(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as I have done throughout this process, I support the noble Lord, Lord West, and, having had the advantage of hearing him today and earlier, I endorse without qualification his remarks and powerful arguments in support of Motion A1.
I am encouraged in that because the Government are yet to produce any reason against these proposals that could be regarded as substantive. I am further encouraged by the fact that the chair of the BEIS Committee supports the proposition and the principle that the amendment embraces. It has been suggested, although not perhaps so strongly today, that confidential information will be made available to the BEIS Committee. There is a difference between confidential and classified. What is confidential as between one Minister and another can easily not be classified. In that respect, the Government have simply not proved their case.
What will that confidential information amount to? It will amount to what the Secretary of State thinks the committee can see. One could describe that, rather pejoratively, as being spoon-fed, but it will certainly come not with its interest in objectivity but with its interest in the subjective opinion of the Secretary of State. In that respect, it is quite different—I repeat, quite different—from the role, powers and the exercise of those powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am further encouraged in my position because I read that the Commons Reason for Motion A is that it is “appropriate and sufficient”—which is probably what Oliver Twist was told when he asked for some more. The words mean what people want them to mean and that, yet again, exposes the poverty of the argument offered by the Government.
I shall finish by reminding the House that members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are chosen for experience and a reputation for balanced judgment. As I have said previously, there have been occasions when nominations made to the committee have been turned down because a particular individual was not thought to have the necessary experience or qualities for the discharge of a quite remarkable responsibility. Members sign the Official Secrets Act and the procedure attached to that is a solemn moment. They form an intimate relationship with the security services—one of trust, which cannot be replicated in any circumstances, in my respectful view, by the relationship between the BEIS Committee and the Secretary of State.
The truth is that the Government do not have a good argument here and that is why they would be wise, even at this late stage, to adopt this amendment.
My Lords, I too believe that the noble Lord, Lord West, is right in insisting that the Government and the other place look again at another way of giving the ISC an explicit role in scrutinising highly classified intelligence underlying the Secretary of State’s use of the powers in this Bill. The Government’s position is, frankly, indefensible. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord West, reminded the House that at the time of the passing of Justice and Security Act 2013, the then Minister for security announced
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.”—[Official Report, Justice and Security Bill Committee, 31/1/13; col. 98.]
The Minister in the other place confirmed on Monday that the Government stand by that statement, yet they refuse to amend the memorandum of understanding under the Act, to bring the Investment Security Unit in BEIS within the purview of the ISC. Frankly, I cannot understand why. In his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord West, has offered the Government an easy way out. If they will amend the memorandum of understanding to bring the Investment Security Unit explicitly within the purview of the ISC, as it would have been had it remained within the Cabinet Office, the problem will be solved at a stroke. There will be no need for this amendment, and if the Minister will give that assurance today, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord West, would be prepared not to press his amendment.
In the other place, a Conservative Member, Steve Baker, said that the chairman of the ISC, Dr Julian Lewis—another Conservative Member—had made an open-and-shut case for amending the MoU, and yet Mr Baker, under the constraint of his Whips still voted against the amendment. If the Minister’s reply is that the ISC can cover the Investment Security Unit without amending the MoU, I am bound to ask: what is the point of having the MoU at all? The Minister has only to say that the Government will make this amendment to the MoU and he will save the Government and all the rest of us, a good deal of trouble. Will he do so? I suspect that the Government’s position is a result of the arrogance of a Government who have a large majority in the other place. They have taken a position and refuse to change it, however strong the arguments on the other side.
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has indicated his desire to speak.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in supporting the amendment I will first say how disappointed I am to be here at all. As we have gone through the Bill’s stages the argument has been very clearly made. I think a mistake was made in the original construction of the Bill and there now seems to be a determination not to repair the one problem that exists.
I say this as somebody who strongly supports the Bill. We need to have powers for the Secretary of State to prevent serious loss and threats to our national security. I note my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s comments, citing some of the pretty valuable businesses that should not have been allowed to go. If wiser counsel had prevailed that could have been prevented. This Bill would have helped that.
The other important thing that the Government have got absolutely right is ensuring that, if we are going to have this Bill and give the Secretary of State these new powers, there has to be proper parliamentary oversight of it. But they either were negligent or perhaps unaware of the important background: there are limitations affecting the operation the BEIS Committee. It is not qualified and will not be able to see any “top secret” information. If anybody on the government side seriously suggests that there could not possibly be any “top secret” information arising in connection with some possible takeover or acquisition, that position is not one they can seriously seek to sustain in a rapidly changing, increasingly technical and pretty dangerous world, as the noble Lord, Lord West, said. This is a pity, because I would like to pay my compliments to the Minister for the way he has handled the Bill. In every other respect it has been a model of parliamentary oversight and the proper review of it.
Referring again to what we now call the front row of the scrum, it seems, if I may say so, that we in your Lordships’ House each come from a different background. I, having been Secretary of State for a number of departments and then, for seven years, chairman of the ISC, was able to see this from both sides and saw the importance of there being, in the end, proper oversight of the intelligence agencies and of the intelligence and information that may be coming to them which government Ministers might be relying on.
Somebody has kindly sent me a copy of the letter sent by Jacob Rees-Mogg to Julian Lewis, and I echo something the noble Lords, Lord Campbell and Lord West, said: it is pretty dismissive and merely says that the committee’s role should not be on an ad-hoc, Bill-by-Bill basis, and that it would be a significant precedent, providing parliamentary oversight of the UK’s intelligence community. Although my noble friend Lord Grimstone paid what may have been a perfectly well-deserved tribute in Committee to the qualities of the BEIS Select Committee, the simple fact is, as my two colleagues have said, it will not be allowed to see any top secret information. It is not cleared for top secret intelligence that comes in, which might, on some occasions, be the key consideration that affects a decision the Secretary of State takes, for which there would then be no parliamentary accountability or oversight.
I have some sympathy with the Minister, because there are others who seem to have dug their heels in on this one, but even at this late stage, the argument does not stack up. A sensible decision by the Government would be to include this limited amendment to an otherwise excellent Bill and get on with it. Otherwise, it is a serious gap, and we could well pay the price for it in the future.
My Lords, in my rugby-playing days I played in the back row, and I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, played on the wing. However, I am very happy, in this case, to be in the front row with the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Campbell and Lord King, even though the rules might say that that is one too many.
This is a very important amendment, and the House and the Government have to take it seriously. The noble Lord, Lord West, has made an irrefutable case for the involvement of the ISC, on the basis of what the Government promised Parliament during the passing of the Justice and Security Act and subsequently, and there really can be no answer to that.
I will come to the role of the ISC in a moment, but first I will draw attention to an oddity of Clause 61 in its present form if the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord West, is not accepted. We have been discussing the content of that clause, which stipulates that the Secretary of State must make an annual report to each House of Parliament about the exercise of the powers in the Bill. The clause requires that the annual report should cover details in no less than 12 areas, and the Government are now proposing to add to that. So much detail—but all the details are administrative. The clause in its present form omits the essential matter in which Parliament and the public will be interested: namely, the actual decisions of the Secretary of State and the justification for them—the grounds on which they were made. That is an extraordinary omission, and the first part of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord West, puts it right.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has added his name to this amendment, although he is not able to speak today. I shall also speak to other amendments in this group.
Something strange is happening here. The Bill gives the Government extraordinary powers to intervene in, and possibly prevent, private sector commercial transactions. I accept that there may be occasions on which the Government need to protect British industries against incursions from foreign companies, particularly if those companies are under the control of unfriendly states, but these powers are extraordinary and their exercise, and the justification for that exercise, will often depend on intelligence information that the Government cannot, naturally, make public. How then is Parliament going to scrutinise and the Government to justify the use of these powers in those circumstances?
In the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Conservative Government established a parliamentary mechanism precisely for this purpose, by setting up the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. The coalition Government reinforced the committee’s powers in the Justice and Security Act 2013. That committee comprises Members of both Houses of Parliament with experience of intelligence who are admitted within the ring of secrecy so that they can have access to highly classified information and advise the Government and Parliament on its use. I declare an interest, having served on the committee for five years. Yet the Government have refused to provide, in the Bill, for the ISC to have a role in scrutinising the use of the powers in it. It is as if the Government have acquired a watchdog, yet are unwilling to let it bark just when it is needed.
This point was raised by the Opposition parties in the other place, and the Minister produced repeated excuses for denying the ISC an explicit role. Ultimately, the Minister said that the ISC could review the annual report which the investment security unit established by the Bill is required to make to Parliament. That made it necessary for the chairman of the ISC, Dr Julian Lewis, to intervene and say that the annual report would be a public document, which could not, by definition, contain classified information. The Minister’s reply to that was that the ISC could subsequently ask the Secretary of State for such classified information.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has tabled Amendment 82, requiring that the Secretary of State should publish a separate annual report to the ISC which can include classified information. The noble Lord, Lord West, who is your Lordships’ current representative on the ISC, has put down an amendment, with the support of the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, requiring classified information to be contained in a confidential annexe to the annual report of the investment security unit, to be made available only to the ISC. I will support these amendments if my own amendment is not acceptable, but if I may respectfully say so, an annual report after the event involves examining the operation of the stable door after several horses may have bolted.
My own amendment requires that, when a transaction is called in, any relevant intelligence should be made available to the ISC, and the ISC should make a report to Parliament before the Secretary of State makes a final order. The assessment period of 30 days under the Bill, extendable to 45 days, provides adequate time for the ISC to assess the intelligence provided to it, take evidence and give its opinion to Parliament. It seems to me unlikely that there will be so large a volume of transactions actually called in as to make this an unsustainable burden. In this House, we are used to Select Committees such as the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee scrutinising Bills in short order and reporting on them to the House before the Bills go forward. If Parliament is to have any effective scrutiny of the use of the powers in the Bill, this seems preferable—if it is practicable—to an annual report after final orders have been made.
It is a matter for speculation why the Government have been so coy about giving the ISC an explicit role in the Bill. Paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding agreed between the Government and the ISC after the 2013 Act, says that
“only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
Those were the words agreed between the Government and the ISC. The irony is that the ISC’s role is potentially helpful to the Government. Only the ISC can have access to the intelligence information justifying the Government’s intention to intervene. To give an example, I recall that, when I was a member of the ISC, there was a press story that GCHQ was piggybacking on the American NSA to obtain intelligence that it could not obtain under its own powers. The ISC examined the records and was able to reassure Parliament and the public that the reports were false.
Is the reluctance on the part of the Government a hangover from their embarrassment over publication of the ISC’s report on Russian interference before the 2017 election, or is it a result of government pique about the committee’s appointment of its own chairman in place of the Government’s nominee? Whatever it is, it is difficult to understand what the Intelligence and Security Committee is there for if not to have a role on behalf of Parliament and the public in sensitive matters of this sort. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am speaking to my Amendment 78 and will touch on Amendment 70 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, to which he has just spoken, as well as Amendment 82 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter and Amendment 86 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. All relate to the same concern and try to resolve it in slightly different ways. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Lord Rooker, for their support, and the noble Lords, Lord King and Lord Janvrin, for having expressed support for the measure in broad terms. It is rather good that this is the first amendment this afternoon being raised from this side rather than from the Government; that is quite interesting I think.
Noble Lords will be aware it was the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament which first raised the fact—and the alarm—that when the Government were considering major investment decisions, national security concerns were not being taken into account. There are those in this House who served on the committee at that time and should be thanked for their work bringing this issue to light. This was some seven years ago, and noble Lords will know from my previous interventions on this topic that I strongly support the need for this Bill, as I think all of us do in this Chamber.
However, there is a glaring hole in the legislation which the Government have not yet resolved: namely, there is no meaningful oversight. This Bill has national security at its heart, yet the Government will not let anyone oversee this secretive heart. The Minister has said that the ISC—the one body Parliament expressly established to oversee secret matters on its behalf—will not be given proper oversight of this secret activity. The offer that the ISC can scrutinise the public report and ask for any further information it wants is not good enough. The public annual report is just that, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said—it is public. Parliament itself can therefore scrutinise it, so there is no role for the ISC, which is designed to look at secret reports, not public ones. The Minister says that the ISC can request further information. But there is no obligation for that information to be provided. The ISC can only require information from those bodies that fall within its remit, and the investment security unit is not one of those bodies.
Without specific provision, there is a possibility that, even if this Government are well intentioned—which I am sure they are—future Governments may refuse to provide such information to the ISC. Consequently, I am afraid the Minister’s proposals do not meet the requirement for proper oversight. Worse than that, they represent a step backwards from the current oversight provisions. The unit that currently takes these decisions—the investment security group in the Cabinet Office—is overseen by the ISC. By moving this activity to the investment security unit in BEIS, the Government are actively removing it from ISC oversight. I am sure that this cannot be what the Government intend. This is the glaring hole in the Bill that we must fix, and my amendment does that. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, for putting their names to this amendment.
Clause 61 mandates the Secretary of State to produce an annual report to Parliament. The information in that report is limited and obviously will not include any sensitive security information. My amendment to Clause 61 will add to that annual report further categories of information: details about the jurisdiction of acquirers; the nature of national security concerns raised; the particular technological or sectoral expertise being targeted; and any other information that the Secretary of State deems instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered in the new regime.
The amendment then provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to redact any of this information from the public report, should it be deemed damaging to national security. That information must be moved into a classified annexe, ensuring that, if Parliament cannot scrutinise it, the ISC can, on behalf of Parliament. This is an approach already used by organisations such as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, provides for a second separate annual report to the ISC. It seeks to achieve the same outcome as mine—namely, oversight of the security matters at the heart of the Bill. My understanding was that Ministers in the other place had found the annexe solution more palatable, in that it would minimise the reporting burden on the new unit. However, the ISC itself is ambivalent as to whether there is a secret annexe or a separate report; the key is that there is reporting on the security aspects, in whatever form that takes.
This is not a power grab by the ISC—far from it; we have more than enough work to do as it is, and nor do we have any interest in the wider work of BEIS. It is only the intelligence and security work of the new unit, which is, after all, our job. The ISC was expressly established to scrutinise the intelligence and security activities of government—as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said—initially, within the three intelligence agencies, and then from 2013, throughout the full national security apparatus. That change in 2013 was a result of the Justice and Security Act. The long title of that Act refers to
“activities relating to intelligence or security matters”,
and these are set out in a memorandum of understanding under the Act, which was then deemed to be a practical vehicle for listing those bodies overseen by the committee, since it could be easily kept up to date. This was best explained by the then Security Minister, who, during the passage of the Act, said:
“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year.”—[Official Report, Commons, Justice and Security Bill Committee, 31/1/13; col. 98.]
And that is exactly what has happened.
Under this Bill, intelligence and security activity is moving from the Cabinet Office to BEIS, yet the Government have not updated the MoU to include it. They have not honoured their clearly stated intention that the ISC should have oversight of all government intelligence and security activities, and it is not just this unit; other units have been set up in other departments to carry out national security and they have not yet been added to the ISC’s MoU. This is not good enough.
I thank the noble Lord for these comments and in no way want to second-guess the deep experience that he has on these matters. But I repeat yet again: there seems to be a worry that BEIS Select Committee members will not have sufficient security clearance to be able to do the work required of them. I repeat from this Dispatch Box that there is no barrier to BEIS Select Committee members handling top-secret and other classified material, subject to agreement between the department and the chair of the committee on appropriate handling. I am not sure that I can say more than that, but they will be able to have the information they need to carry out their functions.
My Lords, I am grateful for this debate. I am afraid that I have to say to the Minister that, while he may have used his own words in answer to the debate, he used the brief that would have been used by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I do not want to decry the work of the BEIS Select Committee at all, but the Minister gave the game away when he said that access to highly classified intelligence for the Select Committee would be based on an agreement between the chair and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State would control it. In that case, Parliament would be in the position of Glendower in “Henry IV”, who says:
“I can call spirits from the vasty deep.”
So you can, is the reply:
“But will they come when you do call for them?”.
Under the memorandum of understanding, the Intelligence and Security Committee has a right to get the intelligence that it needs. A Select Committee of the House of Commons does not have that similar right.
What has run through this debate, from everybody who has spoken apart from the Minister, is that we want one simple thing. We want to make proper use of a tool that is there for Parliament and has been created for this purpose: the Intelligence and Security Committee. There are various ways of doing it, as has been made clear. It could be by annual reports; it could be by changing the terms of reference, which can be done so easily; it could be a transfer to the Cabinet Office, which would bring it within the terms of the ISC.
I suggested that this should be a real-time operation. If I may say so, the Minister misrepresented that. There is no reason why that should extend the time necessary for the assessment. The Intelligence and Security Committee will be looking at one thing—the highly classified intelligence on which the Secretary of State is acting—and reporting on that. That is not a huge job. The ISC could say quite shortly that it was satisfied, and 99 times out of 100, I think, it would say that there were good grounds for the order that the Secretary of State was proposing to be make. I think that could quite easily be done within the 30 days allowed under the Bill for the assessment. It would not even need to make use of the 15-day extension.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, on her maiden speech, which I heard with great pleasure from the Strangers’ Gallery.
In the limited time available, I will not dwell on the anxiety and shame I feel about Part 5 of this Bill, which others have expressed so eloquently. I hope and believe that your Lordships will assent to the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge. I also hope that, in the next few weeks, agreements will be reached with the EU which enable the Government to assent to removing these clauses from the Bill. In passing, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, and others, that the amendment passed in another place—that these clauses would not be brought into effect without a positive vote in the Commons—is not sufficient to remove the mischief. These clauses contain a threat which should never have been made, and which must have no place in the United Kingdom statute book. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, to consider the precedents that they would provide for an unscrupulous Government in the future.
I shall address my remarks to the situation that will arise if the Government seek to maintain the clauses and can get a majority in the House of Commons to that end. Your Lordships will then have to decide whether we maintain our opposition to them in the face of a majority in the elected House. I have argued in the past, and continue to believe, that this House must recognise the constitutional limitations on our power and must ultimately defer to elected House. But the issues on this occasion are of a different order. The Northern Ireland clauses in this Bill go to the root of our constitution. On this occasion, the power is in your Lordships’ hands, and we may not be used to that. The Government need the internal market provisions in this Bill by 31 December. They cannot, therefore, use the Parliament Acts to get the Bill through. If this House is resolute in rejecting the unacceptable Northern Ireland clauses, the Government will have to agree to remove them if they are to get the Bill passed.
The issues here are the rule of law and our constitution, as well as our national reputation. I believe that it is the role and duty of your Lordships’ House to defend these things, even in the face of an overweening Executive with a majority in another place, and I urge your Lordships to be resolute in doing so. We can prevent this disaster.