Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

I will answer that point. The Bill of course is not draconian in any way whatever. It is a modest response to the technology that exists today, and an attempt to look at the technology of tomorrow that we do not know about. That is part of the problem. I regret that I was a bit late and missed the first 20 seconds of the noble Lord’s introduction, so I may have this wrong, but he gave the impression that David Anderson supported his amendment. One only has to go to the report published in August, from which I want to put two sentences on the record. Paragraph 6.16 says:

“There is a clear value in the use of bulk powers to eliminate lines of enquiry, so that resources can be concentrated elsewhere and disruption to the public minimised”.

I do not think we should fetter the security services by this amendment. The other sentence from the report that I want to put on the record is in paragraph 6.47, at point (d):

“Even where alternatives might be available, they are frequently more intrusive than the use of bulk acquisition”.

Most of the bulk acquisition will never, ever be read. The vast majority—99.999%—will never be read or studied by anybody, and it gives a false impression when the noble Lord says that all our telephone calls, internet searches, and web browsing will be read by someone. That is simply not true. What is more, he has been briefed and knows that that is the case. I do not see why the opponents of the Bill, in this House or the other House, should try to give a false impression of what it is trying to do. I hope the noble Lord tests the opinion of the House, because I would like it clearly on the record that he probably has little or no support for his amendment.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

I can be brief. I must begin of course by expressing my regret that I do not agree with my noble friend on the Front Bench. There is nothing more insulting than the expression, “If you could only see what passes across my desk, you would take a different view”. I do not use that expression, but I have to admit that I cannot expunge from my memory my experience as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee and my contact during that period with the security services. Essentially, we are talking about a question of judgment. My judgment is legitimately assisted by the conclusions of the report from Mr David Anderson, who was, a bit like Moses, dispatched up the mountain and told to come back with tablets of stone. In particular he came back with case studies, and I defy anyone to read them and not be persuaded beyond all doubt of the necessity for the powers that we are discussing today. As my noble friend Lord Carlile has pointed out, Mr Anderson reached the proven conclusion of the operational purpose of three powers and made a further case in respect of the fourth.

Sometimes in the course of these deliberations we confine ourselves to the question of terrorism. As has been mentioned, I think in passing, we should always remember that these are powers that are apt to deal with the question of organised crime and, more particularly, in the rather febrile atmosphere that surrounds the matter, the question of child sexual abuse.

Mr Anderson made the observation, which I doubt anyone would wish to challenge, that the pace of technological change is frightening. We all carry a mobile phone in our pockets; if we think of the first one we ever got some 20 years ago and compare it with the capacity of the one that we now have, that is as powerful an illustration of technological change as one could imagine.

I suppose the question may arise as to whether what we are discussing is necessary and proportionate. I respectfully suggest that the nature of the threat—I noticed as soon as I came into the building that the threat level is still severe—and the experience across the Channel, plus the experience of the security services in dealing with plots, argues beyond peradventure that what is proposed here is both necessary and proportionate. For these reasons, I regret I will not be able to follow my noble friend Lord Paddick when he tests the opinion of the House.

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Paddick and the amendment that he has moved. I should say at the outset that I do not doubt for one moment the very severe threats that we face, nor the essential and dedicated work done by our security services and the police. In the coalition Government we had to tackle many of these issues, and the then Deputy Prime Minister was always as impatient with those who were careless about our security as he was with those who were careless about our liberty.

So I understand the reality of the threats that we face. However, I am afraid I cannot agree with my two noble friends who have just spoken. We have to be very clear what we are talking about in the amendment, which is specifically about ICRs. I think that in some of this debate we might have missed that point.

My noble friend Lord Carlile referred to the fact that powers were already in use, but the bulk powers in relation to ICRs obviously cannot be in place because the powers of the Bill granting the requirement to collect ICRs have not come into effect, so they are not collected in that way. I am surprised that my noble friend takes the view that he does, because during the whole course of the debate on the Bill he has made much of the point that he has been consistent. I am not clear why his position has changed so significantly on the collection of ICRs. As I have noted in our previous debates on the subject, on 25 May 2013, writing in the Daily Mail, my noble friend wrote the following:

“I, Lord Reid, Lord West and others of like mind have never favoured the recording of every website visited by every … user, though we have been accused of that”.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Buscombe]

My Lords, I wonder whether I might be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his quest in some way to emulate the American model. I was recently at a conference in Vienna as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, where we discussed the issue of financing global terrorism. I had the pleasure of meeting two distinguished members of the American civil liberties board. They spoke at great length; they were eloquent, distinguished and had great expertise. I asked them the question: do their Government have to listen to them? The answer was no—there was no point.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, have the misfortune to disagree with my noble friend Lord Paddick, although perhaps in not quite such trenchant terms as my noble friend Lord Carlile. I want to make two points.

First, the original proposal, now contained in this amendment, was made against a wholly different framework and its necessity must be considered against the background of the statutory framework which the Bill now encompasses. On that basis, the fact that the proposal may have been considered previously—by the way, I am much more favourably disposed to the coalition Government than the noble Lord, Lord Rooker—is no argument for its inclusion in the Bill now.

My second point draws not least on my experience as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee and is about the attitude of the security services. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause simply rehearses existing law and adds nothing to the obligations already incumbent on the security services.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As I understand the situation, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, was consulted by the Government on whether it would assist him in his role if he had the support of a privacy and civil liberties oversight board. The outcome was that the independent reviewer is now supported instead by the provision of specialist legal assistance, as David Anderson himself recommended in his 2014 annual report.

David Anderson announced the appointment of three specialist advisers, whom he had personally selected, earlier this year and to the best of my knowledge the independent reviewer has welcomed that approach. Given the measures in this Bill, including provision for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his or her role in protecting civil liberties, and the changes made as a result of recommendations of the different independent committees which looked at the Bill as originally worded—including a Joint Committee of both Houses—and the further changes and commitments made both during the Bill’s passage through the Commons, which led to us voting for it at Third Reading, and in this House, it is not clear what an additional board would positively contribute. We cannot support the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

This is a very limited amendment in one sense, but this has become something of a Second Reading debate on the Anderson report, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the way he introduced it. He made it clear that there is a considerable degree of common ground on the importance of these powers, which have been so carefully scrutinised by Mr Anderson. The whole House will recognise the great debt that we owe him. People not just in this country but in many others will read this report with great interest. As we have said before, there is no doubt that the threat is severe and very real, and we need to ensure that we have all reasonable methods of combating it. We will go further into this issue. I listened with great interest to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I will also be interested to hear what my noble friend the Minister has to say about the panel and the noble Lord’s recommendation. Even if it is not identical to what he recommends, something along these lines may well have considerable merit.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, if this was another forum, I might well say that I concur with the opinion of my noble friend Lord Carlile and say nothing more, but I, too, would like to add a few comments about this remarkable report. It has attracted some controversy. There was a sense at one stage, I think, that Mr Anderson was going up to the mountain and was expected to come down with tablets of stone, and to some extent he has done that.

The point I will direct my brief remarks to is where Mr Anderson says that the review does not,

“reach conclusions as to the proportionality or desirability of the bulk powers … As the terms of reference for the Review made clear, these are matters for Parliament”.

My judgment—I do not suggest that my judgment is any better or worse than any other noble Lord’s—is that from the point of view of proportionality and desirability, these powers meet those two criteria. I offer in support of that the fact that the continuing threat level in this country is severe, as well as the experience in France and other parts of Europe. In that sense, if we are to reach a judgment about proportionality and desirability, I most certainly am on the side of those who say that those two elements are more than satisfied by the requirements now placed on us all in relation to the security of this country.

[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, I would like to put three questions to the Government, which arise from Mr Anderson’s latest report. There are not many surprises in the report but one of them—certainly to me and most other people who follow these matters—was the revelation that bulk personal datasets are used by agencies beyond the intelligence agencies. Perhaps the Minister could give us some information about which other bodies use bulk personal datasets.

I also ask the Minister to put on the record the difference between bulk equipment interference and thematic targeted equipment interference. I got the impression from Mr Anderson’s report that he was struggling to spot the dividing line, apart from that bulk equipment interference is likely to be required where,

“the Secretary of State and the Judicial Commissioner is not ... able to assess the necessity and proportionality to a sufficient degree at the time of issuing the warrant”.

Necessity and proportionality are the golden rules throughout the Bill and their apparent demise in respect of bulk equipment interference seems to alter the relationship between the citizen and the state. My third question is to ask the Minister to comment on this apparent relinquishing of the golden rules of proportionality and necessity in the case of bulk equipment interference.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I begin by associating myself with the expressions of gratitude to Sir John Chilcot and his committee and with the expressions of sympathy for families who lost loved ones—and let us not forget those who were grievously injured as a result of their service.

The noble Earl said at one stage that Iraq was a better, freer place. I suspect that that judgment might be challenged by some, at least in Iraq, not least following some of the events of the last fortnight or so, when great loss of life has been incurred.

The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, said that there was an atmosphere of mutual respect at the time of the vote. I beg leave to question that judgment. Charles Kennedy was described as being guilty of appeasement. He was told that he was similar to Neville Chamberlain, and a national newspaper printed a photograph of him with the word “Traitor” underneath. There was by no means mutual respect. So the reactions on these Benches to the report from Sir John Chilcot are, as might be imagined, somewhat mixed. But the one thing on which I hope we can all agree is that Charles Kennedy’s principled leadership on this issue has been vindicated, as indeed has the similarly principled stance taken by Robin Cook.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

In the few minutes available, it is not possible to do justice to the herculean efforts of the Chilcot committee. The passages on the lack of preparation for the aftermath of military action and those that deal with the adequacy—or, some might prefer, inadequacy—of the equipment available to the forces make compelling and sombre reading, and there are certainly lessons to be learned from them. But I will concentrate for a few moments on the events leading up to the war and the inevitable consequences of that decision. Indeed, there are lessons to be learned from that also.

Contrary to popular belief, I have never believed that what we were presented with was a false premise—implying that there was some effort at deception—but I have always believed that it was flawed, and the distinction is important. But it is clear that throughout these events Mr Blair thought that it was the right thing to do—and he still does. That was inevitably a moral judgment, but the strength of it gave rise to the error of making the evidence fit the judgment rather than the judgment fit the evidence.

The belief that the United Kingdom should be with the United States “whatever” was a flawed belief. Indeed, some would say that that single word reveals all that lay at the heart of the disastrous decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein. On reflection, there seems to have been a complete misunderstanding of the position of the United States. George W Bush always wanted regime change—it was no secret—but why was that? It was because around him was a cluster of influential neocons who thought that his father had made a fatal error in not instructing American forces to go to Baghdad at the end of the first Gulf War. If anyone doubts the good reasons for that decision, I suggest they read the memoirs of Sir John Major, who sets out with great clarity his support for that decision.

These were the same neocons who wrote to President Clinton telling him he was in breach of his responsibilities as commander-in-chief for not seeking to remove Saddam Hussein. It is true that the Motion passed at the end of the two-day debate in the House of Commons concentrated on weapons of mass destruction as a justification for what was being proposed, but I suggest that by our concurrence with the United States’ military action we inevitably became party to the policy of regime change and the responsibilities that flowed from it.

At the heart of all this was the belief that we had to stay close to the United States to be of influence. We had, we have, and I hope that we will continue to have an intimate and rewarding relationship with the United States, but we cannot allow our foreign policy to be defined by that relationship alone. “My ally right or wrong” is not sustainable.

It is clear that the intelligence assessments were accepted at face value and without demur. They formed the basis of the document of 24 September 2002 but were never revisited after publication, even when Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei were saying something different. Indeed, as Sir John Chilcot records, no one ever considered that Iraq might be telling the truth or that Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei were right.

The really dodgy dossier was not the one of September 2002 but the one produced in the spring of 2003 in advance of the decision-making. It was based on the 10 year-old thesis of an American PhD student—hardly, one might think, a compelling basis for justifying actions of the kind being contemplated. There are questions here. Why was no account taken of Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei? There has been no proper answer to that. Was it because their reports undermined the case for intervention, even if Resolution 1441 allowed it? Was it because they contradicted the assertion that Saddam Hussein’s weapons programmes were “active, detailed and growing”, made by the Prime Minister on 24 September? This was plainly not true but it became, as Sir John Chilcot has recorded, an “ingrained belief” that inevitably polluted all other thinking.

The authority for intervention was said to be derived from Resolution 1441 of the Security Council. But read that resolution: it is a masterpiece of ambiguity, designed to persuade the French, who were wholly opposed to military action, to sign. There is more than a hint of Lewis Carroll: “Words mean what I want them to say”. United Nations-speak for authorisation is the expression “all necessary means”, but Resolution 1441 simply talked about “serious consequences”.

Sir John Chilcot is highly critical of the process by which legal advice was provided. Without going into that in detail, because it is fully recorded, let me put it this way: at the highest the Attorney-General’s final view was little more than lukewarm and,

“on balance, the better view”.

I respectfully suggest that, if we are going to commit thousands of our young men and women to circumstances where their lives may be at risk, we need something a little better than a “better view”.

We know that the Cabinet was not provided with the full, detailed opinions of the Attorney-General. Sir John Chilcot forcefully finds that that was not proper and should not happen again. He says that he had no obligation to take a view on legality, but he has provided all the information necessary to do so. He found that military action was not yet the last resort, that diplomatic options were still available, that there was no imminent threat, that Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei were still able to fulfil their responsibilities, and that there were conflicting views about Resolution 1441. When you add to that Article 2 of the United Nations charter which prohibits regime change, it is a legitimate judgment that this was not a legal war.

No account was taken of Iraq’s recent history: no account of the anger and frustration felt by the Shia majority at their brutal subjugation by the Sunni-dominated regime of Saddam Hussein; and no account of Iran’s resentment of Saddam Hussein’s 10-year war against it, in the course of which he used chemical weapons. As a result, a vacuum was created and, as a consequence of the failure to have a plan, the Shia population, encouraged by Iran, was emboldened to take revenge against the Sunnis, who, not surprisingly, fought back. We became embroiled in a civil war. The welcome army of liberation became an army of hated occupation.

I began by saying that the prospectus was flawed. The unhappy truth is that the prospectus was flawed not simply in conception but in execution. The lessons to be learned from that are manifold. It will only be a justification of Sir John’s work and that of his committee if we can say with confidence, now and in the future, that these lessons have been properly learned.

Counter-Daesh: Quarterly Update

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we are in close touch with the Egyptians about this, and we share their concern about the spread of Daesh in Libya. We welcome the signing of the Libyan political agreement in December for the establishment of a Government of National Accord to restore a measure of security and stability in Libya. We know that the Egyptians are also supportive of the new Government in any way that they are able. All I can say to the noble Lord is that we will continue to play an active role and encourage the Government in Libya to make sure that, as the Libyan state authority is re-established across national territory, we see respect for human rights being considered as an important part of rebuilding governance—and, of course, we impress that message on the Egyptians as well.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

The noble Earl will forgive me if I press him a little further on the issue of Libya, where Daesh has now established bases on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, within easy reach of southern Europe. I also ask him to take into account the well-founded reports that Daesh has formed an association with Boko Haram. Military success is obviously to be welcomed but, if a consequence of that is displacing the activity of Daesh into further acts of terrorism, it is clear that we must have a strategy to deal with that. Precisely what is that strategy?

Queen’s Speech

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jowell, on her maiden speech. I see that she is no longer in her place, but outside the protocols and confines of the Chamber, I am very glad to acknowledge her as a close friend. In particular, I congratulate her yet again on the remarkable achievement of bringing the Olympic Games to London, which proved to be such a success. In my remarks today, I want to apply my mind and invite noble Lords to apply theirs to the consequences of withdrawal from the European Union for relations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

That is of particular significance in the year of the American presidential election. As we have already seen, Mr Trump and Mr Sanders are avowedly isolationist. So far as Mrs Clinton is concerned, she has been badly burned by her support for military action against Iraq and, when she was at the State Department, for being the author of the suggestion that United States’ foreign policy should pivot towards the East. That was later described as a rebalancing in some effort to allay the fears of the Europeans. But what is clear is that the State Department increasingly looks towards China and the problems of the South China Sea.

I do not believe that there is any question of the abandonment of Europe by the United States, whoever becomes president, because of NATO and the obligations that are contained there, particularly in Article 5, and of course because the US has interests to defend and maintain. It is worth pointing out that President Obama’s intervention—which gave rise to one of Mr Johnson’s, shall we say, less attractive interventions—was based on self-interest. We should not be surprised at that, nor feel any sense other than understanding, because it has been the United States’ policy since President Kennedy that Britain should play a leading role in Europe. For the White House, a European Union with the United Kingdom inside it is much more reflective of the United States’ interests and of the values that we and the United States share. Indeed, you could argue, if you were being politically mischievous, that it provides a counterbalance to France and support for Germany by our presence. Such influences are an important part of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. Removing them will have an impact on what we British wish to call the special relationship, although sometimes in American circles it is given rather less credit than we would prefer.

But there is one area where relations are strained: defence spending. Washington spends 75% of NATO’s budget and only four countries in Europe—not three, as was suggested earlier—reach NATO’s minimum spending target of 2% of annual GDP: the United Kingdom, Estonia, Belgium and Poland. The United States used to talk of increased burden sharing when the question of European defence expenditure came up. Now, Members of Congress and of the Administration are much more vocal in private, and increasingly in public, in asserting that Europe gets defence on the cheap, an argument recently put most aggressively by Donald Trump. If Europe wants to maintain the present level of American commitment to Europe, it needs, if I may be forgiven the Americanism, to step up to the plate. It needs to adopt policies of interoperability, force specialisation and—most difficult—common procurement. There is no question of a European army, save in the mind of Mr Juncker. Go around the capitals of members of the European Union and ask people if they want a European army; it will be very hard to find anyone who says yes.

Our role and the role of Europe is to allay the anxieties of the United States and to enhance our security. That we can do through the kind of co-operation in defence which the European Union offers, not least in European projects such as the Eurofighter, now the Eurofighter Typhoon. The compelling arguments for maintaining our presence in Europe only go towards buttressing the strength of our relationship with the United States.

Syria

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, is it not necessary to retain a sense of realism about these matters, not least because Mr Putin has achieved all his strategic objectives? He has managed to buttress the Assad regime, at least for the moment. As has already been pointed out, he has retained the military base at Latakia and the port of Tartus. There can be no settlement of the Syrian question without the endorsement of Russia. It may not be game, set and match to Mr Putin, but it is most certainly game and set.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I can only agree with a great deal of what the noble Lord has said, but one cannot help observing at the same time that Russia’s stated aims and its actions in Syria have been at odds with one another. It remains to be seen whether its withdrawal leaves the Syrian regime in a stronger or weaker position. I am not so sure that the noble Lord is right that the Russians have left at an optimal moment from the point of view of the Assad regime. Certainly, Assad is stronger than he was six months ago, but his position is by no means secure.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl on the lucid way in which he introduced this legislation. It is perhaps rather more complex than it appears at first sight and we look forward to his explanations when we reach both the Committee and Report stages.

I associate myself with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead. I yield to no one in my support of the Human Rights Act, nor indeed of the importance of human rights as the underpinning of a democratic state such as ours. However, I have grave reservations about the decision that was taken by the Supreme Court on a very narrow majority. I have heard it suggested informally, and possibly mischievously, that if a similar case were to go before the same court today a different result might well be achieved. None the less, the fact is that there now exists, as a result of that decision and of the way in which it has been commented upon since, a considerable doubt about the protection available to our Armed services when engaged in conflict. That doubt ought to be resolved. That is why when the noble Lord says that he will support an amendment—which, we understand, may be proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—I will certainly support both the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord when an amendment to that effect is put forward. It is a duty and responsibility of Parliament to resolve an issue that is clearly causing such uncertainty in the minds of those whom we expect to be responsible for our safety to the extent that they are willing to give their lives, if necessary.

I am unaware of any other country that engaged either in the second Gulf War, or, indeed, in Afghanistan, that has conducted such a lengthy and detailed post-mortem of the actions of those whom we sent to fight there. That of itself would not be an obstacle to us doing what is right, but it is certainly worth reminding ourselves that we may be imposing a standard on our Armed Forces far in excess of that being imposed by our allies on theirs.

As one who has recently run the gauntlet of a maiden speech, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidding, will not think it presumptuous of me to say that she spoke with such confidence and distinction that she can be guaranteed to be heard with great interest and attention when she speaks again in your Lordships’ House. She struck more than a chord with me about the vital importance in the political process of the raffle at the end of the coffee morning, or the wine and cheese party, which was once defined to me as the kind of party in which you hope that the wine is a little older than the cheese.

I speak with some diffidence on these topics, having listened to the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig and Lord Boyce, because they come to this with a depth of experience and understanding that no one who has not been engaged as they have can really expect to achieve. My observations are based on what I have seen from outside. My diffidence is also to a large extent compounded by the excellent contribution of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. My professional experience of courts martial is both dated and minimal, but he has raised a number of issues that will require careful consideration during the progress of the Bill in your Lordships’ House.

I will talk about two issues, one of which has not been mentioned, perhaps because it was not controversial in the House of Commons, nor does it appear to be controversial here: the repeal of the provisions of Sections 146(4) and 147(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act. I speak to some extent from my experience as a Member of Parliament with a large military airbase in my constituency, based on the number of occasions on which I was consulted by servicemen and servicewomen about the possible consequences for them were there to be any question of homosexual behaviour on their part. It is right to remind ourselves that it was not long ago that even suspicion of such behaviour, irrespective of rank, achievement or service, could have brought an untimely end to a career, with consequences that were sometimes brutal and inevitably long-lasting.

Nor do I believe that the services benefited, because good men and women were lost and others cowed and frightened. Indeed, the military police assumed the character of a committee for the suppression of vice in a fundamentalist country. Telephones were tapped, friendships obsessively scrutinised and personal behaviour subjected to intense scrutiny. This repeal is probably the last legislative change necessary to reflect the change first in domestic attitudes and now in the military. We should accept and be glad that it has now come to pass because it reflects a proper balance between domestic law and law relating to the military, and the values of society as a whole.

The second issue is one on which I am slightly inhibited, but I believe that it is right to draw attention to the fresh inquest now opened into the death of Private Cheryl James. I am rightly constrained in what I may say because these proceedings are actively sub judice, but I feel able to raise a number of points of general interest. The Bill is substantially about discipline, but by implication it is about morale as well. I always believed that these were two sides of the same coin: poor discipline damages morale and poor morale most certainly damages discipline. That is particularly the case when the services deal with young and inexperienced members. Services take in young men and women of varying levels of maturity. The objective is to turn them into mature adults with a specific and, in some ways, unique set of skills. With that objective goes an obligation to recognise that, in many cases, so far as may be necessary, the services will act in loco parentis. I hope that the inquest will pursue some of these issues.

I finish by saying this, and I put it in abstract. If any serviceman or servicewoman, of any rank in any circumstance, were to be cajoled, intimidated, pressurised or otherwise to have sexual relations with another member of the Armed Forces of whatever rank, that would be a gross breach of the moral obligation owed to those who offer themselves to protect us with their lives as necessary. It is one which I hope would engage universal condemnation.

Defence Spending

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I made the point earlier that defence spending as a percentage of GDP has been falling under this Government, but my message is not just to my own Government. There is a political disconnect between the extent of our commitments and the lack of funding that is not being recognised across the political divide. I do not hear either of the main political parties saying that we should scale back our ambitions in the world, but nor has either party made it clear that it is committed to at least 2% in the future. I personally would like to see much more than that, but everyone can see the terms of the motion.

The reservist plan has been a disaster, in my opinion, resulting in unacceptable capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the long term, as we throw yet more money at it to try to make it work. Matters are not much better in the Royal Navy, which has been reduced to a mere 19 surface ships, although a recent SDSR suggested that 30 would be more appropriate. In addition to problems with the new aircraft carrier, the lack of a replacement for Nimrod means that we are in the ridiculous situation of having no maritime patrol aircraft. We have to go cap in hand to the Americans and the French to police our waters against potentially hostile submarines. That is a ridiculous state of affairs for a country of our standing.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I agree with the point that my hon. Friend makes about maritime patrol aircraft. It is urgent if we intend to deploy aircraft carriers, which are currently being constructed and fitted out in order to come into service in a couple of years.

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a valid point.

With these major shortcomings in our defence, it was alarming that a report by the Royal United Services Institute published this week suggests that the defence budget might be cut by 10% after the next election. Talk that Britain has the fifth largest defence budget—and the second largest in NATO—rings hollow when MOD reforms are cutting manpower, capabilities and the armed forces’ capacity to deploy force. Some estimates suggest that we rank 30th in the world in our ability to deploy force overseas, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) told us of the extent of the American concern about this issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am not sure whether to call you colonel on this occasion.

I, like others, have been greatly impressed by the quality of the debate so far. I agree with much of what has been said, but let me pick up on a couple of points. First, it is right to say that defence does not win votes, but poor defence can certainly lose them if the public form the view that we are not fulfilling our primary objective—their protection. Secondly, the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr Donaldson) made an extremely eloquent speech, but I say to him that there was no option but to abandon the maritime patrol aircraft. The original decision to go with Nimrod was questioned by the Defence Committee at the time. Other alternatives were available, for example, the P-3 Orion, but the decision was taken, I believe by Mr Secretary Portillo, that Nimrod it should be. A final irony was that Nimrod, the mighty hunter, never actually fulfilled his responsibility.

Let us consider the following:

“The Ministry of Defence is being led by the nose by the Treasury towards reductions in Britain’s armed forces which have no rational basis”.

The House will not recognise that quotation, and neither did I until the BBC drew to my attention, in an article written for its website, that in my capacity as defence spokesman for the Liberal Democrats in August 1991 I had said just that. I do not introduce that to offer some support for the view that I am wise; I do so to point out that nothing seems to have changed. My proposition was put rather more pithily by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames), who said that after four years as Minister of State for the Armed Forces he formed the clear view that the enemy was not the Russians, but the Treasury.

Some things have changed, though, and the point has been made by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard). When I first came into this House and took an interest in these matters, we had five days of the parliamentary year to consider defence. We had a two-day debate on the annual White Paper at the beginning of October, and then each of the services had a single day of discussion devoted to them. When the three service days were amalgamated we were confidently assured that it would not result in fewer opportunities to hold the Government to account—people can form their own view about the value of that assurance.

I have been through it all: “Options for Change”; Front Line First; and Labour’s so-called defence review of 1998. That came closest of all to being a proper defence review, except for one thing: Labour refused to publish its foreign policy baseline attributes or intentions. As a consequence, what was otherwise a first-class exercise, with consultation the length and breadth of the country, driven by the then Secretary of State, now Lord Robertson, and with Lord Reid, as he now is, a very important part of it, that was the closest we have come to a defence review. We have not, even in this Parliament, had a defence review. It is an open secret that in 2010 the MOD was told, “Here is a metaphorical envelope containing money. Go away and find a defence policy that fits that sum of money.”

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is a fact that in spring 2010 the Labour Government produced a Green Paper, which would have fed into the defence—[Interruption.] What happened afterwards was what the Conservatives did with it, but we did produce the Green Paper to start the process.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

The hon. Gentleman is right about that. I know a bit about this because I was invited by the then Defence Secretary to be part of the group of politicians, of all parties, who participated in debates with officials as to what should be in the Green Paper.

A defence review is not a hugely impossible concept to understand. What one needs to do is set out one’s foreign policy objectives; decide what military resources are necessary to fulfil those objectives; and then allocate the financial resources necessary to provide the military capability. We have not had a defence review that fulfils those three principles in all the time I have been in the House of Commons.

The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney made a sound point when he said that 2% cannot be described as a panacea for all the ills of defence. If 2% is to be spent, it must be spent wisely. We do not have to go far in Europe to see that several of our allies spend money, perhaps getting up towards 2%—there are not enough of those countries—which could much more readily be spent otherwise. For example, it could be spent on a greater amount of interoperability, force specialisation and such things. There is no point Mr Juncker talking about a European defence policy when European states have not yet properly fulfilled their responsibilities to NATO, of which almost all of them are members.

[Mr Havard]

May I take the right hon. and learned Gentleman back a little to the defence and security review? We can have a defence review and we can have a security review, or we can have an integrated process that looks at the whole business of future resilience, which I think is what he is suggesting we have not done and are not doing now. Does he think that when the new Parliament forms, the circumstances will be such that the current budgets for defence might be maintained in order to allow time for a proper, integrated assessment of defence and security, possibly in the next calendar year, if not this one?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very sound point. I am sorry that I cannot give any commitments in relation to the next Parliament, as I shall not be here, but as a spectator outside I shall firmly cling to the view that a proper, full-scale defence review of the kind I have described, and with which he agrees, is necessary if we are to provide ourselves with the proper defences for the foreseeable future.

The situation is worse than I have described, in a way. Not only is the 2% a public commitment, but it was restated at Celtic Manor during the NATO summit and in the final communiqué from that summit. Of course, it is also one that the British Government have been at pains to emphasise to other allies. How are we going to explain away the fact that in recent months, even years, we have been complaining about the level of defence expenditure of other allies yet we are about to breach the very standard we signed up to and advocated only a few months ago? It is a bit worse than that, too, because we know that the possibility that we should fall below 2% has caused great anxiety, particularly in the United States, which is our closely military ally. Senior official after senior official has made exactly that point.

I have another source of embarrassment: in about 10 days’ time, the United Kingdom delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which I have the honour to lead, will be the hosts of the Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We have in the past 12 months, with the encouragement of Ministers, sought to persuade the other members of the Assembly of the importance of the 2% figure. We will look rather embarrassed in 10 days if the consequences of the actions that appear to be taken in this country are that we will fall below the very figure which we have been advocating and on which we have been seeking to hold the feet of others to the fire.

Let me finish by saying this: if we do not have sufficient defence—and 2% may not be enough—we will diminish our capability, we will reduce our influence and we will limit the options of government. We cannot afford any of those.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

It is not for us to get agreement on a broad-based Government; it is for the Iraqi people to seize the moment to ensure the future continuity of Iraq as a unitary state. That is not assured. Clearly, there are three separate regions within Iraq, any one of which could seek autonomy if a broad-based Government in Baghdad is not formed. We have to devote our present energies to seeking to ensure that outcome.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

May I ask my right hon. Friend to return to the issue of Jordan? That country is under grave pressure as a result of the influx of refugees. It is a country that is generally recognised to be both politically and economically fragile. The fact that ISIS has expanded its activities to such an extent that people believe Jordan could be menaced serves only to underline the importance of our assistance to a country that is enormously important to us, not least on account of its being a very long-standing ally. Can we be assured that this Government will understand the urgency of Jordan’s position and do everything feasible to ensure that it does not succumb to the undue influence of ISIS?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. Jordan is a key ally in the region. Crown Prince Faisal will be at Farnborough tomorrow, and we look forward to discussing these issues with him. However, what my right hon. and learned Friend has said also emphasises the need for us to look at the impact of ISIS on a cross-regional basis. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan are all affected by its activities, and the threat that those activities represent will also be felt by many states in the Gulf and, indeed, in the west.