Defence: Reform
Lord Bramall Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Bramall
The report on defence reform by the noble Lord, Lord Levene, is yet another chapter in the steady evolutionary process of the higher organisation of defence going back some 47 years to the Mountbatten reorganisation, in which I had some direct involvement. I even recognise some of the same cries and aspirations.
I want to ask two questions, but before I do, having had a chance to read the report and based on consideration experience I must say that I consider it to be a well considered, logical, sensible and helpful report that will give very good guidance for the future, although whether it will achieve the aim, to which I heartily subscribe, of making the Ministry of Defence a smaller action headquarters capable of delivering effectively, economically and on time what is required to support and sustain the national strategy that has been agreed by the National Security Council will, as has already been said, depend on the attitudes and actions, to say nothing of the calibre, of those who have to implement the reform.
My first question is: does the Minister agree that if the CDS alone is to represent the overall military view at the Defence Board with sufficient strength, substance, urgency and authority to ensure that operational policy and what is practicable and realistic in combat do not get out of step, he requires the manifest support and ready advice of the heads of those services who have the responsibility of carrying out that policy? The Chiefs of Staff in committee with, where necessary, direct access to the Secretary of State and, indeed, to the Prime Minister during operations still have an important part to play. Otherwise, the operational and military requirements that may make all the difference between success and failure, if we have to deploy forces, may not get taken care of quite as enthusiastically as the political and financial ones, which have wide and urgent representation. Some reassurance on that point would be welcome.
Secondly, although the head of each service is still called a chief of staff, because he is responsible to the Secretary of State and has now gratifyingly been given more power and flexibility to run his own service, will we not be asking too much of one man if he is to be expected to combine his overall policy functions in that respect with the day-to-day geographically extensive command and administrative responsibilities of a commander-in-chief?
Lord Campbell-Savours
I wonder whether I can catch the attention of the Whip, whose responsibility it is to police the House.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, particularly—
Lord Shutt of Greetland
I think the Minister has got the message and has the answers for the noble and gallant Lord. We have to give other noble Lords the opportunity to come in in the remaining 14 minutes. It is only fair to other noble Lords.
Strategic Defence and Security Review
Lord Bramall Excerpts(14 years ago)
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Lord Bramall
My Lords, one of the most important parts of the strategic defence and security review was the establishment of the National Security Council, chaired at the highest level by the Prime Minister with his own designated staff, whose task it would be to develop and, one hoped, to oversee an updated national strategy. It was to cover, among other matters, vital interests, likely and even possible threats—international and domestic—and a range of state powers that we had to be prepared to take in the short and longer term. It would also lay down what the country might require its Armed Forces and the other complementary agencies to be able to do.
I greatly welcomed this innovation, because it should have produced the planning assumptions in terms of priorities, scale, warning time, concurrency of possible involvements, reliable allied co-operation and broad financial restraints without which no detailed review could be coherent or relevant. It also had to be the only way of trying to balance the strictly military requirement to defend the realm and its established interests, together with any other aspirations in the international arena, against the resources that Parliament would be prepared to allot and above all to sustain.
The trouble was that such a fundamental and intricate exercise needed not only considerable thought, realistic insight, vision and some grasp of history by wise, clear-headed people but also, inevitably, a reasonable amount of time to think things through properly. Yet, in parallel, there was an even more urgent exercise designed, irrespective of any strategic guidance and with a black hole of overspend to be eradicated, to secure an arbitrary cut of 10 per cent, or whatever, by certain dates from all vote holders, which often produced completely conflicting answers.
It would have been surprising if this exercise, rushed through in barely four months, came up with a blueprint that was truly in the up-to-date national interest. The fact that in the light of all the factors and pressures—political, strategic, economic and industrial—the review has come up with, at least for the moment, perhaps as good an optimum solution as could be expected owes much, I believe, to the direct interest and involvement of the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister, the urgent and compelling requirements of Afghanistan, if we are successfully to complete our vital work within five years, and a general realisation of how invariably this country has needed really effective professional Armed Forces.
As far as I can judge, the NSC, although not properly constituted and not fully effective—I hope that it will become both those things—and however rushed, has come up with some helpful strategic guidance and assumptions. The operation in Afghanistan is to have the highest priority and is even in equipment terms to be enhanced. The cost of actual operations is to continue—I hope that everyone will note this, because the Prime Minister said so—to be met out of the Treasury reserve.
The review naturally highlighted good intelligence as being all important and often by far the best way of heading off the most urgent threat to us at the moment of international terrorism. It itemised the range of state power that this country has, under various circumstances, to be prepared for. That ranges from active dynamic diplomacy through power projection for conflict prevention, humanitarian operations and peacekeeping, to limited and highly selective—and, perhaps, pre-emptive on hard intelligence—military action, and even, almost always with allies, larger-scale intervention in order properly to protect our established interests.
Secondly, in giving broad guidance on size, shape and equipment type required, the review made a distinction between what is manifestly needed now and in the foreseeable future and that which, because of the volatility and uncertainty of the international scene, is required more in the form of a firm and experienced base for expansion and equipment development in the longer term, after a degree of notice and warning time but possibly against more sophisticated opposition. Of course, because you can often get these things wrong, as we have in the past—you can back the wrong horses—there has to be an element of flexibility. The point has been made that the review must be redone at least every five years if not even more regularly.
On the review itself, I personally can find nothing to be concerned about. The decision on the exact successor to our present Trident nuclear deterrent, which after all could be extended to serve effectively for at least another 15 years, has been put off to 2015. This interim period will at least give us much needed flexibility diplomatically in negotiations on non-proliferation and multilateral nuclear disarmament. It also gives us an opportunity to examine whether there are not other cheaper, more usable and therefore more appropriate and relevant ways of, with allies, deterring and, I hope, stopping likely threats to us in the future.
Yet some misgivings undoubtedly remain. There are misgivings about the carrier muddle and the shortage of destroyers and frigates, misgivings about the heavy reductions in the size of the Army and the future of the reserves and misgivings about where the covenant exactly stands at the moment. There is also sadness and sorrow about the early retirement of the highly versatile Harrier. However, as those things have been dealt with by other noble Lords at some length, because of time I will not deal with them any further.
The Nimrod saga was clearly a disgrace and should, among other things, be studied carefully when the whole structure of the Ministry of Defence, which has been for some time strong on second-guessing and bureaucratic procrastination and very weak on dynamic and effective action, is examined by my noble friend Lord Levene. For the moment—this is what is on the table—the SDSR has left us with, and in many places enhanced, a viable Armed Forces presence capable of playing, at short notice, an appropriate role in the protection of our country’s interests overseas and nearer to home. Also, in conjunction with allies, but if necessary on our own, it can be well led, as our service men and women have been and continue to be. They will still, most importantly, be able to display that remarkable degree of motivation and dedication that sets them apart as professional forces in this troubled world. That does not happen by accident; it happens only because of the way in which they have been trained, led and organised over a number of years.
I hope that the review will be looked on in a positive way and implemented with a will. Many of us who have had a great deal of experience in this field can give it a measure of encouragement and support. There is, however, one important caveat, which I want to stress. The National Security Council took a conscious decision and announced publicly that defence and security should be cut less than the activities of other departments and, presumably, by less than the Treasury had at first demanded and that the NATO figure of 2 per cent of gross domestic product should be held to. Some might say that that is little enough in all conscience. These changes, both reductions and enhancements, must have been costed and have contributed to the 7.5 per cent in the defence budget, which is what the National Security Council agreed at the highest level. The Treasury must now be held to that and must not, as has invariably happened in the past—usually before the ink was even dry—start to undermine the whole review by further restricting the cash flow by various means. Every review over the years—some of them have been very good—has been affected immediately in this way, which has had an appalling effect. It has downgraded the expectations announced to the public, minimised political and parliamentary intentions, served up endless trouble for the future, which is partly why we have had this yawning black hole, and rebounded dangerously, not only on operational performance but very much on the lives, support and welfare of the men and women of our Armed Forces and their families—on the covenant, in fact—to whom this country owes so much.
I hope that Ministers will take heed of these words, which are based on long experience, because, with the Treasury short of its full pound of flesh, it is all the more likely that the money will not be there to pay for the changes in the defence review. The Government say that they are cutting this and bringing that down and getting rid of the “Ark Royal” and that we will be left with this, that and the other, but we will find that, if we are not careful, the money will not be there to pay for even that. That would be absolutely disastrous. This has to be fought at the very highest level in the Cabinet and by the Chiefs of Staff in the Ministry of Defence. Ultimately, we have to not just hold the line as it is at the moment but in the future do very much better with the financial resources, or the whole pack of cards will collapse and we will be in for real trouble.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, it may be helpful to the House if I say that I estimate that at the current rate of progress this debate is likely to end at about six o’clock. A number of noble Lords have told me that that may place them in some difficulties as regards trains and flights to catch. I hope that noble Lords will bear that in mind.