Creditworthiness Assessment Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Blencathra and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 11th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Naseby. He cannot be here today but he has asked me to make it clear that he is not opposed to the principle of this Bill, as am I, but he is worried that it ties the hands of the FCA and is too prescriptive. That is why he seeks to delete the word “must” in the first group of amendments and substitute it with “may”; rather than the instruction to the FCA to “ensure that”, he suggests “consider whether”; and the word “should” in the final amendment in the group is a grammatical change.

In all of these amendments he was guided by the advice of the Consumer Credit Association and I would like to justify the amendments by explaining the CCA’s concerns. I want to set out this properly in this group so that there is no misunderstanding where my noble friend is coming from—the amendments are not a rabid desire for unfettered market forces. These are not so much probing amendments as airing amendments, if your Lordships will accept the term, to air the concerns of the CCA. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bird, with his tremendous experience in this matter, has considered them and will have impeccable detailed arguments against them. If that is the case, then we will have succeeded in airing these amendments today.

The Consumer Credit Association says that it is not against the general evaluation of credit referencing systems; however, it considers it inappropriate and disproportionate for the law to force firms to use and pay for rental data—or any other specific type of data—in their commercial assessment. It is concerned about what it calls unintended consequences.

At face value, most people would think that requiring lenders to use more data would inevitably lead to better decisions and improved consumer outcomes. However, a number of complexities appear not to have been properly considered, says the Consumer Credit Association. For instance, the rents of just under 4 million households—that is 40% of the rental market—are subsidised via housing benefit to the extent of about £5,000 per household per year. This means that the rent payments in these cases reflect receipt of subsidy rather than a tenant’s propensity to pay. Where the subsidy is paid direct to the landlord, this effect is even more pronounced. In the same vein, non-payment of rent may often reflect delays in paying the benefit rather than the unreliability of the tenant. It also says that well over 1 million tenants are already in arrears on their rent. The proposal would not help this large group; on the contrary, these consumers would find it more difficult to access credit and would therefore become even more financially excluded.

The collection and use of rental data is being marketed to landlords as a means of reducing arrears. The proposal would give unscrupulous landlords who fail to repair their properties increased leverage over tenants, because it would increase the risks for a tenant making any reasonable attempt to withhold or set aside their rent against getting repairs done to the building.

The CCA also says that it is not a given that council tax and rental data would add value for all types of lenders in all situations, yet all firms would be required to pay for this data whether or not they used it. This would be commercially inefficient and the cost would be passed on to consumers through higher prices for credit. It is the CCA’s strong view that firms are the best judges of whether it makes commercial sense for them to subscribe to products such as rental exchange and credit lending. Compelling them by law to do so would, on the other hand, be inappropriate.

Consumer representatives are divided on the potential impacts of the proposal but have flagged the risks of possible harm to some consumers. The Centre for Responsible Credit, for example, has urged caution, because failure to pay rent could lead to the loss of a home, bailiff action and, ultimately, imprisonment. Mainstream lenders are unlikely to consider the data predictive. For many people who miss a rental or council tax payment, it could lead to complete credit exclusion or higher cost credit.

The rollout of universal credit is expected to lead to a significant increase in rent arrears for housing benefit claimants. Similarly, private tenants face rising rents and a freeze on local housing allowance rates. In evidence to the Treasury Select Committee on 28 February this year, both StepChange and Citizens Advice acknowledged the potential negative impact. StepChange said:

“That is fine if the thing that is going to be included is something that you are paying well and on time. If you are behind on your rent and your council tax payment, all that is going to do is enhance the social exclusion for those individuals”.


Matt Upton of Citizens Advice said:

“It is important to acknowledge that it is a double-edged sword. As you say, we see lots of people struggling to pay those bills, and that will not necessarily affect them in a positive way … of the clients we see who struggle to access credit there is a proportion for whom credit referencing is a factor. For a greater proportion it is not the big factor”.


The ambition to increase access to credit for those who rent is laudable. As said by the noble Lord, Lord Bird, I believe that it will help about 80% of tenants, but the CCA says that the proposal’s potential benefits are uncertain, unquantified and currently unsupported by robust independent evidence. My noble friend Lord Naseby thinks that more studies on this must be done but he respects the point of the noble Lord, Lord Bird, that millions of honest, hard-working tenants who pay their rent and council tax would benefit from having their good record of payments used to get a mortgage or cheaper white goods.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bird, is keen to pick up the 20% who are in debt and seek ways to get them out of that hole, but my noble friend finds the CCA’s worries and concerns quite persuasive. As I read them, I found them persuasive too. I look forward to the answers of the noble Lord, Lord Bird, and the Minister. All we wanted to do was give these amendments an airing, raise the CCA’s concerns and wait to hear the answer.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very supportive of what the noble Lord, Lord Bird, is trying to achieve with the Bill. I have to admit, I was not aware of the issue until I read the debates on it and the Big Issue article he wrote.

I also have some worries about the potential unintended consequences raised by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I have communicated to the noble Lord, Lord Bird. We have to think about the context: more people are getting into rent arrears, partly because of universal credit and partly because of cuts to the benefits they rely on—in or out of work—at a time of rising rents. We know that council tax arrears are also going up because of what has happened to the council tax support system. This group of people will not be helped by the Bill. That is understandable: the Bill will help those with a good record, which is very useful and important. In his reply, I would like the noble Lord, Lord Bird, to assure the House that things will not rebound on that group and that they will not be in a worse position than they otherwise would have been. It would be helpful to have that assurance on the record.

Welfare Reform and Work Bill

Debate between Lord Blencathra and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Monday 21st December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 74 and 93. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, for his support for both, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for his support for Amendment 93. The aim here is to ensure that we debate the human rights implications of the cap, particularly regarding children and women. I am grateful to CPAG for its help with these amendments, and I declare an interest as its honorary president. I also support the other amendments in this group.

Amendment 74 would require the exemption of households from the benefit cap where necessary to avoid a breach of convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. It would send a clear message that Parliament intends a cap to be implemented in a human rights-compliant way. It would enable tribunals and courts to exempt families from the operation from the cap so as to avoid a breach of human rights without having to make a declaration of incompatibility. This is necessary because by incorporating the list of benefits included in the cap in primary legislation in Clause 7, which was not the case before, rather than leaving them in regulations as now, it appears that the Government are trying to avoid legal challenge under the Human Rights Act other than by way of such a declaration.

Amendment 93 would require the Secretary of State’s review of the cap to take into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The phraseology echoes that in Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 and Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. In ZH (Tanzania) the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, found that this effectively incorporated Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires the welfare of the child to be treated as “a primary consideration”.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The noble Baroness quoted the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, which I presume was from the Supreme Court case which ruled just a few months ago. However, the noble Baroness will be aware that the Government were taken to court on this very point of not implementing the UNCRC, the court ruled by three to two against Lady Hale and the judgment was that the Government were perfectly correct. The court went on to say, quoting some other distinguished noble Lords in this House, that it would be quite inconceivable for an unincorporated charter like the UNCRC to be given force in English law.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will come on to that case; I was talking about an earlier case that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, was involved in. I am quite aware of the outcome of the case heard earlier this year, but I thank the noble Lord for providing a trailer for what I will say later.

These amendments are prompted in part by the inadequacy of the Government’s own assessment of the human rights implication of the cap and in part by the judgment in the Supreme Court case that the noble Lord mentioned on the cap earlier this year. Both the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I was then a member, and the Office of the Children’s Commissioner have emphasised that child poverty is a human rights/children’s rights issue. Lowering the benefit cap clearly has implications for the number of children living in poverty. An internal assessment leaked to the Guardian in May suggested that if parents are unable to avoid the cap through paid work, it could plunge a further 40,000 children into poverty.

The impact assessment says nothing on the subject of child poverty, yet when I tabled a Written Question to ask what the impact on the number of children in poverty would be, I was referred to that impact assessment. As I said in our first session, I consider that rather insulting, as the implication was that I had not read it. I remind the Minister that the Companion makes it clear that Ministers should be as,

“‘open as possible’ in answering questions”,

as this is,

“inherent in ministerial accountability to Parliament”.

I therefore ask the Minister now, what is the department’s estimate of the impact on child poverty of reducing the cap, given that we know from the Guardian that such an estimate exists? I am quite happy to accept any provisos about possible behavioural responses but this is not a good enough reason for refusing to provide Parliament with such a crucial piece of information. Also, can the Minister tell us how the Government responded to the questions from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on whether a proper child rights impact assessment had been conducted and,

“the measures being taken to mitigate negative impact on the enjoyment of the rights of children, particularly those in vulnerable situations”?

The impact assessment has a section entitled “What are we doing in mitigation?”. I could summarise the contents by saying, “Not very much”. It says nothing at all about mitigation of the negative impact on the rights of children, despite the request from the UN committee. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, too, has criticised the impact assessments and the human rights memorandum which accompany the Bill for failing fully to assess the impact on equality and human rights. It warns that there is a risk to the UK’s compliance with its obligations under national and international human rights law, particularly with reference to children, women and disabled people, and therefore it gives its firm support to these amendments.

The impact assessment does at least acknowledge that women are more likely to be affected than men, as 64% of claimants who have their benefit reduced are likely to be single females—mainly lone parents. Sixty-three per cent of households capped to date have contained a child under five, and in total more than twice as many children as adults have been hit by the cap.

In the human rights memorandum, the Government note the Supreme Court’s decision, which I shall come to now. They assert that they have fully considered their obligations under the UNCRC—in particular, Article 3, which concerns the duty to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. However, their analysis of the best interests of the child seems to rest on the proposition that it is in the best interests of children overall to have parents in work and that work remains the surest route out of poverty.

That would be laughably inadequate if it were not for what is at stake. As the EHRC observes, it betrays a particular lack of understanding regarding compliance with the UNCRC. It may well be in the best interests of many children for parents to find work but it will depend on the work available and on the circumstances—as has already been discussed on earlier amendments, work can represent a cul-de-sac rather than a route out of poverty. Moreover, this bald statement ignores the fact that, as my noble friend said, the great majority of those who were already subject to the cap did not find work as a result. Is it really in the best interests of children to have their standard of living reduced even further when a survey, reported in the first-year review of the operation of the cap, found that more than a third of those affected had already had to cut back on household essentials and many had incurred debt?

In fact, the Government’s position pretty much ignores the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr— that it,

“misunderstand[s] what article 3(1) of the UNCRC requires”.

The final decision does not alter that fact. She continues:

“It requires that first consideration be given to the best interests, not only of children in general, but also of the particular child or children directly affected by the decision in question. It cannot possibly be in the best interests of the children affected by the cap to deprive them of the means to provide them with adequate food, clothing, warmth and housing, the basic necessities of life. It is not enough that children in general, now or in the future, may benefit by a shift in welfare culture if these are also the consequences. Insofar as the Secretary of State relies upon this as an answer to article 3(1), he has misdirected himself”.

She also pointed out that the children affected suffer from a situation which is none of their making and which they themselves can do nothing about. Can the Minister now give a more convincing response to the weighty charge that the cap, and therefore these clauses, are not in the best interests of children? As it is, the failure to give proper consideration to the best interests of the child could leave this measure vulnerable to a further future legal challenge.

In his judgment, Lord Carnwath referred to a point—mentioned by my noble friend—made during the passage through this House of the Welfare Reform Bill, which became an Act in 2012. That point was that most of the savings from the cap resulted from the inclusion of child benefits and child tax credits, even though these will be received by the great majority of those on median earnings. I shall return to this when I speak to Amendments 76 and 77. Although ultimately, Lord Carnwath sided with the judges who did not allow the appeal, he still considered that the cap did not comply with the UNCRC, and he expressed the hope that the Government would address the implications of this when it came to reviewing the cap. Even Lord Reed, who spoke for the majority in disallowing the appeal, linked the proportionality assessment to the fact that the cap was set at median earnings. Now that, as my noble friend has made clear, there is no clear rationale for the level of the cap, as it is pushed to be below median earnings, that proportionality judgment might start to look rather different.

I have focused mainly on the implications for children’s human rights, but, as I said, the human rights of women and disabled people are also at issue. I am sure we will hear more about the more recent High Court case that found indirect discrimination against disabled people through the impact on carers, but I will not go into that now. These wider implications are another reason for my amendment to Clause 7, which requires general human rights compatibility.

I believe that these amendments should be uncontroversial. After all, if the Government are so confident that the cap is compliant with human rights instruments, they have nothing to fear from them. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be willing to take them away and consider them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis. She said at one point that the public do not understand how social security works. That is very true; I spent many years as a Member of Parliament and understood only a fraction of it, and I believe that very few people understand the details of the 70,000 regulations. However, what the public do understand is that when they have to move to another part of the country and cannot afford a mortgage on £26,000, or if they have to live in a house which they would ideally like to be bigger, better or different, or in a better street, and they cannot afford that, but then they see someone else or a family getting £26,000 or more in benefits, they feel it is unfair. You do not have to know how the regulations work to have that instinctive feeling. That is why all parties strongly supported the benefits cap when it was introduced by the previous Government. I appreciate that the Labour Party now has some reservations about it and I will comment on that later.

I had intended to talk only about the level of the cap and how it was fair. However, in view of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the UNCRC, which I thought I would be dealing with on another amendment, perhaps I could make those comments in this speech in answer to her and I will not speak again on UNCRC matters. On the level of the benefits cap, as politicians we have different views but this was part of a case before the Supreme Court last year. It was just decided a few months ago and five of the noble judges ruled in the Government’s favour that the benefits cap was not contrary to the rights of the child and not in breach of the ECHR.

In looking at the level of the cap, Lord Reed for the court said that:

“In relation to the related criticism that children in households affected by the cap are deprived of the basic necessities of life, that argument was rejected by the courts below, and I see no basis for reaching a different conclusion. As I have explained, the cap for a household with children is equivalent to a gross salary of £35,000 per annum, higher than the earnings of half the working population in the UK, almost three times the national minimum wage, and not far below the point at which higher rate tax becomes payable”.

That was of course in relation to the level of the cap then and we are now talking about a reduction of 12.5%—but, based on the strong views of the court, I can see no reason why it would come to a different conclusion if the cap were lowered by 12.5%.

In looking at how families had been forced to move, the learned judge went on to say:

“In relation to the argument that households with children cannot reasonably be expected to move house … Millions of parents in this country have moved house with their children, for a variety of reasons, including economic reasons. It is, in particular, not uncommon for working households to move out of London in order to find more affordable property elsewhere. It is also necessary to recognise that transitional financial assistance is available for households affected by the cap who cannot move until suitable arrangements have been made in relation to the children, as I have explained”.

Those views were taken from a 95-page report of the Supreme Court, having heard days and days of argument.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I may have misheard, but I think that I heard the noble Lord say that all five judges said that the cap complied with the UNCRC on the rights of the child. Is that right or did I mishear?

[Lord Blencathra]

If I said that, I misspoke. It was three out of five: a majority verdict of the Supreme Court.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

So some of the five said that it did not comply but the fact is that the UNCRC is not incorporated into UK law, and therefore that was not sufficient for the appeal to be allowed.

[Lord Blencathra]

I take the noble Baroness’s point but that was not the view of Lord Reed, which I read. I can see nowhere in his judgment where he said that we did not comply with the UNCRC but that nevertheless, because it was not incorporated, he was going to find in the Government’s favour. That is not my interpretation of reading those pages whatever.

Let me move on to the UNCRC, since we have got there. First, the judge made the point:

“As an unincorporated international treaty, the UNCRC is not part of the law of the United Kingdom (nor, it is scarcely necessary to add, are the comments upon it of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child)”.

Then comes the crucial point:

“‘The spirit, if not the precise language’, of article 3(1) has been translated into our law in particular contexts through section 11(2) of the Children Act 2004 and section 55 of the Citizenship, Borders and Immigration Act 2009”.

The judge was making it very clear that although the exact wording of the UNCRC was not applicable in the UK, the Government, through legislation, had incorporated the principles of it and were therefore complicit.

The judge went on to say that,

“it is therefore inappropriate for the courts to purport to decide whether or not the Executive has correctly understood an unincorporated treaty obligation”.

He then quoted Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s comments from a famous judgment, which I will leave aside, before noting:

“Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood expressed himself more emphatically … ‘It simply cannot be the law that, provided only a public officer asserts that his decision accords with the state’s international obligations, the courts will entertain a challenge to the decision based upon his arguable misunderstanding of that obligation and then itself decide the point of international law at issue’”.

The noble Baroness, who I greatly respect and who is very knowledgeable in this matter, quoted extensively I think from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who took a rather more fundamentalist view of incorporating the UNCRC into English law. She has held that position for some time, but it was not the view that the court collectively took.

I will conclude taking extracts from these turgid 95 pages shortly. The judge went on to say:

“Finally, it has been explained many times that the Human Rights Act entails some adjustment of the respective constitutional roles of the courts, the executive and the legislature, but does not eliminate the differences between them: differences, for example, in relation to their composition, their expertise, their accountability and their legitimacy. It therefore does not alter the fact that certain matters are by their nature more suitable for determination by Government or Parliament than by the courts. In so far as matters of that nature have to be considered by the courts when deciding whether executive action or legislation is compatible with Convention rights, that is something which the courts can and do properly take into account, by giving weight to the determination of those matters by the primary decision-maker”.

That decision is,

“relevant to these appeals, since the question of proportionality involves controversial issues of social and economic policy, with major implications for public expenditure. The determination of those issues is pre-eminently the function of democratically elected institutions. It is therefore necessary for the court to give due weight to the considered assessment made by those institutions. Unless manifestly without reasonable foundation, their assessment should be respected”.

In conclusion, the judge says:

“Many of the issues discussed in this appeal were considered by Parliament prior to its approving the Regulations … Furthermore, that consideration followed detailed consideration of clause 93 of the Bill, which became section 96 of the 2012 Act. It is true that the details of the cap scheme were not contained in the Bill which Parliament was debating, but the Government’s proposals had been made clear, they were challenged by means of proposed amendments to the Bill, and they were the subject of full and intense democratic debate. That is an important consideration. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General … ‘The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in Parliament’”.

He went on to say:

“The same is true of questions of economic and political judgment”.

I apologise for quoting extensively from those bits of the judgment. I shall not speak again on UNCRC issues, but the noble Baroness provoked me in the sense that she relied heavily on the UNCRC to somehow suggest that the Government were acting improperly or illegally and had something to fear from the Human Rights Act. That was not the view of the majority of the court.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I do not want to provoke the noble Lord any further, but would he not accept that Lord Carnwath, in accepting that the appeal was unfounded—whatever the legal term is—and that the issue was one for Parliament, specifically asked the Government when they reviewed the benefit cap to consider what the judges had said about Article 3.1 of the UNCRC? That was my point—the Government have reviewed the benefit cap, and it will be even less in the interests of children than it was at the higher level.

[Lord Blencathra]

I thank the noble Baroness. I think that the comments of Lord Justice Carnwath are what the lawyers would call obiter dicta—they did not go to the heart of the judgment. He was making an observation that it might be nice if the Government considered it, but there was no suggestion that the Government’s action in imposing the benefits cap was somehow contrary to the European Human Rights Act because we had failed to look after the interests of the child, as set down in the UNCRC.