Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, this is not just a good amendment, it is a very important and timely one. Noble Lords will recall that after the death of Robert Maxwell and the exposure of the way in which he had looted the Mirror Group pension funds, the Government introduced a new pensions structure to protect defined benefits pensions, as well as new accounting standards which needed to be obeyed by pension funds. The effect of this protective barrier placed around defined benefits funds has been that they have adopted extremely conservative investment strategies and the return on investments has correspondingly been extremely low compared with what could be achieved by quite modest amendments of investment strategy.

These issues are now a matter of widespread discussion where the unfortunate unintended consequences of the post-Maxwell legislation have been revealed. It is necessary quite rapidly to take account of the discussions, to assess the performance of pension funds since the last significant pensions legislation, and to come up with sensible proposals for reform. That is why this amendment is crucial, for both the pensions funds industry and the wider economy. I encourage the Minister to support this amendment because by doing so the Government would make a major contribution to the future prosperity of a whole raft of pensioners in this country and to the success of pension funds as investment vehicles within the UK economy.

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I am concerned that, while seemingly innocuous, this amendment might turn out to be the thin end of the wedge of government intervention in pension investment. Clearly, the obligation on pension trustees should be to do their best to get the right returns for their investors. Once we start incentivising trustees to take decisions based on incentives offered to them, that raises the question of who then bears the consequences and the responsibility if those investments turn out in the long term not to be the right thing for their pensioners to be invested in.

I do not dispute the point that pension fund investments have not been optimal in the past, but to my mind that is to do with regulatory restrictions that have been placed on pension funds and the requirements to meet those restrictions. I think there is a case to look at the regulations around pension funds that restrict their investment choices and to enable them to invest in a wider set of assets, but I do not think the right way to do that is to start proposing incentives that would turn into the Government mandating the way that pension funds should be invested.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I still think of myself as a relatively new Member of the House, so it is useful to remind the House of my lifetime spent working in the pensions industry, broadly in support of scheme members. I have been a scheme trustee, I have chaired the Greater London Council investment panel and I have advised trustees of pension schemes as the scheme actuary. I am just stating my expertise here.

I support the amendment because I think a review is required. I take on board the remarks about the thin end of the wedge, but unless we have the review those concerns cannot be addressed. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, there is now a big conversation about using pension scheme money to promote the British economy. There is actually a long history of that sort of proposal going back over many years, but it seems to have reached a crescendo over the last year or so.

It is essential that we have a review. What is also essential, of course, is that the review is undertaken by those who know what they are talking about, but that has not necessarily been true about all the comments made so far. For example, I draw the attention of the House to the recent useful report produced by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association—not a body that I consistently agree with—on supporting pension investment in UK growth and thinking up quicker and simpler ways to promote pension fund investment in our economy.

I was going to raise two issues. One has already been explained clearly by my noble friend Lord Eatwell: the funding standards that have been established work against the principles that I am sure we all support. Another problem that we have is the Conservative Government’s introduction of freedom and choice. It is difficult to oppose freedom and choice but, when you come to pensions, which are long-term arrangements depending on long-term investment, giving people freedom of choice weakens the very basis upon which they are being organised. It is all very well saying to pension funds, “You’ve got to invest in infrastructure”, but if the members of that scheme have the right to pull their money out at any time, it is very difficult to take the long-term view. That is a fundamental incoherence behind the so-called policy of freedom and choice. Those issues need to be addressed in the review.

I also hope that the list of consultees for the review is not a complete list; to the extent that it is possible to consult the scheme members, they should be consulted as well. I also hope that the issues can go somewhat broader than those listed in the amendment.

In general terms, a review is needed, and I hope it will lead to the objective being clearly set out of promoting the UK economy.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to offer the Green group’s support for the general sense of direction here on both the provision of cash and the review of resilience. It is not an accident or a convenience that those two things have been brought together, as the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, just made clear.

We come back to a fundamental question: what is the financial sector for? If it is there to serve the real economy and real lives, it must meet people’s needs in both good and bad times. That applies at the individual level and the national one. The system must be able to stand up to not just financial shocks but the kinds of shocks that we know about in this age of the climate emergency, the nature crises and the threat of pandemics.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, was speaking, I was reflecting on being in Lancaster in 2016 about a week after Storm Desmond. I saw a city in shock. I saw what happened when they lost electricity for a day and a half or so. Digitisation and the disappearance of cash have come a long way since 2016 but people were absolutely desperate. They were not able to meet their basic needs, which surely must be part of the financial sector’s responsibility.

I broadly agree with the general tenor of everything that has been said but I want to make one strong point of disagreement with what most people have said. There is an idea that this is a transitional phase and that, once we have gone past the generation where people have not had digital in the prime of their life, the phase will end and everybody will then be able to use digital. I was going to tell exactly the same story as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, did. I will not repeat it but I will draw a further lesson from it. It is a story about a 91 year-old lady. She may have been able to cope with the telephone system and the buttons at 70 or even 80. I know someone in this situation; he is an older gentleman who finds it harder and harder each year to navigate the complications of digital.

None of us in this Room knows what our capabilities will be in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time. Just because you can do something now, you cannot guarantee that you will be able to do it in 20 years’ time. In terms of national resilience and meeting everybody’s needs, we genuinely have to make sure that, long into the future—potentially for ever if we look at that kind of scale—there will always be somewhere where you can walk up to a person and say, “This is my problem. I need you to help me sort it out”. That person needs to have the resources, knowledge, skills and power to sort out that situation for you because, ultimately, only having a person who looks you in the eye, sees the problem and deals with it will really meet everybody’s needs.

I have one final thought. There is sometimes a feeling that we have to have maximum efficiency and meet the needs of the majority, and tough luck for the rest. If we have a system that meets the needs of the most vulnerable people in our society—this is often said about public transport systems but it applies far more broadly—we have a system that is good for everybody in our society.

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, since I have not spoken in Committee so far, I should remind noble Lords of my interest as a former chairman of a bank and a current shareholder. However, I am not going to defend the service levels of banks, which I recognise need improvement.

On these amendments, I point out that, while I understand the rationale behind the desire to maintain access to cash, everything has a cost. We need to consider the cost of what is proposed as well as the benefit. My noble friend Lady Noakes is right that the shift towards digital and away from cash has snowballed over the past few years. It is not just customers who prefer not having to carry cash around. Many small businesses, clubs, associations and societies find it much easier now to have a low-cost terminal with which they can process membership dues, fees or even small transactions. It makes the accounting so much easier and avoids having to deal with collecting and disbursing large amounts of cash.

The move towards digital is happening across the whole economy. People talk about keeping branches open but there are many branches where only a handful of people come in during the week. When you think about the cost of maintaining the building infrastructure, as well as the staffing, security and systems, the cost per transaction becomes astronomical. Those costs have to be borne by somebody; they are borne by the other bank customers in higher fees, charges and interest rates. Nothing comes without a cost so we have to consider what the appropriate cost-benefit answer is.

As many noble Lords have said, clearly there are people who find it difficult to use digital technology and need access to cash, but there are other ways of—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord but I am afraid that there is another Division in the Chamber. The Committee will adjourn for 10 minutes and we will resume with the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, when the moment comes.

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[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

I was making the point that maintaining open bank branches as a solution to this problem is potentially a very expensive way of solving the problem and that the cost would be borne by other bank customers. We need to accept that there may be better ways of serving the genuine needs of those who cannot cope well with the digital economy and may need access to cash. Clearly there are potential solutions using other shops or post offices in localities to provide access to cash where that can be done, but another solution that many banks are adopting is the development of mobile banking branches. A mobile branch that visits a village once week may not be as good as a permanently open branch but at least it gives access to cash and the costs become much more affordable and socially acceptable.

We need to be cautious about assuming that maintaining the structure of the past is the right way to meet the genuine needs of those who have difficulties. We need to avoid fossilising a structure that is no longer fit for purpose. If this debate had been happening 20 years ago about telecoms, we might have wanted a law that said there had to be a telephone box in every high street. If we had had this debate 100 years ago, we would be requiring there to be a horse trough in every high street. There have to be other ways in which we can meet the genuine needs of those who have special needs without the blanket approach of insisting that highly costly and inappropriate branches remain open in places where there is no demand for them.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the excellent maiden speech of my noble friend Lady Lawlor, and to welcome her to the House. I have had the great good fortune to collaborate with her on policy issues over what now amounts to several decades in her role as founder and head of a major think tank with a well-deserved reputation for well-researched and detailed reports—perhaps the hallmark of somebody who started her career as an academic historian. I know that she has wise but spirited and forthright views on many topics, and I have no doubt she will bring that sharp intellect and independent mind to the business of the House. We look forward to her future contributions.

Before I speak on the Bill, I should note my role as a former chairman of Lloyds Bank, but I have no current interests other than as a continuing shareholder. I welcome the Bill, in particular the proposal to add competitiveness to the objectives of regulators, but my fear is that the Bill does not go far enough to redress the overly burdensome nature of the regulatory system that has built up over the last decade. I am not proposing that we turn the clock back to the inadequate regime prior to 2008—many of the reforms introduced then were necessary and are effective—but as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral argued, the excessive regulatory burden on the financial services industry comes not so much from the regulation itself as from the overly bureaucratic way it has been implemented by the UK regulators.

This culture stems from the regulators’ overriding internal objective to avoid the risk of being blamed for failing to do something, with little incentive to balance that against the costs that their intervention may impose on the industry. I fear this tendency to gold-plate is fuelled by the current superficial nature of the parliamentary scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place, which tends to focus on naming and shaming someone for anything that has gone wrong. Furthermore, the growth in staff numbers means that much of the regulation of major institutions is undertaken by relatively junior staff who are more likely to stick to a rigid interpretation of the regulatory rules because they simply do not have the confidence or experience to make balanced supervisory judgments.

The senior managers regime, for example, is, in principle, a sensible safeguard to ensure appropriately qualified people are in key industry roles and are held accountable. However, when a major institution has gone through a responsible and exhaustive recruitment process involving an external search firm, it is simply unnecessary and damaging to then have the appointment held up for further lengthy scrutiny by often far less experienced staff at the PRA and FCA. The overly forensic attempt by regulators to pin every mistake on some individual and require consequential penalties has had a corrosive impact, discouraging individuals from making difficult decisions or taking on difficult roles that carry a risk of failure. It has led to a huge increase in bureaucratic processes and documentation, as managers seek to syndicate responsibility and cover their backs.

Another example is the tendency of the regulators to apply a one-size-fits-all approach, unwilling to recognise this may be disproportionate for some sectors or firms. The FCA’s fair pricing review is a case in point: in seeking to address certain consumer pricing practices, the review spread across the whole industry and imposed burdensome data collection on sectors such as the wholesale insurance market, where the participants are skilled professionals. Ring-fencing is another example where the overly rigid application of something which is in principle a sound idea has had a disproportionate impact on banks with relatively small non-ring-fenced activities. The FCA’s worthy objective of protecting the customer has been developed under the customer duty approach to the point where firms fear that even negligent or unreasonable customers will claim redress for buying a financial product that, after the event, causes them a loss. As a result, many products and helpful financial guidance have been withdrawn or repriced out of many people’s reach. This overly protective approach to customers needs to be replaced by a more even-handed objective of simply ensuring fair trading. Caveat emptor has been replaced too much by caveat venditor.

The downside of this overly intrusive regulatory approach is not just the direct costs but, more significantly, the diversion of management time and IT resources away from transforming businesses to better serve their customers. The introduction of competitiveness as a regulatory objective may be helpful to provide a counterbalance. I also welcome the provisions in this Bill for the Treasury to require regulators to review their activities and to set up independent cost-benefit panels, but these measures will not solve the problem without a fundamental shift in attitude, skills and culture within the regulators. I welcome the Chancellor’s commitment in Edinburgh to bring forward further measures to address some of these issues, including reviews of ring-fencing, the senior managers regime and the boundary between advice and financial guidance, but even then, I am not sure we will transform the regulatory approach without a more fundamental reshaping of the organisations and their accountability.

I think it is worth considering whether smaller regulators with fewer and more experienced staff would do a better job of providing supervision, with more considered judgments, and whether the benefit of having two separate regulators outweighs the burden of having two overlapping supervisory teams for major institutions. Finally, while I support the Bill, as other noble Lords have argued, given the powers it transfers to regulators it is important that it is accompanied by a more informed and balanced structure of parliamentary scrutiny that can also hold regulators to account for their new objective of the competitiveness of the industry. I ask my noble friend whether the Leader of the House has any plans to bring such proposals before the House.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to build on what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord McFall, Lord Barnett and Lord Hollick. Then I will make one suggestion in respect of Amendment 92, which I support. Comment has been made about the fact that the accountancy profession has got too concentrated for public benefit. It is altogether too cosily placed vis-à-vis the very largest banks and companies. The noble Lord, Lord Hollick, referred to Barclays using the same auditors for more than 100 years; it that is not a recipe for slack auditing, I do not know what is.

The noble Lord, Lord McFall, noted that many accountancy firms provide both auditing and consultancy services. Sometimes, the non-auditing services are more valuable than the auditing services, which is a crazy situation. It is a pity that the Bill does not address that because if, as auditor, you ought to be saying some things with “rigour”—the word quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, from an article by Mr Woolf—how can you avoid a deep conflict of interest? I suggest, and experience bears me out, that you cannot bring to the very difficult task of auditing the rigour that is on occasions necessary to bring a bank or a large company to heel and to ensure, as far as any audit can, that some of the disasters we have seen are thereby avoided.

As I say, I am sorry that we are not addressing that issue in this Bill. Perhaps it is not too late to table such a provision on Report. However, I fear that a great deal is lacking. I think I am right in saying that all the big four accountancy firms have been penalised or fined many millions of pounds in the past few years. I remember that in America, KPMG was fined more than $450 million for running fraudulent tax schemes for years on end. What happens to these firms’ reputation and business? Very little does, as far as I can see. I suggest to my noble friend Lord Lawson and his co-proposers of Amendment 92 that it is not clear beyond peradventure that the bank under consideration should not be present at these statutory meetings. It may seem an obvious common-sense point that you cannot have such a statutory meeting with somebody from the relevant bank being present. However, given the cynicism of our world, we should make that clear. Given that we are at a flexible stage of our consideration of the Bill, if Amendment 92 goes forward, I recommend that that provision be included in it.

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think anyone can disagree with the arguments put forward by my noble friend Lord Lawson that the regulators should have access to the best available information from the auditors and should be able to request the information relating to the accounts that they want. What I am less clear about from this discussion is whether there is a need for that to be built into this legislation. I should be very grateful to my noble friend the Minister if he would clarify whether there is anything in the current law that prevents regulators doing exactly what these amendments suggest.

Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I sit on the board of a bank and on its audit committee. Things have moved on considerably since 2008. It is clear to me that as regards the major banks, the PRA has frequent confidential discussions with the auditors; and those are perfectly proper. It is also clear to me that the PRA can, and does, request information from the relevant bank in any form that it feels it needs to have to perform its duties. Therefore, the question is whether there is anything in the current legislation that would allow an auditor to refuse to meet the PRA or to refuse to provide information on the grounds of commercial confidentiality or conflict. Are those powers extant in existing legislation? Is there anything that allows a bank to withhold financial information if it is requested by the PRA? If those powers are already available, I am less clear what these amendments would add.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, it is clear from remarks made around the House that noble Lords support the intention of these amendments—that there should be regular dialogue between the regulators and auditors, and that accounts submitted to the regulators should be fit for purpose and provide the relevant information to inform their decision-making. I understand that the contested issue is whether these meetings take place at the moment, and whether there are sufficient codes of practice—or simply what is regarded as normal practice—to enable these meetings to take place. However, I do not think that that is enough. As my noble friend Lord Hollick said, we have a responsibility to the taxpayer to ensure that these meetings take place and that the appropriate accounts are provided to the regulators.

When he replies to this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, will have to tell us that he can guarantee that these meetings will take place and that accounts will be provided in appropriate form: not simply relying on codes of practice, but on the force of statute.

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[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, from the discussion, I am once again not clear on whether this needs to be built into the legislation in the way that is being suggested. As the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has said, I do not think that anyone would now dispute that it is a useful backstop to have a leverage ratio alongside the risk-weighted assets calculation of capital. However, that is built into CRD 4, and the PRA and FPC have recently demonstrated that they are perfectly capable of anticipating that in terms of the capital guidance that they give to institutions on the capital that they are required to hold.

There is an argument about whether 3% is the right level or not. I can assure my noble friend Lord Lawson that in the UK at least, whatever banks may have done in the past, they would not get away with applying whatever risk weighting they chose to devise against their own risk assets. All the risk weightings applied in the risk-weighting process are reviewed intensely by the PRA. It has to approve the internal model in order for it to be used to assess your own risk capital, and that process is now extremely well scrutinised by the regulator.

Nevertheless, there is a good argument that, because the process is bound to be imprecise, having a backstop of an overall leverage ratio makes sense. I think that is generally agreed. However, if you make that leverage ratio too restrictive, you may distort behaviour in a way that you do not desire by encouraging banks and other financial institutions to put too many of their assets into risky assets. If you have only a leverage ratio that does not discriminate by risk, and you are allowed only to hold that amount of assets, then you will stop risk weighting them and simply go for the riskiest assets you can get within that overall leverage ratio. The two have to work together. We should be careful about believing that having too hard a biting overall leverage ratio will reduce banks’ risks as it may work in the other direction.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

The issue here is not whether you should have a leverage ratio; it is not whether it should be statutory or not. The issue is who should determine it: the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England. That is the issue. Although I speak as a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, I still think it would be better left to the FPC. That is the issue; not whether it should be statutory or whether it should be alone without any consideration of risk-weighted assets. The issue is simply who should determine it.

[Lord Blackwell]

I thank my noble friend for that clarification, but I was responding to the points that were made by him and other noble Lords in advancing their arguments. If you come down to the question of “Does the PRA need more powers in order to enforce a higher or more restrictive leverage ratio?” then it can, under its existing powers, require capital add-ons to banks if it is not satisfied with the risk weightings. That is the way it would deal with it. It seems a slightly tangential point as to whether it is setting the overall leverage ratio or whether it is setting the capital ratio by other means. I should like to hear the Minister’s response on whether he thinks there is a case for this being built into the legislation.

[Lord Hollick]

I, too, strongly support this amendment. This is a serious matter. It is not a backstop, or at least I do not see capital as a backstop; I see it as the foundation upon which safer financial institutions can be built. We debated in great detail, quite properly, the regulatory process and all of the regulatory initiatives, but at the end of the day there is nothing that can protect the public and the depositors other than a strong capital foundation.

In a characteristically robust article in today’s Financial Times—which of course I will replace in the Library—John Kay said:

“It is hard enough to find people capable of running financial conglomerates—the fading reputation of Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase chief executive, confirms my suspicion that managing these businesses is beyond the capacity of anyone. The search for a cadre of people employed on public-sector salaries to second guess executive decisions is a dream that could not survive even the briefest acquaintance with those who actually perform day-to-day supervisory tasks in regulatory agencies. They tick boxes because that is what they can do, and regulatory structures that are likely to be successful are structures that can be implemented by box tickers”.

He goes on to say:

“Financial stability is best promoted by designing a system that is robust and resilient in the face of failure”.

That is what a strong capital base does.

It is very important that the Financial Policy Committee has the power to do this. Of course, politicians can always be relied on to make the right decisions but, as we know, when political priorities are to encourage Chinese banks to come to London, for instance, they are allowed to open branches. I am sure that China is a better credit risk than Iceland but it gives you an insight into how decisions can be made by politicians. It is very important that the Financial Policy Committee is given the power to make these decisions, and to make them independently, just as the Bank of England does over interest rates.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I can see something like a bail-in scheme working satisfactorily with regard to a bank the size of the Co-op Bank, for example, and indeed the proposals to bondholders are effectively a do-it-yourself bail-in scheme. However, in the unlikely event that it was necessary, if a bank as large as Lloyds Bank were in trouble, I find it difficult to believe that the situation could be resolved by a bail-in scheme. This is in part for the reasons that others have given, that the knock-on effects to the rest of the banking system are too large. So while the bail-in system makes great sense, I do not think it can be a sort of universal solvent to the possible need for taxpayer money to be used when huge banks are in trouble, or for so long as we have huge banks.

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, in asking Parliament to approve these powers, I wonder if my noble friend could set out what protection he believes is built into this legislation for the inappropriate use of these powers. I understand why having a regime in place that allows a speedy resolution to be enacted is desirable. If that is to come about, it needs to happen very quickly and efficiently when the circumstances call for it. The draft legislation sets out the conditions under which those powers might be exercised. The new Section 8A of Schedule 2 talks about appropriate conditions protecting,

“the stability of the financial systems … the maintenance of public confidence … the protection of depositors … the protection of client assets”,

but those conditions are obviously subject to judgment and interpretation, and it would be helpful to understand those parties who might be affected by the exercise of those powers, not least of course shareholders and bondholders, and whether there is any protection for them against the inappropriate use of those powers without getting into some lengthy and time-delaying process of judicial review.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, these clauses give the Bank of England very considerable powers and responsibilities, which we will need to consider very carefully; we are going somewhat into uncharted waters. At a purely quantitative level, will my noble friend, if not today then on some other occasion, indicate how the system would have worked if it had been applicable in the recent financial crisis? That is to say, in the case of the bailed-out banks, would it have been sufficient to mean that there would have been no charge on the taxpayer, or is it likely that there would still have been a charge?

We will consider in particular the question of the hierarchy of debts. The briefs that we have had from the Treasury have been very helpful, but it might be helpful if my noble friend could in some way or another give us some idea of how the new hierarchy is now likely to work or, to avoid any doubt, perhaps to write the hierarchy into the legislation.

Other points give me some cause for concern, some of which have been made by the noble Lord on the opposition Front Bench. It seems that there is still a considerable risk of contagion if one suddenly bails in a particular bank, but the people who are its creditors will have repercussions elsewhere in the banking system. I am not entirely clear to what extent the Government have taken that particular risk of contagion into consideration. These are quite complicated matters, and we look forward with interest to the Minister’s reply.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Tuesday 8th October 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blackwell]

1: Clause 4, page 8, line 47, at end insert—
“( ) In determining the “specified extent” in subsection (5)(d), the regulator shall have due regard to proportionality where the ring-fenced activities constitute a large majority of the group’s overall activities.”

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[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, since I was unable to speak at Second Reading, I should take this opportunity to declare my interests at the start of Committee stage. I am a non-executive director of Lloyds Banking Group and chairman of Scottish Widows group.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con)]

My Lords, I would be most grateful if colleagues could leave the Chamber quietly, particularly because my noble friend is taking the proper course of declaring an interest which must be correctly entered in Hansard.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, before moving on to the amendment, and as I did not speak at Second Reading, I want to make it clear that I strongly support the principles of the Bill, and the principle of ring fencing in particular. My amendment is to deal with some of the practical issues of making that work in the financial institutions. The amendment deals with the situation where a financial services group that is primarily operating ring-fenced activities retains a small set of activities that may fall outside the ring-fence.

The consequence of the legislation as it stands is that where a group is primarily operating ring-fenced activities but retains some non-ring-fenced activities which may be excluded activities, it would be required to have a separate board for the ring-fenced subsidiary and a separate set of directors operating in it—that is, separate from the group board.

I can understand why having separate boards for a ring-fenced subsidiary may be seen as desirable where the group contains a large non-ring-fenced activity in investment banking or wholesale market activities in order to police the separation between the ring-fenced and the non-ring-fenced activities. The provisions of ring-fencing under the Bill should of course deal with that situation by specifying the amount of capital and requirements for security in the ring-fenced activity and its resolution, preventing the flow of dividends controlling the financing relationships between the ring-fenced activity in the group, but I can also understand that having an independent board for the ring-fenced activity where there are other significant activities in the group provides an added level of security to deal with potential conflicts of interest.

However, where the non-ring-fenced activities are of a very minor nature compared with those within the ring-fenced bank, it could potentially lead to a situation where the group board with responsibility to shareholders and to the public has virtually no control over the activities of the ring-fenced activity, despite the fact that the vast majority of the assets and capital are within the ring-fenced subsidiary. That would be a nonsensical situation. It would be poor governance and it would be difficult to operate such a group board in that situation.

The type of activities that I am talking about are those where the ring-fenced bank may feel that to serve its customers effectively it needs to retain some element of activities outside the ring-fence not engaging those as a principal part of its business but as part of achieving a proper level of service to its customers.

The amendment would explore that situation where the non-ring-fenced activities are a fairly minor part of the group. There are two ways in which this could be resolved in a common-sense way. The first way would be for the regulator to exercise discretion under new Section 142D to the FSMA to allow a small volume of otherwise excluded activities to be carried out within the ring-fence so long as the regulator is satisfied that including those activities within the ring-fenced subsidiary did not put at risk the solvency or ability to resolve the ring-fenced activities if there were situations that used the capital applied to the non-ring- fenced activities. So one solution would be to allow the ring-fenced bank to extend its activities. Of course, the regulator would also need to be assured in that situation that allowing the ring-fenced bank to operate those activities would not distort competition with non-ring-fenced banks operating in those markets without the ability to operate within the ring-fence.

The second way of resolving this, if the regulator does not feel that it can include those excluded activities within the ring-fenced subsidiary, would be for the regulator to use its discretion under new Section 142H(5)(d) to waive the requirement for separate board membership of the group and its subsidiary, again where the regulator is convinced that in so doing it does not put at risk the ability to resolve the ring-fenced bank where there was a threat to its solvency.

The amendment is probing in nature. The legislation as I have described it allows the regulator to exercise discretion, but I invite the Minister to provide clarity that where the legislation says that the separation of the boards should be “to a specified extent”, the regulator would have the freedom and indeed the expectation that it should exercise that discretion with due respect for the proportionality of the activities within the ring-fence and any activities that there may be within the group outside the ring-fence. That seems to me to be a common-sense solution. I beg to move.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether, in his assessment of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, the Minister might take into account the fact that it was exactly this sort of procedure that led to the steady erosion of Glass-Steagall over the years. There was a tendency continuously to say, “Well, if we have a particular subsidiary, then perhaps we don’t need to have the separation in this smaller subsidiary”. These steady erosions built up over the years, until by the early part of this century, before its repeal, the effectiveness of Glass-Steagall had been completely eroded. Perhaps the Government should take that into account. There is also the point that, if the investment banking services required by a ring-fenced bank are relatively small, they could, of course, always be purchased from another provider.

Finally, the Minister mentioned that the precise definition of the rules of extent and so on will be defined by the regulators and in secondary legislation. I wonder whether it would be appropriate at this moment to take into account the latest report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which has expressed considerable concern about the scrutiny of secondary legislation that will follow from new Sections 142A, 142B and so forth as we are discussing in this particular context. Are the Government likely to accept the enhanced scrutiny proposed by that committee with respect to these particular sections?

[Lord Blackwell]

I am grateful for my noble friend’s comments on Amendment 1 and for his explanation that the flexibility allowed for in this Bill will be flexibility that the regulator will be expected to interpret. I note the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, but clearly the regulator’s role will be to ensure that creep does not occur on the way and that the protection of the ring-fenced bank is the requirement as set out in this legislation. Therefore, with those assurances from my noble friend, I am pleased to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Deighton]

With respect to the specific question, we have not had the chance to review the delegated powers yet, but of course we will in formulating where we go from here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I am in total agreement with what the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has said about the importance of the reviews of this process. We have to realise that we really are breaking new ground here. In a way, this is a leap in the dark and we have no idea whether it will work. Obviously a lot of effort has gone into trying to ensure that it will work, but it is such a novel innovation that we really cannot be sure whether it will, or indeed whether it will have a whole series of unintended consequences.

Accordingly, I feel that it is very important that the process be kept under virtually continuous review. The amendment in the name of myself and my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe seeks to ensure that the first review and subsequent reviews take place within relatively short time periods of up to two years. The reason for that is that it is only five years ago, almost to the day, that Lehman Brothers collapsed, and let us think what has happened since then. If we were to retain the four-year limit, that would cover almost that whole period, with all the remarkable devastating changes that have occurred.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, in his proposed new Section 142JA, that such a virtually standing group should act as an independent arbiter and assessor of these matters. It certainly should not be, as in the Government’s proposal, the PRA inspecting itself. That does not seem to be a very satisfactory structure at all. It is not appropriate in terms of giving confidence in the reviews, and it is not fair to the PRA. The PRA should be able to stand up and do its job, and then accept that it will then be scrutinised by the sort of independent group proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull. My amendment would simply ensure that that group had a virtually standing role in assessing these major changes to ensure that, once we have taken this leap in the dark, we land on firm ground. On Amendment 5, I shall simply reiterate the arguments that I have just made. I beg to move.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I must express some reservations about the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull. It is not that I do not understand the significance of having continuous and effective review of these ring-fencing procedures, but it seems to me that we have set up, with a lot of time in this House and the other place, a regulator that has learnt in that legislation and its constitution and objectives many of the lessons of the past, and we have entrusted that regulator with maintaining the stability of the financial sector and enforcing this legislation, if the Bill is passed. I think there is a danger in seeking to replace the regulation of an industry by an independent regulator with what might be in danger of turning into regulation by parliamentary committee. Parliamentary committees have many virtues and values, but they cannot engage dispassionately in the same evaluation of detailed analysis and commercial information that a regulator can, and they are more likely to be swayed by current opinions of the day. I pay tribute to the work of the commission on which the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and other noble Lords sat, which did an excellent job. I worry about the possibility of moving away from regulation by independent regulators, which are deliberately made independent of the Executive, towards regulation by parliamentary committees.

[Lord Turnbull]

The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, referred to the fact that this might become a parliamentary committee. I think it is very clear that this would not be a parliamentary committee. The person who chairs it should,

“act independently of the Treasury, the PRA and the FCA”.

It would be much more like the Vickers commission.

[Lord Blackwell]

I thank the noble Lord for that clarification. I was responding to the fact that the amendment suggests that the chair should be approved by the chairman of the Treasury Select Committee. That would certainly alleviate some of my concerns. Nevertheless, the main point is that if we have an independent regulator, we should trust that regulator to do the job we have asked it to do. That does not prevent Parliament, or any Select Committee of Parliament, conducting its own reviews at any time it wishes, or appointing other reviewers if the circumstances require it.

I must just add that my concerns on that would be even greater if this was required to happen at two-yearly intervals, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, rather than at five-yearly intervals, because the task of the regulator with a permanent body looking over its shoulder would then become almost untenable.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, I had the opportunity of speaking at Second Reading, which seems rather unusual. I pointed out then, and I remain of the view, that the way that the Bill is drafted, with so much reference to a previous Act, makes it extremely difficult for the House to work out what is happening from moment to moment on an unbelievably complex matter. Having said that, the briefs that have been provided by the Treasury on individual amendments and so on are extremely helpful and do something to ameliorate the problem that I have just mentioned.

It seems to me that we are going very much into uncharted waters here. There is a lot of doubt about ring-fencing, its effectiveness and whether it is a sensible way of proceeding at all. I continue in the view that total separation is a better way of going with it. Certainly, since ring-fencing may cause problems, the case for having a review of it is overwhelming.

With regard to the specific way in which this amendment is drafted, the noble Lord who moved it pointed out that the suggestion is that the people who are appointed to the reviewing body should require the endorsement, effectively, of the Treasury Committee. I think I served as chairman of the Treasury Committee for longer than anyone else has ever served, and I welcome the fact that it is playing an increasing role in these affairs. It also seems to me that the development that has been adopted lately, of saying that it requires a degree of endorsement by the Treasury Committee, is good.

It certainly would be wrong—I think that my noble friend Lord Blackwell has misunderstood the position—to start saying that the review should be carried out by the Treasury Committee. It has, after all, an awful lot of work on its plate anyway. However, having said that, we certainly ought to have this amendment or some variation on it, simply because of the difficulties that the ring-fence system as now proposed is likely to create, assuming that we go ahead with it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Turnbull]

I referred to the second reserve power, which would allow that where, in the commission’s view, it was felt that not just a single bank but the banking sector as a whole was not respecting the constraints of ring-fencing and the scheme was basically not working, it could move by steps to full separation. Of course, this second reserve power was predicated on the assumption that there will be a fundamental review of the kind that some of us have been arguing for. If all that we have is the PRA-led review of the kind that the Government have been seeking, we would certainly not have a sufficiently strong basis. However, the review we are seeking is based on a view of the world in which, first, there is continuous innovation and, secondly, other jurisdictions are making changes—notably in the EU. At some point that, combined with the behaviour of a banking sector, may lead to the conclusion that there should be a further change. Deciding that this scheme is not working does not necessarily lead you to full separation; it could lead you to something else, such as tightening the regime or some other modification.

We have had this argument about the review. However, then you get to the real crunch, which is that even if there is agreement on the review, and the review says that ring-fencing needs to be changed in some way, this amendment says that the further action that has been identified and recommended by a son of Vickers could be implemented under the powers of this Bill. That is the fundamental disagreement. The Government argue that that means that you are doing something completely different. I argue, first, that getting legislation is not an easy thing to do—you have to compete for time; and, secondly, that not being able to implement the conclusions of such a review reduces the effect of the deterrence and increases the opportunity for lobbying. In any case, the Government would have the last say in the scheme that we have devised. Therefore, if there was a recommendation from a Vickers mark 2, the Government would not be forced to act on it: they could decide that they did not want to act on it and did not have to accept it. Equally, if they wanted to, they would be able to. The position is asymmetrical. Since the Government have a veto, they cannot be railroaded into a policy that they do not want. However, if it is a policy that they do want, they have the power to accept it and act accordingly. That is the basis of Amendment 23, which refers to this power, and of Amendment 117, which states that you cannot exercise this power until a fundamental review has taken place.

[Lord Blackwell]

Could the noble Lord explain the drafting of Amendment 23? As I understood his explanation, it was that this would be a contingent power that the regulator could enforce if necessary. The way the amendment is drafted, proposed new Section 142VA gives the impression that it would be a requirement regardless of any other condition. Perhaps the noble Lord will clarify how it will become contingent on the regulator deciding that it is necessary.

[Lord Turnbull]

If the drafting does not say that, we will have to amend it. The clear intention is for this to be a power and not a requirement. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, what underlies this whole debate is a feeling that the so-called advantages of the universal bank do not outweigh the dangers and disadvantages. My noble friend referred earlier to preserving the advantages of the universal bank, but there is no doubt that such advantages as there might be, regardless of the risks, are significantly reduced if we have an effective system of ring-fencing. Many of us here feel that the ring-fencing proposal is wrong and unlikely to be very successful. We came up with the Vickers report and the Government have gone along very largely with the proposal that was made, but the reality is that we are going to have a situation whereby we should really be going in the direction of full separation. This is bound to take time. Therefore, an amendment of the kind that my noble friend has proposed would effectively give us a means to get out of the present impasse to a situation where we move towards full separation.

I return for a moment to a point that I made earlier. Where does all this leave us in relation both to the United States and with regard to the European Union? This is clearly a global industry. It is no good our legislating for the situation with regard to British banks if quite different rules are being applied in Europe, or applied to us from Europe, or the rules are different in the United States. There is a strong case for trying to get an international consensus on this, but the ring-fencing proposal seems significantly different from what I understand is being proposed in Europe and certainly what is being put forward in the United States. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend will respond to two points. First, where do we stand with this proposal in relation to the international situation? Secondly, is there not a case for the amendment which, as my noble friend has said, will enable us to act if what has rightly been called an experiment as regards ring-fencing turns out not to work?

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, given some of the recent speeches, I again sound a small note of caution. While I understand the need to electrify the ring-fence, the Government and this House should be cautious about legislating on a presumption that universal banking is the wrong commercial or organisational model. I share many of the concerns that have been expressed about the difficulty of having a common culture in an organisation that embraces too many different activities. However, it seems to me that it is primarily a commercial judgment for the management and shareholders to decide whether or not they can make that range of activities succeed. The primary duty of the Government and the regulator is to ensure that whatever is done is not a threat to the financial stability of the system. As I said in my introduction to the first amendment, I support ring-fencing which seems to me to be targeted at that purpose, which is to define the capital and risk exposure of the ring-fenced bank and ensure that it is regulated in such a way that the other activities of the group do not impinge on the capital and solvency of the ring-fenced activity. So long as the Government and the regulator can do that—I understand that people are raising questions about that—it seems to me that the question of other activities in the group is not something on which the Government should rush to legislate.

There are arguments which have not been put in this House about, for example, the ability to serve customers in a common way across different entities in the group, which would not be prevented by ring-fencing. There are arguments about the use of common resources such as IT resources, infrastructure and a whole range of central resources that can be used in a group structure. There may be good arguments or bad arguments but those are arguments that the management and the shareholders should primarily be in a position to consider. Some will succeed and some will fail but it is not up to this House to decide the commercial logic or otherwise of universal banking. The House should decide primarily whether or not the ring-fencing, the safeguards in the Bill and the electrification that is already built into the government amendments will do the job that is intended.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, what is particularly striking about the commission’s report, especially its final report, is the way in which it presents a coherent package of measures. This amendment fits together with the review amendment that we considered earlier as those two elements reinforce each other. As Amendment 117 makes clear, the review element is the key trigger for Parliament to consider whether this measure of separation should be introduced. There is coherence here. What is distressing about the Government’s rejection of the nature of independent review and hostility towards this amendment is that by removing that internal coherence of argument they significantly weaken the overall approach to financial regulation which we are attempting to achieve.

In anticipating this discussion on separation, the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, asserted that the arguments for separation had not been considered and that if you wanted an amendment of this sort you ought to have another commission to consider the arguments. That is just not so as the arguments were considered extensively, first by the independent commission and then by the parliamentary commission. The main point that came out of those discussions was that there was a strong case for separation. However, the experiment of ring-fencing was felt to be worth while as, if it worked, the trauma of separation would not be required. The idea that this issue has not been considered is not the case as it has been considered very thoroughly. It has not been rejected but is seen as a backstop, if you like, to the ring-fencing proposal.

The most reverend Primate made the terribly important point, in a way which has not been brought out by other speakers, that this measure strengthens the whole structure of the ring-fence and will incentivise the banks to regulate each other. There will be an enormous incentive for all the banks to keep an eye on what everybody else is up to to ensure that they are not drawn into this final total separation. The people on the inside who really know what is going on will have a strong incentive to make the ring-fence work because if it does not work they know that there is a reserve power in the Bill. If you really want the ring-fence to work, you need this clause. It is a contingent clause and a reserve power but if we really want the ring-fence to work, the Government should wholeheartedly embrace the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull.

Sterling: Exchange Rate

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

I do not agree with the noble Lord. The April trade figures show a deficit in goods and services of £2.6 billion, compared with a figure of £4.6 billion 12 months ago.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, does my noble friend accept that, according to macroeconomic theory, one of the drivers of a trade deficit is a government deficit, because any public borrowing tends to be offset by savings from overseas savers? Would not those noble Lords who are concerned about the trade deficit, rather than trying to manipulate the exchange rate, be better off supporting the Government’s efforts to reduce the government borrowing level?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, that is a very sensible point. I think that everybody is agreed that we need to do everything we can, as UKTI is, to promote exports, because growing exports means growing jobs, greater growth and a smaller deficit.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

The failure of our tax system, about which we hear more from month to month, is a classic tale of legislation that is unfit for purpose and, above all, an enforcement resource that is grotesquely unfit for purpose. Any one of the large banks can wheel out more lawyers and accountants to defend them from a single thrust from the regulator than the regulator has in its entirety. It is not David and Goliath; it is David, without his sling, and Goliath. This is a very difficult Bill to be leading on and this is perhaps the most difficult aspect of a difficult Bill but I hope my noble friend will have something to say on enforcement.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, it is difficult to disagree with the objective of appropriate codes of conduct in this industry but I am left wondering what the amendment adds to the state of current regulations. As the noble Baroness will know, there is a regime of approved persons in the industry and to be an approved person, and to hold any position of responsibility in financial services, you are required to behave in accordance with a fairly clear code of conduct which covers many of the things that this amendment seeks to introduce. Before calling for the writing of yet another code, it would be helpful if the noble Baroness could explain what she thinks is omitted from the current code for approved persons, or whether it is an enforcement problem and, if so, how that would lead to better enforcement than currently exists under the approved persons regime. Otherwise, we are in danger of rewriting the same words over and over again.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend in her amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, seems to be replying for the Minister, telling us why it is not necessary. Is it harmful to have this amendment in the Bill? If so, let him tell us how rather than asking whether it is necessary. As I would have expected, the case has been made very well indeed by my noble friend Lady Hayter and supported elegantly and eloquently by my noble friend Lord Peston. I hope the Minister will not take any notice of the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, when he replies.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blackwell]

25F: Clause 6, page 21, line 19, at end insert—
“( ) the need to balance protection for consumers against the desirability of consumers having affordable access to appropriate products with appropriate information or advice or both”

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 25F I should ask the House to take note of my interests as set out in the register. The purpose of this amendment is to make it explicit that the FCA is able and, indeed, required to balance the absolute objective of consumer protection against the desirability of ensuring that the costs and risks of regulation do not result in customer detriment by discouraging providers from serving customers with products from which they can benefit.

The context of this amendment is the retail distribution review, which is coming into force shortly and to which my noble friend Lord Flight referred earlier. In my view, this quite properly moves the industry from selling investment products through often hidden commissions and ensures that independent advice is truly independent, high quality and paid for through a transparent fee. While my noble friend Lord Flight raised a number of practical issues, I am supportive of the aims of the RDR. Clearly, industry practices in the past led to some customers being sold inappropriate products and paying high commission charges without being clear about the size of those charges, how they were levied or how they might influence the advice they were receiving. The new regime should, on the whole, lead to those who want advice being clear what they are getting and what they are paying.

However, one consequence of higher standards is that those with relatively modest amounts to invest, or with relatively modest pension pots to turn into retirement income, may find that the cost of advice is prohibitive. By modest I am talking about people with tens of thousands of pounds, at and above the population average, not just those on low incomes or from disadvantaged communities. We are talking about a large part of the population finding the cost of advice prohibitive. Yet such people, while they have the need to invest, are less likely to be financially sophisticated and need the most help and guidance—particularly as they approach retirement.

It is important that the industry is therefore able to do its best to support those customers by providing information and guidance that helps individuals to understand their options, weigh up the risks and, where they do not want to take or cannot afford personal advice, come to their own decisions about which investment is best for them. We are talking here not about exotic investment products but simply, for example, about whether to stick to a cash ISA or purchase one with potentially higher long-term returns, or a decision about what kind of annuity to purchase—a decision that an increasing number of ordinary citizens will face over the coming years as direct benefit plans decline and more direct contribution pension plans mature. It is clearly up to the industry to provide the best information and guidance it can to help these customers, but, inevitably, without personalised advice and the full fact find and high costs that go with it, there will be some customers who make the wrong decisions.

The aim of this amendment is to make it clear that the FCA can and should balance the objective of protecting consumers in these circumstances against the risk that placing too high a bar for consumer protection will discourage providers from seeking to serve this market, for fear of the compliance risk that they take on. Of course we should want high standards of protection for everyone against deliberate mis-selling or plain negligence, and there may well be many customers who are better off doing nothing than being encouraged into inappropriate products, but there needs to be a balance to enable those providers who seek to act responsibly in providing information and guidance to do so with some confidence that the compliance risks are acceptable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken to my amendment and to my noble friend the Minister for his response, in particular for his statement that he and the Government are sympathetic to its aims. It is a very difficult issue. As he and I recognise, full advice based on a full fact find is a very expensive process. Only a small proportion of the population with significant assets would sensibly be able to afford that scale of advice and the costs that go with it. My amendment concerns the larger group of people who will not have personalised advice and will need to rely on what the Minister called generic advice, and which I described as guidance and information, where people will have to make their own decisions based on the information provided for them.

The essence of my amendment was not focused on more people having access to personalised advice—while that would be desirable, the costs speak against it—but on ensuring that where providers are trying to serve the market through generic advice, guidance and information, the level of protection that consumers can expect reflects the reality of the level of information and guidance that they can be provided with, and that the industry is not discouraged from entering into that market because of the potential costs of compliance. I note my noble friend’s comments that he believes this is adequately dealt with in the Bill. I am not completely convinced, but I will go back and read his comments and look at the Bill again before Third Reading. I encourage him and his colleagues to do the same to see whether there is a better way of resolving this difficult issue. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 25F withdrawn.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Myners]

The words proposed by my noble friend take us a little further in the right direction. I would like to go a great deal further but am more than happy to support my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, despite the cogent words of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, I share the confusion on this side of the House about what these amendments are intended to do. Everyone agrees that it is vital that there should be strong oversight of the governor and the executives of the Bank by the non-executive directors and that we have proper accountability and scrutiny. But what is proposed here is a court that will have a clear and very sizeable majority of non-executive directors. The amendments proposed by my noble friend earlier made it clear that all the members of that court would be directors, and would be directors in common, sharing responsibility for the decisions of the Bank. However the non-executive directors would be in a majority, and if those non-executive directors disagreed with what the executives proposed, they could make that clear in the court and they would have the majority to hold sway.

According to these amendments, the court, involving all directors, would be able only to propose policies and then a sub-committee of the board of only the non-executives would then go away and approve them. That seems to turn corporate governance on its head. Either we have a supervisory board of non-executives, which is a totally different structure, or we accept that the Court of Directors is indeed the Court of Directors and should, with all its members, accept responsibility. What we have here is a very sensible proposal for an oversight committee of non-executive directors that will play its role in allowing non-executive directors to review and scrutinise offline, but to report to the full court, as is normal in any governance process. All directors must share equal responsibility in the end for the decisions of that organisation.

[Lord Nickson]

My Lords, I apologise for the fact that I have not taken part in the proceedings and I did not intend to do so today. I am completely out of date in that my experience goes back a long way. When I was the chairman of a Scottish bank, which belonged to an Australian bank, Fred Goodwin, as chief executive, reported to me, before he went to RBS for five years. We got on very well. I am quite thankful that he went to RBS and that I did not have responsibility at the end.

I completely sympathise with the points of view that have been put from the government Benches. The principles are exactly the same. It is impossible to conceive that one would appoint a majority board of non-executive directors along with an executive. They have the responsibility for oversight. You might have a sub-committee, but I would be very surprised if any candidate for the position of governor would actually accept it having power over the non-executives in the Court of the Bank of England. Therefore, I think that the amendment is nonsense in practical terms. Although I may be out of date, I strongly believe that it should be rejected.