Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick

Monday 14th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I welcome Commons Amendment 188 on the confidentiality of legal advice. As the Minister knows, a concern has been raised, long after the 11th hour, about the position of arbitrators. The concern is that the Bill addresses the data protection obligations of judges and lawyers but does not address the data protection position of arbitrators. Arbitration is of course an important legal service, in which this country leads and provides services to the world. All I can do at this stage is to ask the Minister and the Bill team whether they will reflect on this concern, which has been raised not just with me but with him. If he thinks that there is any basis for concern, will he consider using the very extensive powers conferred under the Bill to bring forward regulations to address the issue?

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, as the Minister made clear in his lucid introduction, this is a really significant group of amendments. It is very good to see that some of the work that was done in this House has come back in the form of amendments. In particular, the Minister will remember that it was my noble friend Lord McNally who raised issues around Thomson Reuters in the first place. However, I know that there will be considerable pleasure in the financial services industry, which is very concerned about such things as money laundering, anti-corruption measures and so on, and making sure that it can process data in pursuance of achieving those important goals.

I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, on her campaign, which has clearly borne fruit here. I had not heard what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had said but there seems to be a bit of a hole in the Bill if that is the case. I can certainly testify to the fact that arbitrators are an incredibly important part of our judicial system. Indeed, within it they are one of our global competitive advantages; therefore if anything is done that is to the detriment of our arbitration system, it would be really quite serious.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment arises from concerns about the narrowness of the derogations based on article 89 of the GDPR for research statistics and archiving expressed by a number of organisations, notably techUK. The argument is that there should be a derogation similar to Section 33 of the Data Protection Act 1998. That Act makes provision for exemptions for research and development where suitable safeguards are in place. The GDPR limits this to scientific and historical research, but member states are able to legislate for additional exemptions where safeguards are in place.

The organisation techUK and others believe that the Bill’s provision for scientific and historical research should be broadened, involving the same provisions as Section 33 of the Data Protection Act 1998, and that the definition of scientific and historical research needs clarification. For example, it is not clear whether it would include computer science engineering research. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to clarify that. I recognise that the amendment leads the line in this group but may not be followed in exactly the same way. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 86BA, in my name. It concerns the application of data protection principles in the context of the law of trusts. The law has long recognised that a trustee is not obliged to disclose to a beneficiary the trustee’s confidential reasons for exercising or not exercising a discretionary power. This is known as the Londonderry principle, named after a case decided by the Court of Appeal, reported in 1965, Chancery Division, page 9.1.8. The rationale of this principle was helpfully summarised by Mr Justice Briggs—recently elevated to the Supreme Court—in the case of Breakspear v Ackland, 2009, Chancery, page 32, at paragraph 54.

The principle is that the exercise by trustees of their discretionary powers is confidential. It is in the interests of the beneficiaries, because it enables the trustees to make discreet but thorough inquiries as to the competing claims for consideration for benefit. Mr Justice Briggs added that such confidentiality also advances the proper interests of the administration of trusts, because it reduces the scope for litigation about how trustees have exercised their discretion, and encourages suitable people to accept office as trustees, undeterred by a concern that their discretionary deliberations might be challenged by disappointed or hostile beneficiaries and that they will be subject to litigation in the courts.

There is, of course, a public interest here, which is protected by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to supervise and, where appropriate, intervene in the administration of trusts, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, stated for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd, 2003, 2 AC 709.

The problem is that, as presently drafted, the Bill would confer a right on beneficiaries to see information about themselves unless a specific exemption is included. A recent Court of Appeal judgment in Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing, 2017, EWCA Civ 74, drew attention to the general applicability of data protection law in this context unless a specific exemption is enacted.

My understanding, which is indirect—I declare an interest as a barrister, but this is not an area in which I normally practise—is that in other jurisdictions such as Jersey, the data protection legislation contains a statutory restriction on the rights of a data subject to make a subject access request where that would intrude on the trustees’ confidentiality under the Londonderry principle. Indeed, I am told that those who practise in this area are very concerned that offshore trustees and offshore professionals who provide trust services are already actively encouraging the transfer of trust business away from this jurisdiction because of the data protection rights which apply here, and which will apply under the Bill.

The irony is that the data protection law is driving trust business towards less transparent offshore jurisdictions and away from the better regulated English trust management businesses. I have received persuasive representations on this subject from the Trust Law Committee, a group of leading academics and practitioners, and I acknowledge the considerable assistance I have received on this matter from Simon Taube QC and James MacDougald.

This is plainly a very technical matter, but it is one of real public interest. I hope that the Minister will be able to consider this issue favourably before Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Yes.

[Lord Pannick]

May I add to this fascinating debate? Does this not illustrate one of the problems of the withdrawal Bill—that in many areas, of which this is one, there will be two potentially conflicting sources of English law? There will be this Act, on data protection, and the direct implementation through the EU withdrawal Bill on the same subject. The two may conflict because this Act will not contain the recitals.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, all I can say is that I do not know how the legal profession will cope in the circumstances.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I understand the wish of the Government to appeal against the decision of the commissioner because of the general issues of importance raised under the freedom of information legislation, but the issue raised today by the amendment does not depend on the proper answer to the question that was before the commissioner and which will be before the tribunal. That is because the issue before the commissioner and the tribunal was the proper balance of interests—a very difficult balance of interests, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, has said—between the public interest in having this information and the very real need to ensure that risk registers in general are not disclosed. But the issue before the House is different. It is the issue of whether the Members of this House should be given information that the commissioner in his judgment, having seen that information, has said will be of considerable importance in enabling the Members of this House to perform our scrutiny function in relation to this vital Bill.

I cannot share the opinion of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that this is the same issue as will be before the commissioner. It is a matter for the judgment of this House how best we perform our scrutiny function. Whatever the balance may be, in general, between the public interest in disclosure and the very real interest in not disclosing confidential information that is on a risk register, the balance is surely very different in principle when we have before the House a Bill that we are scrutinising and considering. It would, I think, require an overwhelmingly strong argument to justify non-disclosure to this House of information that is relevant to our scrutiny function. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to say today that he is prepared to disclose to this House at least the substance of the information that is contained in the risk register, so that we may fully perform our scrutiny function in relation to this vital Bill.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, I am very interested in the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He seemed to be setting a rather different standard, well above that imposed by the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I have no doubt that the Minister will deal with that argument when he comes to it. However, I believe that the question for the House today is whether we support the Department of Health’s right to appeal against the Information Commissioner’s decision. This has been a much more finely balanced decision than I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is prepared to credit, which I find somewhat surprising given her recent role in government. In this kind of situation, with a qualified exemption under the Freedom of Information Act, it is all about whether the balance of public interest is served by disclosure or non-disclosure. The arguments put forward to the commissioner were in relation to two essential aspects. First, there is the “safe space” argument: the importance of government having the freedom to debate policy and make decisions,

“without being hindered by external comment”.

Secondly, there is the “chilling effect” that disclosing information relating to a particular policy, while that policy is still being formulated or developed, could have on,

“the frankness and candour with which relevant parties make future contributions to that particular policy debate”.

These are perfectly respectable arguments and that is why the commissioner found that the factors are finely balanced, as my noble friend Lady Williams said. In the light of the particularly strongly held views of the department—and I believe that these are genuinely held—it seems that it is entirely valid for the department to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

However, I agree very strongly with my noble friend that time is of the essence in this case. There is little point on a decision on appeal not being made until March or April; because, as my noble friend has pointed out, the Bill will probably have passed through this House entirely by then. To mitigate the possibility of that kind of delay, my noble friend’s suggestion is entirely right and sensible. The Department of Health and the complainants should apply to the First-tier Tribunal for an expedited hearing. This is well within the tribunal’s case-management powers under paragraph 5 of the procedural rules, which were last set out in 2009. Of course, this is a discretionary power, but I believe that any tribunal would recognise the need to resolve these matters quickly, particularly in the light of the debates we have had in this House. I believe it would be extremely helpful in the circumstances if the Minister indicated the department’s willingness to proceed along these lines. I hope that my noble friend can give a positive response today, even if further time is needed to prepare the case on both sides.