Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clement-Jones's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I wish to speak to this group of amendments. Other noble Lords have clearly made the case for the amendments in their names so I will try not to repeat what they have said.
Given that, I have three simple questions for my noble friend the Minister. First, having decided that appeals by firms should be decided not on merits in a court but by JR appeal, why have the Government now decided to allow this merits-based appeal on the size of the fine? I know that noble Lords have their own views on this, but I would like an answer and some clarity from the Government. Secondly, what evidence has come to light to persuade the Government to lay their amendments on this matter in the other place? Thirdly, how confident are the Government that, if a firm wins its merits-based appeal on the size of a financial penalty, this definitely will not give the firm a legal basis for challenging the reasons for the penalty and the conduct required by the CMA in the first place? I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s responses to these three questions.
My Lords, following this superb debate, I am worried about being able to add much to what has been said.
First, I want to pick up what the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, said. As ever, I agree entirely with half of what he said, but the other half is rather more controversial. This seems to be a growing habit. Exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, if there is a solution to overreach, it must be through greater parliamentary scrutiny. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also referred to this and we have amendments coming down the track on it. Going back to JR-plus for the majority of decisions to be made under the Bill would be a retrograde step.
The noble Lord said that we should not go back to JR-plus, which would bring in a limited form of merits review. However, many decisions in merits appeals have been found to be clearly wrong, once in the appeal, and would have harmed consumers’ interests had they been allowed to stand, under full judicial review. Does the noble Lord agree with that remark? Before he decides whether or not he does, I remind him that I am quoting him in his opposition to the move made in 2017.
My Lords, it is lovely to be reminded of previous remarks but, of course, that was then and this is now. We were talking about the standard for Ofcom then; today, we are talking about the CMA standard. The noble Lord would need to produce evidence that that standard did not in fact have a really poor outcome as a result of the power of big tech not being as limited as it could have been. He talked about us needing to recognise the power of big tech, but that is exactly what adopting the JR standard—the Wednesbury “unreasonable” standard that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, talked about last week, and which all of us are content to stick with—would do.
Of course, what we are trying to do, if possible—if the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are accepted—is to revert back to a JR standard for penalties. I believe that consistency across the board is rather more important than trying to revert to a form of appeals standard that obtains in a different part of the regulatory forest. However, as the noble Lord said, the danger of executive overreach is much more easily cured by increased parliamentary scrutiny than by trying to, in a sense, muddy the waters of the test for appeals.
What the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said about incentives was entirely right. Litigation has clearly been used and is being used by big tech for strategic business purposes. We are trying to make sure that this does not drag on for ever and that appealing against the penalties does not open up the whole caboodle as a result. The noble Lord, Lord Black, and others who talked about the change of standard for penalties infecting other aspects of a CMA decision, made very strong points.
Ultimately, the Minister has a large number of questions from noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, asked what would be relevant for an appeal on penalties. What is the motivation for the Government in putting forward this new standard for penalties? What is so special about it and what evidence did they use to come to that view? Is not the danger of using a merits appeal basis that the decisions on which the penalty was based will be unpicked? The practicalities were also raised by a number of noble Lords.
I intervene on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, made to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. There is a difference. The noble Lord was absolutely right to raise his concerns about Ofcom moving from a merits-based to JR-based appeal, in 2017. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, knows very well, Ofcom often makes decisions on extremely complicated pricing mechanisms. The telecoms companies had a point in saying that a merits-based appeal for Ofcom decisions is worth while, because going through the calculations again could sometimes be worth £50 million, £100 million or £200 million.
Ofcom was right in finally moving to JR for those cases when it took quite important strategic decisions about the marketplace—for example, forcing Sky Sports to offer its content wholesale to competitors. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, had a point then and he has one today.
It is very nice and helpful to be reminded of things that I had forgotten entirely. We need to make sure that we are consistent across the board. A full merits-based standard is not, for example, used to appeal against fines issued by Ofcom under the Online Safety Act. These Benches have serious concerns regarding the insertion of two different appeal standards in the Bill, as it may decrease the deterrent effect and risk lengthier appeals, as we have heard.
If we are not successful in persuading the Government to change back to JR for penalty appeals, and a merits appeal is to be included, a number of amendments—the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, that in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and my amendment—are of great relevance to make sure that we do not see that drift that the noble Lord, Lord Black, talked about. A failure to do so could run the same risks as an entirely novel appeals standard. On that basis, we very much support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and my own Amendment 68, which would ensure that there is no further extension of the merits appeal standards into any other part of the Bill. It is intended to have the same impact and draw a clear line in the sand beyond which no court can go.
I am sorry that we do not have the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, here to reveal perhaps another letter from a Minister. We had an interesting discussion last Wednesday, when the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, quoted the letter, sent to Damian Collins and Sir Robert Buckland, about the nature of the intention behind including “proportionate”. It said:
“In practice this means that firms will be able to challenge whether the DMU could have achieved its purpose for intervention through less onerous requirements”.
In a sense, that is a massive invitation to litigation, compared to ordinary JR. If that move is an invitation to litigation, think how much further along the road we are travelling if we go for a merits test for the fine and the penalties. I hope the Minister will therefore reverse course back to the pre-Report situation in the Commons; that would give a great deal of satisfaction around this Committee.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for raising the important subject of digital markets appeals through Amendments 64, 65, 67, 71 and 72. I thank noble Lords for their powerful and compelling contributions. I am glad of the opportunity to set out the Government’s position.
These amendments seek to revert the changes made in the other place to the appeal standard of digital markets penalties. This would mean that penalties would be subject to judicial review principles, instead of being heard on their merits. It is important that decisions made by the CMA can be properly reviewed to ensure they are fair, rigorous and based on evidence. As the Bill stands, the key decisions—particularly the regulatory decisions that will drive the benefits from this regime—will be appealable on judicial review principles. Only penalty decisions will be appealable on the merits. This will provide SMS firms subject to penalties with additional reassurance, without compromising the regime’s effectiveness.
Penalty decisions will come at the very end of the regulatory process, if at all. They do not have the same impact on third parties as other decisions in the regime. Conduct requirements and pro-competition interventions will already have been in place to address their intended harm before penalty decisions are considered. Decisions on penalties are different from those about imposing requirements: they are more about making assessments of facts. They will assess what the SMS firm has or has not done. Other decisions that the CMA will take in the regime are forward-looking expert judgment calls. It is appropriate that the latter be given a wider margin of appreciation through a judicial review standard than decisions to impose penalties.
To address the point made by many noble Lords, I make it clear that challenging penalties does not open up the question of whether a breach occurred, or whether a conduct requirement or PCI was right in the first place. I will set this out in more detail in response to the next set of amendments—but perhaps I should say, as I did on the first day of this Committee, that I am happy to listen to and take forward any form of words that strengthens the clarity or intent of the Bill. As I said, the intent of the Bill is that the decision about whether a breach has occurred is made on JR principles.
The digital markets measures, as with other CMA regimes, have always treated penalties differently in the regime. For example, they are automatically suspended upon appeal, unlike other decisions. This would also have been the case under JR. We have aligned penalty appeals with those under the Enterprise Act 2002, as was said, so that parties can challenge these decisions on the merits to ensure that the value of penalties is suitable. The regimes in the Enterprise Act apply to firms from all sectors, rather than just tech firms. In addition, to give two examples, penalties are appealed on the merits in the financial services and markets regime, administered by the Financial Conduct Authority, and, under the Water Industry Act, overseen by Ofwat. In the EU’s Digital Markets Act, penalty appeals are similar to merits reviews in the UK.
My Lords, I am delighted to speak on the third day in Committee. I reiterate the sentiment articulated in the first session by my noble friend Lord Camrose that the Bill, importantly, will drive growth, innovation and productivity and ensure that businesses and consumers in the UK reap the benefits of competitive markets. I thank noble Lords for their contributions throughout the passage of the Bill and for their continued scrutiny and debate.
I turn to a number of miscellaneous amendments put forward by the Government that affect different parts of the Bill. Amendments 214 and 219 introduce a new clause and schedule into the Bill that make amendments to other pieces of primary legislation, consequential to provisions in Parts 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill. The consequential amendments fall into three groups. The first amends sectoral legislation that applies, with modifications, the information-gathering power given to the CMA for its merger control functions in Section 109 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Where that power is applied for non-merger related purposes, the changes made by Part 2 of the Bill—which make express provision about the extraterritorial reach of the power and strengthen the civil sanctions regime that supports its enforcement—are not to apply. The schedule makes provision accordingly.
The second group of amendments is in consequence of Part 3, and the repeal of Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and its replacement with Part 3 of this Bill. The third group is in consequence of provision in Chapter 1 of Part 4 and Chapter 2 of Part 5, to amend legislation which otherwise restricts disclosure by regulators and others of information relating to individuals and businesses. This will permit them to disclose information for the purposes of the enforcement of consumer protection law, unfair trading and the provision of investigative assistance to overseas regulators.
Amendment 223 amends the commencement provision in Clause 334, so that the new clause and schedule can be commenced alongside the substantive provisions to which they relate.
Amendment 213 will ensure that information that comes to a UK public authority in connection with its power to provide investigative assistance to an overseas authority in Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Bill will be covered by the information disclosure restrictions and gateways in Part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002. This ensures that a public authority can share the information that it has collected on behalf of an overseas authority with that overseas authority. This will be in line with relevant safeguards, including personal data protection and safeguards for commercially sensitive information. To help ensure that the investigative assistance regime operates efficiently, the amendment will also enable UK authorities that hold information to which Part 9 applies to disclose that information to another UK authority to facilitate the provision of investigative assistance by that UK authority.
I turn to data protection override. Amendments 73, 206, 207, 208, 216 and 217 are minor and technical amendments which will make provision in relation to data protection across the Bill. Amendment 217 adds a new clause that clarifies that no provision in the Bill would require or authorise the processing of data that would contravene data protection legislation. Amendments 73, 206, 207, 208 and 216 remove provisions that previously applied only to some specific powers and insert a definition of data protection legislation that applies across the whole Bill.
On pre-commencement consultation, Amendment 218 adds a new clause to clarify that:
“A duty to consult under or by virtue of this Act may be satisfied by consultation that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act”.
The provision clarifies that the CMA has the flexibility to begin consulting before Royal Assent to ensure that the full set of reforms in the Bill can be implemented as soon as possible.
I hope that noble Lords will accept these amendments. I look forward to addressing any questions or points that they may have about them. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is quite a set of amendments and the Minister rather rattled through his speech, but I have only one question: why are they now being included in the Bill here in Committee? Why were they not in the original version of the Bill? What is the motivation behind these new amendments? I am always a little suspicious. With the data protection Bill coming down the track, we will have hours of endless excitement. The words “data protection” and “government” are sometimes a bit of a red rag, so one always has to kick the tyres quite hard on any provision that appears to be opening a door to disclosure of data and so on. Obviously, in a competition context, it is most likely to be commercial confidential information, but the Minister needs to explain what kind of information we are talking about and why we need to have these provisions included at this stage.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his overview and explanation of the various government amendments. I look forward to his response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones: why now? These are mainly technical and tidying-up amendments and we are in broad agreement with most of them in this group.
Amendment 217 makes it clear that any imposed or conferred duties to process information do not contravene data protection legislation. That is welcome. Amendment 213 ensures the disclosure of information under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Bill, which allows UK regulators to provide investigative assistance to overseas regulators. This is in line with the restrictions on the disclosure of certain kinds of information found in the Enterprise Act 2002, which is fine. I ask the Minister what assessments are in place to safeguard the sharing of such details with autocratic regimes, which may not have robust governance and accountability systems in place and whose values we do not share? On Amendment 218, I ask the Minister whether the intent is similar to that of Amendment 1, as set out so eloquently by my noble friend Lady Jones of Whitchurch on the first day of Committee?
Finally, I refer to Amendment 216, which replaces the definition of data protection legislation for the whole of the Bill, so the definition in Amendments 73 and 208 are removed. Can the Minister confirm that such a definition is consistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Enterprise Act 2002? I look forward to the Minister’s response and comments.
My Lords, I support Amendment 73A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Knight, and will speak to a number of the other amendments in the group.
The noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, made a very interesting and attractive case for both his amendments. On Amendment 93A, the whistleblower review amendment, I was particularly struck by him saying that the budget for compensation for whistleblowers comes from within the CMA’s budget. That seems to be an extraordinary set of circumstances. In the case of both amendments, he clearly spoke from a huge amount of experience, and he has obviously been thinking about these areas for improvement for some considerable time. I very much look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response, because the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, made an extremely good case from the point of view of someone who has been inside the system and is well informed about the issues.
On the full cost recovery for mergers, one of the perennial issues that we come across when talking about regulators is the question of resources. Anything that assists them in not having to cheese-pare in the way they regulate is extremely welcome, particularly when this kind of solution can be so easily put into effect.
On the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Knight—and on what the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, said—I do not think we are very far part. A lot of this is making sure that, where something does not fall within the remit of a particular regular, that regulator can co-operate with other regulators and exchange information to make sure that the other regulators, in whose province a particular issue is located, can then take appropriate account.
What the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, said amounted to almost a generic speech about how you regulate the digital sector or digital services. I do not disagree with him, but I would perhaps be slightly more robust in thinking that regulation is not the enemy of innovation. Sometimes, regulation can be the friend of innovation, because it creates a certainty in the context in which people are developing new technology.
The noble Lord will know that, on the current pie chart of activity undertaken by the CMA, 80% is for mergers with companies with a turnover north of £100 million, while 20% of it is for companies with turnovers below that. The 80:20 rule always works in life, so there is obviously scope to charge the larger companies more if that is the decision taken. I refer to the reassurance given that this can be amended in secondary legislation if that is deemed appropriate.
Let me move on to media merger public interest interventions. Amendment 93 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would expand the list of public interest grounds for the Secretary of State to intervene in a merger case to include the need for free expression of opinion and plurality of ownership of media enterprises in user-to-user and search services. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue. Media mergers are particularly sensitive, as they could have an impact on how the UK public access and consume information.
The Government are currently reviewing the recommendations on changes to the media public interest test in Ofcom’s 2021 statement on media plurality. Ofcom did not recommend that online intermediaries or video and audio on-demand services should fall within the scope of the media mergers regime, which this amendment would provide for. We are considering Ofcom’s recommendations carefully and, as we do that, we will look closely at the wider implications on the industry. The Government have not proposed pursuing substantive changes to the grounds for public interest interventions in mergers in this Bill. The changes recommended in Ofcom’s review can be addressed directly via secondary legislation under the made affirmative procedure, if appropriate.
For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord opposite will not press this amendment.
I do not have a detailed timetable. I understand this is being looked at currently. I am happy to confirm in writing when we have a detailed timetable.
I move now to Amendment 93A and protection for whistleblowers. I again thank the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, for his informed contribution to the scrutiny of this Bill. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Leong, for their contributions on this topic. Amendment 93A would introduce a new requirement for the CMA to carry out a review of protections and support available for whistleblowers under the UK’s competition and consumer law.
The noble Lord will know that the Government consulted on the important issue of incentives and protections for whistleblowers in the competition regime. However, no clear evidence or support was put forward by respondents that would support making changes to the existing framework. Therefore, the Government do not propose to introduce reforms to whistleblowing protections. In taking this decision, we also considered that the courts can already give due weight to the importance of anonymous whistleblowing in competition law enforcement. This could, for example, justify a court restricting how the identity of a whistleblower is disclosed depending on the circumstances of the case.
As the noble Lord mentioned, in 2023 the CMA increased the compensation cap for informants in cartel cases from £100,000 to £250,000. This will support the CMA to investigate effectively and, where appropriate, enforce against criminal cartels, which can cause serious harm to consumers and businesses within the UK.
Any whistleblower worker who faces victimisation in the UK can also seek additional compensation from their employer in an employment rights tribunal. This compensation can be awarded uncapped and can reflect the costs of some whistleblowers being unable to work in their chosen profession again.
The Government, therefore, have not proposed reforms to the compensation for whistleblowers in the Bill. However, I stress that we recognise the importance of whistleblowing in uncovering wrongdoing and will continue to ensure whistleblowers are not discouraged from coming forward under the current framework.
At this time, we do not think that a review in the form that the noble Lord’s amendment calls for would be merited, nor that it would be appropriate to place a new and binding obligation on the CMA requiring it to conduct such a review within a specific timeframe. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord does not push this amendment.
My Lords, I promise I will speak briefly to associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Stowell and support her Amendment 77 and Amendment 76 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville.
Despite the fact that there are fewer of us here than there have been in the debates on some of the other quite contentious issues, this is an extremely important amendment and a really important principle that we need to change in the Bill. To be honest, I thought that the power granted to the Secretary of State here was so egregious that it had to have been inserted as part of a cunning concession strategy to distract us from some of the other more subtle increases in powers that were included in the other place. It is extremely dangerous, both politically and technocratically, to put an individual Secretary of State in this position. I challenge any serious parliamentarian or politician to want to put themselves in that place, as my noble friend Lady Stowell said.
On its own, granting the Secretary of State this power will expose them to an enormous amount of lobbying; it is absolutely a lobbyist’s charter. This is about transparency, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, and parliamentary scrutiny, which we will come to properly in our debate on the next group of amendments. However, it is also about reducing the risk of lobbying from the world’s most powerful institutions that are not Governments.
For those reasons, I have a slight concern. In supporting Amendment 77, I do not want the Government or my noble friend the Minister to think that establishing parliamentary scrutiny while maintaining the Secretary of State’s powers would be a happy compromise. It would be absolutely the wrong place for us to be. We need to remove the Secretary of State’s powers over guidance and establish better parliamentary scrutiny.
My Lords, it has been very interesting to listen to noble Lords on this amendment. I am getting a strong sense of déjà vu from our debates on the then Online Safety Bill.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made a devastating case for the deletion of the Secretary of State’s power, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, made a superb case for the inclusion of parliamentary oversight over the guidance. The fact is that, just as we argued in our debates on the then Online Safety Bill, there is far too much power for the Secretary of State in this Bill. This example is the most egregious, but there are so many other aspects that one could argue with, and have argued with—the noble Viscount reminded us of his earlier amendments—such as the conditions for an undertaking to have an SMS designation; the turnover condition; the permitted types of conduct requirements; the period during which the DMU must decide which terms to include in the final transaction under the final offer mechanism; the amount of penalties imposed by the DMU on individual undertakings; and the DMU’s statement of policy on penalties. That is a heck of a lot of different powers for the Secretary of State and, as I say, power over guidance is the most egregious of them.
The way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, expressed this was exactly right. We will come on to parliamentary scrutiny in our debate on the next group, but the word “accountability” is crucial. Of course the regulator should be independent but, at the same time, it should be accountable. This is not just a licence to roam beyond the bounds; it is the right and duty of Parliament to have oversight of the regulator, which is exactly what this amendment would provide for. You have only to look at the draft that was put together of the Overview of the CMA’s Provisional Approach to Implement the New Digital Markets Competition Regime to see just how broad the Secretary of State’s powers over the way in which the CMA carries out its functions will be. That is why this is such an important amendment.
I very much hope that the Minister will hear our voices. This is a really important area of the Bill. As the Minister can see, it is something about which, having had the experience of the then Online Safety Bill, we feel very exercised.
My Lords, this is the beginning of an important couple of debates about accountability. The breadth and the import of what noble Lords have said so far underlines how much we value that. We on the Labour Benches are co-signatories to both amendments in this group—the first, Amendment 76 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the second, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell.
Put simply, if the CMA is to be a regulator genuinely independent of government and accountable to Parliament, these amendments should stand. As it is, the legislation seems to suggest that, before the CMA can take any initiative on guidance, it first has to receive the approval of the Secretary of State. This is surely not only a time-consuming process but a wholly inefficient way of conducting business. I can well understand and appreciate why the Government desire to understand how the CMA intends to implement its regulatory policy, but do they really require such a firm and strong hand in the process? As it is, the CMA will be in constant consultation, discussion and interaction with government Ministers, and I do not see why, in the final analysis, approval has to come from the Secretary of State.
Can the Minister tell us how the regulatory regime compares with others? Do regulators like the Charity Commission, Ofcom, Ofwat, the Electoral Commission et cetera all require approval from the Secretary of State before issuing guidance? How does this process contrast with these other regulators? Is there a standard practice, or does it vary across regulatory frameworks? We need something that will work for this particular part of our economy, and it has to be built on trust and understanding and not reliant on the heavy hand of the centre of government coming in and ruling things in or out of guidance which the experts, in the form of the CMA and the DMU, have reflected and consulted on.
We obviously support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, which, as I said, we co-signed. Consulting the relevant parliamentary committees seems a wholly sensible solution and step. These committees are powerful entities, as we know, full of expertise and insight, and they provide a layer of accountability that Parliament rightly expects. After all, the CMA is a creature of Parliament and of legislation that we will put through this House.
I am sure there are plenty of examples of where legislation, particularly secondary legislation, has benefited from the input and oversight of Select Committees and other committees of both Houses. The points made about lobbying the Secretary of State were important and powerful. We need maximum transparency, and we need openness in this process; otherwise, suspicion will abound, and we will always have cynics who say that Secretaries of State are very much in the pockets of business and commercial interests. We do not want that in this legislation; we want something that works for the market, for the competitive interests in the digital world, and particularly for consumers.
Ministers would do well to listen carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said. She is an experienced parliamentarian, but, more than that, she was the chair of a regulator, so she understands exactly the import of the pressure that can come from central government and how it can best be managed.
These amendments are important for us in order to secure accountability in this market and in the way in which the various institutions work and operate together. I happily lend my support to both of them.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but, if the logic were being followed for what he said, there would be—at the very least—some form of affirmative resolution for the guidance, as with all the other powers in the Bill.
I am happy to look into that as a mechanism, but, as currently set out in the Bill, the logic is that the Secretary of State can approve the guidance.
The Government will continue to work closely with the CMA, as they have throughout the drafting of the Bill, to ensure that the timely publication of guidance is not disrupted by this measure. Published guidance is required for the regime to be active, and the Government are committed to ensuring that this happens as soon as possible. Guidance will be published in good time before the regime goes live, to allow affected stakeholders to prepare. The Government hope that, subject to parliamentary time and receipt of Royal Assent, the regime will be in force for the common commencement date in October this year.
In response to my noble friend Lord Black’s question about guidance and purdah, the essential business of government can continue during purdah. The CMA’s guidance relates to the CMA’s intentions towards the operation of the regime, rather than to a highly political matter. However, the position would need to be confirmed with the propriety and ethics team in the Cabinet Office at the appropriate time, should the situation arise that we were in a pre-election period.
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and my noble friend Lady Stowell for their amendments, and I hope that this will go some way towards reassuring them that the Government’s role in the production of guidance is proportionate and appropriate. As I said, I recognise the grave seriousness of the powerful arguments being raised, and I look forward to continuing to speak with them.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 81 in this group. I also wanted to speak to Amendment 77 in the previous group; I apologise that I was not here earlier to speak to it then.
I will refer to three notions from political science that may be relevant here. The first is that of the principal-agent theory and principal-agent problem. That is when a Government—namely, the principal—delegates authority to an agency. There is a huge body of work about delegating power to regulators, including the notion of agency slack, where the regulator does not act as was originally intended for a number of different reasons, raising the question of how you hold it accountable for that. Alternatively, it may perform very badly; for example, in some government departments there are concerns about arm’s-length bodies. How do we make sure that a poorly performing regulator is acting as it should have done in the first place?
The second notion is public choice theory. When people call for government intervention, they usually assume that officials and politicians are benign and will act in the public interest. Public choice theory suggests, however, that we must remember that individuals are also motivated by their own incentives and may act in their own self-interest at certain times—not because they are bad people, but because they are human. There are many cases of that; for example, with the housing market, most people agree that we need to build more houses, but many people just do not want their homes anywhere near those new houses. It is therefore very difficult in parts of the country for a candidate to stand up and campaign for more development because, according to public choice theory, they are acting in their own interest about wanting to get elected, even though they know that there should be more homes in the country. One of the fathers of public choice theory, James Buchanan, called it politics without the romance. It is when officials, who are well intentioned when the organisation starts up, just like politicians, suddenly do not act as was intended in the first place, because there are certain interests that conflict with each other. Therefore, how do we address that problem when it happens?
The third notion is the idea of unintended consequences. Given that we do not have complete knowledge, we should ask ourselves sometimes what happens if we are wrong. Are we absolutely sure that the JR appeals will prove a better way to achieve faster and more accurate decisions? We all support them, because many of the small challenger companies are asking us to do that—I have spoken in favour of them, as have many other noble Lords—but what if we find down the line that the appeals are taking longer, or that large companies are winning their appeals and the CMA has to start all over again? What if we find that it in fact takes longer than if we had gone to a time-limited merits appeal?
I considered laying an amendment asking for a review after three or five years, but I was worried about that, in case it became another loophole that large companies would use to undermine the JR appeals process, so I stood back. Another reason I did not do that was because the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—I thank him for this—said to me, “You may well be right, but surely this should be about the accountability of the CMA to Parliament, and Parliament can question it on the issue of why some of the cases it is bringing are being lost on appeal”.
The other question that many of us politicians across the spectrum are asking is: who regulates the regulators? This comes from people right across the board. How do we make them accountable? I suggest that my noble friend Lady Stowell’s Amendment 81 addresses those three concerns. I hope that I have laid out the reasons why I support her amendment, notwithstanding some of the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie.
I speak briefly to Amendment 82 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox; he has raised an important issue. When I was in the European Parliament, we looked at digital regulation as well as financial regulation. I was told by many national European regulators, including those in the European Commission, and other global regulators that they had a huge amount of respect for UK regulators. Quite often, they would use what we did previously. For example, early telecoms regulators basically took what we did in the 1980s and replicated it across many countries in Europe.
I teach students about intergovernmental organisations. We can see that even the more technical intergovernmental organisations, some of which are over 100 years old, have now become more political. Companies and Governments are starting to influence soft power, as another noble Lord said. The EU, for example, wants to be the technical standard for regulation; China also wants to get involved in international bodies and to set the standards in its own interests—look at the debate over CDMA a few years ago. This is not just in the tech sector; we see its officials active in many intergovernmental organisations. I am not sure that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is the right way to address these concerns, but he is certainly on to something and it deserves further consideration.
My Lords, I am going to be extremely brief as the hour marches on: yes to Amendments 79 and 83. Most of the debate has been around Amendment 81 but I want to mention my noble friend’s Amendment 82 because the concept of lock-in is absolutely crucial. I am a big fan, particularly in the AI field, of trying to get common standards, whether it is NIST, IEEE or a number of them. The CMA’s role could be extremely helpful.
Of course, many other regulators are involved. That brings us into the landscape about which the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, has—quite rightly—been so persistent over the course of the then Online Safety Bill and this Bill. She is pursuing something that quite a number of Select Committees, particularly her one, have been involved in: espousing the cause of a Joint Committee, as our Joint Committee previously did. It is going to be very interesting. I am a member of the Industry and Regulators Committee, which has been looking at the regulatory landscape.
These accountability, independence, resourcing and skills issues in the digital space are crucial, particularly for those of us in this Committee. For instance, the role of the DRCF and its accountability, which were raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, are extremely important. I very much liked what the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said about us having talked about Ofcom before but that we are now talking about the CMA and will talk about the ICO very shortly; for me, AI brings a lot of that together, as it does for her.
So what is not to like about what I think is a rather cunning amendment? The noble Baroness gets more cunning through every Bill we get on to. The amendment is shaped in a way that is more parliamentary and gets through more eyes of needles than previously. I strongly commend it.
My Lords, I shall be as brief as I can possibly be, I promise.
I thank all noble Lords for their brilliant and stimulating contributions. Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, would require the Government to undertake an annual assessment of the operation of the CMA, to include the DMU specifically. The CMA is already required to present and lay its annual report in Parliament. This covers the operation and effectiveness of the CMA, including a review of its performance, governance and finances. The CMA recently published a road map setting out how it will report on the digital markets regime in its annual report. Although I of course appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, adopting it would run the risk of being duplicative of the CMA’s assessment of its activities, which could lead to concerns regarding its operational independence. The Government set out their priorities for the CMA in their strategic steer and the CMA reports publicly on how it meets these priorities. The Government will also carry out a post-implementation review of the regime to assess how it is delivering on its aims.
Amendment 81 from my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston would require additional reporting by the CMA, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office and Ofcom. It would require these regulators to publish annual reports on the impact of the digital markets regime on their activity and its effectiveness in supporting them in regulating digital markets. The Government agree that it is vital that regulators are held to account for their activities. Each of these regulators already produces annual reports that are laid in Parliament covering their operations and effectiveness. An additional report by each of the sector regulators would again run the risk of being duplicative and creating an unnecessary additional administrative burden. Additionally, the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum was established in 2020 to support the co-ordinated regulation of digital markets and includes the regulators named in this amendment; the DRCF also publishes an annual report on its activities and priorities.
In response to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s important point regarding a committee on digital regulation, I agree with her that parliamentary accountability is crucial and thank her for engaging so clearly with me and my noble friend Lord Offord earlier on this topic. I absolutely recognise the problem. Perhaps I can offer to continue to engage with her on how to drive this forward. At the risk of disappointing the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, we have a concern that the formation of parliamentary committees is a matter for Parliament, not the Government, but I welcome ongoing work to determine how best to ensure that committee structures can scrutinise the important issue of digital regulation.