If it turns out that this five-year limit is inhibiting investment and choking it off, and evidence is seen to that effect in a year or two’s time, would it not be sensible for the Government to take another look at this? The Government have made it clear in the impact assessment and elsewhere that they want the kind of mass digitisation projects that could be undertaken by libraries, archives and other cultural institutions to happen, but that needs very significant investment. Those who are to put up the investment capital for this need to be confident that they are going to get a return. They are saying that the timescale of five years is insufficient to get the return. With the uncertainty about licence renewal, there is a real danger that the investment will not occur. Would it not be sensible for the business department to keep an open mind on this and be willing to look at it again if there is evidence that the policy is inhibiting investment?
Perhaps I may add a question so that my noble friend can answer them all in one fell swoop. Strangely enough, although I agree with the five-year initial term, it not clear, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, pointed out, whether a subsequent authorisation can be longer than five years. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, might be entirely delirious with a 20-year extension. I would not be very keen on that but he might think that it was a wonderful thing. But from my reading of the regulations, it is not clear whether or not that subsequent authorisation could be longer than the initial authorisation.
My Lords, as the Minister knows, I have always been a supporter Clause 13. I know that many small designers will be delighted to see it contained in the Bill and I hope that it survives its passage through the Commons.
Although I did not feel that the clause needed a huge amount of amendment or that it will be the blunt instrument that some people have predicted, if the addition of the amendment makes it more acceptable, it must be welcomed. I welcome the fine tuning that the Minister has carried out.
In welcoming the amendment, and given the restrictions on speeches at Third Reading, I want to thank the Minister for the accessible and receptive approach that he has taken throughout the Bill. I hope that as the Bill goes through the Commons the further discussions that he has promised on lookalikes—and, in particular, on the comparative advertising issues which may be applicable to lookalikes—and on the kind of penalties that might be appropriate to digital copyright infringement will bear fruit.
My Lords, I echo the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to the extent that he has welcomed the Minister’s constructive response to some of the issues raised by my noble friends on the Front Bench and myself in Committee and on Report on the matter of the criminal offence. More broadly, perhaps I may I express my appreciation of the Minister’s scrupulousness and fair mindedness in the way he has responded to a range of issues raised by noble Lords throughout the various proceedings on the Bill. I thank him for that.
My Lords, briefly, this is a shameless attempt to publicise a success story from the Copyright Licensing Steering Group, the people who are bringing us the Copyright Hub. I take your Lordships back to the passage of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, when a number of us argued for progress on metadata protection to be included in the Secretary of State’s annual report. On 6 March of this year the Minister said,
“The Government are keenly aware of and sensitive to the concerns of creators in relation to metadata. They believe that an industry-led approach is most likely to identify the key issues and the most effective solutions. … The Intellectual Property Office will also be working with the Technology Strategy Board to consider other options to tackle the issues around the misuse of digital images as well as search and stripping of metadata. I hope that in the light of what I have said in my brief comments my noble friend can withdraw his amendment”.—[Official Report, 6/3/13; col. 1602.]
It is very gratifying to be able to report that a sub-group of the Copyright Licensing Steering Group has produced, with a very comprehensive range of people within the industry, a draft code of practice that aims to ensure that relevant licensing metadata is identified in a consistent manner and remains readily available for licensing purposes. It calls on creators of images—photographers, and so on—to make it easier for potential users to find them by ensuring that they include key information such as their name, the date of creation of the image and a contact address. For users of images, the code of practice recommends that they take all reasonable steps to check that licensing metadata is attached to an image before they use it.
I understand that the draft code of practice is currently out to consultation and the Copyright Licensing Steering Group is seeking views on whether it is pitched at the right level and whether having general principles rather than more detailed principles is the right way forward. The Copyright Hub itself is now using Getty Images technology to search and identify images. It looks as though the Copyright Hub will fulfil the hopes placed in it, together with this whole development of protection of metadata.
The irony is that metadata stripping is unlawful under Section 296ZG of the CDPA 1988. The problem until now has been the issue of policing and enforcement. It looks as though photographers will be able, through a combination of the code of practice and the fact that the Copyright Hub is coming into existence, to remedy the unlawful stripping of metadata. It is good to know that other aspects of the Copyright Hub are being developed; some of them involve metadata, others do not. In the case of music, that is in conjunction with the new Global Repertoire Database.
It is useful to reflect briefly that this has been an interesting year in terms of debating and discussing intellectual property so fundamentally, and that there is some good news out there. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, takes us back quite nostalgically to the days of the passage of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill. He is absolutely right to remind us of the importance of the metadata issue. It would be welcome if the annual report were to include a section describing such progress as may be being made on that important issue.
I will speak to Amendment 14, in my name. I very much welcome the commitment that the Minister has made in the Bill to the publication of an annual report. Policy on intellectual property is arcane and is vigorously contested among specialists and between special interests. It is very important—its effects are far-reaching—yet it is not well understood, either by Parliament or the public. I therefore hope that the annual report will be more ambitious than is suggested by the terms of the clause in the Bill. I want it to range rather more widely to help Parliament and the public better understand the major policy issues and the principles which animate the Government in taking their specific decisions and formulating their broader policy.
I take it that the role of government is to judge the balance of the public interest in relation to intellectual property between affording protection to creative individuals and enterprises, and opening new possibilities as early as possible to the wider public, consumers and other originators of ideas and knowledge, such as academics, designers and other creative people.
Of course we need to protect intellectual property in certain circumstances. It is essential to incentivise innovation. Often there is a strong public interest in that—but not invariably. It should not be axiomatic that we grant more and more intellectual property rights. Applications should be judged on their merits. The Intellectual Property Office and the Government should not be negative but should be sceptical about applications, and should all the time be ready to question the consensus. While it is desirable to achieve an alignment of international regimes, for example through agreements at European Union level, it is important not to rest on the achievement of those agreements. As the noble Viscount reminded us, consistency is not necessarily a virtue.
Intellectual property is a form of monopoly. It leads to some rigging of the market and restraint of trade—and rigged markets and restraint of trade carry with them inefficiencies and opportunity costs. Others are restrained from accessing or exploiting new knowledge as early as they might do. Price competition is postponed. The holders of intellectual property, being protected, may become complacent and less innovative. That would be an ironic outcome of a policy intended to promote innovation. The incumbent may try to use monopoly power to crush rivals and new challengers who dare to enter the field.
Historically there have been vast benefits when decisions have been taken not to patent new discoveries. Jonas Salk declined to patent his invention of the vaccine for polio—to vast human benefit. Sir Tim Berners-Lee thought it was wrong to patent the world wide web. While it will be many decades before we can begin to assess the benefits or otherwise of that decision, it certainly created large new freedoms.
In Committee, my noble friend Lord Stevenson and I used the historical metaphor of the enclosures movement. We agreed that we preferred intellectual commons to intellectual enclosures. As the House will know by now, my view is that intellectual property is a necessary evil and that we should keep it to a minimum—just enough but no more than is needed to incentivise. Yet the tendency of policy has been to lengthen protection, and Governments have been prone to brag about the number of patents that are held in the UK, as if it was a measure of success. It is a measure of inventiveness, but it is also an index of economic rigidities. The Government should not simply equate maximising the profits of intellectual property holders with the public good. The question must be asked: cui bono?
It is commonly preferable to enlarge opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises rather than to buttress the monopoly strength of giant multinational corporations. If we want to generate more jobs, spread wealth, tackle the negative externalities of certain business practices and raise more taxes, it may be preferable to support SMEs as against corporate giants.
The methodology needed to establish the necessary minimum has to be pragmatic and based on an assessment of the benefits and disbenefits of protection in relation to the economy, social well-being, research and culture. There are different effects of intellectual property depending on different timescales, industrial sectors, amounts of market share and geographical scales, just as there are different effects between luxuries and necessities.
The Government’s vision should not just be of what is in the narrow interest of the United Kingdom. They should not take the view “my country right or wrong” in relation to intellectual property. We should not always reflexively back UK plc. As we move towards a world with a population of perhaps 10 billion people and with vast migrations, it will be enormously in the interests of the United Kingdom that the poorer peoples of the world should be able to make rapid progress in knowledge, education and the growth of their economies. Judgments about intellectual property policy need to be economically farsighted, humane, ethical and wise. They will be very difficult indeed to make in, for example, the burgeoning field of the life sciences and where bioethical issues are at stake. I very much welcome the judgment by the US Supreme Court in relation to Myriad Genetics. However, as the noble Lord reminded us in Committee, it poses a significant challenge to the European Union. The EU biotechnology patents directive may need to be reconsidered in the light of that American judgment. As we see the development of techniques of so-called human enhancement, such issues are likely to proliferate. I hope that, year by year, the annual report will offer discussion of these matters.
The Minister very understandably and rightly said in Grand Committee, at col. 53 of Hansard on 18 June that each annual report should not be “a Hargreaves-like review”. But it should be thoughtful and instructive and should be more than a catalogue or parade of BIS or IPO activities, statistics, lists of negotiations and seminars and an account of assistance given to business. It should articulate values and principles and the Government’s vision. I mean the vision of the whole Government, not just the business department but other departments that have a vital interest in intellectual property such as the DCMS, the Department of Health, the schools department and the Department for International Development.
I conclude by noting that the noble Viscount, as Minister for intellectual property, has vastly important responsibilities which go beyond what is written into the clause as we have it now—that is,
“the promotion of innovation and of economic growth”.
The annual report ought to reflect those wider responsibilities and should be the basis of Parliament’s and the public’s continuing consideration of this policy area, which has such wide significance.
My Lords, Clause 20 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament annually on how the activities of the Intellectual Property Office and legislation have supported innovation and economic growth in the United Kingdom. I very much welcome the Minister’s commitment to the production of an annual report, but the requirement in Clause 20 is too narrow. The responsibilities of government range more widely than the wording suggests. Amendment 26A would require the report to cover how,
“legislation, the policy of the government and the activities of the Patent Office have balanced the interests of the owners of intellectual property and the wider interests of society”.
By “society” I mean not only in this country but across the world.
New inventions and techniques have improved lives again and again, particularly since the Industrial Revolution. Intellectual property laws and their intelligent enforcement are essential for the stimulation of innovation. As my noble friend Lord Stevenson said, we need a robust system of intellectual property legislation. However, I contend that it is not always the case that strong intellectual property rights—and their strong assertion—improve economic performance or are an unmixed benefit to society. Incentives and rewards to inventors, innovators, creative people and investors need to be balanced against the public benefit of wider and quicker diffusion of knowledge, and the lower prices that may result from early competition.
We should seek in policy to balance the interests of businesses with those of consumers and academics. A judgment always has to be made about the costs and benefits of monopoly, and, where monopoly is mitigated, of licensing. It has to be made on the appropriate length and breadth of a particular patent. It has to be made on whether the price in economic inefficiency of restricting the diffusion and use of knowledge is outweighed by the benefit of increased innovation. The appropriate balance will vary according to the context.
A longer duration of intellectual property rights seems more appropriate in literature and the arts than in manufacturing. There may be differences, too, with luxuries as opposed to necessities, and in the advanced world as against the developing world. We should also ask what proportion of patents in any field a business should be permitted: for example, in the field of genetic modification. I believe that there are enormous benefits to GM, but it is legitimate to ask whether Monsanto should hold patents for the vast majority of seeds planted in the world.
There are risks and disbenefits in granting patents too easily, and there are reasons to be sceptical when we look at applications for patents. There are definitional problems. What is new? What is original? The great Jewish sage Maimonides said that there was nothing new under the sun. Delacroix said of Raphael:
“Nowhere did he reveal his originality so forcefully as in the ideas he borrowed”.
True originality is indeed rare.
Much research is publicly funded. Should the first private interest to exploit that research gain a large advantage over the rest? It has been suggested, rather colourfully, that the application of intellectual property law in the 20th and 21st centuries should be compared to the movement of agricultural enclosures in the 18th century. Do we want intellectual enclosures or do we want commons?
A monopoly-holder protected from competition will be under less pressure to innovate again. That result is surely perverse. Monopoly-holders may move aggressively to squash budding competitors by taking lawsuits against them or taking them over. Microsoft has practised those techniques over many years. The consequence of those practices is that research and innovation have been discouraged. Research efforts can be distorted where patents exist. A competitor business may be more attracted to coming as close as it can to copying an existing patent that is seen to be a money-spinner than to developing a new product or embarking on innovation in a new area. We have seen that in the pharmaceutical field. Where there are dense patent thickets, it is particularly discouraging to new entrants and competitors.
I will say a word about genes. I was Minister for Science between 1990 and 1992. The most difficult decision I had to take as a Minister in government was whether we should allow gene patenting in this country. All my instincts and values were against it, but I was driven to take the view that we had to do it. We had unfortunately had poor funding settlements for science from the Treasury in recent years and it was difficult to see how British scientists would be able to stay in the game of the human genome project. At the same time, the US Supreme Court and subsequently the US Patent and Trademark Office had made it clear that they would grant patents for discovery of genes in certain conditions.
However, what was “discovery of genes”? It was not the invention of genes; it was precisely discovery. It seemed to me wrong that natural genes should be patentable. Knowledge of that kind ought to be disseminated as rapidly as possible for the benefit of humanity. There were vast potential benefits, obviously, in the field of health. Of course, when patenting became established, there was a headlong rush to patent. Among the companies that were successful in that competition, Myriad Genetics patented two human gene mutations that affect the susceptibility of people to breast cancer and ovarian cancer. Having secured those patents, they demanded licence fees even from not-for-profit laboratories. In that way, the existence of patents discouraged screening and discouraged the search for improved screening technologies. The medical benefits arising from the human genome project were restricted.
Yet I do not think that those businesses made more money internationally, because poor countries could not pay the higher costs that arose from the existence of patents. I therefore welcome wholeheartedly the recent judgment of the US Supreme Court written by Judge Clarence Thomas which, as I understand it, reverses the position that the court took in 1980. Sandra Park of the American Civil Liberties Union has said about the judgment:
“Because of this ruling, patients will have greater access to genetic testing, and scientists can engage in research on these genes without fear of being sued”.
The annual report will, I hope, reflect on issues such as that. I hope that it will reflect on what policy ought to be in the life sciences now and in the future. We face the possibility of new techniques of so-called “human enhancement”—adjustments to the brain and other parts of the human anatomy—which there will no doubt be attempts to patent. The Chinese are investing enormous resources in the field of life sciences. We will want to know what the Government’s view is on appropriate policy in this field. I hope that the annual review will provide an opportunity for the Government to share their thinking with us.
What will the annual report say about graphene? Graphene is said to be the new miracle material: single-atom-layer carbon. It is the thinnest, strongest material with high conductivity and flexibility. It has potential uses in desalination, solar power, waste cleaning, packaging, super-fast computers, and super-strong and super-light composite materials. Graphene is hardly yet commercially viable, but the race is on to patent in the area of graphene. I understand that, in May, UK businesses and universities held 54 patents in relation to graphene; US businesses and universities held 1,754; and Chinese businesses and universities held 2,204. What intellectual property regime in relation to graphene will be in Britain’s and in the world’s interests? I hope that the annual report will expound on Government’s policy in this kind of area and the principles upon which they make their judgment. The business department and the IPO do not assume, I hope, that the more UK patents there are, the better. When Jonas Salk, the discoverer of the polio vaccine, was asked in a television interview who held the patent, he said:
“The American people, I guess”.
He chose not to exploit that massively important and beneficial discovery. Tim Berners-Lee did not seek to patent the world wide web and, indeed, considers that software patents stifle innovation.
Inequality of access to knowledge often compounds the evils of inequality of access to income. We should not, in this country, take a narrow view of our national interest and should not ignore the interests of the developing world, particularly where medicines are concerned. To do so would be short-sighted, even in our own interest. We do not know whether the population of the globe at the end of this century will be 10 billion or 11 billion people, although these are the sorts of projections. We should not deprive the developing world of the knowledge that will enable its economies to grow and allow them to be rescued from poverty. If billions and billions of people are to live in poverty unnecessarily, because of the restriction of knowledge to the advanced, wealthy, western countries, that would be wrong in itself and very perverse in terms of our own interest. At the World Trade Organisation, I hope that the United Kingdom will seek to remodel and liberalise TRIPS. Clause 20 should not be just about the Intellectual Property Office and legislation—the requirements of the report should relate to wider policy.
Cost-benefit analysis in this area is never easy. It needs economic far-sightedness, ethical judgment and wisdom. We need a regime that is flexible and pragmatic, not schematic, and yet clear and comprehensible. As my noble friend Lord Stevenson said, the annual report ought to reflect a broad view from government as a whole—not just from the business department and the IPO but very much from the DCMS, with its particular responsibilities to promote creativity, and also from the ODA, because we have responsibilities, which I have mentioned, in relation to poverty and the advancement of human interests across the world. I hope that the annual report will share the Government’s vision and analysis in these respects. That is why we need to amend Clause 20.
I will very briefly set out the reasons for Amendment 28ZA, also in my name, which are obvious. The ears of the Intellectual Property Office must be deafened by the clamour of lobbyists. The office must be pushed and tugged this way and that and be continually under massive pressures, although I am certain that it does its best to arrive at a sensible, appropriate and balanced policy amid all this melee. In a democracy, everybody is entitled to put their point of view to the IPO but everybody also ought to be entitled to know who is seeking influence. We need to be sure that policy does not echo who shouts loudest. I believe that Amendment 28ZA would strengthen the IPO and the business department in their search for a balanced policy, would encourage confidence in the intellectual property regime and would assist the Government in the very difficult task they have of arriving at an appropriate policy in relation to lobbying.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, the debate on the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill was a very useful start to this whole discussion about the IPO report to Parliament. We have built up a considerable degree of consensus about what that report should contain. I welcome Clause 20 as a step in the right direction but the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, put the points extremely well on Amendments 26, 27 and 28, to which I have also put my name. If we are going to have such a clause in a piece of primary legislation, we need to be explicit about the kind of reporting requirement that the Secretary of State has. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, that those are absolutely essential requirements, particularly as regards Amendment 26, and that the report should be about the promotion of innovation and economic growth,
“arising from the creation and exploitation of intellectual property”.
After all, that is what the Intellectual Property Office is all about.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has found a novel way of responding to the consultation on exceptions. It is not a wholly welcome process nor, I am sure, will the Minister find it wholly welcome, since I suspect that questions fired with the rapidity of bullets can only really be answered in correspondence.
I am content to see the full suite of exceptions that will be put forward by the Government, which will of course need scrutinising. I hope that that will be both a formal and informal process, so that parliamentarians will have the opportunity to engage with the Minister and with the IPO on these exceptions—not simply through the debate that we will formally have when they come to the House as statutory instruments. I can see that the motives of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, are pure but I am not quite so sure whether the instrument he has used is appropriate.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara in his proposal that the Government should publish a document of some sort setting out their thinking in relation to the suite of exceptions that they propose to legislate for. It will not be satisfactory if the first opportunity that Parliament has to consider these exceptions is in the highly constrained circumstances in which we consider unamendable orders, in fairly brief time, in Committee.
It would be very helpful if the Government would lay out their thinking in a report and better still—essential, I would suggest—if Parliament had the opportunity to debate that report, so that when we come to consider the specific orders and enact legislation on them, we do so in the context of a proper understanding of the thinking and strategic purpose of the Government. The Government have some very delicate and difficult judgments to make, exception by exception, and Parliament needs to take responsible decisions. Parliament will be better educated, and better placed to make appropriate judgments on this, if we have the opportunity to go through the preliminary stage that my noble friend suggested. The report need not be quite as ambitious as the one that he proposed in his amendment, which would set out,
“the government’s long term plans for the future of intellectual property in the United Kingdom”.
That could be quite a bulky document. However, if the report is focused on the issues raised in the exceptions for which the Government are minded to legislate, it would be very helpful to Parliament and to others as well.
My Lords, as your Lordships know, the public lending right is the legal right of authors to receive payment for the loan of their books by public libraries. Currently it applies to the loan of books only in printed format. It does not apply to e-books, audiobooks and e-audiobooks.
William Sieghart and a distinguished advisory panel carried out a review of a number of issues and concerns on the subject of e-lending in libraries. Their report, An Independent Review of E-Lending in Public Libraries in England, was published in March 2013. A number of recommendations were made to ensure that authors receive fair remuneration from the lending of digital, audio and e-audiobooks by libraries. The review recommended that the anomaly whereby rights holders are still not recompensed for the loan of their audio and e-books should be urgently addressed by extending PLR to cover e-books, audiobooks and e-audiobooks; that there should be an increase in the Government’s PLR funding to take this into account, so that writers and other rights holders are equitably compensated; that the provisions in the Digital Economy Act 2010 that extend PLR to on-site loans of audiobooks, e-books and e-audiobooks should be enacted; and that the Government should find space in their legislative programme, at the earliest opportunity, to enact primary legislation to extend PLR to remote e-loans.
I will say a word on the legalities around PLR. Authors who have granted publishers the right to publish their works as audiobooks or e-books will typically retain copyright in the work and will often retain the exclusive right to lend the work granted by Section 16(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Under Section 18A of the CDPA it is an infringement of copyright in a literary work to lend that work to the public without the copyright owner’s permission. However, Section 40A of the CDPA permits public libraries to lend books that fall within the public lending right scheme. If the Digital Economy Act is implemented, the PLR scheme will be varied to include audiobooks and e-books. Until that happens, loans of audiobooks and e-books issued without a copyright owner’s authorisation perpetuate a situation in which lending rights are being infringed.
Loans of audiobooks are significant, considering that no payment is made to authors for their loan from libraries and that in many instances the libraries charge for the loans. The latest CIPFA statistics put the number of audiobook loans at 9.9 million for 2010-11 and 8.9 million for 2011-12. However, CIPFA treats e-audio separately in the 2011-12 figures and there is an additional figure to be taken into account of 287,000 loans for e-audiobooks.
In their response to the Sieghart report, the Government committed to pursuing legislation to extend PLR to remote lending in future parliamentary Sessions. They also agreed to consider commencing the relevant provisions of the Digital Economy Act. Their commitment to pursuing the legislation to extend PLR to remote lending was said to be subject to compliance with the EU copyright directive, with further funding dependent on evidence of remote loans.
What are the potential consequences if the Government do not implement the recommendations? The continuing failure to provide for lending remuneration in respect of non-print formats raises an important legal issue. While on-site e-book lending is a developing service, the ability to access audiobooks in public libraries is clearly highly valued by the public. The advisory panel heard that around 10 million audiobook loans take place each year, the vast majority of which are in hard-copy formats. Quite apart from the inequitable treatment of rights holders, the current situation also places the library service in a position where rights are being infringed on a daily basis. For libraries and authors, the longer-term consequences of a failure to implement the Sieghart recommendations expeditiously are clear: readers are increasingly choosing digital formats, anticipating on-demand access at the time and place of their choosing.
The Government should act upon William Sieghart’s recommendations without delay to effect the extensions to PLR envisaged by the Digital Economy Act, to provide adequate additional funding for these extensions and to fund and encourage appropriate models for remote e-book lending so that libraries can act within the law and authors can receive fair remuneration.
Since the Government are now committed to pursuing the legislation to extend PLR to remote lending, subject to compliance with the EU copyright directive, with further funding dependent on evidence of remote loans, why not use this Bill for the enabling legislation? I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, very strongly indeed. I am very glad that he tabled this amendment. There is a palpable injustice that needs to be remedied and I can see no good reason why it has not already been done. It should be done very expeditiously indeed.
The historic authors’ public lending right scheme has always been run on a highly cost-effective basis. The cost of it has been minimal to public funds. But it has been valued very much by authors, not because it makes them rich—there is a low ceiling on the total remuneration they can receive through the scheme—but because it gives recognition to their copyright and their rights as authors. Rightly, they feel strongly about it. It is clear that the principles of the system need to be extended to e-books and should have been extended long ago to audiobooks. All the thinking has been done by Mr Sieghart and his colleagues.
To carry on with the present state of affairs is disreputable. I suspect that the constraint is seen as one of cost but even a token royalty or token remuneration would satisfy the principle, which I think is important to authors. I hope very much that the Minister, speaking on behalf of not only his department but the DCMS, will be able to encourage us today.
My Lords, I shall be very brief. The beauty of Committee is that entirely opposing propositions can be put forward by the same person. It is only when we get to Report that we have to get serious by being absolutely clear about the propositions being put forward. I therefore do not intend to respond in great detail to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who, I believe, was taking an argument out for a trot. Earlier in Committee, I previously talked about frightening the horses and I am afraid that we are back to horse analogies. It has been an entertaining trot in many respects.
The way that the argument was put together misunderstood what happens in court. It is about the adducing of evidence. It was reassuring that the judge listened to the arguments and evidence and felt as a result that he understood far more about the genesis of the design right. Of course, in a criminal court you add mitigation to all that. It is not worth suddenly locking up people as a result of being prosecuted for design infringement. If you do something reasonable in the eyes of a criminal court in such circumstances, you will be able to mitigate the offence, even though technically you may be guilty of it.
I am afraid that I do not accept the noble Lord’s argument. However, I have wanted to use the expression “a fortiori” for many years in Committee; if you have the ability to prosecute in a criminal court for an infringement of registered design, you should have that ability for unregistered design. If you have it for copyright, you should be able to prosecute for unregistered design. If you have it for trade marks, you should have it for unregistered design. All these intellectual property rights may be complex but they are a vital underpinning for our creators and our creative industries. I am unashamed in my wish for those creative industries to thrive in this country and for their intellectual property protection to be as solid as we can make it, without falling unduly into a monopoly situation, about which the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, is ever vigilant, I am glad to say.
My Lords, the noble Viscount needs to offer us some compelling reasons for the creation of a new criminal offence. It is undesirable in principle to create new criminal offences unless there is a clearly demonstrable need for them. Successive Governments over decades in this country have been promiscuous in the creation of new criminal offences. They have been trigger-happy in this matter. It makes them look as if they are being tough and it is quite popular in certain quarters, but it has not been very good for our national life or our culture. It tends to create a more pervasive culture of distrust, suspicion and fear within our society.
There are also a lot of practicalities to think about. If you have a criminal offence, you must commit policing resources. You are laying another burden on the courts. The police and the courts are already excessively burdened and their resources are diminishing. You must consider the capacity of the prisons, which are bursting. I hope that we will not have to anticipate many people being incarcerated in consequence of the noble Viscount’s measure but that is clearly what it points towards. I do not know what thought the noble Viscount has given to the cost of all this. We understand that the Government are intent on reducing the deficit but he is proposing here a measure that will have clear implications of additional public spending. I can quite understand why the measure is popular with small and medium-sized enterprises in the design field: the burden of the enforcement of rights will be transferred from civil action being taken by them where necessary to criminal prosecution by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. It saves SMEs troublesome, tedious and possibly expensive activities. I can see why they like that. However, I am a bit surprised that the Minister has been willing to gratify them in this way.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Young, has encapsulated the argument pretty well. It merely takes a reading of the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to see that, although on slightly different bases and for rather different reasons, it is not happy at all with negative procedure for either Clause 8 or Clause 11. In addition to the amendments tabled between us, I have some sympathy with Amendment 10 as well. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give either convincing reasons for continuing with the negative procedure or will accept the fact that the committee has delivered a pretty strong opinion, particularly in terms of being able to amend primary legislation, and that therefore he will accept or put forward his own amendments to change it to the affirmative procedure in the case of both clauses. Simply reading the committee’s report is pretty persuasive by itself.
When the Minister comes to reply in a second, will he give the Committee some indication of the volume of order-making that he anticipates? If these orders are to be subject to the affirmative procedure, will we be meeting every Tuesday and Thursday afternoon?
My Lords, since we are starting Part 6, which I suppose is a form of light relief from earlier parts of the Bill, I want to thank the Minister. All those participating in Part 6 will have noticed that the Minister has been a prolific correspondent. In case full details are not provided on all the amendments we have put forward, those outside the House should know that letters were passed on 25 February to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on the orphan works aspects of Clause 69 and on Clause 67; to myself on 11 February, and on 4 March on Clause 68; and, most recently, on 5 March there was a letter on extended collective licensing. I thank the Minister for the clarification that a lot of that has produced.
Like other noble Lords, I much appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has just said. However, should we not also thank the Minister for his willingness to meet with noble Lords on a number of occasions? It has been extremely helpful to enable us to understand the Government’s thinking and for him to be able to understand some of ours.
I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said. I quite agree. It is refreshing to be able to have that communication. It is not always a game of ping-pong or tennis. One can resolve some of these issues as we go along. In particular, this probing amendment is designed to elicit further information from the Minister. I thought we had a very good assurance from him that the IPO would publish an annual report which would be laid before Parliament, and that this could include a progress report on work towards a digital hub for licensing purposes.
When the Government’s response to the informal consultation on the role of the Intellectual Property Office came out very recently, it was very good to see that precisely that is enshrined in the document. Essentially, the Government are confirming that they will do that and that it will take place, particularly in terms of progress on licensing.
I would like to push the boat out a little further. In Committee we had a very useful discussion about metadata, its treatment and its protection. It is, of course, an issue of great importance to many creators, and we discussed that informally as well when we met the Minister. Work is ongoing in a working group, but as yet there is no indication of what its work might produce, technologically or legally. This new amendment is really designed to get a further assurance from the Minister that there will be regular progress reports on this aspect and that the proposals for action by the working group will be acted on. I beg to move.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I support Amendment 28DZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I agreed with much of his introduction, the broad sweep of which was impressive given the nature of these amendments. He commented that exceptions will be introduced by secondary legislation. I associate myself with those remarks. I do not believe that secondary legislation is the right way to introduce those exceptions. It should be done by primary legislation.
That said, it is worth unpacking the metadata amendment slightly because I think that exactly how the amendment would operate should be on the record. Section 296ZG of the 1988 Act, which was inserted in 2003, provides protection for electronic rights management information by giving a cause of action to rights owners when such information is removed or altered by a third party without authority, provided that the third party has the necessary mental element—that is, that it knowingly and without authority removes or alters electronic rights management information.
The amendment seeks to deal with the specific problem that arises when copies of works or other subject matter are gathered by an automated process. It has particular relevance to the actions of search engines and other operators who “spider” the world wide web. Because copies are gathered and often stored or processed by an automated process, no human mind will normally read rights management information which is associated with or embedded in the protected subject matter. The law is presently unclear about the circumstances in which the operator of the automated process will be deemed to have rights management information drawn to his attention. Therefore, the amendment seeks to provide certainty in this regard. It does not expand the scope of any rights belonging to the copyright holder or other right holder. A person gathering materials is free to disregard any restrictions which may be communicated by means of rights management information if, for example, the acts he is carrying out are protected by a fair dealing defence or for any other reason do not fall within the scope of the copyright or other right.
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the effects of the proposed new clause are restricted to persons who gather or access copyright or other protected materials in the course of a business. Therefore, the circumstances in which consumers might be affected by any restrictions in electronic rights management information are outside the scope of the proposed new clause and remain governed by the law at large.
As the Minister may know, the amendment is supported by a large number of members of the creative industries. There is a strong view that metadata is crucial for the future of copyright protection, that it is central towards an efficient, effective and robust licensing system, that it has part of the solution to diligent search for orphan rights and orphan works, and that it is also helpful in terms of pseudonymous works.
I end by quoting the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe —I often trawl through the internet to find her best quotations. This one is particularly apt in this set of circumstances. It comes from a House of Lords debate in June 2005:
“For those who make photography their life’s work, protecting their copyright goes beyond the emotive; it is their livelihood. Without adequate protection the photographic image—tomorrow’s cultural heritage—and those who create it will cease to have true value, and without adequate protection a profession dies. Photographers are concerned that, in the digital age, information supplied with the digital image about copyright and the creator is stripped away, often automatically, so that in a matter of moments the world is awash with ‘orphan’ images”.—[Official Report, 22/6/05; col. 1690.]
That was in 2005. We have not done anything about that issue but the passage of this Bill provides a chance to do just that.
My Lords, my noble friend has done well to raise the question of metadata in his amendment. I think that we need to be extremely careful about how we legislate on this, whether in primary or secondary legislation. Until such time as the technical means to counter the well known abuses of the intellectual property for digital photography by stripping metadata have been found, we should certainly be cautious, to say the least, about how we proceed to license digitally photographed works on the basis that they are orphan works.
My noble friend Lord Stevenson has also done us a good turn in fixing our attention on the question of what should be legislated in primary legislation and what should be left to secondary legislation. Will the Minister in due course comment on some questions of practicality and principle in this regard?
In what I am going to say, I make absolutely no criticism of the Minister personally. He has only just become Minister for Intellectual Property. I wish him very well indeed in that responsibility, and I hope he stays there until May 2015, and no longer. I wish him well during his incumbency, and the continuity that he may enjoy will undoubtedly be valuable for all concerned. Would it not have been more satisfactory if, when we came to consider clauses in primary legislation seeking to update the law on copyright, we also had before us at least an advanced draft of the secondary legislation to which the primary legislation would give authority? It is very difficult for us to know how to amend primary clauses and what view to take, all in all, about the Government’s proposals in the Bill if we do not know what the secondary legislation might look like as it will flesh out the relatively simple legislative propositions in the Bill.
I remember when it became clear that Clause 43 of the Digital Economy Bill was not going to make it to the statute book because of the imminence of the general election in 2010. I pleaded with the department that as it continued to wrestle with these policy issues it should move towards exhibiting draft regulations at the same time as it exhibited draft primary legislation so that all this could be put out to consultation together once it had been considered with the expert groups, such as those that the Intellectual Property Office is meeting at present. That was three years ago, and it seems to me that the House, and Parliament as a whole, is entitled to expect that the Government had made better progress on preparing the primary and secondary legislation before they presented it to us.
I was the government Whip in the Commons on the Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill 25 years ago, and I think it is fair to say that that legislation was somewhat less bald, somewhat less framework, and attempted to contain a more substantial body of legislative provision. The spirit in which both Houses of Parliament worked on that legislation 25 years ago was entirely collegiate. There was no party politics in it at all. We were all simply seeking to work our way forwards to find an appropriate legislative solution. Our deliberations and conclusions were observed with very great interest in other countries. We can continue to legislate in that spirit, but it would have helped us if the Government had allowed us to know a little more about what the primary legislation would open the way to.
While I reject the suggestions that have been put to us in some of the otherwise very helpful briefings that we have received that Parliament virtually does not scrutinise secondary legislation, I think that the situation, at least in this House, is significantly better than that, and we ought to pay tribute to the committees of this House that examine the quality and appropriateness of secondary legislation. We all know that it cannot be amended, and a great fuss is made if a statutory instrument is rejected by the House, so although we are not quite presented with a fait accompli when we consider secondary legislation, it is not a particularly satisfactory manner of advancing the frontiers of legislation. Much more exposure in draft and much more consultation—I know we will have it in due course—would be preferable at this stage. The Minister has perhaps not had an opportunity to consider this question of process as yet, so I hope that, not today, but at some point, he will feel able to offer some comments on it.
Does the noble Lord not think that we should be asking a little more from the Minister? We should be asking for an assurance that the presumption will be that statutory instruments will not be bundled and that they will be taken together only when there is a compelling reason by virtue of the interrelatedness of their contents.
That is a very fair formulation. Certainly, I was also reassured that the Minister confirmed that there would be an impact assessment for each and every one of the uses of the ECA in these circumstances. I look forward to the proper use of House of Lords scrutiny in these circumstances, to which the Minister alluded, because our scrutiny would be extremely valuable. The interpretation that I put on the Minister’s very useful assurances is very much that formulated by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, so perhaps if the Minister disagrees with that he could indicate that at the same time.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 28KA, I shall speak also to Amendments 28LA and 28LB. These amendments provide for implementation of the EU orphaned works directive in substitution for the Government’s proposals. The directive provides for non-commercial use of orphan works by cultural institutions. Although the permitted use is non-commercial, the directive allows sales to recover costs. The major question here is why we are going further than the EU orphan works directive, which EU countries have to implement within two years of this September when the directive was passed. It specifically makes provision for museums, galleries, archives and libraries, educational establishments and public service broadcasts to make use of orphan works. These are all essentially cultural institutions. It may not be a perfect directive at this stage, but surely if it will apply in 27 countries, we should build on it. We can, of course, use the new digital hub to good advantage when applying the provisions of the directive.
The Government’s proposals under Clause 68 go much further by permitting exploitation for commercial purposes, which is a matter of real concern to many, particularly the creators of images, where the metadata has been stripped and attribution lost. That is the reason that equivalent provisions failed to get through Parliament under the Digital Economy Bill before the previous general election.
Has no account been taken of photographers’ strong concerns, voiced during the passage of the Bill and in the Hargreaves consultation? The impetus for orphan work licensing comes largely from cultural institutions. The provisions of the directive, therefore, should largely satisfy the need for orphan licensing among those institutions. On 13 September 2012, the orphan works directive was passed, and it must be implemented within two years. Digitisation for preservation and replacement of any work and supplying copies of unpublished work to other libraries, unless the author has forbidden it, is already permitted under current UK copyright law.
On the other hand, the proposed measure in Clause 68 is designed to make orphan works available for commercial exploitation. That measure would deprive rights holders of their property simply because they have not been found by the would-be user of their work, although the Government have not yet formulated the rules and do not intend to publish them until after the measure has been enacted. Being exercisable by secondary legislation, they will not be fully subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Those are some of the problems which are not dealt with in the measure. Many works contain other copyright works, such as photographs or illustrations. Unlike the EU directive, there is nothing to protect the owners of those copyrights if the overall work is declared an orphan. Diligent search has been used in a number of fields for many years and produces a high level of false orphans. That is because copyright does not have to be registered and there are no definitive registries of the ownership of copyright works. Some types of works, such as photographs and illustrations, are especially easy to separate from the information about their creators—I mentioned the issues about metadata earlier. In particular, foreign copyright holders are likely to be unaware of the provisions and so will be more likely to lose out as others exploit their works commercially in the UK. Primary legislation should not allow orphan works provisions beyond the EU orphan works directive until it has been drafted to give the same standard of protection to creators as are provided under the directive.
Great concerns have been expressed not only by photographers but by a whole range of others, such as AP, British Pathé, Getty Images, ITN, the Press Association and Thomson Reuters, which are UK, European and worldwide news agencies and audiovisual archives; and FOCAL International, which is the industry body representing commercial and audiovisual archives throughout the world.
The provisions in the clause are premature and should not be introduced in the Bill. If there are flaws in the directive—there may well be—surely we should work on them rather than erecting a totally separate definition of orphan works, which will have few equivalents anywhere else in the world and will certainly be of no use in international rights clearance. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 28LA and 28LB, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has introduced. I see these issues very differently from the way that he does. I am sure that he would agree that it would be a pity if we in the Committee excessively polarised the interests of contemporary creators against those of our great cultural institutions and the public, who benefit from the work of those institutions and could benefit so much more if a larger part of their collections were to be made accessible.
The simple answer to the question raised by the noble Lord, both on Second Reading and just now—why we should go beyond the provisions of the European Union orphan works directive—is simply that the directive does not go far enough; it is too limited. Only public sector bodies and educational establishments, not companies, can benefit. That means that public/private partnerships are prevented. Even cultural bodies, are prevented from working in partnership with the private sector. Mass digitisation, which would confer very great benefits for the public, is best carried out with private sector contractors and partners. In that way, the production is made possible for global educational markets.
If I can clarify, we are still on orphan works amendments, which are designed to improve the orphan works provisions in the clause.
Before the Minister responds, the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, apologised that she had to depart from the Committee because of a commitment, but she asked me to say that, as chair of the British Library, she associated herself with the points that I put forward in my remarks.
My Lords, the amendments cover both the scope and detail of the proposals for a UK orphan works scheme. Amendment 28L would limit who could be authorised to grant licences to use an orphan work and de facto would mean that only a collecting society already operating in the sector could be authorised to grant licences. The amendment assumes that all orphan works will be licensed by collecting societies. However, many orphan works are simply not of a type that is licensed collectively—unpublished works, diaries, old photographs and oral history recordings, for example. There will therefore need to be a separate independent authorising body for orphan works which are not covered by any collecting society.
Amendment 28M seeks to make clear that the orphan works scheme applies to a work where there are multiple rights owners and one or more of these are not known or cannot be traced. The Bill already makes provision for this. The requirement for a diligent search for the copyright owner will be described in greater detail in the regulations. This will include all relevant rights-holders where there is more than one.
Amendment 28N would mean that a separate diligent search had to be undertaken for every orphan work that someone wants to use. The clause already provides that a work must have been subject to a diligent search for the rights holders before it can qualify as an orphan work. However, requiring a separate diligent search for each individual orphan work could result in potential licensees having to conduct repetitious searches. For example, five poems by the same poet whose name is known, published by the same publisher, would require five separate diligent searches.
Amendment 28P is concerned with creators who have assigned some or all of their copyright in a work that goes on to be a suspected orphan work. The diligent search for rights holders will cover all potential rights holders in a work, including the creator. This amendment would also provide an author with a new right to remuneration for the use of an orphan work, even when the author had assigned the relevant copyright in the work to someone else. Only those who are rights holders will be entitled to remuneration for the use of an orphan work. This is exactly the same as for non-orphan works.
Amendments 28Q and 52 seek to clarify what the term “authorised” means in this subsection. In particular, they seek to ensure that those authorised to license orphan works cannot grant themselves a licence. This is an important point and one on which the clause is already clear—in new Section 116A(5)(c) introduced in Clause 68. Any body authorised to issue orphan works licences cannot license themselves to use an orphan work.
Amendment 28R would mean that a licence to use an orphan work must be time-limited and not run beyond the copyright term in a work. I can confirm that regulations will provide for limits for orphan works licences. These will be appropriate to the type of use being licensed and could be a time limit or a limit according to intended use—for example, a print run. In reality, sometimes it will not be possible to tell whether the copyright in an orphan work has expired.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke to Amendment 28S, which I shall address at this point. The amendment seeks to clarify that orphan work licences can be granted even when it is not known whether an exclusive licence has been granted. An orphan works licence may be granted where a diligent search does not find all the relevant rights holders, including an exclusive licensee. The noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, raised this particular issue. Where the diligent search reveals the existence of an exclusive licence, the work will not qualify as an orphan work. Where an orphan works licence is granted following a diligent search but subsequently an exclusive licence holder appears, the exclusive licence holder will be treated in the same way as any other absent rights holder that appears. The detail of this will be set out in the regulations. That is why the clause specifically applies to cases where it is uncertain where the copyright subsists.
I turn to Amendment 30. This concerns the very important issue of remuneration being set aside for rights holders when an orphan works licence is granted. I can set on the record that the regulations will provide for the treatment of remuneration. I also draw my noble friend’s attention to the wording in the clause:
“The regulations must provide for the treatment of any royalties or other sums paid in respect of a licence”.
I believe that the term “royalties” is not used in all sectors but it is understood in the Bill to mean the same as “remuneration”. The phrase “other sums” would also cover any other types of fees to be set aside for rights holders. Therefore, the Government’s view is that the clause already provides for remuneration to be dealt with by the regulations.
I should like to pick up one point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. He asked whether there will be proportionality in undertaking a diligent search. I hope that I have that right. Much work is already being undertaken in diligent search work for different types of work. This is being considered by the working group, which includes representatives of museums, libraries and archives.
I hope that in the light of the explanations and assurances that I have given, the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, from the outset I should stress that this amendment is strongly supported by the Special Educational Consortium of special needs disability charities. The consortium and I believe that access to a suitable and challenging education is a right for all children, and that parents need to be able to enforce a legal obligation when they are let down by the system. When parents do not have the financial resources to bring an appeal on their own, they should be supported to do so in the interests of justice.
The Government initially consulted on removing legal aid for all appeals against local authority decisions on the provision for children with special educational needs. I welcome the Government’s subsequent decision to retain special educational needs appeals for children of school age within the scope of legal aid. The Government clearly recognise the importance of these children’s entitlement to an appropriate and challenging education. Nevertheless, the Bill as currently drafted will mean that young people with special educational needs who are aged between 16 and 25 will no longer be eligible for legal aid.
The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that young people aged between 16 and 25 with special educational needs continue to be eligible for legal aid when appealing against decisions made about special educational provision. Removing access to legal aid for young people aged 16 to 25 with special educational needs, as the Bill currently does, is inconsistent with the Government’s position on the importance of the rights of young people with SEN and, in particular, with the aims of the SEN and disability Green Paper, Support and Aspiration, of March last year. I very much welcomed the Green Paper, which sought to develop a streamlined system for children from birth to the age of 25. I hope that this is an oversight rather than a deliberate move to exclude these young people with SEN from the scope of legal aid. Surely there is no justification for cutting this off at the age where young people might be transitioning from one educational institution to another, and when some young people with SEN continue to face barriers to getting the support that they need.
For young people with SEN and their families, the transition to adulthood can be a particularly difficult time as support from children’s services falls away and is often not replaced by support from adult services. As the Green Paper recognises, many young people who are disabled or who have SEN can face additional challenges during their teenage years. It states:
“Too often the opportunities and support available to disabled young people and young people with SEN fall short of what they need to make a successful transition to adult life”.
Those words come directly from the Green Paper.
I welcome the Government’s plans to extend support for young people with SEN up to the age of 25 through the proposed education, health and care plans in order to improve the support that young people receive during this difficult transition period. Cutting legal aid for this age group is inconsistent with the rest of government policy in this area. Therefore, I urge Ministers to accept this amendment to ensure that all young people with SEN remain, up to the age of 25, within the scope of legal aid. I beg to move.
My Lords, special educational needs is a particularly tortuous and difficult area of administration and, equally, for negotiation and representation. Young people with special educational needs are almost by definition ill equipped to represent themselves and to handle these difficult challenges on their own behalf. The system, at least in so far as children with special educational needs are concerned, provides very fully developed support, but there is something of a cliff edge beyond the period during which children are eligible for statements. While, admirably, the Government are seeking to improve the structure and quality of provision for special educational needs later on, it seems particularly unfortunate if, in this important area, they are to take away help for the very people they are otherwise seeking to improve their support for. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will find it possible to look sympathetically on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, which was so well moved by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.