(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI want to respond to the concern expressed in Committee about the impact the clause would have on vulnerable groups—particularly, for example, female claimants fleeing gender-based violence—and to respond to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. Victims of gender-based violence may still be considered to be members of a particular social group for the purposes of making an asylum claim if they meet the conditions in Clause 32(3) and (4). In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, this clause does not therefore mean that women who are victims of gender-based violence are less likely to be accepted as a member of a particular social group: all cases are assessed on a case-by-case basis.
I cannot say, of course, that all women fleeing gender-based violence will always be found to be refugees, if that was the nature of the point that was being put to me. What I can say with certainty is that the structure of the definition does not preclude it. I think I heard, in the way the noble Baroness put the question, that the example was of a woman with “good grounds”. If she is asking, “Will this application be accepted?” good grounds is not the test and therefore, if good grounds is part of the question, I am afraid that that is why I necessarily gave the answer I did. I think if the noble Baroness looks at Hansard, she will see that I have now, again, answered the question directly.
I turn to Amendment 45A from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It is vital that we provide protection to those in the UK who require it as a result of persecution they would face due to sexual orientation, but I suggest that it goes without saying that protection must not be afforded on the basis of one’s sexual orientation where the acts in question are criminal in the United Kingdom. I shall deal with both his points.
First, I note the explanatory statement on the amendment. For those who have not seen it, I shall summarise it. The obviously well-meaning intention of this amendment is to prevent applicants under the age of consent in the UK being excluded from refugee protection—I hope I have understood that correctly. I reassure the noble and learned Lord and the House that line 9 of Clause 32 does no such thing. That is because, although an asylum applicant may be under the age of consent in the UK, they can still be persecuted as a result of their sexual orientation. For example, a 15 year-old homosexual applicant may still be recognised as a member of a particular social group should they meet the requirements of Clause 32, even though they are not legally able to consent to sexual activity in the UK. I distinguish in this regard—I hope this is helpful to the noble and learned Lord—between sexual orientation and sexual activity. In that context, I come to the other point.
Let me say what should not need to be said—of course this is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention—but we are concerned that, as drafted, the amendment could allow convicted paedophiles and other convicted sex offenders to be granted refugee status in the UK, solely on account of their criminal acts relating to their sexual orientation. Of course, that is not the intention of the amendment: we are concerned that it is an unintended consequence of it. I hope that what I have said already deals with the intention behind the amendment and reassures the noble and learned Lord.
Lastly, I come to Amendment 46. Clause 36 provides the interpretive framework for Clause 11, which sets out Parliament’s position on Article 31(1) of the refugee convention. Clause 36 is still relevant in terms of providing the UK’s interpretation of key terms in Article 31 of the convention, such as immunity from penalties, so it is not just there to serve Clause 11, which was the first point made by the noble and learned Lord. The convention does not define what is meant by coming “directly” or “without delay”. Again, we have taken the opportunity to define those terms. We have taken into account that group 2 refugees will still be protected and not refouled, and will receive relevant entitlements so that the object and purpose of the convention are upheld.
Clause 36 is clear that there is discretion not to grant differentiated entitlements where a person could not reasonably be expected to have claimed in another safe country or where a person made a claim as soon as reasonably practicable. I made points earlier as to discretion and individual assessment. So this does not necessarily rule out the position taken by the House of Lords in R v Asfaw; it will all turn on the particular facts of the case.
Finally, I will prevail on the Home Office, I hope, to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the point she raised. For these reasons, and with apologies that it has taken a little longer than I anticipated, I respectfully invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very full and considered response and all noble Lords for their contributions. The strength of feeling is strong and again I make the point that these clauses are overly punitive towards women and victims of gender-based violence. I fear that that concern was not answered in the very full answer we were given. In particular, I still do not think that the responses given take any awareness of the trauma of so many of the women who come forward. I fear that to talk about “sufficiently detailed interviews”, as the Minister did at one point, would raise hackles on that front.
I have no doubt that my right reverend friend the Bishop of Gloucester will read Hansard very carefully and may well write off the back of that. I thank the Minister for making the promise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister—I was about to ask him to, but he got in there before us. It is rather regrettable that we have not been able to persuade the Government on these points, and the Bill will not now adequately protect those who are subject to gender-based violence. That is the deep concern. That said, with deep regret, I will withdraw the amendment.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe point I am making is very important and we will get to it in another group. I absolutely accept that people use “mandatory sentence” in a common parlance way, but when we get to a later group, we will discuss what the test should be. I will not delay the Committee now, but the figures for when the minimum sentence is not actually imposed are surprising. People using the phrase “mandatory sentence” would be surprised to hear that in a third and sometimes nearly half of cases, the minimum sentence is not given. If “mandatory” does not apply in a third of cases, I question whether it is the appropriate word. Therefore, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with a minimum sentence with a provision, whether that is “exceptional” or some other test. I certainly do not seek to criticise the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for using the shorthand. I wanted to point out that it is a shorthand which can be misleading when one looks at the facts as to how such sentences are imposed.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am sorry—I thought very carefully about whether I should intervene. I was genuinely so taken aback by the Minister’s reference to prisoners being included that I nearly leapt up immediately. The question was then asked, but I have tried to replay it in my head. I absolutely understand that the Minister meant no offence but, out of context, I fear how it might be understood by those workers, such as chaplains, tutors and so on. By, in a sense, lumping them together with prisoners who have been employed, it could easily be misheard outside this House. I know that was not the Minister’s intention, but I ask him to put on the record that it was not what he meant.
I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to do that. As I am sure everybody recognises, that was not the point I was making. I appreciate that it was regarded as lame by some people, but the point that I sought to make was that the distinction and purpose of the amendment was to expand the definition from prison officers to other people working in prison. My point was that from the way in which it is drafted—and I appreciate that it could be redrafted—it could and would be read so broadly as to include prisoners who were doing jobs in prison. It was certainly not what I was saying to place prisoners doing jobs in prison with chaplains and others who are working in prison. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for giving me the opportunity to make that clear, if it was not already.