Armed Forces

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

At the outset I thank the Minister and ask him to pass on my thanks to the Leader of the House and the government Chief Whip for making time available for this important debate this afternoon and evening. During the Question for Short Debate in my name on defence manning on Monday 7 April, many noble Lords who spoke that evening asked for time to be made available to explore defence issues more widely. I am most grateful that that opportunity has been provided today.

What also makes this afternoon’s debate most timely is the general election next May and the quite proper defence and security review that will follow. I certainly welcome the current Government’s commitment to hold such a defence and security review once in every five-year Parliament. This is clearly a step forward and will prevent a repetition of the 12 or 13-year gap between the Labour Government’s SDR of 1997-98 and the coalition Government’s SDSR of 2010. So our eyes now should be on the review to come in 2015. That review will be conducted within the context of the international security environment within which we currently sit—an environment that has changed significantly since 2010.

Although I stress the importance of the strategic context of any defence review, it is inevitable that the allocation of resources by any Government will be a major constraining factor. Indeed, as we know, in the 2010 SDSR it was financial considerations that took a higher priority than strategic considerations, with the result that the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces were constrained to provide for the defence of the realm and the safety of our citizens at home and abroad from a defence budget that was, in effect, 17% less than before.

Why do I say 17% less? I use the figure of 17% because rebalancing the then defence budget and filling in the £35 billion black hole inherited by the coalition Government itself equated to about a 10% reduction in defence spending over 10 years, and the Chancellor, of course, wanted his cut in the headline defence budget of some 7% or 8%. Hence we were in the position where the MoD had to do what it needed to do on behalf of the nation with some 17% or so less resource than previously.

In those circumstances choices had to be made, and they were. The major policy decision was to prioritise spending on defence equipment at the expense of manpower, which translated into 30,000 posts being cut from the regular manpower of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the Army and the Royal Air Force. Such manpower reductions, even if to be mitigated by a planned and, let us hope it happens, increase in Reserve Forces, certainly in the case of the Army, could not be cut by the traditional practice of salami slicing.

The 2010 SDSR outcome required structural change and has produced Force 2020, within which Army 2020 has set out a 10-year migration plan to move from a Regular Army of 102,000 trained strength to 82,000. It is worth reflecting for a moment on the implications of that 10-year migration plan. First, it is a10-year migration plan with a large number of moving parts: withdrawing the Army from Germany; rebasing many units within the United Kingdom, in particular focusing our armoured units increasingly in the Salisbury Plain area; integrating reserve manpower with regular manpower to a greater extent than ever before; and implementing a redundancy programme while endeavouring to manage voluntary outflow in order to keep a sensible manning profile. In my view, the current Chief of the General Staff and his team have done a remarkable job in redesigning the Army in order to maintain a certain level of capability from a deck of cards dealt to them which had many twos and threes and not a sniff of a picture card.

From this, my second and third points on Army 2020 flow. Whereas in 2006 to 2009, when our land forces were heavily committed to major operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, we were able to deploy as a nation nine Army brigades and the Royal Marine brigade in two five-brigade cycles, providing troops to both operational theatres. However, in future we will have only six Army brigades, some heavily dependent on mobilised reserves. Therefore, in future we could provide forces for only one operation on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, not two.

So, therefore, in headline terms, the potential output of our land forces is some 50% less than before, a reduction forced by an apparently modest 7% to the defence budget but one which, as I have already argued, is in reality a 17% cut. However, irrespective of whether you prefer to talk about a 7% or 17% cut, a 50% reduction in land forces capability is a fairly poor deal.

My third point on Army 2020 is that the scale of the structural reorganisation to deliver even this significantly reduced level of land force capability is such that the Army cannot implement the migration to Army 2020 should there be any further cuts to its budget. Any further cuts will inevitably lead to Army 2020 being torn up and a new plan devised, with a loss of credibility in the whole point of trying to plan sensibly for the future, not to mention the loss of morale among those serving and an unhealthy dose of cynicism about the whole government process.

Therefore, notwithstanding the Chancellor’s warning in his recent Budget speech that there will have to be further reductions in overall government spending, there is a widely held view that to remove further funding from defence will seriously call into question the Armed Forces’ ability to continue the migration towards Force 2020 and field even the reduced level of capability provided for by the SDSR.

My comments thus far have focused around the reductions to our Armed Forces which were necessitated in 2010 by the overall reduction in government spending, but the proper context for a discussion about defence issues should focus on our strategic goals within the current security environment. This should be the start point for any strategic defence and security review.

It is fair to say that we have little control over the wider security environment: events unfold, strategic shocks happen and we have to deal with the consequences. However, we do have control over our national ambition and therefore the setting of our national strategic goals. Being clear about this must be the start point for any defence and security review. However, is there an appetite to have that discussion? As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has already alluded to, the Foreign Secretary is on the record as saying that he senses no appetite for strategic shrinkage, but is he right? If he is right, how is the UK to continue to maintain its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as a member of the G8 or G7 and the G20, as a firm ally of the United States, as the leading European military power within NATO and, of course, as the leader of the Commonwealth? We have managed to fulfil these responsibilities in the past by maintaining a good level of defence spending—yes, probably punching above our weight—taking risk where we need to and by recruiting high-quality people to our Armed Forces who see such service as an attractive career prospect.

What are the options for the future? I have already rehearsed the view that any further cuts to defence spending would be highly damaging as the Armed Forces migrate towards Force 2020. I have no sympathy with the view that the results of SDSR 2010 will produce smaller and more capable Armed Forces. As far as I am concerned, they will only produce smaller Armed Forces. Quantum has a quality of its own and smaller means smaller. I have already illustrated the reduction in our land forces’ capability. We are less capable now because we are smaller.

So do we spend more on defence? Looking at Syria, Iraq and Ukraine today, there is certainly a case that can be made for that. So should we spend more on defence if we want to maintain our current position in the world, or do we accept that the UK’s role is indeed diminished and therefore lower our national ambition accordingly, even if there is apparently no appetite for that?

Or perhaps, as we say at home in Norfolk, we should do different. There is an avenue of difference that we could embrace if we want to try to maintain our current level of influence and status on the world stage. I am not about to make the case for so-called soft power as an alternative to hard power, but I will make the case for better integration of our overall defence capability with our diplomatic skills and our determination to fund a high level of international development work. Embraced as a determined government policy, the integration of defence, diplomacy and development, plus an acknowledged role for the private sector, could retain the UK in an influential position. However, this will happen only if such an initiative is endorsed and led at the very top of government; if the strategy is agreed by the National Security Council; and if all the various government departments, at all levels, work closely with each other.

The challenge here is to get better at horizon scanning, to get better at spotting potentially failing states and engaging with them early to prevent them failing and falling prey to extremist or terrorist opportunists. It is a widely accepted truism that prevention is better than cure and our recent experiences of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan followed by nation building under fire, which have proved so expensive in the expenditure of blood and treasure, should make the case for acting differently on the world stage and seeking to prevent conflict rather than dealing with the consequences of it.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, made reference to the role of women in combat units. Before I draw my points to a conclusion, I shall offer my views on women in combat units. I would like to make it quite clear that within the Army, the Navy and the Air Force women have an enormous role to play and that what they bring to all aspects of our life is without equal. However, there is a question that needs to be addressed, and that is whether it is correct, appropriate or right for women to serve in our front-line combat units. It is important to understand that combat units—in the case of the Army these are the infantry or the armoured corps—are the units that we commit by design to offensive operations. The mission of that unit, that battalion, that company or that platoon is to go forward, under shot and fire, with fixed bayonet and close with extreme violence on an enemy. The question I ask is this: is it an appropriate task for a woman? Is it actually an appropriate task for anyone, but in particular, is it one for a woman?

I expressed these views in either a radio or a television programme a while ago, and received a certain amount of mail, as one might expect. One lady wrote to me and described the sort of the person she thought I was. I did not actually agree with her description. She also said, “Surely we can trust our commanding officers to know when it is appropriate to use their personnel”. I am afraid that that comment completely undermined her other point. That is because the basic fighting unit of an armoured regiment is a four-person tank crew. The basic fighting unit of an infantry battalion is a four-person fire team. How can a commanding officer be expected to say, “This task is appropriate for a fire team or tank crew that includes women, but that task is not”? Frankly, as Chiefs of Staff, former Chiefs of Staff and Members of this Parliament, we have a responsibility to take that decision and say what is appropriate for men and what is appropriate for women. I am afraid that I am implacable in my view that a woman in a four-person fire team or two women in a four-person tank crew is not appropriate. We have absolutely to own this unpopular decision and take it in the best interests of our overall capability.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Dannatt]

With that off my chest, I will draw to a conclusion.

The 2010 SDSR, in response to the national financial situation and in recognition of the inherited overdraft in defence, reduced defence spending and reduced our defence capability. It has produced smaller—not smaller and better, just smaller—Armed Forces. The international security situation as we approach the next defence review in 2015 looks considerably more challenging than it did in 2010. Cutting UK defence spending any further would send all the wrong messages to the Kremlin, to al-Qaeda and to those who do not share our British values. A modest increase in defence expenditure would signal that the UK still takes its international responsibilities seriously and would reassure both our NATO partners and our principal ally, the United States.

If no more money for defence can be found and we wish to maintain our historic level of international influence, then the alternative of better integrating our overall defence, diplomacy and development capability offers a different and potentially beneficial path. But we must remember that even if we go down that alternative path, what underpins our overall policy and our overall position in the world, and what guarantees the overall security of the British people, is a strong defence capability. SDSR 2010 weakened the UK and the world is now even more challenging, so SDSR 2015 will be a watershed. The next Government must remember first and last that their primary responsibility is the defence of the realm and the safety of our citizens, and they must not forget their duty to the well-being of the members of our Armed Forces—a relevant thought tonight as we enter Armed Forces week.