Lord Berkeley
Main Page: Lord Berkeley (Labour - Life peer)My Lords, I invite colleagues to leave the Chamber quietly so that we may at least hear the mover of the amendment.
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hanworth, is to require the Secretary of State, in dealing with the modifications to the licence conditions, to include in Clause 43(3)(b),
“provision imposing restrictions on the sale or purchase of electricity to or from group undertakings”.
This is an attempt to persuade the Minister, when she responds, to go a little further than she did in Committee last Monday when she said:
“There is no clear evidence that the divestment of retail businesses will increase competition or lower consumer prices”.—[Official Report, 28/10/13; col. 1386.]
I think that there is probably quite a lot of evidence, but we now have the opportunity to test this because, among many statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Energy last week, Ed Davey said that they would introduce annual reviews of the state of competition in the energy markets and that the first of these new competition assessments will be delivered by spring of next year. He went on to say:
“The assessment will be undertaken by Ofgem, working closely with the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition and Markets Authority, when it comes into being”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/10/13; cols. 1095-96.]
Those organisations, separately and together, are probably some of the best experts on competition issues we have in this country. It would be logical and right for them to include within certainly the first annual review a comment about separation. There has been an awful lot of talk about competition, which appears rightly to boil down to considering whether there is competition among those from whom you buy your electricity. However, the issue of competition at the other end and separating the generators from the retail end is just as important. I therefore wish to persuade the Minister to agree that the issue of separation within the assessment of competition that has been announced—and is very much to be welcomed—should be included. I beg to move.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 61A in my name and that of my esteemed colleague, my noble friend Lord Berkeley. According to common testimony, the Bill is an extremely complex affair. It seems to have been designed by lawyers and parliamentary draftsmen to render politicians incompetent to assess its intentions and to predict its likely effects. There is a suspicion that the Government are not fully in control of this juggernaut.
Our anxieties in this respect are particularly acute in connection with the provision of a so-called route to market. Such a route should enable the independent generators to survive what seems to be the clear intention of the big six energy companies to squeeze them out of the market. The independent generators are important because they represent the germ from which a genuinely competitive energy market could develop. They are also important because they could be expected in ideal circumstances to provide a large proportion of the investment in renewable energy generation. Some of the Government’s documents recognise this potential. They imagine the proportion of new investment in renewables attributable to independent generators being between 30% and 50% of the total.
Amendment 61A reflects our knowledge that small generators are presently constrained to sell their output to the oligopolistic suppliers at a very heavy discount. A long-term power purchasing agreement costs the independent generators approximately between 10% and 17% of their net revenue, whereas in Nord Pool, which is the multinational Scandinavian exchange for trading energy, the equivalent cost is between 2% and 6%.
There has been recent evidence that some in the Government are becoming aware of the dysfunction in the energy market and the fact that, notwithstanding their ideological presuppositions, a free-market environment cannot be relied upon to engender competition. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Davey, said last week in a Statement made to both Houses that he intended to,
“consult on the introduction of criminal sanctions for anyone found manipulating energy markets and harming the consumer interest”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/10/13; col. 1096.]
One doubts whether this sound and fury has any practical significance. The Government seem to lack the leverage and will to intervene effectively in the markets.
The Labour Party takes a more positive approach. It promises to break the vertical integration of the energy oligopolists by separating the generators from the suppliers. The intention is to require energy companies to conduct all trades in a competitive manner on an open exchange. My proposal has been for a state-sponsored electricity and marketing board that would purchase its supplies from independent generators. It would aggregate them and sell them in competition with the supplies of the big six energy companies. In my opinion, the participation of the state would be the most effective way of introducing genuine competition into the energy market.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the debate on the amendments and I shall speak to them after I have spoken to my own amendments in this group. The amendments standing in my name pertain to powers that enable the establishment of a power purchase agreement scheme, which could provide generators with access to an offtaker of last resort. The offtaker of last resort mechanism will benefit both independent renewable generators and investors by providing a guaranteed backstop route to market through which generators can sell their power. This will enable generators to use new and different routes to market, ending their dependency on established players and stimulating new entry and innovation in the PPA market.
The amendments I am speaking to today address specific concerns raised in Committee that the price at which electricity is purchased in PPAs under the scheme should be determined by reference to the current market price. Amendment 61 clarifies that a PPA under the scheme is an arrangement under which a supplier agrees to purchase electricity,
“at a discount to a prevailing market price”.
This amendment confirms our policy intent that the offtaker of last resort mechanism is exactly that: a last resort. Electricity purchased through the PPAs under the scheme must be purchased at a discount to a market price. This will give confidence to suppliers that they will not be required to purchase electricity at above-market prices. I assure the House that it is the Government’s intention that the level of discount should also represent a sufficient level of revenue to enable generators to raise finance. The discount level will form a key part of our consultation in early 2014.
Amendment 63 enables the Secretary of State to make provision in licence or code modifications to determine the appropriate discount and market price for PPAs under the scheme. I believe that these amendments clarify our policy intentions.
Amendment 61A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, would mean that a PPA under the scheme is an arrangement under which a supplier agrees to purchase electricity at a discount to the market price and that the discount is no more than 5%. It is important that the discount is large enough to ensure that PPAs under the scheme are a last resort. The requirement for the discount to be no larger than 5% is not compatible with that; given that open-market PPAs typically have larger discounts, the scheme would quickly become a first, rather than last, resort. This would undermine new entrants to the PPA market and mean that anticipated benefits of the scheme in terms of facilitating a more dynamic and competitive PPA market would not materialise.
On Amendment 59A, I begin by stating my strong, and, I believe, shared desire to see ambitious action to improve wholesale market liquidity, which is crucial to allow independent generators and suppliers to compete without restriction. That is what Ofgem is doing through its ambitious package of reforms to address low levels of liquidity in the market, and what this Government will do should Ofgem’s reforms be delayed or frustrated. If it proves necessary for the Government to act, they should consider all options to achieve their objectives, including those listed in Clause 43. However, it would not be prudent to tie our hands to a particular course of action at this stage.
I hope that noble Lords have found my explanations reassuring and that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken—some in support, some less so. We have had a very good debate. I think we all agree that this issue is not going to go away. We probably will need to see whether there is new legislation after the Labour Party wins the next election, or whether the annual review from the competition people will result in a recommendation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.