make it more satisfactory.
Would it help the Government if we voted this clause down? They could then produce a clause that was satisfactory and would listen to what the Committee had said.
Why have a vote at all? We are in Committee and the Bill will then be on Report. At that stage, the Government can tell us what sensible amendments they wish to move. Some of us have been whipped to come this afternoon—and I always treat Whips with great discernment—but what is the point in voting this afternoon?
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I obviously cannot comment on individual cases. It may be that cases with lawyers proceed only if lawyers have advised that there are reasonable prospects of success. As to those cases which fail, I do not accept that the tribunals are not able to do justice in the absence of lawyers. Most of the tribunal members are extremely well trained. They are capable of eliciting the facts. Simply to say that there cannot be justice without lawyers is, with respect, simplistic.
Will my noble friend accept that those of us who supported these changes because of the large sums spent on legal aid in this country as compared with other countries would still be concerned to ensure that what we thought was going to happen is happening? Is he aware that many of us feel that rather than waiting five years before we have the kind of assessment which is surely necessary, as we are dealing with the poorest and most vulnerable people in our society, we really ought to look at this rather earlier?
My Lords, I share my noble friend’s concern, as do the Government. My answer was “within five years”, and I take note of what he says: that five years might be regarded as too long. Nevertheless, I am sure he would agree with me that we need time to assess these matters, particularly in view of the fact that before April 2013 there was a spike in the number of applications so as to take advantage of the old regime. It will take a little time to assess the true effects of the reform.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Serious Crime Bill is intended to deal with serious crime, which unfortunately is a problem. If serious crime is committed, sadly it will result in sentences of imprisonment.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, this is an Urgent Question and the time allocation of 10 minutes is up.
(12 years ago)
Lords Chamber(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it would be a great mistake to do this if we did not have to. The problem is that we have to, because the present situation is not acceptable. No business could be run on this basis. You would have shareholders, even of the most reactionary kind, asking how on earth it was possible to run a major business in which there was one woman, on the basis that you had to have one. I very much appreciate the words that have just been said.
As I said on a previous occasion, if we did not need it, we would not have to do it but because we need it, we have to do it. I know that that sounds odd, but it seems the only answer to the Government’s argument so far, which I do not understand. I do not understand why it is sensible to do this at some points but not at others. That does not seem very sensible either. Surely it has always been best to do it at the top first, then all the way down. You do not do it at the bottom, and then hope it goes up. It is like having girls come into a boys’ school. It is a very odd system but when you want to open up a school you start at the bottom and the number of girls gradually goes up, until you have a mixed school at the top. I say that as the father of four children, two boys and two girls, none of whom went to mixed schools, but I know how they work and that is how you do it.
However, that does not mean that when you are dealing with the law you set a very good example by suggesting that it is not the same at every level. I am interested only in why that should be the case. I have listened to the Government’s arguments and no doubt if I have to listen again, I may be persuaded. Up to now, however, I am missing the logic. I would like to see a logical reason why this proposal should not be there, or why the other bits that are there should not be removed. That is the alternative: if we do not need this, why do we have the bits that we have?
I will say one last word about the addition to the Bill. The noble Baroness made a very good point about how long this is. There are many things in the law that could be removed to make room for this, and I can give a long list of them. For example, there is a part that makes it illegal for Roman Catholic churches to ring a bell. That is much longer than this bit; we could take that out and put this in quite happily. If, therefore, there is a question of overburdening, I can think of a series of overburdens that can be removed—so that argument does not work. I ask the Government to understand that by not doing this, a signal is being made. By doing it, a signal would also be made. I do not understand why they want to make the wrong signal.
My Lords, I had some experience of trying to push this agenda forward rather a long time ago but I wonder about, for example, creating a duty on the present Lord Chancellor to do this. What does this amount to? I have a feeling that the argument that has been presented suggests that you should make the duty incumbent on all the judiciary at all levels, so that they welcome diversity. That is my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. There is a limit to what the Lord Chancellor can do to change the culture now, with his present powers. There is also some question as to what the Lord Chief Justice can do, though he can be welcoming and so on. The logic of it is for the whole judiciary to be required to welcome diversity and all the benefits that it brings.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment and that tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, because this duty should be extended to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. I will say at the outset that I strongly refute the comments I have heard elsewhere that this will be perceived as gesture politics. I do not think that it will be, because it is a joint endeavour. Promoting diversity is a matter for the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice as well as the JAC. They have a part to play and they need to take meaningful action, so this duty should be extended to both of them.
What has been the result of this disparity? My experience as the chairman of the JAC was that one heard a lot of warm words, but they were not often followed by purposeful action. Moreover, all the criticism about slow progress was directed at the JAC, which became a convenient fig leaf for senior politicians and interest groups. Too much attention was paid to the selection process. There was an almost forensic examination of each stage of the process, whereas the barriers which were outwith the responsibility of the JAC received very little attention. That left the JAC exposed and some of the structural obstructions were not dealt with as speedily as they should have been. There were endless debates about the JAC’s processes and a disproportionate amount of time was spent on making minor changes to the selection process, which in the long run may not have had a major impact. However, they detracted attention from the other substantial changes for which, as I keep saying, the responsibility lies elsewhere.
If the JAC drew attention to the changes that were needed in order to widen the pool and improve diversity, in my view they were not often given the consideration they deserved. If there was a duty on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, they would have been much more focused on them. Perhaps I may give two examples. There is the issue of non-statutory eligibility criteria in vacancy requests. An analysis made by the JAC as early as 2008—I hasten to add that this was done after the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, had left—found that a key factor in limiting the ability of the JAC to make a significant contribution towards improving diversity was the usual requirement for the Lord Chancellor to stipulate in vacancy requests to the JAC that candidates for salaried judicial posts should have had previous fee-paid experience. This was a real barrier to a large number of potential candidates, such as members of the employed Bar and, of course, solicitors. The JAC argued for this factor to be made “desirable” rather than “normally required”. However, there was a reluctance to change. These concerns were formally raised by the JAC in response to the consultation on the Green Paper The Governance of Britain, in 2008, after two years’ experience of working with these requirements, by which time the commission was able to analyse their impact. I give that as an example of something that obstructed progress towards diversity.
Let me give another example. In 2008 an agreement was reached that every post in the circuit Bench selection exercise which the JAC was due to run should be open to part-time working, but potential candidates said that while the commitment was welcome in principle, it was not sufficient to encourage them to apply without an indication of an acceptable part-time working pattern. That is quite important. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that each circuit would make two posts available for part-time working. It took an enormous amount of time to arrive at this arrangement. These were seen as concessions to the JAC, and not a joint effort to promote diversity. The JAC always felt that it was a tiresome body which was constantly asking for concessions. It should have been a joint endeavour. If everyone had been involved and had had the same responsibilities, they would have given closer consideration to the JAC.
Other changes that the JAC proposed were rejected on the grounds of so-called business needs. Business needs always trumped diversity considerations, and the lack of purposeful engagement was frustrating. It was compounded by the fact that all the criticism about the slow process, both by the interest groups and the politicians alike, was directed at the JAC. I could go on because I feel very strongly about the amendment, and totally reject any assertion that this is gesture politics. I very much hope that the Government will consider the amendment.
My Lords, I would like to continue the effort that I have tried to make over past days to ensure that these decisions are not made merely by the legal world itself. I find this debate very peculiar indeed. I cannot think of a business which is worth its salt that does not insist that the chief executive has a responsibility for these matters. I sit as chairman of a number of companies, and in every case I have a personal responsibility for health and safety. I think it is important and I think that I have to take that responsibility. The direct responsibility is for the chief executive.
I know that it hurts many of a traditional kind in the legal profession for me to make comparisons between the Lord Chief Justice or the Lord Chancellor and such mundane people as chairmen and managing directors. However, it seems to me not an unreasonable parallel, and therefore I find this whole debate—as I found a debate in an earlier Session—to be really peculiar indeed. It should be the other way round: one should start off by saying that there are responsibilities of this kind lying on the shoulders of those who direct the whole shebang. One should not go half way down it—I am being rude now—and say, “It does not arrive up here, it comes down somewhere here”. One can repeat it, of course. It is perfectly reasonable to say, “It is also to be done here”, particularly if one has some suspicion that it is not being done lower down quite as well as one would like. However, one really cannot in any reasonable way exclude those who set the tone from issues which are the tone.
I very much accept the noble Baroness’s comment about this not being gesture politics. It is not gesture politics, because we are saying that we need to get rid of the fundamental view that merit is an easily definable thing and that it is terribly easy to say that somebody has got half a point better than somebody else. That is not what happens in business. We all know that when one looks at a number of people, one sees that they have differing contributions to make. One can say, “Yes, I have two people here who, on balance, both have the same contribution to make, as people”. The next question is: what are they making a contribution to? One says, “Let me make an assessment of what they are contributing to”. If, in most cases, they are making a contribution to what I would call a community, a panel or a group, then I might say that they are equal, but that this particular person makes less of a contribution to the whole than the other person, who would do more for the whole. That is the argument behind these elements of the Bill.
This is not a matter of tokenism, but a matter of reality, and it should be seen as such. If it is a matter of reality, it cannot be restricted to people lower down the pecking order. It must start with people at the top. I therefore beg the Government not to come back with the usual civil servant explanation to the effect that, “These people do this anyway, they are of a very high standing. We could not imagine them thinking in any other manner and, my goodness, why could you?”. I would reply that the present Lord Chancellor is an old friend of mine and a man of impeccable standards in this way. However, he still ought to be under the law; it still ought to be part of the way we present it.
It is really important simply to say that this is not a minor matter to be applied to people lower down, but a central matter to be applied from the top, because it is too important to be particularised. The only way not to particularise it is by saying that the chaps or girls in charge must take this responsibility. I very much hope that on this occasion the Government will see that this is a very reasonable amendment, that it could be taken without any difficulty at all, and that it could in fact be seen to be valuable step.
My Lords, just for the sake of the record and having put my name on this amendment, I make it clear that I support it for the reasons so admirably given by those who have spoken, including the noble Lord, Lord Deben. If I may say so, he showed remarkable acuity as somebody who is not a lawyer in contributing to this debate.
My Lords, Amendment 121, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would extend the duty in Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The duty requires the Judicial Appointments Commission to have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments. The amendment would extend this duty so that it applied also to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.
Similarly, Amendment 121AA, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, introduces a new duty on the commission, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor, albeit in slightly different terms. Rather than a duty to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for appointment, the amendment sets out a duty to promote diversity in the judiciary. In addition, it sets out a requirement for an annual report on performance of the duty.
The Government have given a firm commitment to improve diversity within the judiciary. We consider that a diverse judiciary, reflecting modern society, will enhance confidence in the judicial system. However, we do not consider that the extension of the duty to promote diversity in Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act, or the new duty suggested by Amendment 121AA, would make any difference in practice.
I understood what the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, meant when she said that these matters should not be turned into gesture politics. Since becoming a Minister, I have made it a personal commitment to attend every meeting of the judicial diversity task force in the hope that my presence will put a little speed into the process that we are trying to carry through.
The Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, when exercising their public functions—other than those relating to judicial decision-making in the case of the Lord Chief Justice—are already subject to the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010. This means that when either is exercising public functions in relation to the judiciary, the public sector equality duty applies.
I followed the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and for a time thought that he was on my side in arguing that, where responsibilities already exist, it is not necessary to rewrite them. The duty of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice is set out in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and provides that a person exercising functions of a public nature must have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by the Act; advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not; and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not.
It is true that the Equality Act duties are not in the same terms as the duty in Section 64 of the 2005 Act or the proposed new duty in Amendment 121AA. Parts of Section 149 of the 2010 Act refer to persons with protected characteristics. This does not have any bearing on what steps, for example, we should take to encourage more solicitors to apply for judicial office. However, it is also clear that this duty contains the key elements of advancing equality of opportunity that we are normally concerned with when discussing diversity; that is, issues of gender, race, disability and sexuality.
The duty of course applies to the Lord Chancellor not just in relation to judicial diversity but in any functions of a public nature that he exercises. We consider this general duty to be a better approach than attempting to multiply separate legislative duties on the Lord Chancellor in different areas. This debate has already given an indication of that with the various duties proposed by different amendments.
We are often told by this House that we overlegislate, but there is also a tendency to want to put every specific duty in every Bill. We endorse the Constitution Committee’s comments on the importance of leadership and understand the reasoning behind the amendments, but we believe that the existing duties in the Equality Act 2010 are sufficient to keep us up to the mark in this context. Extending the existing duties to include both the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice would add nothing of practical value in increasing the diversity of the judiciary. Nor would it add anything to a commitment clearly made and embedded in the Bill.
If it is necessary to state these things in particular for some parts of the system and it is not thought to be otiose, why is it not necessary to do it at the top of the system and thought to be otiose in those circumstances? Either you leave it entirely and rely on the general demand or you apply it to both cases.
I will ponder on that, but I also ask the Committee to ponder on the Pannick amendment. The noble Lord’s proposal to write specific responsibilities into the Bill makes a regular appearance when we are legislating—I think that it is the second time that he has done it anyway and that makes it regular. The argument is usually the same; it is a please-stop-beating-your-wife amendment. These duties are embedded in the Bill and in the roles of both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it always surprises people that non-lawyers such as me sit through long periods of Bills such as this one. It is mainly because some of us think that no profession should be left to make its own decisions about its own set-up. Therefore, I hope the Committee will allow me to say just two things.
First, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. It is necessary for the protection of judges that someone should make an interjection of this sort. Secondly, the noble and learned Lord who argued against the question of equal merit ought to learn a lesson from the rest of his life. I know perfectly well what I have to do when I choose people to work for me in my businesses. I often get a large number of people of similar merit. Then I get it down to people of equal merit. What do I say to myself? I say, “I can’t run a business in which I have too many women and too few men. I can’t run a business in which I have no gays. I can’t run a business if I don’t have some kind of different ethnic minority representation when I could”. It is a very simple thing and I am a bit tired, if I may say so, of the legal profession talking as though it was a unique operation—as though it somehow has nothing to do with how the rest of us work.
That is why I sit through these debates from time to time—to say occasionally, “For goodness’ sake, realise that you are in a world that operates in a particular way. When you talk about representation, it is about being sensible of and sensitive to the way the world works”. I found the previous discussion bewildering. It is manifestly true that you often find people who are of equal but different merit. The issue then is about what mix works, given that you have 25 other people of equal but different merit. How do you fit that person in? Anybody who has chosen people for a team or run anything finds that to be true. I cannot understand why judges are supposed to be different or, in particular, why they become more different the more senior they become. I find that extremely odd.
Therefore, I ask the Committee to learn a lesson from those of us who are not lawyers. The nature of our legal system is accepted partly because people feel that, in general, the way in which it operates has some parallels with how everything else operates. If it operates in a totally different way, frankly, we have got it wrong. Let us try, in those areas where parallels are obvious, to make the system parallel. Where it is not parallel, we should be able to defend why it is unique. In neither of the cases that we have talked about in this curious group of amendments is it possible to claim uniqueness. In both cases, it is better to do what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested, and to disagree with the well argued but fallacious point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.
My Lords, I do not dare to follow what the noble Lord has just said. I want to make a slightly different point, which is to agree very much with the noble and learned Lords, Lord Falconer and Lord Woolf. There needs to be somebody in Parliament who speaks for the judges. That is probably the most important point that is being made and the major reason why the Lord Chief Justice should not have the final say.
(15 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI referred earlier to New Zealand, where an official leaflet explaining the system was provided. Afterwards, there was a great argument about whether it had been impartial.
If there is to be a leaflet from the Electoral Commission—I find that idea difficult, because the Electoral Commission will have an attitude that comes through—will it give a full and detailed explanation of why AV has not always worked and will there be an explanation of why the first past the post system is on occasion thought to be better? That is the only way in which there can be an unbiased leaflet. If it merely explains AV, it will lead people to believe that the system is sensible, when it manifestly is not, because the leaflet will have the Electoral Commission’s name on it and will therefore be taken more seriously than it would be if it did not. It seems wholly unacceptable that the Electoral Commission should interfere in something that is none of its own business.
I think that the opponents of the yes vote are already getting their excuses in. The leaflet will help people to make a decision and factually explain both systems. I am not sure that the outcome of the 1975 referendum owed itself to a government leaflet in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, suggested.