(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the operation of the consumer panel and other panels of the FCA is a matter for the FCA. I am sure that it draws on all its different panels, as appropriate, when taking forward its work programme.
My Lords, one recognises the important issue being raised, but the context has to be understood of a financial services industry that does not have an unblemished record, in terms of the personal pensions and endowment insurance scandals. The FCA has to recognise that it cannot take the good will of the industry towards the client as given.
My Lords, some of the issues that the noble Lord sets out are why it is important to take forward the programme of reform in a measured way that takes into account the interests of all involved in the sector, whether industry or consumers, and makes sure that we have proper consultation in everything that we do.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with the noble Lord on both points. When it comes to assessing whether that has taken place, that is a question for the regulator.
My Lords, I have to express a bit of concern about what I take to be the mood of the House. Will the Minister confirm that a PEP regime is essential, albeit one that is properly operated, and secondly, that if people cannot account properly for their income, it is right and proper for banks to refuse to continue an account?
My Lords, that is why it is important to distinguish between the PEP regime, which has caused problems for people, and questions about banks’ actions in relation to freedom of speech or political views. It is important, though, in both circumstances, whether you are a PEP or you have expressed any view that is lawfully held, that you have access to bank accounts. In taking forward our work on PEPs in particular, we are mindful of always maintaining our commitment to international standards in this area, and our amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act do just that.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as the Committee will be aware, Silicon Valley Bank UK Ltd—SVB UK—was sold on Monday 13 March to HSBC. The aim of this sale was to ensure that customers of SVB UK could access their deposits and banking services as normal; to limit risks to our tech and life sciences sector; and to safeguard some of the UK’s most promising companies.
We have achieved these outcomes—the best possible—in short order, without any taxpayer money or government guarantees. There has been no bailout, with SVB UK sold to a private sector purchaser. This solution is a win for taxpayers, customers and the banking system. The IMF has said that the UK’s response to SVB UK restored market confidence and contributed to the UK’s upgraded growth forecast. It now expects the UK to avoid a recession this year.
On Monday 13 March, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury laid in both Houses a statutory instrument, using the powers under the Banking Act 2009, to facilitate the sale of SVB UK to HSBC. That instrument has now been approved by both Houses. It granted HSBC’s ring-fenced bank an exemption so that it could provide liquidity on non-arm’s-length terms to SVB UK on an ongoing basis. This was needed to facilitate the sale of SVB UK to HSBC, because it ensured that HSBC was able to provide the necessary funds—over £2 billion in the immediate days after—to its new subsidiary. The exemption also ensures that HSBC UK can provide liquidity to SVB UK as needed.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury has now laid this second statutory instrument, which we are debating today, to provide an ongoing exemption from ring-fencing requirements for SVB UK, beyond the existing four-year transition period. This exemption is subject to conditions relating to the size of SVB UK’s core deposits, and the type of business it can undertake.
The first condition is intended to ensure that SVB UK, or its subsidiaries, will not be able to hold core deposits—typically, retail and SME deposits—above the existing core deposits threshold in the ring-fencing regime; that is, £25 billion. The threshold is used to determine whether a bank becomes subject to the ring-fencing regime. The second and third conditions are intended to ensure that SVB UK, or its subsidiaries, will be allowed to undertake only new business activities similar to SVB UK’s existing business at the time of the acquisition by HSBC.
These conditions are intended to ensure that the exemptions from the regime are limited to what was needed to facilitate the sale of SVB UK. Together, they minimise risks to financial stability and limit any competitive distortion.
Indeed, Sam Woods, deputy governor for prudential regulation and chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, has confirmed the PRA’s support for the provisions in this instrument in a letter which the EST has laid in the Libraries of both Houses and which I sent to those who spoke in the debate on the first SI relating to SVB. It states that
“the statutory instrument and its conditions supports the PRA’s primary statutory objective of safety and soundness, and limits competitive distortion”.
The letter also confirms that the PRA has a range of tools to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and SVB UK.
This amendment, along with the previous exemption, was crucial to the purchase of SVB UK by HSBC and protected taxpayers and depositors. The UK has a world-leading tech sector, with a dynamic start-up and scale-up ecosystem, and the Government are pleased that a private sector purchaser was found. I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting this legislation. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the order, but it raises some issues that bear significant further thought. The exemption from the ring-fencing requirement is clearly an issue, so it was discussed in the Chamber earlier in the week. The Government have said that ring-fencing is a key part of their package of banking reforms designed to increase the stability of the UK financial system and prevent the costs of failing banks falling on taxpayers—this was following the financial crisis. Clearly, it is important, and any decision to have some exemption needs careful consideration. I shall not deal with the issue in detail; I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said about it in the Chamber earlier in the week, so I can say in anticipation that I very much agree with her remarks.
I want to say something about the resolution process and what we learned about it during this episode. The Bank of England is responsible for taking action to manage the failure of financial institutions—the process known as resolution. The Bank said that the financial system needs an effective resolution framework, and that was one of the key lessons from the global financial crisis of 2008. Resolution reduces the risk to depositors, the financial system as a whole and the public finances which could arise following the failure of a bank. The object of resolution is to reduce the risk of bank failure as well as to limit its impact when it occurs. To be effective, a resolution authority needs powers that ensure that any losses will fall on a failed bank’s investors but without risk to financial stability or to the broader economy.
To achieve those objectives, the Bank has powers that affect the contractual rights of counterparties and investors in the failed firm, so there have to be statutory safeguards for creditors and counterparties. The requirement in general is that shareholders and creditors must absorb losses before public funds can be used. The Bank has a range of powers to enforce insolvency, which was the initial expectation in this case, or to transfer all or part of a firm’s business either to a private sector purchaser or to a temporary bridge bank established by the Bank pending a sale or transfer.
At the point of failure, Silicon Valley Bank UK had a total balance sheet size of about £8.8 billion and a deposit base of approximately £6.7 billion—that is, assets greater than liabilities to depositors. In that sense, it was solvent. However, the scale of the deterioration of liquidity and confidence meant that the Bank and the Prudential Regulatory Authority—PRA—concluded that the position was not recoverable. It is what the Governor of the Bank of England has described as “banking 101”.
Having consulted the Treasury, the PRA and the Financial Conduct Authority—the FCA—the Bank of England decided ultimately to use its resolution powers to transfer the bank to a private purchaser. My question for the Minister is: what lessons have the Government learned from this episode about the resolution process? The process is relatively new and untested, which means that each example must be explored in detail. The idea of testing the resolution regime is of course problematic; you would not want to test your home insurance by burning down your house, so we have to learn where we can.
Now, getting to the crux of what I am talking about, the example was discussed at the meeting that the House’s Economic Affairs Select Committee had with the Governor of the Bank of England on Tuesday, which I attended. Unfortunately, we do not yet have the official transcript, so I cannot quote what the governor said, but I can give the Committee my impressions of what issues need to be explored based on what was said at the meeting.
The first issue is whether the resolution regime worked. Was there a clear and predictable set of rules upon which depositors could rely or was it, in practice, totally ad hoc? It may be that what worked was the right approach in the circumstances, but we need to be clear about that. The governor appeared simply to rule out certain approaches—for example, a bridge bank—largely, it would seem, because of the impact on the public purse. Manifestly, the wish to avoid splitting the assets and liabilities led to the decision to break the ring-fence.
Another thing that was clear is that resolution is inevitably an intensely political process. When the bank said it consulted HMT, it certainly was not just officials. Certainly, the Chancellor but also the Prime Minister were involved in what in banking terms does not really count as a large institution but that on the face of it had wider financial implications. I do not want to downplay the significance of the event. It appeared that at one stage of the process it was suggested that a failure to resolve the matter satisfactorily would “really set back curing disease”—so no pressure.
Finally, the underlying question is whether we are heading in the direction that means that it will, in practice, never be acceptable to impose losses on uninsured deposits. We must remember that in this case the deposits were generally commercial, not personal, deposits. These issues are being discussed, and there is ongoing discussion about a digital currency, but it would be best if they were discussed clearly, openly and together.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I am very glad that he has had an expanded discussion of resolution. I will refer to that very briefly in what I have to say.
I have a lot of questions for the Minister on this area. She will not be surprised by them because I and others had questions in March when we debated the SI that provided the temporary exclusion of HSBC from the ring-fencing provisions. This time we are looking at a permanent exclusion.
First, let us look at this permanent exclusion. A few moments ago, the Minister said that there are constraints and conditions. Indeed, when we discussed the first SI she led us to believe, I do not think with any ill intent, that when we saw the SI including the permanent exclusion we would find constraints and conditions on either the activities of Silicon Valley Bank UK or the ability of HSBC to transfer unlimited funds to it, in a way that would give us reassurance that this was a very limited busting of the ring-fence, not something with fundamental implications.
I am struggling to understand that because the Minister made it clear just now that Silicon Valley Bank UK could not expand into being a major retail bank. None of us ever thought that HSBC, as a major retail player, would be setting up Silicon Valley Bank UK to be a major retail bank. So long as Silicon Valley Bank UK does not become a retail bank, I cannot see how the PRA is in any way able to limit its activities. Presumably it would limit those activities under Section 55M of FiSMA—“Imposition of requirements by PRA”—and those would not apply if it was not engaged in regulated activities. I am struggling to understand quite how the role of the PRA would work to limit the range of activities carried out by Silicon Valley Bank UK.
Secondly, let us look at those activities. If anybody wants to know what they are, I suggest that they take a look at the Silicon Valley Bank UK website; they will see that it is heavily engaged in supporting both venture capital and private equity. That takes us into that investment banking, high-risk activity that has, since the changes post the crisis in 2007, been separated out from retail banking. We also know, just from discussions, that it is heavily involved in a range of derivatives.
To answer the noble Baroness’s question about whether SVB UK will be permitted to use unlimited amounts of retail funding from HSBC’s ring-fenced bank, the ring-fencing exemptions are subject to conditions that restrict the amount of SVB UK’s core deposits and the type of business that it can operate, as I have set out and as is in the SI. In addition, the PRA has granted HSBC UK and SVB UK temporary waivers to remove constraints in the PRA Rulebook relating to the capital requirements regulation—CRR—on the intragroup lending and funding from HSBC to SVB UK. These waivers, along with the modification to the regime the Government made in the first SI, allowed HSBC to provide emergency liquidity to SVB UK.
As is usual practice with PRA waivers, they are time-limited. One of the waivers expires on 17 September 2023 and the other on 17 June. Whether these waivers are extended or modified is a matter for the independent regulator. The waivers are part of the range of tools that the PRA can use to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC UK and SVB UK. If these waivers lapse, the constraints in the PRA Rulebook regarding intragroup lending and funding from HSBC to SVB UK will come into effect, which would mean that SVB UK would not be able to be funded to an unlimited extent from HSBC UK’s retail deposits.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said that she took no comfort from either the provisions in this SI or the PRA’s wider supervisory and regulatory powers. What I would say is that the PRA has confirmed its support for provisions in this instrument. Sam Woods has stated that the SI and its conditions support the PRA’s primary statutory objective of safety and soundness and limits competitive distortion. He outlined that the PRA has a range of tools that it can and will draw on to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and SVB UK and ensure the protection of retail deposits. It will continue to supervise both HSBC UK and SVB UK in line with its usual supervisory approach.
The noble Baroness asked me about Section 55M of FiSMA. I suggest that I should perhaps write to the noble Baroness and the Committee on this point. I have the outlines of an answer, but I think that it might be better delivered in writing for complete clarity. To come back to her point, more broadly, about parliamentary scrutiny or control over the process around the ring-fence and changes to it, the actions in this case are entirely in line with powers granted to the regulators in terms of operating the resolution regime. What we should not do is to think that the powers used under the special resolution regime are indicative of the Government’s or regulators’ approach to reforming the ring-fence more broadly. Any fundamental reforms to that ring-fencing regime would require changes to primary legislation. There is nothing in this process that has changed that.
To turn to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, on lending to the sector, or sectors, that formed a large part of the customer base for SVB UK, he is absolutely right that it is essential that tech and life science firms have access to the capital that they need to start up and scale up. We support that through the British Business Bank, which has several programmes tailored specifically to the needs of the UK’s life science and technology companies, including the £200 million Life Sciences Investment Programme and the £375 million Future Fund Breakthrough programme, which is specifically aimed at increasing the supply of growth-stage venture capital to UK-based companies working in capital and R&D-intensive areas, such as quantum AI, life sciences and clean tech. There is the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, which invests commercially in advanced technology firms and aims to accelerate the adoption of the Government’s future national security and defence capabilities.
Further to that, at the Budget, the Government extended the British Patient Capital programme by a further 10 years. Alongside that, the Government launched the long-term investment for technology and science initiative to aim to spur the creation of new vehicles for investment into science and tech companies, tailored to the needs of UK defined contribution pension schemes. The contribution of pension scheme capital in this area is something that we discussed quite a bit yesterday, and the Government have further intentions to take forward action in this area.
I believe that at the Spring Budget the Chancellor said that he would report back in the autumn on the further work undertaken in that area—so quite soon, I would say.
I shall read through the transcript of this debate and look to ensure that where I have not fully answered the questions raised I write to noble Lords. Although it has been a short debate, it is an important area and I want to make sure that we get all the facts clearly on the record.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, interest rate decisions remain a matter for the independent Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, but I say to my noble friend that high inflation is also bad for the economy. To have high growth we must first have low inflation, so we absolutely support the Bank of England in its task of pursuing the 2% inflation target and the difficult decisions it will have to take to achieve that.
My Lords, I cannot resist the temptation to draw to the House’s attention the fact that this is the 278th anniversary of the Battle of Naseby—I am not picking a fight with the noble Lord.
My question concerns the fact that this is going to have a massive effect on the buy-to-let market. We are expecting further increases in interest rates, given recent news. A report in the Times last week showed the relationship between increases in the bank rate and the knock-on effect on “underwater” buy-to-let owners. This will cause severe damage to the buy-to-let market. I have mixed feelings about that market, but to the extent that owners of such properties cannot maintain their property properly, this will have a deleterious effect on the UK’s housing stock. The Government should be seized of this issue. To me, the solution is that the Government should provide funds to local authorities in order that they can take over these underwater buy-to-let properties—interestingly, a large proportion of them are ex-council properties anyway—so that local authorities can address the housing problems in their local areas.
My Lords, the noble Lord will know that the Government have given local authorities many more powers and more discretion in how they approach housebuilding and house supply in their area in recent years. He is right that the changes to interest rates will affect those in rented accommodation as well as those who have mortgages through channels such as he described. The Government are putting in place further support for renters. We have a series of reforms coming in through the Renters (Reform) Bill which will improve quality and security in the private rented sector. For those on benefits, the Government boosted investment in the local housing allowance in April 2020 by nearly £1 billion, and rates have been maintained at this increased level.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am concerned that, while seemingly innocuous, this amendment might turn out to be the thin end of the wedge of government intervention in pension investment. Clearly, the obligation on pension trustees should be to do their best to get the right returns for their investors. Once we start incentivising trustees to take decisions based on incentives offered to them, that raises the question of who then bears the consequences and the responsibility if those investments turn out in the long term not to be the right thing for their pensioners to be invested in.
I do not dispute the point that pension fund investments have not been optimal in the past, but to my mind that is to do with regulatory restrictions that have been placed on pension funds and the requirements to meet those restrictions. I think there is a case to look at the regulations around pension funds that restrict their investment choices and to enable them to invest in a wider set of assets, but I do not think the right way to do that is to start proposing incentives that would turn into the Government mandating the way that pension funds should be invested.
My Lords, I support the amendment. I still think of myself as a relatively new Member of the House, so it is useful to remind the House of my lifetime spent working in the pensions industry, broadly in support of scheme members. I have been a scheme trustee, I have chaired the Greater London Council investment panel and I have advised trustees of pension schemes as the scheme actuary. I am just stating my expertise here.
I support the amendment because I think a review is required. I take on board the remarks about the thin end of the wedge, but unless we have the review those concerns cannot be addressed. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, there is now a big conversation about using pension scheme money to promote the British economy. There is actually a long history of that sort of proposal going back over many years, but it seems to have reached a crescendo over the last year or so.
It is essential that we have a review. What is also essential, of course, is that the review is undertaken by those who know what they are talking about, but that has not necessarily been true about all the comments made so far. For example, I draw the attention of the House to the recent useful report produced by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association—not a body that I consistently agree with—on supporting pension investment in UK growth and thinking up quicker and simpler ways to promote pension fund investment in our economy.
I was going to raise two issues. One has already been explained clearly by my noble friend Lord Eatwell: the funding standards that have been established work against the principles that I am sure we all support. Another problem that we have is the Conservative Government’s introduction of freedom and choice. It is difficult to oppose freedom and choice but, when you come to pensions, which are long-term arrangements depending on long-term investment, giving people freedom of choice weakens the very basis upon which they are being organised. It is all very well saying to pension funds, “You’ve got to invest in infrastructure”, but if the members of that scheme have the right to pull their money out at any time, it is very difficult to take the long-term view. That is a fundamental incoherence behind the so-called policy of freedom and choice. Those issues need to be addressed in the review.
I also hope that the list of consultees for the review is not a complete list; to the extent that it is possible to consult the scheme members, they should be consulted as well. I also hope that the issues can go somewhat broader than those listed in the amendment.
In general terms, a review is needed, and I hope it will lead to the objective being clearly set out of promoting the UK economy.
My Lords, I fully support and have added my name to this amendment. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies. We both go back a long way in the pensions industry. My entire career has been in pensions—examining occupational pension schemes as an academic, then managing occupational pension investments in the City, then advising schemes and Governments. I have also been a trustee on investment committees for pension schemes.
I have to say that the current position that members of pension schemes find themselves in—both members of defined benefit schemes and members of too-often-forgotten defined contribution schemes—has not been positive in terms of the experience of the 2022 markets. As we have heard, trustees and managers of pension schemes have been encouraged to believe that the right way in which to invest a pension fund is in supposedly low-risk—which actually also means relatively low-return —investments, rather than in the traditional and older-fashioned way of managing schemes that persisted until the noughties, which was to try and maximise returns.
We have now moved to a position whereby we were supposed to be minimising risk, but I argue that that entire movement away from supporting the British economy and away from supporting UK equities and UK growth assets has been underpinned and misled somewhat by quantitative easing. The Bank of England’s policy, which effectively offered a natural large buyer that underwrote and underpinned the government bond market, perhaps led people to believe that that was the best or safest way in which to invest pension funds. That was partly because the long-term value of the liabilities, as well as their present value, is discounted and measured as of today by using the gilt yield or bond yield measure. In corporate reporting it is double-A corporates; in actuarial valuations it is typically gilt yields.
In 2022, conventional gilts lost 20% and index-linked gilts 30% of their value. The FTSE 100 rose a little. Yes, smaller companies did not do so well, but the idea that pension schemes were investing in a low-risk manner was actually confounded last year, and I would argue that, as we move into a post-QE world and as we have recognised and I have been warning since 2011, or even earlier than that, the policy of quantitative easing is a significant danger for pension scheme investments and members.
We must recognise that we do not fully understand what investment risk means any more. The capital asset pricing model is based fundamentally on the idea that gilt yields are the lowest-risk assets and all assets are more risky—even if they offer more returns, potentially they are more risky—and may need to be considered with a little more circumspection.
That leads on to the idea that, if we do not quite know whether gilts and fixed income are indeed low risk in the way that we thought they were and they have been in the past—because central banks are going to need to offload at some point and are certainly no longer underpinning the markets—diversifying investments and supporting the domestic economy in the way that this review would be investigating must come into the public debate.
I will speak very briefly to offer Green support for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate. The amendment, in a way, is a smaller and lighter version of my attempt to strike out the competition clause, on setting a competitiveness objective, which has sadly remained in the Bill.
In November last year, City Minister Andrew Griffith told the Financial Times:
“The overall thrust of things is to allow more risk … you shouldn’t be risk”
averse;
“we just need to manage that in an appropriate way”.
He went on to say that the aim of reducing ring-fencing was
“to release some of that trapped capital over time”.
I acknowledge that the Minister said that before the collapse of SVB and Credit Suisse, and the other crunches in the American banking system.
In an April piece in the Financial Times, Martin Wolf said:
“A shock like this should make mindless deregulation less appealing to politicians”.
As has been clearly outlined already, the amendment does not actually make anything happen; it just ensures parliamentary oversight. When we get to the dinner break business, my noble friend will seek to ensure that parliamentary oversight is included there. Surely, this is what democracy is supposed to be about.
My Lords, I support the amendment. We will return to these issues on Thursday, when we discuss the regulations in Grand Committee. However, it is worth mentioning to the House the clash today between this Bill and a meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I are members. By chance, the committee was interviewing the Governor of the Bank of England. The issue of this arrangement arose, and the governor was quizzed on these very issues. It will be useful on Thursday to explore further why and how this action was taken. The governor provided a justification, but, in the light of his remarks, it will be worth while exploring these issues in more detail when we get the regulations.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate have retabled as a single amendment—Amendment 106 —the two amendments that were debated in Grand Committee: Amendment 241C on ring-fencing, and Amendment 241D on the senior managers and certification regime.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes said during that debate, these amendments are trying to set in stone for all time the conclusions of the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Times change, and I cannot support this amendment because it introduces an inappropriate degree of rigidity.
As my noble friend also pointed out, the lesson of the HSBC and Silicon Valley Bank episode was that the ring-fencing rules were not, after all, considered inviolable. It was necessary to provide HSBC with special statutory exemptions from the ring-fencing rules to enable it to acquire Silicon Valley Bank. That exemption has brought permanent changes to the ring-fencing regime for HSBC which affect it alone. Can my noble friend say whether that means it has a permanent competitive advantage over rival ring-fenced banks in the UK?
In any case, I rather doubt whether the introduction of ring-fencing has reduced the risks to which bank customers’ deposits are exposed. I disagree that it is therefore important to make it very difficult to weaken the ring-fencing regulations in any way. As I said in Committee, I worked for Kleinwort Benson for 23 years, for a further 12 years for Robert Fleming and then for Mizuho. All three banks operated both commercial and investment banking businesses. Internal Chinese walls between departments made it quite impossible for customers’ commercial banking deposits to be diverted to risky investment banking activities. As I said in Grand Committee, there is no positive correlation between the two cash flows of retail and investment banking. It follows that universal banks are in fact gaining diversification benefits. There is little global evidence that splitting up the banks has made them less likely to get into trouble.
Following the Lehman shock, is it not interesting that the US Government did not go for the reintroduction of a kind of Glass-Steagall Act? I am not convinced that ring-fencing is a good thing, and in general I am opposed to market distortions of this kind, which actually make the consumer less safe rather than safer. Ring-fencing also makes it harder for smaller banks to grow, because they must compete for a small pool of permitted assets against the capital of the larger banks. Will the Government conduct a review of the effectiveness of ring-fencing?
As for the senior managers and certification regime, I am sceptical as to whether it has been effective, because there is no hard evidence that it has been used as the stick that was originally intended. Most well-run banks operate in a collegiate manner, and I think it rather odd to attempt to attribute personal responsibility to managers and directors of banks for the decisions and actions of those banks, beyond the responsibilities that the directors carry in any event.
The SMCR has especially inconvenienced foreign banks operating in London. As an example, I refer to the Japanese megabanks. It used to be their practice to assign a very senior executive to London to take responsibility for all the bank’s activities in the UK and in most cases the whole EMIR region. Often, this might be the executive’s last major management position before retirement, and would typically be for two to three years leading up to his retirement date. Such executives have typically worked for 40 years or more for that bank and have managed regulated financial businesses in Japan for many years. However, the FCA has consistently been extraordinarily slow in approving those executives under the SMCR.
Therefore, the Japanese banks have given up on this strategy and feel compelled to appoint as head of their UK and EMIR operations not the person most appropriate for the job, but the most senior person who has already been working in London for three years or so, merely in order to meet the criteria of the SMCR regime. This has caused considerable inconvenience, because it is unreasonable to send a trusted senior executive overseas for five or six years in the last years of his active career, rather than a more reasonable stretch of two to three years. I know that the SMCR is much resented by Japanese and other foreign banks and I ask my noble friend if she will agree to conduct a review of how it is being implemented by the FCA.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests as a director of two investment companies, as stated in the register. I agree to some extent with what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, but I am not sure I can agree that the United Kingdom’s financial markets are uniquely peculiar in any sense. It is true that we do not have such a large domestic hinterland as the United States, but compared with financial centres such as Switzerland and Singapore, we have a rather larger domestic hinterland. I do not think what he said is therefore so relevant as he perhaps believes.
Furthermore, I agree that our high standards and what used to be called “my word is my bond”, which was what I was taught on day one when I went to work for Kleinwort Benson in the City, are very relevant. We have always been proud, and rightly so, of the very high standards and honourable way, in the main, in which our financial institutions have conducted their business. Indeed, competitiveness of the market depends, to a degree, on maintaining those high standards. But competitiveness also depends on having clear, comprehensible and proportionate regulation, and in recent years our regulation has become too cumbersome, particularly after the FSA was split into two regulators. If you are a dual-regulated company, it is a nightmare to have to report much the same information but in different formats to the two regulators. This is why the time spent by executive committees of operating financial companies in the City is so greatly taken up by compliance, reporting and regulatory matters, rather than innovation and the development of new businesses to attract more international companies to do their business in London, thus providing more revenue for the Exchequer and more jobs for British people, and indeed for non-British people to come and work here.
I support the Government’s amendments to strengthen the reporting requirements of the regulators, and Amendments 40 and 41 tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I agree with those noble Lords who have thanked the Minister most sincerely for her response to concerns expressed across the House about accountability and scrutiny. However, the British Insurance Brokers’ Association has expressed concern that the Bill, as drafted at present, largely allows the regulators to decide how to fulfil the reporting requirements for the competitiveness and growth objective.
Clause 37 acts as a backstop that allows the Treasury to compel additional reporting. What assurances can the Minister give that the Government’s response to the ongoing consultation on the appropriate metrics for the regulators to publish will lead to concrete changes to which metrics are published, given that the Bill will have been passed by the time the Government respond to the consultation? Given that it will not be possible to include any details of specific metrics or how the Treasury will exercise its powers in Clause 37 in primary legislation, how can the Government ensure that the consultation will lead to a sufficient challenge to the regulators, allaying concerns about them marking their own homework in their reporting? Will the Minister also give assurances that the Government’s response to the consultation will reflect the parliamentary debate in this area, where noble Lords have consistently stressed the need for extensive metrics to be published by the regulators with regard to the new objectives?
My Lords, I do not want to run the risk of repeating myself, but I have made plain in previous debates my concern about the inclusion of the competitiveness objective in this legislation. Just to be clear, I think it has no place, but I welcome these provisions that there should be a report on the competitiveness objective. My concern is that the wording does not get to the heart of the problem that I believe exists, which is the interaction between the competitiveness objective and the other objectives. My reading of the way this is worded is that the report just has to talk about the competitiveness objective and does not have to say how it affected the other objectives. Maybe the Minister in her reply could allay my concerns and make it clear that the regulatory bodies are required to look across the whole gamut of their obligations when reporting on the competitiveness objective.
My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as an employee of Marsh Ltd, the insurance broker. I offer my support to the amendments in this group, so thoughtfully proposed by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. My noble friend the Minister has indeed made improvements since Grand Committee, and for that I thank her, but I wonder whether the Government have gone quite far enough. I particularly thank the Minister for the generous amount of time she spent with me the other evening.
My noble friend the Minister’s amendment proposes two reports, 12 months apart, as has been mentioned, but I believe that it is important that reports from the regulators should become an annual occurrence concerning the competitiveness and growth objectives. The financial sector of the United Kingdom is a major driver of revenue for the country and we must ensure consistency over time, not just the immediate future. In turn, this suggests the need for consistent metrics on which to report, allowing for the proper comparisons.
Amendment 19 concerns the principle of proportionality, recognising that not all financial services are the same. Again, I will look at the insurance market in particular, but I suspect there are similarities in other financial lines. I am all for keeping individual retail and small business customers safe when working with insurance companies, but there are significant differences to be found between them, users of the London wholesale insurance market—which is used by knowledgeable buyers, using one of many potential advisers—and captive insurance entities. Smaller customers need a level of protection not required by either of these other two groups.
In the debate on this amendment, I wish to refer particularly to captive insurance companies. Captives are wholly owned subsidiaries set up to provide risk mitigation services—insurance—for their parent company and/or related entities. The parent is inevitably a sophisticated entity, almost certainly hiring advisers. They should require a very different approach from the retail customer.
There currently seems to be a one-size-fits-all approach by the regulators when reviewing insurance companies that does not take into account the nature of the purchaser. This is not only time consuming but costly in comparison with other overseas regimes. Captives provide low risk to the financial system and the buyer of their services requires a significantly different level of regulation from an insurance company trading with individuals. They are fundamentally different.
There is no captive company authorised in the UK and even those of our major companies, including UK public bodies, are located in overseas jurisdictions. The captive insurance business generates in excess of $50 billion annually, and here lies a significant opportunity for growth in the insurance sector which, should the regulator alter its stance and act with proportionality, could, as an example, add significant additional capital into the country.
Amendments 40 and 41 refer to the requirements to publish regulatory performance on authorised firms and new authorisations. The Government certainly recognise in Clause 37 the need to improve the regulatory culture, but we need more teeth in terms of reporting metrics so it becomes standard practice within the regulators. This culture needs to become ingrained.
The metrics being proposed in Amendment 40 are granular concerning timing and would bring some needed haste to the system. In business, time is often of the essence and being held up disproportionately by a UK regulator, as opposed those in other jurisdictions, acts as a deterrent to trade in this country. The metrics being proposed in Amendment 41 link together to give a consistent window into the activities of the regulators. With quarterly reporting it will be possible to gain some comparative statistics that will tell a story.
Lastly, Amendment 92 concerns determination of application. London remains one of the world centres of insurance and we must do all we can to preserve its status, but there are for sure a number of other locations that can attract capital more easily and so challenge it. Unfortunately, regulatory burden is regularly raised as an issue damaging London’s ability to attract additional capital and support the market.
Concerns have been raised about the overall performance of the regulators in terms of timing, with authorisations and approvals taking longer they should. It is recognised that they are falling behind their KPIs. Insurance companies here have experienced delays in case handler assignment, which is the beginning of a domino effect. In addition, concerns have been expressed over some of the questions asked and the appropriateness of the data being requested, leading to additional time and expense. The regulators need to streamline their activities by being relevant.
These amendments refer to a great extent to measures designed to bring some more accountability to the reporting by the regulators. I realise there is a consultation with the financial markets, but I believe that the measures being proposed are the bare minimum that should be required and included in the Bill. These sets of metrics will prevent the regulators deciding which of their own sets of data to publish. Certainly, from an insurance perspective, this will allow life to proceed way more freely. This will ensure transparency from the regulators, which is surely what is being strived for.
My Lords, there are currently quite a few difficulties with the UK economy, but one that seldom gets the focus, attention and commentary that it requires is the lack of financial inclusion for so many people right across the United Kingdom. At its extreme, it is best summed up as: those who have the least are often forced to pay the most for financial services and products. However, it is a question not just for individuals but for micro and small businesses, which can find themselves effectively financially excluded.
Amendment 13 simply seeks to introduce a secondary objective for the FCA on financial inclusion. It would not in any sense fetter any of the other objectives, not least the primary objectives. It could operate effectively and efficiently within that current stream of objectives for the regulator.
Without in any sense seeking to pre-empt my noble friend when she comes to wind up, I think that she may well say that it is not the right approach to introduce a new objective for the financial service regulators without first undertaking a significant and serious consultation. That is a fair point. If she is unable to accept my Amendment 13, would she agree to take away the opportunity and possibility to launch the consultation into a secondary objective for our financial service regulators on financial inclusion? I beg to move.
My Lords, my Amendment 14 proposes a new clause to the objectives, adding the principle of protecting the mental health of consumers. I set this out at some length in Committee, and I think it is worth repeating the point. I should perhaps say at the beginning that I support the other two amendments, although I prefer the one from my Front Bench. I would like to see an explicit statement that the concept of financial inclusion extends to people who have problems dealing with financial services because of problems with their mental health.
Financial services have to understand and recognise the nature and scale of the mental health problems faced by some people. They need to be placed under an explicit duty of care to their customers who suffer from these problems, and they should be required to take explicit additional steps to minimise the potential difficulties faced by those who have or are at risk of having mental health problems associated with their finances.
I am sure that all noble Lords accept the principle that financial regulation should pay regard to the problems faced by people who have problems with mental health. It goes almost without saying. The issue is not about the principle but about whether it should be referred to explicitly in this bit of the legislation. I think that it should, but I am willing to take small mercies if the Minister can make clear the explicit and implicit responsibilities on the regulators to undertake to provide this sort of support and explanation for people who have mental health problems.
The experience works both ways: financial problems lead to mental health problems, and people with mental health problems have difficulty in handling their finances. That is an established fact. I ask for general support for the principle and an indication that, one way or another, the legislation will provide these people with the support they require.
My Lords, I thought it might be useful to speak at this point to introduce Amendment 18, the amendment in my name in this group. I have taken part in many discussions in this House on financial inclusion. It is to this House’s credit that such a keen interest is taken by Members on all sides on this topic. Financial exclusion is a priority concern for the Labour Party. It is often caused by the way that financial products are designed and marketed. Of course, poverty and the cost of living crisis plays a huge part in this: they mean that the poorest often pay more in fees for products, but there are even things like mobile phones not being available on a contract unless you have a bank account. We know that all these issues can make life more expensive for people who can least afford it.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI suggest to the noble Viscount that, in fact, the whole corpus of international soft law on finance is generally known in the trade as the international standards, and those who work in the regulatory community would immediately relate to the proposals of those particular institutions. As the noble Lord pointed out, occasionally Basel standards have not been followed. This is true in the United States, where only international competitive banks follow Basel committee standards. The US has learned painful lessons over the last year or so with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and others that did not follow Basel standards. The relaxation of standards was one of the elements that led to that particular collapse. Alignment with international standards and the institutions which—I say again—Britain has done so much to help develop is an important part of the maintenance of financial stability in this country.
My Lords, I will make an argument that the idea that greater competition is a public benefit is simply wrong, if you think it is inevitable. Now, I spoke about this at length in Grand Committee a couple of weeks ago, and the Minister had the benefit of my views on the matter at the time, so I am not going to repeat them at length; one or two other Members present did as well.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 93. It is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Baroness Drake, who has said it all. I will join on the back of her comments to say that I strongly support the approach she has taken.
I also support Amendment 113 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I respect the extent to which some concerns have been taken into account to make it clear that the interests of the members are paramount in the amendment—that is crucial. On the idea that pension funds should have a more active role in growing our economy, obviously its time has come. It is not new—people have been making suggestions about it; I have been involved in it in the past—but there now seems to be a confluence of views that something must be done. However, it has to be done in a way that respects the fiduciary duty to put the interests of members front and centre in the decisions that are taken. I take a fairly broad view of what constitutes members’ interests, but it is the members and their trustees acting on their behalf who have to take that decision, rather than bodies which do not have the direct results inflicted on them if they get it wrong.
It is important to stress that any ideas have to be practical and effective. I have some doubt as to whether the problem we face is about the supply of money; rather, it is about how the money will be used. Putting these proposals forward without having the other side of the bargain improved will be a problem. It is also important to stress that there are very different types of schemes, and they all have different investment needs. Again, whatever guidance is given has to respect the particular types of schemes.
I have one concern, which I would like the Minister to address, about the phrase “have regard to” in relation to guidance. It appears in the government amendment and in Amendment 113 put forward and supported by my noble colleagues. The problem with the “have regard to” is that it is a legal lottery. It is very difficult to know in advance what exactly it means, so it would be very helpful to me, and I hope the House, if the Minister could say something about that. Is it, as is sometimes suggested, like the accounting requirement—you comply or explain—or do you have to, in some way or another, follow the requirements as they are set out? What does “have regard to” mean in this legislation? It would be good to have clarification during the progress of the Bill, because the phrase appears several times.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on her Amendment 4. I am sure that it is very well-intentioned, and it meets some of the concerns that were clearly expressed in Committee. I welcome the update that will be coming from her on the green taxonomy; I believe that there will be a consultation on that. There is also the new green finance strategy, which has been published. They are all welcome.
Amendment 4 is welcome, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, explained, although it will ensure that the Treasury produces guidance or requirements for sustainable investing by pension schemes and others, it would appear that the FCA and the PRA may not have the powers to issue that guidance. So, once the Treasury has produced its recommendations, we will still need to legislate. Can my noble friend the Minister confirm that that is the case, and that we will need further legislation if we want to implement the impacts of Amendment 4 through to pension schemes?
I have added my name to Amendments 93 and 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. Amendment 93 deals with the investment duties of pension providers and investment managers, and Amendment 113 deals with the investment duties of occupational pension trustees and managers. Clearly, if we are to make progress in line with the Government’s laudable objectives—and I congratulate them on all the work they have been doing, including some of their world-leading work on trying to ensure that pension schemes invest more in line with green objectives and sustainable investments for the long term—the amendments will ensure that the FCA and the PRA can make those rules. The amendments are very reasonably drafted; the FCA and the PRA may make these rules, but they do not require them at this stage to do so. The trustees and investment managers must then have regard to the rules, but, as the noble Baroness explained, they can explain why they are not going to implement the rules. However, at least we can set up a system where the trillions of pounds of long-term investment money in pension schemes can assuredly do more to protect the planet and provide investment opportunities that will help with social objectives for this country.
I do not have a problem with the concept of government directing pension schemes to invest a certain proportion of their assets, if necessary, in green, sustainable and socially desirable projects, including infrastructure, forestation, nature preservation and so on. At least 25% of all pension schemes—we are talking about hundreds of billions of pounds—has come from the taxpayer in the first place in the form of tax relief. Given that 25% of everyone’s pension is tax free, that is money that was spent by taxpayers. Given the budget circumstances that the country faces, and as taxpayers would otherwise be funding these projects outside pension schemes, I do not think that it is impossible to justify the idea that, should the private sector not be forthcoming with its investments in these vital elements for future growth and for a sustainable future for us all, the Government might themselves decide to require it.
These amendments will at least pave the way to ensure that there is more chance of these huge amounts of money, which are put aside for millions of people’s retirement income later in life, being invested in a way that will benefit them and the economy, as well as ensuring that there is much more and better protection for the planet, which I know that the Government wish to achieve. So I support Amendments 93 and 113, and I have added my name to Amendment 114, so excellently explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, again facilitating rules that it will be necessary for schemes to follow, should the Government desire that—which is the indication that I have had from my noble friend the Minister and which is implied in the Government’s Amendment 4.
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate. I very much welcome this report, which is important and timely—well, a bit out of time, one might say. It deals with the aftermath of Brexit and, of course, an important part of our economy. I will resist the temptation to go down the Brexit rabbit hole, but I will return to the issue at the end.
Before making my main contribution, I will express my credentials for taking part in this debate. I have worked in the financial services industry for the whole of my working life.
I question the premise on which this debate is taking place, and on which I think the report is based. I may be wrong, and I will be happy to be corrected, but the implied premise is that the bigger the financial services industry, the better. I question that. It strikes me that, in a phrase that is familiar to me, it is akin to making ourselves rich by taking in each other’s washing.
What does the financial services industry contribute to the real economy—the production of goods and services that go towards serving individual and societal wants? My view is that the financial services industry contributes far less than is typically assumed, particularly by the financial services industry itself, and that it is in a sense a millstone around our economy’s neck. It strikes me that it is akin to the resource curse, which is typically talked about in terms of mineral and fuel abundance in less-developed countries and which tends to generate negative developmental outcomes, including poor economic performance, collapsing growth, higher levels of corruption and greater political violence. Well, leaving the political violence and maybe the corruption aside, it is a fact that we are experiencing poor economic performance and have done for a decade and, in my view, one of the contributing factors to that is the overreliance on financial services that contribute nothing to human welfare.
Clearly, we need financial services. We need to facilitate payments between people and organisations. We need to match borrowers and investors. We need to facilitate saving, not least for retirement and the passing of wealth between generations. But is what we have at the moment in the industry commensurate with those needs?
In expressing these views, I take inspiration—although he is not in any way to blame—from Sir John Kay, the eminent economist, and Andy Haldane, who, when he was the economic adviser to the Bank of England, said that
“the past few decades have seen a sea-change in the functioning, and hence perception, of the financial sector. Latterly, that sea-change has at times risked flooding the entire economic and social waterfront. In a nutshell, finance has moved away from serving the economy and towards serving itself—and indeed remunerating itself”.
Any debate about the relationship between the UK and the European economy in financial services should have these views in mind. We should not be promoting a financial services industry that fails to deliver services to individuals.
To quote some figures from Sir John Kay, he points out:
“Lending to firms and individuals engaged in the production of goods and services—which most people would imagine was the principal business of a bank—amounts to about 3 per cent of that total … The value of daily foreign exchange transactions is almost a hundred times the value of daily international trade in goods and services … Trade in securities has grown rapidly, but the explosion in the volume of financial activity is largely attributable to the development of markets in derivatives”,
and derivatives based on derivatives, and no doubt derivatives based on derivatives that are based on derivatives.
They contribute nothing to the proper functioning of a financial economy, as I described earlier. The profitability of this sector is vastly overstated. The value of its activities is poorly reported in the economic statistics, and it is very difficult to say what the productivity of these services is and what, if anything, they actually contribute to the betterment of lives and the efficiency of businesses. The true value of the financial sector to the community is the value of the services that it provides, not the returns recouped by those who work within it.
There is no doubt that a modern economy requires finance: a country can prosper only if it has a well-functioning financial system. But that does not imply that the bigger your financial system, the better it will be and the more prosperous the country will be. In fact, there is a point at which it becomes counterproductive, and we are well past that point. All the industry does is pass around bits of paper, leading to a net benefit for no one.
This is not an attack on the individuals involved in the industry: they have bought the rhetoric and are doing a good job in terms of the way the industry has developed. But, if you step back and question what the industry is doing for us, I believe that it is well beyond the profitable sector. We need to have that in mind when we discuss these issues. The question should be, “Do we need this work being done?” I look forward to returning to the discussions on the Financial Services and Markets Bill, where we will be able to explore these issues in more detail.
There is a specific problem here: I return to Brexit. Discussing the financial services industry totally in terms of Brexit, which we tend to do, is getting it wrong. We should be looking at the financial services themselves and what value they give, and then ask the second question: how does that fit with our relationship with the European Union?
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this important debate and particularly to hear the maiden speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Moyo. I am sure that she will be an asset to the debates in the House, even if I do not necessarily always agree with what she says.
It is no great surprise that I am going to focus on what the Chancellor said about pensions, but I have a couple of more general points. First, it is shocking that there is nothing in the Budget about social care. We were told by the last Prime Minister but one that this Government had an oven-ready plan. Clearly we do not even have the recipe, let alone the ingredients. Secondly, credit was taken in the speech by the Chancellor for past rises in tax thresholds, with the claim that these had lifted 400,000 pensioners out of absolute poverty. Perhaps we should now also be told how many pensioners will be pushed into poverty by the decision to freeze tax allowances for the next five years. You cannot take credit for one without taking the blame for the other. I very much hope that a forthcoming Labour Government will reverse this decision and revert to Rooker-Wise, particularly for the personal allowance.
“Pension” appears 11 times in the speech, once as part of “suspension” and a couple of times when referring to the Department for Work and Pensions. The main references to pensions were about tax allowances, which I will come to in a moment, but the Chancellor returned yet again to the issue of pension fund investment. Lots has been said on this by the Government but very little done. This time, we are promised
“measures to unlock productive investment from defined contribution pension funds and other sources”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/3/23; col. 841.]
As ever, on this issue the devil is in the detail. I am a sceptic but, until we see concrete proposals, it is just so much hot air. Can the Minister tell us when the Government will actually come up with some firm proposals?
I turn to pension tax allowances. First, I welcome the decision on the aggregation of pension input amounts where employees belong to more than one scheme for the same employment. While it looks like a technical issue, and is not mentioned specifically in the Chancellor’s speech, it is one of the most significant decisions and truly to be welcomed. It is an issue I have raised several times in this House and at a meeting with the Minister for Health, so I am pleased that what seemed obvious has at last been accepted by the Government. Other Members were involved, of course, not least the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, but I also need to mention that it was an issue of importance to the late and sadly missed Lady Masham.
I do not agree so much with the proposed abolition of the lifetime allowance. I need to mention that I have an interest in the matter, in that I could benefit from the change, but I still think it is wrong, particularly in current circumstances. Clearly, there is a crisis in the NHS—the shortage of doctors—that requires urgent action. It has been widely acknowledged, not least by the Chancellor himself as chair of the Health and Social Care Select Committee, that pensions tax was one of the factors involved and that action is required, but a more targeted approach would be better than the blunderbuss adopted by the Chancellor. I believe that the most immediate problems around retaining doctors in the NHS arise from the annual allowance, not from the lifetime allowance, so to deal with the undoubted problems, it would be better to spend money on reducing the impact of the former rather than the latter and target the problems of the NHS specifically.
Pensions taxation is a complex mess that needs thorough review. We continue to suffer from one-off decisions that increase complexity and unfairness. The Chancellor based the argument for change in the lifetime allowance on the concerns of many senior NHS clinicians, but he went on to say that he realised the issue goes wider than doctors. That was echoed by the Minister in her introduction, but in his interview this morning on the “Today” programme, the Chancellor referred only to doctors. What we do not know from the figures from the Treasury or from the OBR is how many of those being helped by this change are doctors, and how much of the resources being employed to facilitate the change are going specifically to doctors as opposed to other parts of the public service. I accept that doctors are a priority—that is clear—but the point is that it is for not the sake of the doctors but for the sake of people on the waiting lists.
The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, said we could not have a special one-off for the doctors. I am afraid that that is clearly not correct. There is already a special one-off for the judges. We passed an Act last year creating a scheme specifically for the judges that addressed exactly the same problem. I explained this in debates and was told, “There will not be any more special cases”. Well, I think doctors are a special case here, and a more targeted approach could have been adopted. Can the Minister tell us who else will benefit from the change, and why, in the current context, they represent such a priority to spend such an enormous amount of money? How much of the total cost will go to other groups of employees?
There are other more technical points that need to be clarified. Looking at the impact of abolishing the lifetime allowance, the OBR flagged this as a major uncertainty, both in relation to the cost and the numbers involved. Commentators, not least the coalition Government’s long-serving Pensions Minister, have cast considerable doubt on whether this change will actually achieve the stated objective of keeping people at work. On the other hand, I have no doubt that changing the annual allowance will have a direct impact in terms of keeping doctors working.
What research has been undertaken to ascertain the impact of the changes to the tax credits? It is worth noting that, of the total cost over the next five years, £2 billion is being spent on abolishing the lifetime allowance and only £1 billion on adjusting the annual allowance, but to my certain knowledge it is the annual allowance which is the focus of the particular problems that people face.
There are also practical issues. What about those who have agreed to retire over the next three weeks? The change will not come into effect until 6 April, so can they reverse their decision? Those who have retired over the past few years—while the Government were refusing to acknowledge the problem—will have a justified sense of grievance at having paid a substantial amount of tax that the Government now declare they should not really have paid.
Finally, on a slightly more positive note, I welcome the first step in limiting the generosity, and I use the word advisedly, of the
“anomalous but much-loved tax-free lump sum”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/3/85; col. 791.]
the words of Nigel Lawson back in 1985.