(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe way the noble Baroness talked about the relationship between the independent reviewer and the board underlines the importance of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about clarifying whether the board is to be supportive or consultative. She talked as if the board was going to be part of the support staff for the reviewer, which would be excellent—but in that case, it is rather funny to call it a board. Why not just call it his staff?
I think that there is probably an element of face-saving in calling it a board. The amendment makes clear that it would act under the,
“direction and control of the Independent Reviewer”.
So he can make of the board—or whatever you want to call it—what he will. That is an opportunity for him, and I am sure that he will not be slow to take it.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise in defence of the Minister because the Intelligence and Security Committee discussed this point with the director of GCHQ on Tuesday morning in the short time available. There have been developments since 2012 that have affected the attitude of the providers—for example, the activities of Mr Snowden. The committee was satisfied that there is a serious risk of loss of visibility of people who ought to be under observation and that the Government’s arguments that this is an urgent matter were justified.
My Lords, I rise briefly because I think that perhaps my noble friend Lord Davies has been misunderstood. I do not think that he doubts for one instant the emergency situation that necessitates this legislation. His argument is that the Government could have acted sooner. I will not enter into a debate as we had a long debate yesterday, but it remains our contention that the Government could have acted sooner on this issue. But there is a time imperative now on this legislation.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was one of those contacted by the chairperson of the Northern Ireland Civil Service Commissioners about this matter and I support the amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Empey said, this is a simple matter. It really should be straightforward and I cannot see that there can be a serious objection to the amendment that the noble Lords, Lord Empey and Lord Alderdice, have tabled.
In the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the provision was made to enshrine in statute the obligation of the Civil Service Commissioners that appointment to the Civil Service should be on merit following fair and open competition. We have always taken that as a constitutional principle of our Government. That Act did not apply to Northern Ireland—not that it was deliberately excluded for any particular reason, but it simply did not apply. However, exactly the same principles should apply, and I think everybody would want them to apply, to the Northern Ireland Civil Service. Indeed, because of the divided history of the Northern Ireland community there is a particularly strong reason why they should apply.
I was very pleased to hear what the noble Lords, Lord Empey and Lord Alderdice, said, because over many years I worked with members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, as it were from the inside rather than working with them from a political perspective. My experience was exactly the same as theirs, as I would have expected: that members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service were politically impartial and appointed on merit. It took 150 years before these principles of fair and open competition were embodied in statute in Britain, following the Northcote-Trevelyan report. Once they have been embodied in statute, it seems to me that the same thing should be done for Northern Ireland, and before a question of devolving this function should take place. I strongly support the amendment. I hope the Government will say that they see no objection to it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken on this. I too support the principle of the amendment before us. It is a very important principle. I was also contacted by the Northern Ireland Civil Service Commissioners and they make a powerful case. They were established, as noble Lords will know, by the Civil Service Commissioners (Northern Ireland) Order 1999. The principle is that a person shall not be appointed a situation in the Civil Service unless a selection is made,
“on merit on the basis of fair and open competition”—
the merit principle. The commissioners have the power to consider, make decisions, and have appeals made to them under the Northern Ireland Civil Service code of ethics, and their notepaper says:
“Ensuring appointment on merit and safeguarding ethics”,
which is, indeed, their role.
Noble Lords from different backgrounds have made important points, and I will also make a point, having served as a Minister in Northern Ireland and in Whitehall. The Northern Ireland Civil Service is a much smaller unit. Everybody knows everybody else in Northern Ireland, and sometimes it seems—I am sure that other noble Lords will confirm this—that everybody knows everything about everybody else in Northern Ireland. Many senior Northern Ireland civil servants had a profile that was not known here in Whitehall, but they were known across Northern Ireland in their respective roles as Permanent Secretaries. Therefore this is not just about things being done in the right and proper way and about there being impartiality; the perception of impartiality must also be there for all those who are appointed, and for others.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. I shall couple with it Amendment 23. I am grateful to the Opposition, who have given their support to these amendments. They relate to circumstances in which the ISC may consider operational matters. At the moment, these are defined in Clause 2(3), which states:
“The ISC may … consider any particular operational matter but only so far as the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that
(a) the matter—
(i) is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation, and
(ii) is of significant national interest, and
(b) the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.
The problem is that that is too restrictive, but I want to make clear at the outset that the ISC does not aspire to consider current operational matters unless the Government have some particular reason for asking it to.
The reason why the wording is too restrictive is that at present there are three tests that have to be passed by an operational matter for the ISC to continue to consider it. The first is that it,
“is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”.
The second is that it,
“is of significant national interest”.
The third test is that,
“the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.
However, the preface to that is that the ISC and the Prime Minister must be satisfied that those conditions are met. That would curtail the present operations of the ISC considerably.
I shall cite one example. When the SIS operation in Libya went so badly wrong and it got into the newspapers, the first thing that happened, quite rightly, was that the chief of SIS wrote a letter to the committee to explain what had gone wrong. If the words of this provision were taken literally, he could have done that only if he had first cleared his lines with the Prime Minister. I could repeat lots of examples of matters where something appears in the press and the heads of the intelligence agencies then report to the ISC. However, the provision says that before any operational matter can be considered, the Prime Minister has to be satisfied that the three tests are passed. My first amendment would omit the words,
“the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that”,
so that the provision would read, “The ISC may consider any particular operational matter but only so far as” the three tests were passed. In other words, it would remove the hurdle of satisfying the Prime Minister, which certainly does not apply at the moment. To have to satisfy the Prime Minister in each case would add a new and cumbersome bureaucratic procedure, which I doubt very much that the Prime Minister would welcome, let alone the ISC.
Doing that alone, however, is not sufficient, and that is where Amendment 23 comes in. That amendment says that the three tests would have to be passed before the ISC could consider an operational matter, and one of those tests would be that it was not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation.
As I said, the ISC has no aspiration to consider an ongoing operation, unless the Government ask it to. It normally looks at operations retrospectively, but there are circumstances in which it suits the Government to ask the ISC to look at an ongoing operation, so Amendment 23, which my noble friend and I have tabled, states:
“The ISC may, notwithstanding subsection (3), consider any particular operational matter if the relevant Minister of the Crown agrees to consideration of the matter or it is consistent with the memorandum of understanding”.
An example of where this was necessary was cited by the noble Lord, Lord King. When he was chairman of the committee, it was asked by the Home Secretary of the day to consider the Mitrokhin case. That was a circumstance in which it suited the Government to ask the ISC to consider that operational matter. It would be very quixotic if the ISC had to say to the Government, “Sorry, you may have asked us to look at this matter because it would help you, but I am afraid we’re not allowed to because there is an absolute ban on it in the Bill”.
The purpose of these two amendments is to give more flexibility to the Government about the circumstances in which the ISC may look at an operational matter. It is not the ISC’s wish, in normal circumstances, unless the Government want it to, to look at matters retrospectively. The purpose of this amendment is to increase the flexibility which has been removed by the current drafting of the Bill. I beg to move.
As noble Lords will see from the Marshalled List, we have added our names to Amendments 18 and 23, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, noted, and we have also tabled Amendment 24 in this group.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, has proved a worthy proponent of his Amendment 18, which would return the procedure for determining whether a matter should be considered by the committee back to the status quo by removing the requirement for the committee to seek the approval of the Prime Minister before making any such decision. It seems absolutely clear that the committee is bound in statute to abide by the remit set out in Clause 2 and it should not have to seek the approval of the Prime Minister to determine that it had done so. I agree with the members of the ISC and the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who have argued that not only is this overly bureaucratic but it is a step backwards from the current position where the committee itself determines, on the basis of given criteria, whether a matter falls within its remit.
Amendment 23, to which we added our name, and Amendment 19, which was tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, address the same point, but in a slightly different way. The Bill reflects the status quo by incorporating operational matters, which the committee has been de facto undertaking for some time, into the formal remit of the ISC. However, it seems overly prescriptive for the Bill expressly to prohibit the committee from reviewing ongoing operational matters. All Members of your Lordships’ House fully accept that there are security issues to do with reviewing operations that are current and may risk compromising individuals involved. However, there may be rare cases where an operation carries on for a long time and, despite the risk being minimal, it is still considered current by the standards of the Bill. It seems much more reasonable to make a general stipulation against the review of ongoing operations but to allow the committee to review such matters in special circumstances if it has the express consent of the relevant Minister.
Opposition Amendment 24 is a repeat of that tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours in Committee. It would require the ISC to consider a request by a Select Committee to review a certain matter related to the ISC’s remit as well as any request to provide the Select Committee with information. It should be clarified that under no circumstances would the amendment require the ISC to act on any such request from a Select Committee, for instance, to disclose sensitive information or that simply would prove to be unmanageable for the committee’s workload. It would be a request. However, fostering greater communication and collaboration of Select Committees in Parliament could be only a positive development for the ISC.
My Lords, this may be the last amendment that we consider this evening. I can move it very briefly indeed because I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for putting his name to it and therefore take it that we are pushing at an open door. This amendment would remove the words “a draft of” in relation to the report submitted to the Prime Minister. The committee does not and never has submitted a draft of the report; it submits its report. The Prime Minister can then ask for certain redactions to be made before it is published. However, it is by no means provisional. I take it from the fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has put his name to this amendment that the Government will accept the removal of the words “a draft of”.
My Lords, since we are considering the last group of the evening, I confess to being envious of the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I have been in your Lordships’ House a relatively short time in comparison with him, but I have never had an amendment signed by both the Official Opposition and the Government. I congratulate him on that achievement.
There is not very much that I can say on this amendment that will not be said even better by others. However, I will say something regarding our Amendment 27. This is a revised version of an amendment which I tabled in Committee. This amendment would amend the grounds on which the Prime Minister may exclude matters from the annual reports. These are currently broadly defined in the Bill as that which the Prime Minister considers,
“would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Security Service”.
It goes on in that vein. We have argued that the primary reason for the Prime Minister to request the redaction of material contained within the annual report should be on the basis of national security, or that it risks a disclosure of sensitive information as defined in the Bill. Again, we have reservations that the reason given in Clause 3(4) is a bit of a catch-all provision which allows the Prime Minister to prohibit the publication of material perhaps considered too critical and which may damage the reputation of government agencies.
Of course, we acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which the Government will need to prevent the publication of material. That may not be only on the basis of national security or the sensitivity of information. It could also be where the information might threaten the UK’s economic interests. However, it would be better to make such additional criteria transparent and accountable, in order to prevent any misrepresentation of the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Amendment 27 allows the Prime Minister to prohibit publication on grounds in addition to national security and the sensitivity of information, along the lines defined in the Bill, but also requires that the scope of the information must be set out in the MoU with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a moderate and reasonable amendment and I hope that the Minister will give it his consideration.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, much of the debate regarding this amendment was covered in the debate on the previous group of amendments. I will therefore keep my comments brief. We put our names to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. We considered that the arrangements that they are proposing for the ISC, which is a variation of a statutory parliamentary committee, to be the next best option were the Select Committee option to fail.
In the previous debates, I referred to a committee being strengthened in its independence by the privileges and status afforded by being a creature of Parliament rather than a creature of the Executive, while retaining robust safeguards over the constitution and the work of the committee in the interests of national security. The idea of a security committee that is covered by parliamentary privilege and also bound by safeguards established by statute is of course attractive, as it would give the absolute guarantee needed on issues such as the disclosure of sensitive information and the appointment of members. However, my concerns lie—the noble Lord, Lord Butler, also acknowledged these deficiencies—with the argument raised by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours that parliamentary privilege conferred in this way would be suspect and potentially challengeable in the courts. That makes me nervous and I am sure that it makes other Members of the House nervous. If my noble friend is right that the present statutory committees of Parliament are not covered by privilege, it is difficult to see how statute can provide for it in this case, for the fundamental reason that the committee will not be a fully fledged body of Parliament.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said that discussions would take place. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to that. I am very concerned that, if I understand correctly, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said that no discussions on the issue have taken place with the Government. There is an overwhelming desire on all sides of the House to get the issue right.
Perhaps I may do justice to the Government. There have been discussions. My complaint is that they do not seem to have reached a conclusion.
I do not know whether that is better or worse. It is disappointing that the Government have not been able to reach a conclusion, given the overwhelming desire on all sides of the House to get this right and to ensure that the committee has the privilege that it will need to do its job properly. I remain concerned about the process that is being used. I wait with interest to hear what the noble Lord will say about the consequences of pursuing parliamentary privilege in this way. Without assurances that the committee will have full privilege, I will have serious reservations about the viability of the proposed amendments, despite the fact that I fully support the aims behind them.
My Lords, as ever, my noble friend Lord Reid has summed up the point I was making. The Minister did not refer to an emergency situation but to departments that would not have a Secretary of State and therefore it would be downgraded. It is entirely appropriate to ask that a decision as serious as to withhold information from the ISC should be taken only at the highest levels in government, and that means the level of Secretary of State.
My Lords, I also support the amendment. It is no answer to say that if the information is held by the Cabinet Office, where there is not a Secretary of State, it should be at some other level. Any intelligence information held by the Cabinet Office will belong either to the Home Office, the Foreign Office or some other department where a Secretary of State is responsible. It is not the case that provision ought to be made for an exception where the Cabinet Office is involved. I support the amendment moved by the Opposition.
My Lords, I should like to test the opinion of the House.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI accept that, and we will be coming to some other amendments where I will be arguing that we should have our cake and eat it. We are entitled, however, to have our cake and eat it. For the reasons I have been arguing, I do not think that it is advantageous to have this as a Select Committee because I do not think it can be like any other Select Committee. I do think, however, that it requires special arrangements to give it the privileges of a Select Committee, and I do not withdraw that argument.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has done this Committee a service in degrouping his amendments. It is a broader and deeper debate than the one we had on the first two amendments. It has been extremely helpful. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, hit the nail on the head when he described it as a useful debate with a lot of consensus. I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who said this was a polarised debate. I am not convinced that it is. This is less about what we expect the ISC to do and how we expect to do it than the structure that can best achieve those objectives. There seems to be a fair amount of agreement on the kind of objectives we are seeking. I wrote down a couple. The idea of a veneer of expertise has now been firmly laid to rest. I hope that we will not hear that expression again either in your Lordships’ House or outside. I was intrigued when the noble Lord, Lord Deben, mentioned to the Minister the comments from civil servants. I felt the ghost of “Yes Minister” creeping into our debates. Civil Service Ministers sometimes have to make a decision and challenge civil servants on some issues.
The areas of broad agreement were the independence from the Executive and the issue of parliamentary privilege. I thought the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, about the power to take evidence under oath was a powerful one. Security of information caused considerable concern for those who are not keen on having a Select Committee structure but who also, like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, want to protect security of information if there is any question on that. There is the same point even if the structures are different.
The issue of public hearings came up. I am not sure how relevant that is in terms of structure in that amendments have been tabled about the kind of public hearings there could be and what form they could take. My own view is that they are valuable. They certainly should never be automatic but we have that debate coming up. I am unclear whether a Select Committee would have to have public sessions unless the Committee wanted to have it. It is the best structure for achieving that.
We have also heard from a number of noble Lords about ensuring public confidence in whatever structure the Government decide to go ahead with. It was helpful that in the last debate the Minister, if I understood his words correctly, said he wanted to look at the best means of achieving these ends and consider all implications. I hope he can say that in the context of this debate as well. It has been a broader debate in that noble Lords have been thinking carefully about powers, independence and structure, and I hope the Minister finds that debate and those comments and views helpful.
Public confidence is an issue to take into account. It can be well served by public hearings or it can be badly served by public hearings, and we will debate that further today. Public confidence does have an impact on how sensitive or highly confidential information that is relevant to national security is dealt with. So I am interested in what the Minister has to say. I hope that he will take on board all the comments made in the last debate and in this debate. I hope that he is smiling because he agrees with me rather than because he is amused by what I said. I hope that he will say—as I hope I would say if I were sitting in his seat—that he will take this away and take into account not only the comments that were made in the previous debate but the wide range of views expressed in this debate. They are moving in the same direction and seek that, whatever structure the Government want to proceed with, the comments of the House should be taken into account to ensure that the Government get it right, protect national security, safeguard sensitive information and also secure parliamentary independence and public confidence.