Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Requisite and Minimum Custodial Periods) Order 2024

Lord Deben Excerpts

Monday 29th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it was a pleasure to hear the categories that will not be up for release, because nobody wants sexual predators and misogynists out on the streets—so I am delighted to hear that. But when the issue of prisons comes up, we always have to ask ourselves: what are they for? They ought to be for keeping dangerous people off the streets, but that is not what we do at the moment; we throw into prison an awful lot of people who should not be there. Through the Minister, this Government could think about changing who we put in prison because, quite honestly, the number of people going to prison is ludicrous when you think about some of the crimes they have committed.

Drug law reform is an obvious area. It seems absolutely ridiculous to put people in prison because of drugs offences when they have access to even more drugs there than they do out on the streets. Prisons are failing in that way, and I would be interested to hear what the Minister had to say about drug use in prison. Unfortunately, our new Prime Minister has indicated that he wants to continue the ideological war on drugs. Can the Minister at least review the evidence from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs and publish its advice? The Conservative Government kept it secret because it called for the decriminalisation of personal possession of drugs.

It is good to hear about restorative justice, which is something further that that this Government could talk about. It is a voluntary process whereby people who have been harmed can work with the people who have caused the harm and perhaps identify how both parties can resolve or move on from it. We had amendments on this to the Victims and Prisoners Bill, so it would be good to hear the Government’s thoughts on this area.

Of course, if we are going to let people out of prison, we have to remember the scandal of the IPP prisoners. I was sad that the Minister did not mention them today because that category has clearly suffered the most incredible injustice. The legislation was designed to keep serious offenders in prison, but instead we ended up with nearly 3,000 people, most of them non-violent, trapped in prison. IPP prisoners turn to suicide and hunger strike. This is a legacy of the last Labour Government that the new Labour Government need to fix, as I pointed out.

One report says that someone got, in effect, 16 years in prison for stealing a flowerpot at 17. A prison sentence of 18 months should not turn into 18 years, which has also happened. It is no wonder that our prisons are overcrowded if we keep throwing people in there to rot for minor crimes. So do the new Government have a plan to work at pace to safely release IPP prisoners where possible? Is there a proposal for new legislation on this? We need the new Minister to sort out a plan on this. We need a resentencing programme to get the majority of IPP prisoners out of prison. Apart from that, I can say only, “Good luck”.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I wonder whether I may ask a very simple question. I very much support what is being put forward, but in my history no Government have ever answered the simple question: how come Britain locks up so many more people than comparable countries in the rest of Europe? It seems pretty barmy. I do not feel any less safe in Paris or Berlin than I do in London, and yet both those countries do not lock people up in the way we do. It is a fundamental and simple question. I hope very much that we will pass this, of course, but I hope it will be in the context of the Government being the first of any political party—the previous Labour Government refused to look at this as well—to look at this fundamental question and ask themselves, “Why?”

The answer must be that there are better ways of doing what we are trying to do. If it means ignoring pressure from the Daily Mail, then I am afraid that is what we have to do. Given the brave statement the Chancellor of the Exchequer made today about cuts, it might be a very good opportunity for this Government to take a new look at why we lock people up.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I have very considerable concerns, which have also been expressed by the Delegated Powers Committee, about the Secretary of State being able in effect to double the length of time that a prison sentence can last in relation to both summary offences and either-way offences. How long a person goes to prison for as a result of a magistrates’ court sentence is a considerably important factor in determining which cases are tried by a jury and which are tried by the magistrates’ court. If there is to be a change in the powers of the magistrates’ court of this dimension, it should always be done by primary legislation and not by regulatory powers. I oppose the proposal that the Secretary of State could in effect double the sentencing power of the magistrates’ court and think that should be left to primary legislation. For that reason, I support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, as a non-lawyer, I have listened to much of this debate before and today and I think this Government are going too far in taking into ministerial powers decisions which should come before Parliament. This is another example of that. I do not want the Secretary of State to be able to do this without Parliament discussing seriously what it means. Parliament ought to be much tougher about its powers being taken into the Executive.

I was first elected to the other place in 1970. Since then, Parliament has become increasingly less powerful and increasingly the Executive have increased their power. I do not believe that the Secretary of State should have this power. I believe it should be Parliament. What is more, I believe that the public think it should be Parliament. Only with the consent of the public does the legal system work.

I usually come here to ensure that lawyers do not do things a bit on their own in legal matters, and I think I am the only non-lawyer here, but I wish to say—I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, a fellow recalcitrant individual. It seems to me that we have to be much tougher about things that look small because, in aggregate, they become very dangerous, because the public will lose their belief in the fact that the legal system is independent except that it is dependent on the good sense of the elected Parliament and the House of Lords in ensuring that the Executive do not overstep the mark. I do not want this Government to overstep the mark in this or any of the other things they seem to wish to take unto themselves.

Data Protection: Legislation

Lord Deben Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Data do not respect boundaries in quite the same way that the noble Lord does. We do indeed take a number of steps to protect our data—the ICO has a number of powers which it exercises regularly to control data. However, it is appropriate that our data protection legislation should be in harmony with that of the rest of the European Union.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

Would my noble friend not accept that it would be quite difficult to explain to companies which work all the way across the European Union that we were so fed up with the European Union that we did not do the sensible thing for them, which is to do through Europe the things that are best done in Europe?

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend takes a slightly different view of this country in Europe. Certainly that is the approach that the Government take, although of course they make a major contribution themselves to the development. Indeed, I shall be attending on Friday a meeting at which we will discuss the final version of European data regulation, or at least the partial general approach to it over the forthcoming year.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Deben Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister. I am sorry I have not got a loud voice. I may be a little slow. This is not because I want to hold up the Bill, I just have things to say.

We have been told time and again that disabled people with life-limiting conditions—and I use that term advisedly because we do not recognise the terms “terminal illness” and “months” or “weeks to live”; but more about that later, under a suitable amendment—have nothing to fear from the Bill. We are told that it is necessary only to help a few desperate individuals to end their lives when they have weeks or months to live, and that, if enacted, it will not touch anyone who does not want it. I do not believe that and, it seems, neither do the authors of the Bill. Why else would they elect to name it the Assisted Dying Bill instead of the assisted suicide Bill? If it is truly concerned only with personal autonomy and choice, surely that should be celebrated and clear.

By avoiding the term “assisted suicide”, the Bill circumvents the framework of measures in place to review, monitor and prevent other forms of suicide. It seeks to exclude deaths under the Bill from the general requirement for a coroner’s inquest to be conducted where suicide is considered a possible cause of death. It contains a provision for publication of annual statistics of “assisted deaths” separate from the established arrangements for collecting and publishing statistics on deaths by suicide. It provides for a death under the Bill to be recorded by the registrar as an “assisted death”.

I have a question for the Minister. This Government, like their predecessors, have a major cross-departmental suicide prevention strategy. It seeks,

“a reduction in the suicide rate in the general population in England”,

and defines suicide as,

“a deliberate act that intentionally ends one’s life”.

In the light of this definition, will the Minister inform us whether, if the Bill were to become law, he anticipates a rise in the suicide rate, and would he expect the suicide prevention strategy to contain measures to reduce the numbers in this group intentionally ending their own lives?

We all, in this House and outside, understand the word “suicide”. It centres on the individual. The act of suicide is the responsibility of the person who commits it, and no other. It is impossible to commit suicide without first consenting to do so. The same does not apply to the word “dying”.

Assisted dying is practised in Belgium, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Whatever the initial intentions were, decisions to end life in those places are now not taken only by the individual. It is not an autonomous act. The slippery slope is oiled by the vague euphemism of “assisted dying”. Disabled and terminally people are rightly frightened that the Bill, as currently named, puts them at risk. The purpose of the amendment is to provide some safeguards through the use of plain language. “Assisted suicide” makes it clear that only the individual may instigate and control the process leading to an early, state-sanctioned death. I urge noble Lords to support this argument.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, there is a deep reason why so serious a Bill should be particularly careful about the language it uses. One of the problems we have today is that people use language in order to establish not the truth but a slight version of the truth that they wish to pass off. I hope the House will excuse me if I use what may appear to be a flippant example but I think it sums it up.

In the register of interests, I declare that I am the chairman of the Association of Professional Financial Advisers. The Financial Services Authority decided to call the changes that it wanted in the industry, “treating customers fairly”. This was done to suggest that anybody who did not agree with every fact in the policy would be treating customers unfairly. It was designed to have a particular effect.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Lords Chamber

I ask your Lordships to say that, in the interests of justice and of the rule of law, the matter should go back to the other place with the opinion of this House as sought by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to disappoint the noble Lord opposite but it does not need to be a particular party to see that there is something deeply wrong with what is being presented today. I am sorry about the tone that he adopted. I think it was entirely wrong and he may have done his cause and my cause a great deal of harm as a result.

The Government have not distinguished themselves by the way in which they have listened to this House or by the way in which they have thought through what they have presented. I remember the comments of the late Harold Macmillan that it is a mistake to revolt on more than one thing at a time because it confuses the Whips. I am concentrating on this particular issue because it is the most important issue of all. I think my noble friend misunderstood something I said earlier as criticising him. I do not criticise him at all. I think he has presented the case in this House as well as humanly possible, with a courtesy which one would expect and which he has fully expressed. The trouble is that there is not a case for what is being proposed. That is the difficulty. I do not think I have ever heard so damaging an apology as the one which was revealed during the course of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—that the Minister got wrong the only argument of any importance that he presented and then tried to uphold in this House the decision of the other House which would not have come about except with the exercise of the Whip. That would have done credit to the Chief Whip on the Benches opposite during his period in the House of Commons. It is very serious indeed. We have to say no to the Government’s determination. We have to support the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because we have to give the other House an opportunity to reverse the decision that it made when it was not in full possession of the facts. That is the first thing we have to do.

My noble friend said that all that is happening is that the bar is being raised slightly higher. I am not a lawyer. I am proud of not being one and am keen to enter into this discussion because sometimes it seems as if the only people who understand these things are lawyers. I think that most normal people understand these things and they understand them very simply. With the greatest of respect, the bar is not being raised slightly higher. Its nature is being changed. What is being asked now is that judges must make a decision which does not seem to be a proper decision for the courts in any case. Decisions of courts should fundamentally be on the facts of the law—on what something means. But that is not the decision that is being asked for here. The judge is being asked to decide that somebody’s unlawful act was highly unlikely to have affected the people who would otherwise have been affected. That is a curious thing to ask a court to do. Surely a court ought to be asked to say whether a proposal is so unimportant or vexatious that it should not occupy the time of the court. That is a perfectly reasonable thing to say. If judges had constantly allowed people who wanted to argue how many angels danced on the point of a pin, then I would have accepted that we needed to do something about it. However, when my noble friend was challenged for the statistics on which this very serious proposal was based, he honestly said that he had not got any.

Your Lordships might reflect that if I were presenting a proposal to a board of directors of a public company and I said I wanted fundamentally to change the product they had—its constituents, the way it was advertised, the market for which it was being manufactured—I would have to present some figures. I would have to say how many people did not like the product and thought that it needed to be reformulated. I would have to say how often the product had poisoned people or upset their stomachs. I would have to produce some kind of basis.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way on this point. I said that I had no statistics; I did not say that I had no examples.

[Lord Deben]

I have listened carefully to the examples that my noble friend put forward, but has he any more? I do not think that any of them have been convincing so far. I am happy to give way to him if he is prepared to give us some new examples.

[Lord Faulks]

If the noble Lord had looked at the website in which all the examples were set out in the build-up to the Bill, he would have read them. I cannot read them all out now; it would be an inappropriate use of the House’s time.

[Lord Deben]

I am sure that most of my noble friends, and noble Lords generally, have seen those examples. I have to say to my noble friend that they are not very convincing. They are not sufficiently great to suggest that we should change the law of the land in this very particular way. That is my concern. I can see that it is easy to say, “Look, there have been a lot of judicial reviews that have not really been necessary”, or to say that we really need to shorten the time to build and to develop. I have a long history of being keen on building, developing and getting this country ahead of its neighbours, and of being unhappy about the way that we seem to take such a long time to do things. I am therefore a natural voter for this. I am on the side of the Government; I would like to be with them. However, this is not the way to do it. There are ways in which it could be done that would not break the fundamental reason for judicial review.

I come to my third point. During an earlier debate I said that the foundation of British law is that no one is above the law. I am a great enthusiast for King Charles the Martyr, but it was perfectly right to say that he should not be above the law. I think it extremely dangerous—I say this to my noble friend very carefully—if Ministers should feel it reasonable to break the law because it is not really very important, or because it does not really have much effect. Breaking the law, if one is in a position of authority, is ipso facto a serious thing to do. Having been a Minister for 16 years, I would expect my civil servants to tell me very clearly if I proposed something that would break the law. I would take that very seriously indeed. I do not believe that ordinary people will respect the law in the same way that they do today if they think that Ministers have a special arrangement, which is that when they do things somebody has to show that it was really serious, really upset somebody or really made a difference before the courts can adjudicate on it.

I come to my fourth point, which I must say is, to me, very serious indeed. We have to be very careful about legislating in a way that suggests that we do not have trust in the judges who make decisions. Of course, this might be thought to be a dangerous place to say this as there are so many judges here, but it is the thing that distinguishes us from many Administrations: there are very few people who will not say that the judges in this country make decisions without fear or favour. If judges have made decisions that judicial review cases should be heard, I would prefer to rely on them than on people who are parti pris—that is, the Ministers—who find those decisions embarrassing. Ministers of any political party ought to be embarrassed if they break the law. That is an essential part of defending the law.

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[Lord Deben]

I have taken advantage of now being able to look up online in this House the suggestions as to why these cases are important. The first one is a case study on residential development in which the judge decided that there were two grounds of law which ought to be met. They were discussed and both were dismissed. Is my noble friend really saying that because it was inconvenient those two particularities of law should not be looked at? There is a second case put before us about a free school which is quite complicated but there were people who had a real issue. They are the only two cases to explain the argument that there have been more and more cases of judicial review. Frankly, there have been more and more cases of the Government interfering in the detailed arrangements of life and therefore it is not surprising that the number of judicial review cases has increased.

[Lord Horam]

I cannot comment on a churlish Government interfering more and more in the minutiae of daily life. That is something the Government would have to answer. None the less, the fact remains that the use of judicial review, where people are really arguing about the merits of a project, case or change in the NHS, in education or whatever, is fairly extensive. Indeed, I am told by friends and acquaintances in the lobbying industry that if you go to a lobbying company and say, “We are worried about this project and we want to object to it.”, one of the things it will tell you is that if you can afford an expensive lawyer it will find a technical means through judicial review of objecting to the proposal. That is a standard part of the package, I am told. It is hearsay, I fully accept that, but I am told that it is a standard part of the lobbying system in this country. They are the sort of examples I am aware of. It is not particularly statistical evidence but in this field that is rather hard to come by. None the less, it gives a flavour of what is happening out there in the ordinary world.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support the two amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Pannick has explained their crucial importance, as has the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I wish to highlight only one point, which is why I am here at this hour—very usual for me.

It is crucial because if there is one element in the Government’s so-called “reforms” that causes me the most anguish, it is restrictions on legal aid. For many, many disadvantaged people, legal aid is the only way they can pursue their legitimate rights. When it is denied, justice is denied. This is particularly true of judicial review proceedings. I want us to leave here tonight contemplating the fact that, in the landmark decision this summer, the residence test was found unlawful. The court reviewed real-life examples of people who would be ineligible for legal aid in future. The one that struck me the most was the example cited of “P”, a severely learning-disabled adult who had been forced to live in a dog kennel outside the house, had been beaten regularly by his brother and mother, and starved over an extensive period of time. For me, this story encapsulates why we must support these amendments in some way. If we do not vote tonight, we must truly think about how we are going to address this situation. The Government’s residence test for legal aid has no basis in law and, I am afraid, will without doubt deny justice to those who need it most—perhaps the man in the dog kennel.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, many cases have been put before us in these debates in which we have argued the facts. We have disagreed about whether particular measures will have this or that effect. This is not the same kind of discussion. I can see that we could have quite a lengthy discussion about the access to our courts of foreign nationals and the cost to the nation of that.

However, that is not what I want to argue here. I want to argue something that is more serious because it is not a matter of opinion but of behaviour. If a responsible Minister has made an undertaking about a law and that has been accepted by the House, if that undertaking is to be changed, it must be changed in front of the House in circumstances in which the House can make a decision. I am a bit tired of the constant statement by Ministers that there is the affirmative resolution procedure, as if that made any real difference. We all know perfectly well that the system that we have means that there is very little effective parliamentary control over legislation that is passed by those techniques.

If Parliament has been assured by a Secretary of State that a particular situation pertains, it is morally unacceptable that some other Secretary of State can reverse that without Parliament being able to argue the case. I say that as somebody who may not have gone all the way along with some of the arguments about access to justice for people wherever they come from and the rest. I certainly have some concerns—I think many Members of the House have concerns—about the way that our system has been used in the past. I certainly have a real concern about the exclusion of children; I agree with the noble Lord opposite on that. However, that is not the issue for the House today. That is why I am very sorry that we are debating it so late, at a point when the Opposition have decided that it is perfectly possible to send all their people home. Some people might ask why people thought that they would have an early night when matters of real importance—this amendment and the previous one—were being discussed. I think that many will ask that question.

The Government and the Minister need to stand up and explain to the House how it is possible, in a democratic society, for a Secretary of State to give an undertaking to the House as to what a Bill means and for that then to be changed without an opportunity for debate in the House. That is a really serious issue and not one of an ordinary kind. Although we will not vote on this, because one can see the nature of it, I hope that the Minister will take back to his colleagues that this is not a debate of the same kind that we have had up to now. It is a serious issue because people must trust the words of Ministers when they speak officially. I was a Minister for 16 years and I do not think that I can remember a moment when I would have reversed the public statement of a predecessor without giving an opportunity for that debate to take place publicly and clearly. On this occasion, the House has every reason to say that this is not good enough.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, in 1949, when the Legal Aid and Advice Act was brought in, the state of affairs in this country was radically different for the ordinary man and woman in the street from what it is now. I speak in terms of legal services and the availability of the same. In 1949, after the Legal Aid and Advice Act was passed and the scheme introduced, 95% of all law firms in the United Kingdom undertook legal aid. I can assure your Lordships that every single one of those firms would have done a great deal of pro bono work in the communities that they served. Indeed, not to have done so would have been a deathblow to their local reputation and workflow.

In the interim, everything has changed in that regard. Today, the number of firms doing substantial amounts of pro bono work and which are therefore available to the bemused citizen has, I am afraid, shrunk to a very small number. Indeed, the irony is that the bigger and richer the law firm, the less pro bono work it does. I speak as president of the Solicitors Pro Bono Group, or LawWorks as it is commonly known. In the mean time, the volume of legislation that we pass in this place has rocketed. Indeed, it is ironic that LASPO, the Act that underpins these amendments—I am speaking particularly to Amendment 176—is 302 pages long, is complex beyond measure and has rather more pagination than the entire statutes of 1906, which I had cause to look at the other day. Our output is something in the order of 13,000 to 15,000 pages of statute law a year, with only 2,000 or 3,000 pages of repeals. The problem for the ordinary citizen in terms of the law, access to the law and getting help and assistance when they desperately need it has never been remotely as great. Indeed, it is one factor in this strange mood that prevails in our country today—a mood of disillusionment and mistrust.

The amendment is absolutely essential. Make no mistake, judicial review is more and more important in the world that we inhabit, precisely because of the astonishing complexity and volume of the law with which we are surrounded and the need, therefore, to enable citizens and organisations to have access to the courts for judicial review when it is needed. One might think that JR cases are rocketing, but according to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in April this year on the implications for access to justice of the Government’s proposals to reform judicial review, that is not the case. That may be surprising, but I suspect it has as much to do with the lack of pro bono availability —although there are some wonderful exceptions—and the legal aid position as is. The proposal in Amendment 176 to prevent a future Lord Chancellor from imposing further eligibility criteria or restricting the scope of legal aid without coming back to Parliament must be right. I hope that the Minister, for whom I have great respect, will see the importance of this.

Access to justice is surely the ultimate hallmark of a democratic society that is working. We as a Parliament do not walk our own talk unless, as well as passing these tidal waves of legislation, we make available to the citizen the means of accessing that legislation when needed. Otherwise, frankly, we are hypocrites and aiding and abetting a society in which money wealth is ever more dominant. Where justice is concerned, that must surely be wholly unacceptable.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has been a passionate debate. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in close co-operation with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who, to continue the football analogy, persisted with his tactic of man-marking the Lord Chancellor. The debate was also enhanced by the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell. My noble friend Lord Deben made a number of criticisms of ministerial colleagues for announcements. I must, and will, deal with those. My noble friend Lord Phillips told us about bygone days, when the way legal practices functioned was very different. I have, through my relations, memories of rather a different approach to the law than that which pertains now. Legal aid was certainly commonplace in the provinces then and people were charged what solicitors thought they could afford. We live in a very different era now. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, repeated her concern at the effect of the residence test on some children in some circumstances.

Amendment 180 would bring the new clauses into effect at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which the Act is passed. Amendment 176 seeks to prevent the Government making future changes restricting the availability of legal aid for judicial review through secondary legislation under LASPO. Specifically, the amendment would prevent future changes being made through the powers conferred under Sections 2 and 9 of LASPO. It is important to pause here as there is a danger of confusion. Section 2 deals with remuneration and Section 9 with scope, where these have the effect of imposing further eligibility criteria for legal aid in judicial review cases, or of restricting the scope of legal aid for judicial review. The amendment also seeks to annul any statutory instruments that have previously been made through the powers available under Sections 2 and 9 of LASPO, in so far as they restrict eligibility or scope in relation to judicial review.

As noble Lords will already be aware, remuneration arrangements for civil legal aid cases have recently been amended in regulations made under Section 2 of LASPO so that where an application for judicial review is issued, the legal aid provider will undertake work on the application at financial risk, unless permission is granted or a discretionary payment is made. This point was elegantly made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. There is, of course, a difference between scope and remuneration in this context, and that is a partial answer to the point made by my noble friend Lord Deben. A theme correctly adopted by the Government, throughout the difficult period that has persisted since they came into power, is that limited legal aid resources should be properly targeted, particularly at judicial review cases where they are needed most. The legal aid system is there to command public confidence and credibility. It was in that context that we introduced amendments to the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations to limit the circumstances in which legal aid providers should receive payment for work carried out on an application for permission.

It may be helpful if I explain that our figures suggest that there are a significant number of unmeritorious cases—751 in 2012 and 2013 alone—which receive public funding but where permission is refused. Therefore, they have apparently satisfied the Legal Aid Agency that there is sufficient to justify legal aid. In fact, on the old test, they have failed to surmount the rather low hurdle of permission. This change was introduced to incentivise providers to consider more carefully whether to commence judicial review proceedings and hesitate before commencing claims that are unlikely to receive permission. In genuinely meritorious cases, the provider is still paid because the case is granted permission, the case concludes prior to permission and their costs are paid by the defendant, or, where the case concludes prior to permission and they cannot get costs, the provider can apply to the Legal Aid Agency for discretionary payment. Unfortunately, I do not think that my noble friend Lord Deben was able to be present when we had a lengthy debate on these issues, and the question of legal aid for judicial review and its limits in relation to remuneration and scope was debated.

Remuneration continues to be paid in the usual way for the earlier stages of a case to investigate the prospects and strength of a claim and to engage in pre-action correspondence aimed at avoiding proceedings under the pre-action protocol brought in by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is in his place, to discourage proceedings where the matter could be sorted out through an exchange of letters pursuant to the protocol.

I should stress that the regulations made under Section 2 of LASPO do not affect the availability of civil legal aid to individuals, the scope of civil legal aid for judicial review or the eligibility of applicants for legal aid in judicial review proceedings. Where a client is in receipt of legal aid, he or she will remain so for the life of the case unless it is withdrawn for other reasons. These changes relate only to the remuneration of legal aid providers. To put it more simply, it is the lawyer who loses out. The client does not lose legal aid.

As the amendment seeks to prevent the Government using Sections 2 or 9 of LASPO to impose further eligibility criteria for receipt of civil legal aid or to restrict the scope of legal aid, the amendment would therefore not achieve what appears to be the intended effect of, among other things, annulling the recent amendments I have referred to on remuneration. The amendment would however have the consequence of preventing the Government imposing additional eligibility criteria or restricting the scope of legal aid for judicial review, other than through primary legislation. It would also annul previous amendments debated and passed by Parliament in relation to the scope of legal aid for judicial review.

The form of legislation and level of parliamentary scrutiny to which provisions in relation to the remuneration of providers, and the eligibility for and scope of civil legal aid, are subject was considered only recently by Parliament during the passage of LASPO. We continue to believe that the level of parliamentary scrutiny is appropriate.

Perhaps I may remind the House about what happened during the passage of the LASPO Bill. Parliament was assured that the scope of judicial review would not be amended, which is entirely correct, but we do not accept that the proposals we are discussing are inconsistent with LASPO. In other words, the issue of bad faith, which is effectively alleged by my noble friend, simply does not arise. LASPO contains a very clear power to amend the scope of civil legal aid, as per Section 9, to which I referred earlier. There is no exception for judicial review.

Therefore, it is wrong to say that LASPO was enacted on the basis that the scope of legal aid would never be amended to create some sort of estoppel, as my noble friend seems to suggest.

[Lord Deben]

My noble friend will entirely solve my problem if he can say absolutely directly that nothing that the then Lord Chancellor said is in any way inconsistent with what we are now doing. In other words, what Kenneth Clarke said as Lord Chancellor, and what he promised, are entirely carried through and there is no contradiction whatever. In that case, I have no problems at all and will be happy to support him, but that is what we want to know.

[Lord Faulks]

I am sorry that my noble friend is not satisfied with the explanation that I have been rather laboriously making—which is that it all depends on the difference between scope and remuneration. The scope of legal aid has not been altered; we are simply talking about an amendment to remuneration at one stage of the process—a particular regulation which was considered in Committee. It was the subject of a debate on these matters. Admittedly there was opposition to it on the basis that this could stifle people from bringing judicial review, but it was not then suggested that there was some violent inconsistency between the LASPO Bill and what was said during its passage, and the change pursuant to Section 9. Now, however, it is being suggested that there is some bad faith on the part of the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

If you give an assurance that the scope of legal aid for judicial review is not being reduced or altered by LASPO, it seems that then introducing regulations which provide that there will be no remuneration for legal aid unless and until leave to move is granted and that there will be no remuneration for legal aid in residence regulations—although I appreciate they have been quashed—is indeed tantamount to reducing the scope of legal aid for judicial review. There is no point in saying that we are protecting legal aid as to scope for judicial review if you do not pay lawyers for providing the legal advice and assistance. That is what legal aid is about. So, with great respect, I do not accept the distinction between scope and remuneration. That simply will not wash, in my respectful submission.

Tonight I am not concerned with inviting the House to consider the merits or otherwise of the Government’s policies. We will all have our own view on the merits of the policy and whether legal aid is too wide or not wide enough. My concern is the constitutional one of whether it is appropriate to amend this important area of the law by secondary legislation in the light of the assurances we were given and when, I suggest, but for those assurances the Government would have had even more difficulty than in fact they had in getting the LASPO Bill through this House.

[Lord Deben]

My Lords—

[The Countess of Mar (CB)]

I am sorry to remind the noble Lord, but this is Report and nobody should speak after the Minister except the person winding up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, your Lordships have heard today that Part 4 of the Bill contains a number of extraordinary provisions. Amendments 178 and 179, the final group of amendments for debate, provide an appropriate finale to our consideration of Part 4 because they address the quite extraordinary powers that are conferred on the Lord Chancellor by Clause 79.

If your Lordships take time to read Clause 79, you will see that the Lord Chancellor is given a power not merely to,

“make consequential … incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision”,

to none of which I object. He is also given a power to make “supplementary” provisions by subordinate legislation. This power extends, so the Bill says, to amending, repealing or revoking legislation.

These are quite extraordinary powers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Deben, explained to the House in Committee. I can see no justification whatever for conferring such powers on a Minister, far less in the sensitive context of judicial review, which, as your Lordships have heard this afternoon, is an essential element of the rule of law and the purpose of which—or at least one purpose of which—is to control the powers of Ministers. The Minister gave in Committee no explanation that I could understand as to why these extraordinary powers were required. I look forward to hearing his observations tonight. I beg to move.

[Lord Deben]

Happily, I am able to say now what I was going to say earlier, which is that I am one of those people who want to cut the amount of money that we have spent on legal aid. I take a very clear view that it is out of line with the arrangements in any other country that you might like to compare it with and that it is perfectly right for the Government to take those measures. However, that is why the Government should be a little concerned that people who are on their side have found unacceptable the mechanisms by which we have extended the powers of Ministers without due parliamentary control. This is the problem. Ministers should recognise that this is where the difficulty comes.

What we are saying is that the purpose is wholly acceptable but that to give Ministers powers of this kind is unacceptable and, as far as I can see, there is no good reason for doing it. That is the problem for the supporters of the Government and of their stance, which is why it would be helpful if the Lord Chancellor were to understand that we think that Parliament should have control in these very important areas, that we should not leave it to supplementary legislation even if it is of an affirmative kind and that—I am sure that my noble friend the Minister is entirely straightforward in his view about the connections between this and what was promised—when there is a fear that what has been promised has not been carried through, we should err on the side of being careful that Parliament should understand, accept and vote on those matters.

It is a matter not only of morality but of courtesy. I feel that we have not been given the kind of service which it is proper to ask of Ministers on this occasion. As one who supports these measures to a large extent, I am sorry that I shall be put in a position of not being able to support them simply by the mechanisms that have been presented. I suspect that quite a large number of my colleagues on this side of the House who have supported the Government would have been much happier in their support had the presentation been fundamentally different.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to hark back to what I said earlier today, but when one comes to consider the powers given in Clause 79(1) and (2), it is important to bear in mind the special status of the matters which we have been dealing with in Part 4, to which I presume the final provisions in Part 5 are meant to relate. It is just a matter of discernment of the sensitivity of interfering with the basic means of the citizen to protect himself against excess of power by the Executive, among others. Where that is at stake, to give a power which allows supplementary provisions to be made by secondary legislation is wrong in principle. The Government, who I am sure are anxious to show that they are sensitive to the importance of judicial review and the independence of the judiciary—as they say so often—should feel uncomfortable with, at the same time, asking for a blank cheque with regard to the supplementary powers referred to in Clause 79(1) as well as those to amend, repeal or revoke legislation.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I ask the same question of the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit. If he thinks that Ministers, not judges, should make the judgment, then we are in wholly different places. The answer to the question of the noble Lord is that in the end it is for Parliament to make the laws, it is for the Executive to administer the laws, but it is ultimately for the courts to decide and to declare what the law is when it comes to public law, as for any other kind of law.

It is important to emphasise, for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Horam, in particular, that there is no automatic right to judicial review. It has to be applied for. It is granted only if the administrative court is satisfied that the application raises a properly arguable case by someone with a sufficient interest—not a mere busybody—who has exhausted any effective alternative remedy, such as a planning appeal.

The application has to be made without inordinate delay. The concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Horam, about delay are, therefore, met by the strict requirements of the administrative court. If the application succeeds, the court has a broad discretion that the remedy is necessary and proportionate. It will not permit the procedure to be abused. It will punish any abuse of procedure with an appropriate cost order.

If, as the Justice Secretary contends,

“‘left-wing’ campaigners have exploited the process of judicial review to frustrate government initiatives”,

—dear me!—the courts have ample powers to ensure that judicial review is not abused, including making cost orders against those who abuse the procedure.

It is an ancient principle, probably going to back to Magna Carta, that under the common law, which is at the heart of our system, no one shall be judge in his own cause. In seeking to interfere with the powers of the courts, and to place obstacles and handicaps in the way of application for judicial review, the Justice Secretary and the other Members of the Government—Liberal Democrat as well as Conservative—are judges in their own cause. They have a political self-interest in what is in Part 4.

But this House is in a different position. We have a vital constitutional role in protecting the rule of law and the accountability in law of Ministers and of government departments and of all public authorities. The House has the opportunity this afternoon to fulfil that role by placing the wider public interest against party-political interest. That is why, though I do not enjoy being a rebel, if there are Divisions on any of these amendments in the name of the very distinguished supporters of this one, I shall cross the floor and shall vote with them.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, many Members of your Lordships’ House will understand that I very often come to debates on legal matters in order to make sure that legally trained people do not have it all their own way. I have always felt it a danger of this House that legal issues are debated by judges, who, it is often suggested, may have ulterior motives. I speak today because I think the judges are entirely right, and the concern that I have is a concern for my own historic profession of politician.

I well remember the occasion on which I was able to use the fact of judicial review to get my civil servants to understand why I would not accept a particular appeal on a planning matter. It was because it was quite clear to me that the very powerful interests, whose infrastructure aim I entirely approved, had failed in their duty to look for alternatives to the proposal that they were putting forward. They had not, therefore, fulfilled the law. Now, sometimes it is easy for a Minister to make such a decision, but sometimes it is inconvenient. It is important that embarrassment and inconvenience should not be allowed to go so far that it means that Ministers make decisions which are unlawful. Somebody has to decide when a decision is lawful and when it is not. That is what judicial review is about; it is a very simple concept.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben]

Happily, we are not discussing the European courts at the moment. In case anyone did not know, I am entirely in favour of our membership of the European Union. I think we should keep the defence of people’s freedom by the Bill of Rights that we have in the European Union, invented after Winston Churchill. I could go on for a long time, but I will not be led there by my noble friend. The truth is that we are talking about British law, British judges, British courts and the British defence of freedom that is judicial review. I hope that your Lordships’ House will remember the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, when he remarked that this is part of the structure that saves us from having to have a written constitution. This is the mechanism that we have invented. As a mechanism, every now and again it is annoying to Ministers. That should be a judgment of its correctness. That is what it is there for: to make Ministers annoyed enough to make sure that they do the right thing. In that sense, I have in the past—as is bound to be true after 16 years as a Minister—been annoyed by the facts of judicial review, but it made me a better and fairer Minister because I had to think of the law and not of my opinion at a particular point.

I want to say just one other thing. My noble friend Lord Horam said we should trust the judges. That is precisely what those of us who support the amendments are asking. We are saying that we should not say the judge shall not; we should say that the judge has the right to decide. We think there ought to be discretion but the Government are saying that there should not. I find that unacceptable. I do not want the division of powers that one sees in the United States. I want the kind of elegant association of powers that we in this country have worked out over the years. However, an elegant association of powers is held in place by very delicate mechanisms, which we fiddle with at our peril. This is one of those very delicate mechanisms that we will not fiddle with without very considerable effects. Just in case anybody heard the comment about left-wing people misusing this, I remind the House of what happens in the United States where it is almost universally right-wing people who make life almost impossible for elected Governments by using their system of separation of powers. How extremely clever we have been over the centuries to produce something that works so well, is so delicate and interrelates so well. Having done that over centuries, let us be a bit careful about being too clever with it now.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby (LD)]

My Lords, we have heard a brilliant speech. I associate myself very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said about the absolute necessity for Ministers to be obliged to bear in mind all the time how far their policies and decisions are in line with the law. Like the noble Lord, Lord Deben, I was also a Minister for a long time. During that period, on more than one occasion, I was confronted in a very direct way with challenges to the decisions I had made, particularly about issues around comprehensive schools. What I learnt from that experience was, first, to be very careful and thoughtful about any proposals that my department made in my name. Secondly, I learnt to have great respect for the often painful occurrence of reviewing my decisions in great detail, no doubt to the displeasure of a number of local authorities who did not share my view.

I want to make two other quick points. First, our own great Conservative Party has always been deeply suspicious of statism, unlike many right-wing parties in Europe and elsewhere, and has always had a commitment to the idea that the Government might be wrong and that they should be subject to the rule of law like all other citizens and parties in society. I find it, therefore, all the more puzzling that a party with that record and reputation can put forward this extraordinary Bill. I am here, not having taken part in the earlier stages—I had no intention of taking part—only because, when I read in detail both the Bill and the amendments, I became very troubled indeed.

The second crucial point is that the Conservative Party has always been centrally loyal to the concept of its patriotism to the British tradition and British values. As my noble friend Lord Marks, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, have all said, at the very heart of the best of British values is the concept of accepting the rule of law. It is worth saying that almost no other country in the world—certainly no court, such as the European Court of Human Rights, which is nothing to do with the European Union, as may not be realised; it is to do with the Council of Europe—allows an individual, someone with no standing, no resources and no money to challenge the might of the state itself.

I am very troubled by some of the clauses, which will make it difficult for that same humble individual citizen to stand up to the state because he or she lacks the resources to do so or the ability to pay for brilliant lawyers. That is exactly the opposite of what we thought—what I have always deeply believed—that judicial review was all about. Whatever the process may be called, the truth of the matter is that the public broadly, to put it bluntly, trust the judiciary rather more than Governments, who come and go. Our judiciary has undoubtedly formed itself a substantial reputation.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, rightly referred to the judicial system in the United States. Many Members of this House will be aware that over the past five or six years, there has been an absolutely steady uniformity of verdicts—five to four, five to four, five to four—on one issue after another, because, like it or not, the judiciary in the United States is politically chosen. That is why you cannot treat it in the fullest sense as independent; it is heavily dependent on who was President at the time that a particular judge was appointed.

Let us take pride in what we have been and what we are: one of the few countries in the world where an individual is treated as having the full right to challenge the Government and other forms of the Executive. Let us recognise that that has been treated in much of the rest of the world—not least on the continent of Europe —as one of the outstanding claims for the United Kingdom to be treated as an exceptional country, one that, ever since the days of Winston Churchill and the Council of Europe, has been persistently followed. It has had a huge influence on, for example, eastern and central Europe who follow us in that concept of the rule of law.

I conclude by saying that it would be an act of absolute tragedy if we were to allow a law to go through that begins to put in doubt that reputation.

--- Later in debate ---

It is important also to emphasise that the judge will have discretion over both aspects: causation and quantum. That will ensure that the parties will continue to carry a costs risk, helping to ensure that they do not engage the most costly legal advice available to deal with points that do not truly merit that level of expertise.

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I am listening very carefully. The tiny bit that I do not understand is why the judge should not have discretion to decide whether the case merits payment of costs or not. The discretion is very bound, because he has to maintain that these are exceptional circumstances. I find that difficult. Why cannot he be given the right to say, “In this case, they ought to pay because they have been in one way or another negligent”, or have overcharged, and in another case that they should not? Why cannot we leave it to the judge? It is his court and he should make the decision.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, of course that is the burden of the argument in favour of the amendment, and that is the current situation. The clause is intended to place a higher burden—we accept that it is a higher burden—on interveners to think carefully about the intervention that they intend to make as to whether it is truly worth while.

Before my noble friend’s intervention, I was stressing that the judge has discretion over both aspects: causation and quantum. The intervention may have caused only a degree of additional costs, rather than the entire costs of the action, which will modify the intervener’s exposure to costs. That will be a matter for the discretion of the judge. Of course, it is ultimately up to the judge to decide what are exceptional cases. Judges have different views as to what constitutes an exceptional case, but ultimately it is for the judge. It is very rare, if at all, that one sees appeals on questions of costs having any success. Amendment 164 would remove both presumptions that the clause creates, replacing it with a general discretion, which my noble friend would like, for the court to award costs either for the intervener against a party or to require the intervener to pay the parties’ costs. That is the status quo.

Clause 73 has been criticised for being too broad and meaning that interveners could be expected to pay costs in any circumstances. Critics have said that that means that an intervener would not be able to intervene in important cases and provide assistance to the court, as the risk of adverse costs is too unclear and potentially too great. Under Clause 73, what amounts to exceptional circumstances will ultimately be set out in court rules. That will provide clarity for an intervener at the point where they are considering whether to intervene on the manner in which they should carry out their intervention or risk costs.

Clause 73 does not mean that in every case where an intervener is involved they will be forced to pay all the costs of all of the parties, but it is right that they have a fairer financial stake. All those with experience will confirm that, just as interveners can add value, they can delay and hinder and make arguments that simply amplify or repeat—

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Listowel (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham about delaying proceedings on this matter to give us more time to consider the detail before anything is put in place. I wish, as always, that I could support the Government because of their tremendous achievement, which must be repeated again and again, in taking 2,000 children out of custody in the past four or five years. Because of their humane achievement in bringing the number down from the all-time high of 3,000 children in custody—a number that was deplored by Members on all sides of your Lordships’ House—to, potentially, only 1,000 by this Christmas, I wish in my heart to support the Government as far as possible. I would also like to support them because the idea of basing an approach on education is, of course, immensely appealing.

There are, however, in these provisions shortcomings that have already been described. My concern is particularly about the risks that young people may experience in such a setting. On a recent visit to a young offender institution—I shall try not to repeat what I said in Committee, but I will repeat this point—I was given the example of 15 young people attacking two. When I first visited a YOI 15 years ago, there might have been three or four people attacking one or two, but with the gang culture now, it is normal—and a great source of worry and consideration to the governor and the prison officers—to have members of different gangs in prison, and to have to think about how to stop large numbers of boys beating up small numbers of boys. That is one aspect of risk.

Because the Government have been so successful in reducing the number of juveniles in the secure estate, we now have only the most troubled and challenging young people there. That may help to explain why it is difficult to reduce the reoffending rate further. It also means that those people are putting each other at greater risk than was the case in the past. Moreover, I learnt in an early experience of speaking to a prison officer that, contrary to expectation, people tend to be more challenging the younger they are, rather than it being the older ones who are most challenging. The older ones seem to have developed some sense of what one does and what one does not do, but the young ones just do not have that sense, so they can be very difficult to manage.

May I take your Lordships back to 1998, and the setting up of the first secure training centre at Medway? Some of your Lordships may remember Lord Williams of Mostyn coming to this House shamefacedly following the riot there, when in the space of just two hours eight or nine 12 to 14 year-olds caused hundreds of thousands of pounds-worth of damage and injured three of the staff. I think—perhaps the noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong—that the main issue was that the quality of staff was not appropriate to the needs of those young people. It had not been thought through beforehand what kind of staffing was necessary to meet their needs. So my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham has a very good point: we as parliamentarians should think extremely carefully about these vulnerable young people, who can be so damaged.

I am reminded of another example which, again, occurred under a previous Administration—namely, the setting up of Yarl’s Wood immigration removal centre. It was established as a secure centre for children and their parents on the plan of a prison; indeed, it was identical to a prison. One could go into the reception area of Yarl’s Wood immigration removal centre and have very much the same experience as going into a prison. A mother with an eight year-old child would have to walk through a barred gate. One has to ask oneself what the child thought of the experience of walking into a prison through a barred gate. Who gave any thought to what it would be like for children to be placed in that setting, run by a prison governor, if I remember correctly, and manned by prison officers? This caused outrage for 10 years.

The former Children’s Commissioner, Professor Aynsley-Green, repeatedly produced reports on this setting and very gradually the environment was ameliorated considerably over time. But how much better it would have been if consideration had been given well beforehand to what the needs of children and families kept in a secure setting would be—infants, eight year-olds, 16 year-olds with their mothers—and whether a prison would be suitable accommodation for them. This issue needs to be given the closest attention and most careful thought because we are talking about some of the most vulnerable young people in our society.

In conclusion, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, talked about the health and mental health needs of these young people. Many of them will have experienced the care system. In many cases, before they went into the care system, they experienced repeated trauma throughout their lives, had dysfunctional families and were betrayed by the people they most trusted. There was no help available from within their families and they were very damaged by the time they entered care. In those circumstances it is vital that the proposed setting has a very good team of mental health professionals to support young people and the staff who work with such vulnerable young people. I share others’ misgivings. I wish that I could be more generous towards the Government because I applaud them for what they have achieved elsewhere for these young people. I hope that the House will support my noble friend’s amendment to give us more thinking space.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, in my maiden speech I said that one of the things I wanted to concentrate on in this House was social justice. We are talking about what for me is one of the very central issues of social justice—that is, how you deal with those who are most troublesome to society. You can measure a society by how it deals with those who cause it most difficulty.

As a Member of Parliament, I found the visits to the young offender institution in my former constituency among the most troubling that I ever made because you met young men who had never had a chance of any kind whatever in their lives and you recognised that they could so easily have been your own sons. You also recognised how privileged your own children were, not in terms of money or any of the things which are foolishly trotted out by egalitarians, but just by the fact that they were loved.

That leads me to be very worried about any measures which are hurriedly introduced because I think this is a very difficult issue. It is very hard to get these things right. I come back to personal experience. If you bring up children in a loving and secure environment, it is still very hard to get these things right. It is very hard indeed and we all get it wrong. So often we say to ourselves, if we are honest, “If only I’d spent a bit more time thinking about that and taken a bit more advice about it, I might not have made such a blooming mess of it”.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf]

I hope to be very brief in my submission in support of the amendments which relate to the consequential and supplementary provisions in Part 5 of the Bill, which is headed, “Final Provisions”. Clause 73(1) states:

“The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State may by regulations make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision in relation to any provision of this Act”.

Subsection (2) states:

“The regulations may, in particular, amend, repeal or revoke legislation”.

I am not quite sure of the distinction between “revoke” and “repeal” and would be glad to hear about it and be educated as to the difference. I suggest that subsections (1) and (2) are very wide indeed. The regulations will be made by statutory instrument, and subsection (5) states:

“A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section that amend or repeal”—

it does not mention revoke—

“a provision of an Act (whether alone or with other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament”.

So it is true that the consequential provisions have regulations that require approval. Despite that, I suggest that the powers in Clause 73 are too wide. The amendment to delete “supplementary”—and deleting appeal or revoke—is desirable. I would prefer to see the whole power removed, especially in an area that is as important as the provisions covered by the Bill. Noble Lords will be only too well aware of the provisions contained in each part of the Bill, so there is no need for me to recite them again. They all contain very important issues that I suggest deserve to be dealt with by primary legislation rather than delegated legislation of the sort referred to in Clause 73.

The position with regard to Part 4 is particularly acute. Already this afternoon we have heard submissions with regard to the other Henry VIII clauses that are contained in Part 4. In my view those submissions are equally applicable to Part 5. I beg to move.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, as the House may be aware, I am always unhappy if we have debates that become either a military-fest or a legal-fest—in other words, that the only people who discuss these things are lawyers. I suggest to my noble friend that we have already had sufficient evidence in Committee that there are in the Bill very serious matters over which the House has had very considerable disagreement. I suspect that he knows that Report stage will not be easy on a number of these issues, which reach way beyond party and which are about the nature of civil liberties and this country’s legal system. Therefore, I look at this particular proposal with a considerably jaundiced eye.

I want to say something that he may find inconvenient. There was a time when the Lord Chancellor was very manifestly not a political figure. Yes, he was appointed by the Government and he sat in the Cabinet, but he was seen very clearly as a legal figure. For reasons that I wholly disagree with and are all about a mistaken understanding of these things under the previous Government—this is not a criticism of him or present company—we now have a different situation.

Parts of the article read by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, point to the position where the Lord Chancellor feels he is able to make statements that can be seen only in a context that is very strongly political. That means that the natural willingness of this House to accord to the Lord Chancellor a different kind of approach from that which one would to the Secretary of State for this or the Secretary of State for that is very much diminished.

Having debated this Bill in such detail and having shown so many moments when noble Lords of very different political views felt unhappy, we then come to this catch-all clause. My noble friend may explain that it does not really mean what it seems to mean. In that case, can we please write it so that it does seem to mean what it ought to mean? But if it does mean what it seems to mean, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State can—depending on what the situation is—make changes subject to the most exiguous parliamentary control.

Having been a Secretary of State, I know very well that once you get a properly worded document and present it in accordance with the rules, it is quite difficult for it not to pass—let me put it as delicately as that. That same element is in this. I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was more than polite when he reminded us that there was this “saving” bit, because it does not seem to me to be a “saving” bit at all—that it not what happens. Given the mechanisms of the two Houses, if such supplementary legislation is put properly and is not wrong, it will, in normal circumstances, pass.

If my noble friend cannot give the House the assurance that the wording means something wholly different from what it appears to mean, most of us would prefer not to have it at all. We would therefore want to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in his contention, if not now then on another occasion.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I entirely agree with the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. My concern is that the power the Lord Chancellor has under Clause 73(1) extends not only to “consequential” provisions, which is understandable, or to “incidental”, “transitional” and “transitory” provisions—again, entirely understandable —but to anything that is supplementary. That is an extraordinarily broad power: a power to make supplementary provisions.

In other words, as I understand it, if the Lord Chancellor believes that anything falls within the scope of the general area or subject matter of the Bill, he may, by subordinate legislation, make provision to supplement that which Parliament has anxiously debated and may have amended and approved. Under Clause 73(2), this power extends to repealing and revoking legislation. That is a remarkable power. I can see no reason whatever why such a power should be enjoyed, far less in the context of the very sensitive and delicate issues addressed by the Bill—including, but not only, those in Part 4.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am not saying that they would not. This form of words is sufficiently wide, including the various adjectives that it does, to cover a variety of situations, and if one particular adjective does not serve, another will serve. There will be an overlap between the two. I do not accept that the word “supplementary” is as offensive as has been suggested.

[Lord Deben]

My noble friend, rightly, points to the fact that similar, or the same, wording has been used in other Acts. Surely that does not mean that it was right to use it in those Acts. Here is an opportunity for the Government to take seriously the real concerns of people about the way in which this House and the other place control the legislation that goes through them. We have a system that is not very elegant. Therefore, unless there is something about the word “supplementary” that is different and is necessary, it might be better not to have it. If all those other things cover all the points that the noble Lord raised, then “supplementary” is otiose. If it means something more than that, then I would like to know what “supplementary” would cover that none of the other words would. If we knew that, we might well be willing to help the Government by supporting them. If we do not know that, we have a reason to say that perhaps it is better not to have it.

[Lord Faulks]

As a lawyer, I have a particular regard for precedent. The fact that the word “supplementary” has found its way into other Acts of Parliament is at least some indication that previous Parliaments have approved its inclusion. The fact remains that any provision is worthy of analysis, whether it has been in a previous Act of Parliament or not. None the less, I am sure that the noble Lord would agree that it is important that we give, quite properly, the degree of power necessary to the Secretary of State to implement those parts of the Bill that become law. I can reassure him and the House that such powers are narrowly construed by the courts and are available only for the purposes of implementing what is in the Bill, not what is further to the Bill, not in the Bill or what the Secretary of State might like to have been in the Bill.

Amendment 84 proposes to remove Clause 73(2). This would prevent any provision necessary to give full effect to the Bill being made if it required amendments to any existing legislation, whether primary or secondary. Similarly, with the powers subject to Amendment 83, provisions permitting amendment to primary and secondary legislation for these purposes are commonly found and have been approved, and we are concerned that their absence would hamper the Government’s ability to bring the Bill into force.

Of course I accept that it is right that these provisions should be subject to proper scrutiny. That is why we have provided, in accordance with the expectations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, that all provisions made under this clause will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Where provisions amend primary legislation, any regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure. With that reassurance, I hope that I can allay to some extent any residual anxiety that the House may have.

These provisions are not novel and we say that they are necessary to implement the provisions of the Bill properly. During the Recess, among the many other things that I have been invited to reflect on, I will reflect on the precise use of the adjective “supplementary” in this context. At the moment, I do not give any indication of a desire to amend it, but I will of course reflect on it. In the mean time, with the reassurance that I have endeavoured to give the House, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I ask the Government to think carefully about this clause—and I do so because they have pushed me into the very unlikely position of finding it impossible to support this proposal. The reason I find it impossible is that we already have more people in prison than any comparable country in the world. When we had a discussion about that, Ministers said, “Ah well, judges deem it right to send people to prison”. I do not see how you can say that and then say that in circumstances of this kind, judges should be told that they have to send people to prison. That is the first point that I find very difficult to take.

The second point is that judges are in a position to make proper decisions about very vulnerable young people. When I had a young persons’ prison in my constituency, to go there was one of the most depressing moments of the month because you met all sorts of young men who could so easily have been your own children, if they had not been brought up in circumstances of such horror and in such appalling situations that you were surprised that anybody could have turned out other than criminal. You cannot excuse people by their background or environment but you have to make your judgments on punishment with a full understanding of the circumstances and likely effects of the punishment that you make.

The third reason is this. If you can think of a way most likely to ensure that someone who has broken the law will continue to do so, a short prison sentence must be it. It is manifestly true that it does not work; it is even more true that it normally can make things worse. If other countries manage to have a different system without having some enormous increase in crime, the Government really have to think again. After all, if you walk in the streets of Paris or Berlin, or indeed in Dusseldorf or Lille, do you feel less safe because there are half as many people in prison? Of course you do not. They have found better ways of doing this. I am citing not Scandinavian countries but those countries with which we would normally compare ourselves.

There is a further reason, too, which is this. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not be embarrassed by this but I do not like the way that this got into the Bill. It was not in the Bill originally; the Government did not think that it was the answer. What happened was that people outside, not known for their concern for young people or their concern for moderation and real facts, started a campaign to say that this was the answer. But that is the same campaign that we have had for years and years, which is: “Be tougher, lock up more people and really show which side you are on”.

I do not think that anyone could claim that I am on any side other than having the toughest belief in the rule of law and the most concern to protect people. However, I do not like it when the law is changed, or proposed to be changed, not by the sober reflection of those who have to carry the consequences but by the noisy statement of those who will move on to another campaign the moment that that one ceases to sell newspapers or gain support. That for me is the reason why this is intolerable. We must make our laws because we know that they are right and have thought about them; otherwise, we will go backwards in so many ways.

I end by saying to my noble friend that one of the things that characterises this Government—and, indeed, this moment in our history—is that we have become more understanding about things and less damagingly demonstrative about our attitude to other people. We have become more willing to say that there must be another way. As we are going to discuss the appalling situations created by those who think that the only way forward is to use force against others, we ought also to think about ourselves. We do not have this right. We have not made our whole punishment system work as well as those of many of our neighbours. Is not this the moment to say that we are not going to keep going down this route but are genuinely going to see whether we can learn more from other people and, having done so, change our system so that we can get the results we need without the knee-jerk reaction of “lock ’em up”?

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly oppose the proposal that Clause 25 should not stand part of the Bill and it appears that commissioners may think in the same way, according to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Since the early 19th century, it has been the received wisdom that people are deterred from committing crime by the likelihood of detection rather than the length of sentence. I agree with that in general.

As a former Metropolitan Police commissioner and deputy-commissioner, I have experience of two categories of crime that proved the rule by being exceptions to it. The first is the one that Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe has apparently already mentioned: that is, the reduction in shootings that occurred in London after a five-year mandatory sentence was announced. That occurred because communication among the criminal fraternity is good. It is particularly good among the women of that group, who stopped carrying the guns in their handbags. Therefore the guns are not as much in evidence as they were.

I imagine that many noble Lords will recall my second example, which was a response to the marked rise in fatal and near fatal stabbings of teenagers in London a few years ago. The most important factor in reducing that was the issue of a practice direction from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I do not think that he is in his place—when he was Lord Chief Justice, that a first offence of unlawful possession of a knife should normally be considered for a custodial sentence. Knife crime started to fall and I believe that is because people knew that that message was passing around the streets of London.

I believe that, with knife crime falling, a custodial sentence for a second offence of carrying these weapons makes much better sense than for a first offence. The reason for that is it provides people with a chance. A sentencer now sentencing someone for a first offence can give them a very simple message which is very easy to understand—“Don’t do this again or you will go to jail”. Normally, I am in favour of leaving judges and magistrates free to exercise their judgment but this crime has an additional catastrophe attached to it. It ruins the life not only of the person who is seriously injured or killed but also the life of the offender in those circumstances.

I had to talk to the families of people who had been murdered in these circumstances. We have not heard enough from those who oppose the clause or, with respect, from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the victims of knife crime. Knife crime can change lives catastrophically. One of the awful things about that period when teenagers were killing each other in London was how often there was only one knife wound. A single blow had caused these deaths, as if these young people had no idea that that action would kill someone. It seems to me sensible to pass a message to stop the thing happening that will then allow someone to be murdered. One cannot murder someone very easily if one does not have a knife or a gun. I strongly oppose the proposal.

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[Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, was not going to add my voice to this debate, but I feel compelled to do so for two reasons. The first is because this is an issue which has been troubling the House for quite some time and we have had a number of debates about it over the years. There is an issue about whether we believe that judges, when they issue sentencing guidelines, are able to do that which a number of Members of this House want in terms of deterrence. A judge’s guideline which indicates that for a second offence the expectation will be imprisonment does have a profound effect.

Secondly, I refer to the period of imprisonment, which is to be four to six months. Those of us who have been burdened with the joy of helping to deliver the criminal justice system know that a period of imprisonment of four to six months is the least effective term there is. Very little opportunity arises in which to do a needs-based assessment with the offender, to do a skills analysis, and then to be able to ascertain how best to intervene and interrupt the pattern of criminality, if one has already been established. If we are thinking about the efficacy of a sentence, this, I must respectfully say to the Committee, seems to be the least efficacious. I would hope that we can trust the judgment of our judges and invite them, if there is not now a strong guideline in relation to sentencing, to provide us with one.

[Lord Deben]

Will the noble and learned Baroness confirm for the Committee that neither she nor I have any intention of supporting a Liberal Democrat plot on this subject?

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, I can assure the Committee that this has been a sober debate on the issues and that it is clear that there is no unanimity of view on any Bench. I believe that the House of Lords is demonstrating its independence and doing what it does best, which is to argue and disagree, and then, it is hoped, to come to a consensus.

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[Lord Faulks]

I am putting this before the Committee in circumstances in which, as I think the noble Lord well knows, a compromise has been reached.

[Lord Deben]

Does my noble friend agree that this is too important an issue for it to become a kind of joke measure for those who wish to make other party-political points? We ought to consider this seriously, in the way it ought to be considered, and make our own decisions according to the facts.

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with my noble friend that it should be considered seriously and a judgment exercised by the Committee as to what it thinks the appropriate response to this particular clause is.

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[Lord Faulks]

The Committee is looking carefully at the clause. I have endeavoured to assist with various questions to indicate that certain technical amendments would have to be made, which would not alter the fundamental purpose behind the clause, but would nevertheless make it more satisfactory.

[Lord Deben]

Would it help the Government if we voted this clause down? They could then produce a clause that was satisfactory and would listen to what the Committee had said.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

Why have a vote at all? We are in Committee and the Bill will then be on Report. At that stage, the Government can tell us what sensible amendments they wish to move. Some of us have been whipped to come this afternoon—and I always treat Whips with great discernment—but what is the point in voting this afternoon?