Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

18: Clause 2, page 2, line 12, leave out from “as” to end of line 13

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. I shall couple with it Amendment 23. I am grateful to the Opposition, who have given their support to these amendments. They relate to circumstances in which the ISC may consider operational matters. At the moment, these are defined in Clause 2(3), which states:

“The ISC may … consider any particular operational matter but only so far as the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that

(a) the matter—

(i) is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation, and

(ii) is of significant national interest, and

(b) the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.

The problem is that that is too restrictive, but I want to make clear at the outset that the ISC does not aspire to consider current operational matters unless the Government have some particular reason for asking it to.

The reason why the wording is too restrictive is that at present there are three tests that have to be passed by an operational matter for the ISC to continue to consider it. The first is that it,

“is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”.

The second is that it,

“is of significant national interest”.

The third test is that,

“the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.

However, the preface to that is that the ISC and the Prime Minister must be satisfied that those conditions are met. That would curtail the present operations of the ISC considerably.

I shall cite one example. When the SIS operation in Libya went so badly wrong and it got into the newspapers, the first thing that happened, quite rightly, was that the chief of SIS wrote a letter to the committee to explain what had gone wrong. If the words of this provision were taken literally, he could have done that only if he had first cleared his lines with the Prime Minister. I could repeat lots of examples of matters where something appears in the press and the heads of the intelligence agencies then report to the ISC. However, the provision says that before any operational matter can be considered, the Prime Minister has to be satisfied that the three tests are passed. My first amendment would omit the words,

“the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that”,

so that the provision would read, “The ISC may consider any particular operational matter but only so far as” the three tests were passed. In other words, it would remove the hurdle of satisfying the Prime Minister, which certainly does not apply at the moment. To have to satisfy the Prime Minister in each case would add a new and cumbersome bureaucratic procedure, which I doubt very much that the Prime Minister would welcome, let alone the ISC.

Doing that alone, however, is not sufficient, and that is where Amendment 23 comes in. That amendment says that the three tests would have to be passed before the ISC could consider an operational matter, and one of those tests would be that it was not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation.

As I said, the ISC has no aspiration to consider an ongoing operation, unless the Government ask it to. It normally looks at operations retrospectively, but there are circumstances in which it suits the Government to ask the ISC to look at an ongoing operation, so Amendment 23, which my noble friend and I have tabled, states:

“The ISC may, notwithstanding subsection (3), consider any particular operational matter if the relevant Minister of the Crown agrees to consideration of the matter or it is consistent with the memorandum of understanding”.

An example of where this was necessary was cited by the noble Lord, Lord King. When he was chairman of the committee, it was asked by the Home Secretary of the day to consider the Mitrokhin case. That was a circumstance in which it suited the Government to ask the ISC to consider that operational matter. It would be very quixotic if the ISC had to say to the Government, “Sorry, you may have asked us to look at this matter because it would help you, but I am afraid we’re not allowed to because there is an absolute ban on it in the Bill”.

The purpose of these two amendments is to give more flexibility to the Government about the circumstances in which the ISC may look at an operational matter. It is not the ISC’s wish, in normal circumstances, unless the Government want it to, to look at matters retrospectively. The purpose of this amendment is to increase the flexibility which has been removed by the current drafting of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

As noble Lords will see from the Marshalled List, we have added our names to Amendments 18 and 23, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, noted, and we have also tabled Amendment 24 in this group.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler, has proved a worthy proponent of his Amendment 18, which would return the procedure for determining whether a matter should be considered by the committee back to the status quo by removing the requirement for the committee to seek the approval of the Prime Minister before making any such decision. It seems absolutely clear that the committee is bound in statute to abide by the remit set out in Clause 2 and it should not have to seek the approval of the Prime Minister to determine that it had done so. I agree with the members of the ISC and the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who have argued that not only is this overly bureaucratic but it is a step backwards from the current position where the committee itself determines, on the basis of given criteria, whether a matter falls within its remit.

Amendment 23, to which we added our name, and Amendment 19, which was tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, address the same point, but in a slightly different way. The Bill reflects the status quo by incorporating operational matters, which the committee has been de facto undertaking for some time, into the formal remit of the ISC. However, it seems overly prescriptive for the Bill expressly to prohibit the committee from reviewing ongoing operational matters. All Members of your Lordships’ House fully accept that there are security issues to do with reviewing operations that are current and may risk compromising individuals involved. However, there may be rare cases where an operation carries on for a long time and, despite the risk being minimal, it is still considered current by the standards of the Bill. It seems much more reasonable to make a general stipulation against the review of ongoing operations but to allow the committee to review such matters in special circumstances if it has the express consent of the relevant Minister.

Opposition Amendment 24 is a repeat of that tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours in Committee. It would require the ISC to consider a request by a Select Committee to review a certain matter related to the ISC’s remit as well as any request to provide the Select Committee with information. It should be clarified that under no circumstances would the amendment require the ISC to act on any such request from a Select Committee, for instance, to disclose sensitive information or that simply would prove to be unmanageable for the committee’s workload. It would be a request. However, fostering greater communication and collaboration of Select Committees in Parliament could be only a positive development for the ISC.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I recall having read, in the past 24 hours, a particular phrase from the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, refers. I could take the Joint Committee on Human Rights in isolation but numerous other Select Committees could start making requests and the point I am trying to make is that if the ISC started to receive requests—indeed, it is possible at the moment and no doubt the committee considers them—but on a statutory basis, the concern would be that if the committee decided to respond positively to those requests, that would detract from its core function and purpose. Equally, the point I was making was that if it regularly refused action, that could lead to tension and detract from what we are trying to achieve by way of a greater closeness between the new committee and Parliament.

There is also the point that I was making about the information. By its very nature, some of that information will be extremely sensitive and will be classified as secret or top secret, according to the government system of protective markings, but the ISC, in its accommodation, staffing and procedures is set up to handle sensitive information. The ISC secretariat is vetted and its accommodation is secure. However, other committees are not set up to deal with such information, nor are they, we believe, in a proper position to assess the damage that disclosure could cause. If the ISC refuses to provide information, again, that could lead to tensions between committees.

The new ISC will need to consider how it works with Select Committees and with Parliament more broadly, but I am concerned that the provision suggested in this amendment might serve to skew or disrupt the ISC’s work programme and its reputation could be damaged by refusals to take forward work or pass on information. It is important that the ISC can direct its own work programme as far as possible and focus its efforts on issues that it, with its unique perspective, thinks are most important. I appreciate the intention behind the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, but I hope that they will reflect on the concerns that have been expressed and feel able to withdraw it.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s sympathetic reaction to Amendments 18 and 23. I will make two glosses on it. If I heard him right, he said that Amendment 18 would leave solely to the judgment of the ISC the test for considering an operational matter. I think he is thinking of the amendment that was moved in Committee because this amendment removes both the ISC and the Prime Minister. The Bill says:

“The ISC may … consider any particular operational matter but only so far”,

and it goes on to say that the matter,

“is not part of any ongoing intelligence”.

In other words, it means that it is a matter of fact and not something that the ISC could decide by itself.

The second point is that the Minister spoke about it as if these were matters where the committee asked for information from the agencies. However, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, will confirm, that is not usually the case. The circumstances are that the agencies themselves take the initiative in reporting to the committee. They give the information—I should think that that is the case nine times out of 10. It would be a great pity if that closeness that exists between the ISC and the agencies were to be inhibited by a requirement that the agencies clear their lines with the Prime Minister before they can report such a matter.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller]

I have not intervened in this debate because I have really just been listening with interest and support most of things that have been suggested. If there were a great story in the press—with some truth in it or not, about the operations of the service—I would certainly regard it as my duty to report to the ISC as soon as I reasonably could. It would be reassuring to believe that there is nothing in this drafting to prevent that. It is part of the ongoing confidence-building between the two that the ISC does not have to demand a report on something like that, but gets an early report of the facts from the agencies.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes the point from her direct experience.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hope that I gave reassurance that we recognise some of the issues that the noble Lord raised and that there is certainly a willingness to work through this. There is certainly no intention to retreat from the things which have normally been part and parcel of the ISC’s operations and deliberations up until now.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

I am very grateful to the Minister. On the basis on those assurances, I am very happy to withdraw Amendment 18.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

26: Clause 3, page 2, line 32, leave out “a draft of”

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, this may be the last amendment that we consider this evening. I can move it very briefly indeed because I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for putting his name to it and therefore take it that we are pushing at an open door. This amendment would remove the words “a draft of” in relation to the report submitted to the Prime Minister. The committee does not and never has submitted a draft of the report; it submits its report. The Prime Minister can then ask for certain redactions to be made before it is published. However, it is by no means provisional. I take it from the fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has put his name to this amendment that the Government will accept the removal of the words “a draft of”.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, since we are considering the last group of the evening, I confess to being envious of the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I have been in your Lordships’ House a relatively short time in comparison with him, but I have never had an amendment signed by both the Official Opposition and the Government. I congratulate him on that achievement.

There is not very much that I can say on this amendment that will not be said even better by others. However, I will say something regarding our Amendment 27. This is a revised version of an amendment which I tabled in Committee. This amendment would amend the grounds on which the Prime Minister may exclude matters from the annual reports. These are currently broadly defined in the Bill as that which the Prime Minister considers,

“would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Security Service”.

It goes on in that vein. We have argued that the primary reason for the Prime Minister to request the redaction of material contained within the annual report should be on the basis of national security, or that it risks a disclosure of sensitive information as defined in the Bill. Again, we have reservations that the reason given in Clause 3(4) is a bit of a catch-all provision which allows the Prime Minister to prohibit the publication of material perhaps considered too critical and which may damage the reputation of government agencies.

Of course, we acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which the Government will need to prevent the publication of material. That may not be only on the basis of national security or the sensitivity of information. It could also be where the information might threaten the UK’s economic interests. However, it would be better to make such additional criteria transparent and accountable, in order to prevent any misrepresentation of the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Amendment 27 allows the Prime Minister to prohibit publication on grounds in addition to national security and the sensitivity of information, along the lines defined in the Bill, but also requires that the scope of the information must be set out in the MoU with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a moderate and reasonable amendment and I hope that the Minister will give it his consideration.