Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I share many of the reservations expressed already and the analysis given on both the provision and the circumstances which have led to it. I ask the Minister, in his response to the debate, to deal with one of the points raised by the noble Viscount, which is the discretion that might be available to the judge in deciding what tariff accompanies the sentence, as opposed to the provisions of proposed new subsection (2), which give slightly more power—I refrain from defining it as a wider power—in exceptional circumstances to the judge to impose a different sentence altogether.

One thing the Minister did not cover in his helpful introduction was the extent to which the tariff provisions interact with this. I would be grateful if he could explain that, in case he can give us any reassurance about what seems to be the danger of making general law out of a particular case.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, if I may, I will add a point that follows on from what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said. To require a life sentence is pure deception because we all know that life sentences are not life sentences, and there is a strong feeling that the life sentence for murder is a deception. Other than in the most exceptional circumstances, the person concerned will be released, and the judge pronounces, in open court, a tariff. I entirely understand why the Government wish to give comfort to the unfortunate relatives and friends of those heroic emergency workers who suffer this appalling treatment and die in service of the country, but it is a gesture—a misleading gesture. We really should not be perpetuating more and more life sentences when the reality is that people receive a term of years.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, asked: these amendments are so simple, why waste time debating them? Well, of course, the law already proceeds on the basis that these amendments propose. Section 230 of the Sentencing Code already says that the court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence was so serious that a fine or community sentence is not sufficient for the offence. Any court that passed a custodial sentence without stating the reasons for doing so would find that the sentence was overturned in the Court of Appeal. Any sentence in court that fails to consider and address the impact of a custodial sentence on a child or unborn child would not be upheld on appeal. So I entirely support these amendments, but I think we should be realistic about the current state of law.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I do not intend to fall into a bit of disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with whom I worked happily in the Constitution Committee, but the present state of the law has not really solved the problem, has it? Very large numbers of very short sentences are given, and the consequence is that prison places are used, costs ensue, and the least effective way of dealing with individuals seems to be the one that is chosen. If there is some way in which we can strengthen the presumption the sentencing guidelines already carry, that would be good. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is a complicated alternative way of doing it, but it does appear that something needs to be done.

The argument often used for short sentences is that courts have a problem in dealing with persistent repeat offenders and persistent repeat breaches of conditions of community sentences. There is a popular myth that if offenders do not respond to other measures, a taste of prison will soon put them right. There is absolutely no evidence to support this principle. Indeed, all the evidence points the other way.

I used to chair the Justice Committee in the House of Commons, and that has had a continuing interest in this problem. Its report in 2018 recommended that the Government introduce a presumption against short prison sentences. The Government welcomed this and said they were exploring options. In a follow-up report, the Justice Committee noted the Government’s stated intentions to move away from short custodial sentences.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, last but I hope not least, Amendment 32 is in my name and in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 32 addresses a very odd provision in paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1. As currently worded, it states that provisions of the EU regulation on free movement for workers cease to apply if

“they are inconsistent with … the Immigration Acts”

or

“capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of any such provision.”

I suggested in Committee, with widespread support from all sides of the Committee, that the parliamentary draftsmen could and should do better than that. Paragraph 4(2) as currently drafted defies the need for legal certainty. The Bill should set out which provisions of the workers regulation will cease to apply.

The Minister promised to look at this matter, and she indicated that she would discuss it with me. Faithful to her word, as she always is, she has discussed the matter with me—for which I am very grateful—and has now tabled Amendment 32A, which satisfactorily addresses the point. I am very grateful to her. Amendment 33 addresses a similar problem, but sadly it has not received a favourable response from the Minister.

Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 tells us that

“EU-derived rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures cease to be recognised and available in domestic law”

in two circumstances—that is if

“they are inconsistent with, or … capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of,”

a provision of the Immigration Acts, or if

“they are otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I simply do not understand how advisers on immigration law, far less those individuals who are the subject of immigration law, are supposed to work out what their legal rights and obligations are. Legal certainty requires, in my view, that the schedule should set out those EU-derived rights et cetera which are disapplied, or those which are retained. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, criticised the legal uncertainty in our 11th report of this Session published on 2 September.

I think the only answer the Minister could possibly give to the concern I have identified about legal certainty is that Ministers and parliamentary draftsmen do not now know which provisions of EU law survive and which do not. That rather makes my point, I think. However, I do not intend to divide the House on this matter, troubling though it is. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to the noble Lord’s Amendments 32 and 33 because they address two long-standing concerns of the Constitution Committee. The first is the broad and unjustified use of Henry VIII powers. The second is the confusing and counterproductive complexity of immigration law, which we believe needs to be clear and consolidated. That is why I support these amendments. I welcome the fact that the Government have addressed the first of these issues by tabling Amendment 32A, which makes more specific the scope of the power, confining it, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, to Articles 2 to 10 of the workers regulations.

I would have welcomed a similar willingness to move on the issues that the Constitution Committee has raised in relation to paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, which nullifies EU-derived rights and remedies. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has quoted some parts of paragraph 6 and they are really extraordinary: rights should disappear because

“they are inconsistent with, or are otherwise capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of, any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts”

and, even stranger, because they are

“otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I can think of all sorts of functions that people might consider were “in connection” with immigration, but we really need laws that are clearer than that.

Adrian Berry, chair of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, said when he gave evidence to us:

“How is the ordinary person, never mind the legislator, to know whether the law is good or not in a particular area if you draft like that?”


I know that parliamentary draftsmen have had a pretty heavy diet of work lately, not least with Covid-19 orders, but it is possible to do better than that, unless the instructions given to them were so unspecific as to leave things so wide open that they had to draft the legislation in that extraordinary way.

Paragraph 69 of the Explanatory Notes tries to explain why this is necessary, but fails to do so—at least I find it completely unpersuasive. I did learn a little more about Chen carers than I knew previously, which was almost nothing. I am sure that my noble friend Lady Hamwee thinks of little else at some stages of the Bill than the quite obscure provision that resulted from the Chen case before the European Court of Justice. However, I certainly found the argument unpersuasive.

The committee says:

“The statute book requires clarity rather than obscurity and provisions such as these threaten to frustrate essential ingredients of the rule of law.”


An essential ingredient of the rule of law is that it is on record and visible and capable of being understood, particularly by those who practice it professionally, but preferably by a wider range of people as well, including those who may face either a penalty or, in this case, the inability to have a right to which they believe they are entitled as a consequence of wording as vague as this.

There is still time to improve this: the Minister could come back at Third Reading with an amendment that makes clear the purpose of this paragraph, and I am only sorry that she has not done so thus far.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I tabled the amendment to which my noble friend referred, Amendment 5 to government Amendment 4, because I did not believe that the government Amendment, helpful though it is, fully satisfied the clear intention set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that somebody who feels that they can only engage with this process on paper should be able to do so without the creation of a parallel procedure or there being two different processes. What we have is one simplified procedure in which documentation is held online but to which people can make submissions by paper, not only initially but at any necessary subsequent stages. For that to be a reality, they must also be able to receive the relevant documentation on paper through the work and assistance of the Courts Service. I think that some ambiguity has been created.

I note that the Minister wrote to us about the requirement to initiate proceedings by electronic means, which requires rules to be made to enable documents submitted in paper to be treated as if they were initiated by electronic means. The wording of government Amendment 4 appears to refer to the initiation of the proceedings, rather than the initiation of subsequent documents, and is silent on the entitlement to receive documents on paper. The simple issue, which some of us may have faced in dealing with other organisations, is that you cannot have a situation in which you make a submission on paper and have no clue what will happen afterwards because you are relying on the paper process. The Government’s intention was clear in everything the noble and learned Lord said, but it is not clear in the amendment. My addition to the Government’s wording would make it clear, although I fully accept that this could be dealt with in words in a different way or at a different point in the parent amendment. My noble friend is confident that the Government have got the point and are going to do something about it, but I would like the noble and learned Lord to make that clear.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their very positive response to the concerns expressed around the House in Committee. I agree with all the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, and I support their amendments. I am particularly concerned about government Amendment 4 for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, indicated. It is expressly confined to the initiation of proceedings and does not in terms cover, as it must, the right to submit further paper documents and to receive paper documents if the litigant so elects. I very much look forward to the Minister confirming what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated—that the Minister intends to address this point at Third Reading.

I much prefer the solutions offered in the various amendments to which the Minister and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, have spoken, to Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with all due respect to him. As I understand it, his amendment would allow for regulations, under which the party bringing proceedings could choose whether proceedings are under the Online Procedure Rules or the standard rules. I can see no justification, particularly if the other amendments are agreed, for allowing people to choose which rules apply, especially if paper documents can be fed in and received under the Online Procedure Rules. Such an amendment would, I fear, damage the whole purpose of the Bill. It would give litigants an option as to which rules apply and benefit no one other than those who wish to make a simple claim subject to a more complex and more expensive procedure as, for example, a negotiating tactic.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister. I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the important amendments which he has tabled, which will ensure that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice is required under Clauses 2 and 3. However, I have added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—in particular, Amendments 22 and 23—similarly to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of the powers being conferred on the Minister under Clauses 8 and 9.

Clause 8 is an extraordinary clause. It would confer power on the Minister to require the committee to include a specified provision if the Minister thinks it is “expedient” to do so, and if the committee were to be so required, it would have a legal duty to comply. “Expedient” is the broadest possible word to define the scope of such a power. If Clause 8 is enacted as drafted, the requirement for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice under Clauses 2 and 3, which we all agree is necessary, would be rendered pointless. The Minister could simply override the views of the Lord Chief Justice in relation to any relevant matter under Clauses 2 and 3. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, does not share that view, and I look forward to him explaining why there is a limitation on what appears to be, and indeed is, the broadest possible drafting in the language of Clause 8. It contains no express limitation, and it seems very difficult to argue that there is an implied limitation that would prevent the Minister rendering pointless what is in Clauses 2 and 3 when the very purpose of Clause 8 is to give the broadest possible discretion to the Minister to give directions to the committee with which it must comply. Since the Minister has rightly accepted that, in the context of provisions about access to justice—which is what we are talking about—it is necessary for the provisions to require the concurrence of both the Minister and the Lord Chief Justice, there can nevertheless be no justification for conferring on the Minister by Clause 8 a power to override the views of the Lord Chief Justice on these important matters.

Clause 9 confers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, a broad Henry VIII power on the Lord Chancellor to amend, repeal and revoke other legislative provisions whenever the Lord Chancellor considers it “necessary or desirable” in consequence of the Online Procedure Rules or to facilitate the making of Online Procedure Rules. Again, these are exceptionally broad powers, touching centrally on access to justice. For the same reasons that require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clauses 2 and 3, it is necessary to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clause 9.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I do not know what answer the Minister will give to the pertinent question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the Clause 8 powers. The Lord Chief Justice might in some cases exercise the Clauses 2 and 3 powers to defy what the Lord Chancellor had asked the rule committee to do—which it had gone on to do at waste of time and expense and which he would not then agree to. However, that would apply to only some of the powers that the Minister would have in these circumstances; for example, extending into an area which the Lord Chief Justice did not think appropriate for the use of online procedure. But there are other things that the Lord Chancellor might direct the committee to do, such as shortening the notice period for various stages in the process or reducing in one way or another the rights of people engaged in the process, which could then be an obligation on the committee. If its members did not then resign, they would be required to produce rules which the Lord Chief Justice did not have a protective power to veto. The Clause 8 powers are worrying, and I do not recall at any stage in our amicable discussion any explanation why they are necessary and why, if any power is needed in this area, it cannot be much more narrowly defined.

One can make a similar point about Clause 9 in relation to Henry VIII powers, but it is a point that we have made so often that we risk becoming tired of making it. Thank goodness that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, never ceases to make it in every circumstance in which it is appropriate.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I can easily follow my noble friend because he has said much of what needs to be said. With Amendment 4, I am trying to explore what the circumstances are in which it would be possible for people to revert to the traditional procedure rather than the online one. I am in favour of the Bill being introduced—I have called for it on many occasions and strongly support it—but the Constitution Committee has pointed out that it raises some issues that need to be clarified and sorted out, and this is one of them.

What are we trying to do here? Are we trying to create an online system that is advantageous, beneficial to the parties and much less cumbersome as well as saving time for the judicial system? Are we then going to encourage people to make use of it in the expectation that they will? The piloting of more limited projects in this area indicates that we have good reason to be optimistic. So is that what we are doing, or are we setting up a system in which it will be almost impossible to insist on conventional court proceedings even in circumstances where both parties think that is right? The question then arises whether you could have circumstances where one party to a dispute could insist, even when it was to the detriment of the other, that the more cumbersome procedure was used. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that question. Where both parties are quite clear that there are good reasons for a hearing in court, why should they be precluded from having one if our assumption is that this is a system that would be attractive to users and make the court system function more effectively, particularly in large numbers of money claims of relatively modest size?

One of the ambiguities that surrounds this Bill is what it is really for—whether it is the route to a very wide use of online systems or whether it will be confined in this way. Different statements at different stages of the Bill’s progress have had both a narrow and a wide interpretation. Although Briggs referred to money claims, I think there are wider expectations that make these general issues rather important.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I declare an interest as a barrister practising in offline courts. That was the reason I did not participate at Second Reading.

The Briggs report has been referred to, which said at paragraph 6.13 that there are persons,

“living mainly in rural areas with no access to broadband, those who cannot afford a lap-top or desk-top computer, and those who for a variety of understandable reasons regard moving to computer after a life spent communicating on paper a step too far”.

I agree with previous speakers that it is unacceptable that the Bill says nothing about such potential litigants. The Minister accepts that their interests must be accommodated—they need to be accommodated in the Bill.

That is the view of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, on which I served with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Our report said at paragraph 16 that, against the background of what was said by Briggs,

“forcing people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims at all risks excluding large numbers of people from the justice system”.

For that reason, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has recommended that the Bill must place duties on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that adequate provision is made to enable access for the sorts of people I have mentioned.

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, one of the things that might be reviewed is how the arrangements for delegating decisions work in the context—mentioned by my noble friend—of a large number of litigants in person. This number has increased since the withdrawal and limiting of legal aid. Court officials find themselves giving forms of advice to unrepresented litigants, if only to ensure that the court can proceed with the minimum of chaos and disruption. A clerk in a county court, for example, may simply remind the litigant of what the court needs to know in order to resolve a case and what would not be advantageous to spend lots of time on. That is a valuable function. Of course, legal advice can go far beyond that into areas on which it would be wholly inappropriate for a court official to give, or purport to give, advice. Wise officials make quite clear the limit of what they can say.

By whatever mechanism we review these provisions, whether it is that suggested in the amendment or the reasonably adequate existing ones offered by the Justice Select Committee and Constitution Committee, we should look at them in a context in which officials are being asked for advice or guidance by people who are not represented.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We are dealing here—at least potentially—with matters of significant constitutional concern. The power which the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor is being given includes a power to make “consequential provision”. That is a very broad phrase: it is not merely transitional, or transitory or saving, it is consequential—something that is a consequence of that which is in the legislation. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that this amendment should be approved by this House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 7 is in my name and in the names of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: our chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith.

The amendment addresses a difficult issue. In its report HL69, dated 29 January of this year, the Constitution Committee drew attention in paragraph 51 to what we saw as a defect in the Bill: it does not specify the legal status that would be enjoyed in our law by retained EU law—that is, the body of EU material that the Bill incorporates into domestic law as at exit day. The question is: is it going to be primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? And if something else, what?

The Bill deals with this question in part, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, in what is now paragraph 28 of Schedule 8. But that exception simply begs the question as to what status retained EU law enjoys for other legal purposes. The recommendation made by the Constitution Committee that the issue needs to be addressed in the Bill was widely approved by expert legal opinion, in particular the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and Professor Paul Craig of Oxford University, although they disagreed with the suggestion by the committee that the status of all retained EU law should be that of primary legislation.

Ministers agreed to consider this issue and tabled an amendment on Report to introduce what is now Clause 8 of the Bill. Clause 8 is an improvement because it makes two points clear. It states that the part of retained EU law which derives from earlier statutes and earlier statutory instruments, enacted to implement EU law obligations, will retain the legal status it previously had—either primary legislation or secondary legislation. Clause 8 also addresses the circumstances in which different types of retained EU law can be amended.

However, what Clause 8 does not do is address the legal status of other retained EU law for purposes other than amendment. This may matter, as the Bingham Centre has suggested, for example, in deciding which rule takes priority if there is a conflict between different elements of retained EU law, or if the question arises of when courts may allow a challenge to retained EU law and what remedies they may give. Some distinguished legal scholars have expressed such concerns about Clause 8, particularly Professor Alison Young of Cambridge University.

The Minister made it clear on Report that because of the complexity of the issue, the Government were willing to consider the matter further at Third Reading. This amendment suggests addressing the issue of legal status by using the distinction that is in Clause 8 itself —between retained direct principal EU legislation and retained direct minor EU legislation.

I am grateful to the Minister for arranging a meeting for me yesterday with members of the Bill team and parliamentary draftsmen. They explained their concerns about the amendment. They have persuaded me that the contents of the Bill will minimise the occasions on which the legal status of retained EU law will matter. They have also pointed out that the amendment would need to specify more clearly what is meant by “primary legislation”, which covers not just Acts of Parliament but Acts of the three devolved legislatures. They also tell me that they are concerned about the generality of a deeming provision of this sort, which might cause difficulties in other contexts.

I have found these arguments compelling and I would be grateful, and I hope the House would be grateful, if the Minister would say a little more about these points when he replies to the debate. I am, however, concerned that it still appears to be the Government’s position that if any of these problems about legal status do arise in the future, they can be addressed by Ministers exercising delegated powers under the Bill. I remind the House that the Constitution Committee said in our report at paragraph 69:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


I ask the Minister to tell the House whether or not the Government agree with that proposition.

I will add one further point—as a promise, not as a threat—which is that the Constitution Committee intends to keep a very close eye on this issue once the Bill becomes law. If it does become necessary to give particular retained EU laws a legal status, and if this is then done by Ministers exercising delegated powers, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee will certainly wish to return to the issue. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I will not add to the exposition of the amendment and the reasons for tabling it, which have been so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The committee felt that we ought to see whether we could get a more secure place for retained European law in the hierarchy of law as it would be viewed by the courts in this country. There will probably be difficulties in this area and we are probably persuaded that they cannot be resolved by the kind of declaratory amendment that we have tabled on this occasion.

There are further difficulties which the Minister might refer to, which have been pointed out by Professor Alison Young, who was referred to earlier. For example, constitutional statutes are not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal in the same way as other legislation. What will be the position if an item of retained European law is considered to be constitutional in character and appears to be in conflict with subsequent legislation passed post exit day, when the supremacy principle has fallen away and this has to be resolved?

In passing an earlier amendment which removed a discretionary power from Ministers to, in effect, decide whether matters could be put before the courts, we wanted to assert that, wherever possible, we should protect the courts and the legal system from having to be the subject of individual ad hoc ministerial decisions in particular cases. That was part of the motivation for what the committee sought to do in this case. But clearly it cannot be solved in the way that we first suggested.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Pannick

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.

Amendment 358C and Amendment 360A, with which it is grouped, address the powers tucked away in Schedule 8 to modify retained direct EU legislation by the use of delegated powers that relate to subordinate legislation. A power to modify is an important matter because “modify” includes a power to repeal—see Clause 14 (1).

This Committee has debated on previous days the surprising omission from the Bill of any provision that identifies the legal status of retained EU law. Is it primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? The powers in Schedule 8, in paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1), which we are now addressing, have attracted the attention of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee because those provisions treat retained EU law as analogous to secondary legislation for the purposes of powers to modify. That is a surprising position for the Bill to adopt, certainly in relation to that part of retained EU law which confers important rights: for example, in the fields of employment, the environment and consumer protection. It means that, in addition to the other powers to modify retained EU law, which the Bill will confer and which we have debated in detail—Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17—there is yet another set of powers recognised by Schedule 8 that will give Ministers the power to modify the retained EU law, on important subjects, which is brought into domestic law.

My concern is not reduced by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 8 saying that these powers can be used only,

“so far as the context permits or requires”,

and paragraph 5(1) says that the powers may be used,

“unless the contrary intention appears”.

These statements are opaque in the extreme and certainly do not provide any degree of legal certainty.

I therefore look forward to hearing from the Minister why these powers are needed at all in addition to the other extensive powers which the Bill confers, and I look forward to hearing from him what these powers say, if anything, about the legal status of retained EU law. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to be associated with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in supporting this amendment to seek some clarity. I will simply add two further points, having said that this distinctly lacks clarity at the moment.

First, I draw attention to paragraph 3, which says:

“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which, immediately before exit day, is subject to an implied restriction that it is exercisable only compatibly with EU law is to be read on or after exit day without that restriction”.


A little gloss on that from the Minister would be helpful. The second thing that needs clarifying is the impact on the devolution aspects of the Bill. The Government’s Explanatory Notes say that,

“in relation to the devolved administrations these pre-existing powers”—

that is, the powers that can be used under the clause we are discussing—

“are subject to the devolution provisions described in paragraphs 36 to 41 of these notes, meaning powers in pre-exit legislation cannot be used to modify retained EU law in a way that would be incompatible with EU law as it existed on exit day until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”.

I imagine that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pricked up his ears at that phrase, because it goes to the heart of the argument we have been having about the impact of the Bill on devolution and the idea that powers will be released to the devolved Administrations only once the UK Government are satisfied with the way they will deal with the framework provisions. The appearance of the phrase,

“until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”,

in the Explanatory Notes is quite worrying. The provisions are of course there because some of the provisions here relate to existing devolved powers. The devolved Administrations must have the capacity to take this kind of action if the UK Government have the capacity to do so. However, it is subject to this rather extraordinary restriction: the Government hold on to the powers until they are satisfied that they can be released. For the benefit of clarity, I hope that the Minister can help us.