(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the gracious Speech programme contains a sackful of measures on criminal justice and justice matters generally. I start by simply making the point that we can legislate until the cows come home but, in almost every part of the judicial system, it is resources that are causing more problems than any lack of legislation: resources for the courts, the Crown Prosecution Service, access to justice, prisons and early intervention through services provided by local authorities. Unless we address that, we will not make the kind of improvements we need in the system.
I turn to the issue of royal commissions, as discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and several others. It is not a bad idea to have a royal commission—it would be perhaps a less good idea to have an unroyal commission, which would seem rather strange—if it is set up in the proper way, rather than to have half-baked, ill-thought-out policies, hastily implemented. But it depends who is on the commission, how much independence it has, how much expertise it has access to and whether anything is done with its recommendations once they have been made.
I worry that the commission on constitutional matters does not look to be off to a good start and may have its origins in partisan resentments about the proper role of the courts in interpreting the law, ministerial resentment at any challenge to the Executive by Parliament and a dismissive attitude towards constitutional conventions. In his very powerful speech, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, analysed this problem and referred to the Prorogation issue. The Prorogation case was, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, decided on quite narrow facts, but what lay beneath it was the recognition that in modern times Parliament is no longer simply convened when the Crown runs out of money. That was the basis on which there was a prerogative power: Parliament could be called on when needed and got rid of once there was enough money to manage without it. Parliament is now assumed to have a continuous existence, interrupted only by agreed short breaks for elections, conferences and holidays, and not summoned or dismissed to suit the political convenience of the Executive.
The commission suggested in the Queen’s Speech has a very wide agenda, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, pointed out, and I will not go through the list. I will, however, note the things that are not on the list. There is nothing on it about the electoral system. My party got 11.6% of the vote in the general election, which should have produced 70 seats or more in the House of Commons; the Labour Party got 500,000 votes in Scotland and only one seat there. The system we are landed with is absurd, but it is not there. Nor is there anything there about the governance of England, which has become increasingly paradoxical in the system we have developed. The Government say in the briefing that accompanied the Queen’s Speech:
“Careful consideration is needed on the composition and focus of the Commission.”
You can say that again. Whether any such careful consideration will lead to the kind of royal commission that would command wide confidence and lead to a sensible reassessment of constitution issues, I am distinctly doubtful. An exercise such as this needs to be broad based.
The royal commission on the justice system looks to have had a slightly more promising start, although not much has been said about what it will cover. Everybody who has spoken about it today has referred to the wide range of matters that it needs to cover and I have seen newspaper suggestions that things such as the relationship between the Crown Prosecution Service and the police might be covered, and that we might move towards a Scottish, procurator fiscal-type system. Clearly, this is an open goal into which all sorts of ideas about the justice system might be kicked. Clearly, the Government do not anticipate this royal commission looking at the crisis caused by overcrowded prisons, or, elsewhere in the Queen’s Speech, the potential to create the sentence inflation that will make that overcrowding worse and commit resources on a massive scale—resources that need to be used in other areas of the criminal justice system to prevent crime.
I conclude with two separate, specific questions. First, what has happened to the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill? It was supposed to be integral to the modernisation of the court system and went through all its stages in this House in 2017, following the Queen’s Speech, yet has still not materialised and is not in this Queen’s Speech.
My second question is about the espionage legislation. Will the Intelligence and Security Committee be set up in time to study the Bill and advise both Houses, with informed consideration, on the value of the proposals and whether they are sound? Speaking as a former member of the committee, that is essential, but past experience suggests to me that the Bill may be introduced long before the committee is set up.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is a fantasy gracious Speech, because it comes from a Government who do not have a majority to carry out their programme and because there will be an early general election and another gracious Speech, with a Government who may look very different from this one. As Liberal Democrats, we are certainly looking forward to that election, which would have happened already had we not had a Prime Minister who was willing to use the Prorogation as a space free of Parliament so that he could go ahead with a no-deal or bad-deal Brexit without scrutiny or challenge.
I turn first to the criminal justice section of the Speech, which reads as if a good draft prepared by David Gauke, the former Justice Secretary, has been chopped and changed by the Prime Minister and his political advisers so that the good intentions—such as rehabilitation and multiagency co-operation to combat serious violence—remain in, but the resources are mostly diverted away from this work in order to keep many more people in prison for longer. Promising to do this is seen by some—I think wrongly—to be a vote-winner.
The sentencing provisions in both the sentencing Bill and the foreign-national offenders Bill, which will have wider inflationary effects on sentencing, will demand massive resources that could be much more effectively used in tackling the causes of crime and reoffending. What is the point of spending a lot more money than we already spend to feed, clothe, house and guard returning foreign offenders? We could have used that money more efficiently to prevent them returning in the first place, or more efficiently and quickly to return those we now identify—or, in many cases, fail to identify.
Prison is a very expensive resource. We need it to safeguard our citizens from dangerous, persistent and serious offenders while we attempt to turn them away from crime, but every unnecessary or excessive use of expensive custody diverts resources from crime prevention and contributes to the inability of overcrowded and understaffed prisons to carry out essential rehabilitation.
There is a phrase in the Queen’s Speech, quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope:
“New sentencing laws will see that the most serious offenders spend longer in custody to reflect better the severity of their crimes”.
Using expensive custody as the sole barometer or signal of the seriousness or severity of a crime leads to ineffective policy. We must develop more cost-effective non-custodial sentences, or parts of sentences, which are seriously challenging to offenders and a more effective response to the seriousness of the crime than merely adding massively to the cost of the prison system.
The serious violence Bill has ambitions with which I entirely agree. However, I cannot think of anything that cannot be done without it; it seems to me an unnecessary Bill. On the other hand, the Bill dealing with the online procedures of the courts and tribunals is much needed, and has now been lost twice due to Prorogation or Dissolution, but did not appear at all in the gracious Speech.
I turn now to our constitution, on which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, gave such stimulating thoughts. Ours is not an entirely unwritten constitution—some of it is written—but much of it is dependent on conventions and assumptions about how political leaders will behave. This is explained by our colleague the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, as the “good chap” theory of government. These behavioural issues are particularly relevant to safeguarding the monarchy and promoting the rule of law. These presumptions have been tested much more severely than before during recent events.
When Her Majesty addressed both Houses, fresh in her memory will have been the Prime Minister’s advice, unanimously overruled by the Supreme Court, that Parliament should be prorogued for five weeks. It is certainly fixed in our minds, not least because it was followed by the public questioning by Ministers of the independence of the judiciary. These included the Prime Minister himself, who said in an interview in the Daily Telegraph:
“If judges are to pronounce on political questions in this way, then there is at least an argument that there should be some form of accountability. The lessons of America are relevant”.
Those lessons are relevant, but in an entirely negative sense. Trying to identify the political opinions of judges and choose them accordingly would be extremely bad for our country.
I have no doubt at all that the Lord Chancellor and the Advocate-General for Scotland, who opened today’s debate, are resolute in their personal commitment to judicial independence. But I am not so confident of the Government as a whole, still less of their political advisers. We must never go down the road of political appointments to the judiciary, or of confirmation hearings designed to test a judge’s past and present political and social opinions. We appoint judges on the basis of their ability to set aside their personal opinions and use their knowledge and intellectual ability to interpret and define the law in accordance with the statutes that this Parliament has passed and the inheritance of common law.
We will face further constitutional issues with the withdrawal agreement Bill. There were repeated requests from members of the Constitution Committee to have advanced sight of the main clauses of the Bill, so that we could examine its structure and the mechanisms it uses. Clearly, any draft we saw would subsequently be affected by the changes made to the withdrawal agreement by the current Prime Minister, but it was necessary, or would have been better, for us to have had advance sight of some of it. It is likely to involve a massive expansion of the power of Ministers to act independently of Parliament. Will those powers be confined as much as possible? Will they be strictly time limited? How adequate will be the opportunities for parliamentary consideration of the orders made under the powers? This House, in a matter of a few months, has examined 500 Brexit-related orders. How are we going to manage that with the consequences of the withdrawal agreement Bill? Will this House be able to do the same if huge gaps in our law open up as a result of Brexit and need to be filled urgently? Henry VIII will be stalking our corridors, day and night.
Possibly as soon as next week, the focus and the Bill will shift from Commons to Lords. This House may be under extremely severe pressure to wave through unamended a constitutionally significant transfer of legislative power to the Executive.
I remind the noble Lord that the advisory speaking time is for the benefit of the House.
I am the second Liberal Democrat to whom the noble Baroness has given that helpful advice, but I am on my last sentence: that it is our job to make sure that the Bill is properly examined.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the House for its engagement on this Bill throughout its passage. I will first turn to government Amendment 3 on the topic of paper processors. I thank noble Lords once again for their engagement over recent weeks and commend the constructive discussions that we have had on this topic.
On Report, amendments were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beith; the noble Lord, Lord Pannick; and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to ensure that it was clear in the Bill that the ability to submit paper forms and documents would remain available throughout proceedings governed by online procedure rules, not just at the beginning of the application. I am aware that noble Lords were concerned that people should be able to receive documents from the court in paper form as well as to send them.
Of course, our original government amendment tabled before Report sought to address this issue, but I agreed to go away and look again at whether we could provide additional clarity. It has always been the Government’s intention to ensure that paper processors are available at each stage of the process. We are committed to an accessible justice system which supports the needs of all our users. I hope that our new amendments clarify this to the House.
The new amendments make provision for users to choose a paper option at any time throughout their proceedings, and this includes both the sending and receiving of documents. Our system must be accessible and useful for everyone, and with the Bill as drafted I now think that we have achieved that.
I will now turn to government Amendments 1, 2, 5 and 6. Before Report, the Government tabled two amendments relating to support for users of our online services. The first of these provided that, when making new court rules, the committee must have regard for the needs of those who require support to engage online. The second amendment followed this to ensure that the Lord Chancellor should also have regard for the needs of litigants who require digital support when deciding whether to allow or disallow the Online Procedure Rules. These amendments did, and still do, ensure that rules will be made with due consideration of the support which is in place for those requiring assistance to engage with digital services under the Online Procedure Rules.
I had tabled these further amendments to both clarify the intention and ensure consistency of drafting between the earlier government amendments and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which was accepted on Report. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, places a duty on the Government to provide support for users of the online system. The amendment does not use the word “technical” to qualify this support, and instead requires the Lord Chancellor to provide support to assist those people accessing or who wish to access the online procedure by electronic means, in accordance with the electronic procedure rules. The support will be such as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate and proportionate to assist users to gain greater access to and make better use of online services. The government amendments ensure consistency with that approach. They also underline our intention that users who might otherwise be digitally excluded must have appropriate and proportionate support to assist them to access the electronic services that will underpin the new online procedure.
In addition, there are consequential amendments. Amendments 4 and 7 are minor consequential amendments. Amendment 4 follows on from the insertion in Clause 5(7), by way of amendment on Report in the Lords, which allows the Lord Chief Justice to appoint a judicial member as chair of the Online Procedure Rule Committee. This amendment means that the Lord Chancellor, subject to the concurrence and consultation requirements in Clause 7, may if necessary amend Clause 5(7), as he may amend other provisions in Clause 5.
Finally, following amendment on Report in the Lords, Amendment 7 is consequential to the insertion of Clause 10(3), which requires the Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence before the Lord Chancellor may amend legislation in consequence of, or in order to facilitate the making of, Online Procedure Rules. It allows the Lord Chief Justice to nominate a member of the senior judiciary to give such concurrence. I beg to move.
I think we are in danger of slight confusion, with too many amendments moved at the same time. This is obviously a mark of the Minister’s enthusiasm for his amendments, which is actually shared by Members around the Chamber, because they are the fruit of the discussions to which he referred. I simply want to say, before it all becomes water under the bridge, how very much I welcome the Minister’s Amendment 3, which fully achieves what I have been trying to do in amendments both in Committee and on Report. This is, as the noble and learned Lord indicated, to ensure that someone who does not feel comfortable with or able to use the online system can participate in the same process using paper, can receive any documents they have to receive and can put in any subsequent documents, not just the initiating documents, on paper, because the Courts Service will scan the documents and provide the necessary copies as well.
I suspect that this is a minority and even a generational thing. When people like me have ceased even to think of engaging with court cases, or are lying beneath the ground, everybody will be online—but that is certainly not the situation at the moment. We do not want the law to be blind to the concerns of those for whom this is a very new kind of proceeding, and one for which they do not have the necessary skills or experience, particularly when dealing with something as difficult as a legal case. So I am very grateful to the Minister for all he has done in this respect and I support this—and indeed his other amendments.
My Lords, I support not only the amendments to which my name is attached but all the amendments proposed today. Taken with the earlier amendments which the House considered and which the Government have added, this makes for a much better Bill than ever it was. The particular point I wish to emphasise is that, as a result of these changes, the House, and in particular the Government, have recognised the impact of the constitutional reforms of 2005. The emphasis ought now to be recollected whenever there are any proposals to address the way in which the courts system works. Beyond that, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his personal contribution to the discussions and improvements—and, through him, I thank his team.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I tabled the amendment to which my noble friend referred, Amendment 5 to government Amendment 4, because I did not believe that the government Amendment, helpful though it is, fully satisfied the clear intention set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that somebody who feels that they can only engage with this process on paper should be able to do so without the creation of a parallel procedure or there being two different processes. What we have is one simplified procedure in which documentation is held online but to which people can make submissions by paper, not only initially but at any necessary subsequent stages. For that to be a reality, they must also be able to receive the relevant documentation on paper through the work and assistance of the Courts Service. I think that some ambiguity has been created.
I note that the Minister wrote to us about the requirement to initiate proceedings by electronic means, which requires rules to be made to enable documents submitted in paper to be treated as if they were initiated by electronic means. The wording of government Amendment 4 appears to refer to the initiation of the proceedings, rather than the initiation of subsequent documents, and is silent on the entitlement to receive documents on paper. The simple issue, which some of us may have faced in dealing with other organisations, is that you cannot have a situation in which you make a submission on paper and have no clue what will happen afterwards because you are relying on the paper process. The Government’s intention was clear in everything the noble and learned Lord said, but it is not clear in the amendment. My addition to the Government’s wording would make it clear, although I fully accept that this could be dealt with in words in a different way or at a different point in the parent amendment. My noble friend is confident that the Government have got the point and are going to do something about it, but I would like the noble and learned Lord to make that clear.
My Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their very positive response to the concerns expressed around the House in Committee. I agree with all the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, and I support their amendments. I am particularly concerned about government Amendment 4 for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, indicated. It is expressly confined to the initiation of proceedings and does not in terms cover, as it must, the right to submit further paper documents and to receive paper documents if the litigant so elects. I very much look forward to the Minister confirming what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated—that the Minister intends to address this point at Third Reading.
I much prefer the solutions offered in the various amendments to which the Minister and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, have spoken, to Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with all due respect to him. As I understand it, his amendment would allow for regulations, under which the party bringing proceedings could choose whether proceedings are under the Online Procedure Rules or the standard rules. I can see no justification, particularly if the other amendments are agreed, for allowing people to choose which rules apply, especially if paper documents can be fed in and received under the Online Procedure Rules. Such an amendment would, I fear, damage the whole purpose of the Bill. It would give litigants an option as to which rules apply and benefit no one other than those who wish to make a simple claim subject to a more complex and more expensive procedure as, for example, a negotiating tactic.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I propose to address Amendment 5, which touches upon government Amendment 4, and then go on to look at manuscript Amendment 9A and thereafter Amendment 7. I will also touch upon the two technical amendments, as they were termed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
On Amendment 5, the use of the word “initiate” was intended to capture all engagement with online services throughout the proceedings, as I indicated on a previous occasion—in other words, “initiate” was taken as a synonym for “engagement”, not “commence”—but I appreciate the uncertainty that is in the minds of some noble Lords with regard to that matter. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, made the point about comparing the terms of an earlier clause with this clause, where it refers only to “initiate”. I intend to look further at that matter before Third Reading so that we can arrive at a conclusion as to the appropriate wording, because I believe we are as one on the appropriate outcome on that point. In these circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord may see fit not to press his amendment at this stage so that we can proceed with Amendment 4 and address that point further in due course.
I thank the Minister for that indication. I will not seek to move the amendment at this stage.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister. I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the important amendments which he has tabled, which will ensure that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice is required under Clauses 2 and 3. However, I have added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—in particular, Amendments 22 and 23—similarly to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of the powers being conferred on the Minister under Clauses 8 and 9.
Clause 8 is an extraordinary clause. It would confer power on the Minister to require the committee to include a specified provision if the Minister thinks it is “expedient” to do so, and if the committee were to be so required, it would have a legal duty to comply. “Expedient” is the broadest possible word to define the scope of such a power. If Clause 8 is enacted as drafted, the requirement for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice under Clauses 2 and 3, which we all agree is necessary, would be rendered pointless. The Minister could simply override the views of the Lord Chief Justice in relation to any relevant matter under Clauses 2 and 3. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, does not share that view, and I look forward to him explaining why there is a limitation on what appears to be, and indeed is, the broadest possible drafting in the language of Clause 8. It contains no express limitation, and it seems very difficult to argue that there is an implied limitation that would prevent the Minister rendering pointless what is in Clauses 2 and 3 when the very purpose of Clause 8 is to give the broadest possible discretion to the Minister to give directions to the committee with which it must comply. Since the Minister has rightly accepted that, in the context of provisions about access to justice—which is what we are talking about—it is necessary for the provisions to require the concurrence of both the Minister and the Lord Chief Justice, there can nevertheless be no justification for conferring on the Minister by Clause 8 a power to override the views of the Lord Chief Justice on these important matters.
Clause 9 confers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, a broad Henry VIII power on the Lord Chancellor to amend, repeal and revoke other legislative provisions whenever the Lord Chancellor considers it “necessary or desirable” in consequence of the Online Procedure Rules or to facilitate the making of Online Procedure Rules. Again, these are exceptionally broad powers, touching centrally on access to justice. For the same reasons that require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clauses 2 and 3, it is necessary to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clause 9.
My Lords, I do not know what answer the Minister will give to the pertinent question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the Clause 8 powers. The Lord Chief Justice might in some cases exercise the Clauses 2 and 3 powers to defy what the Lord Chancellor had asked the rule committee to do—which it had gone on to do at waste of time and expense and which he would not then agree to. However, that would apply to only some of the powers that the Minister would have in these circumstances; for example, extending into an area which the Lord Chief Justice did not think appropriate for the use of online procedure. But there are other things that the Lord Chancellor might direct the committee to do, such as shortening the notice period for various stages in the process or reducing in one way or another the rights of people engaged in the process, which could then be an obligation on the committee. If its members did not then resign, they would be required to produce rules which the Lord Chief Justice did not have a protective power to veto. The Clause 8 powers are worrying, and I do not recall at any stage in our amicable discussion any explanation why they are necessary and why, if any power is needed in this area, it cannot be much more narrowly defined.
One can make a similar point about Clause 9 in relation to Henry VIII powers, but it is a point that we have made so often that we risk becoming tired of making it. Thank goodness that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, never ceases to make it in every circumstance in which it is appropriate.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I can easily follow my noble friend because he has said much of what needs to be said. With Amendment 4, I am trying to explore what the circumstances are in which it would be possible for people to revert to the traditional procedure rather than the online one. I am in favour of the Bill being introduced—I have called for it on many occasions and strongly support it—but the Constitution Committee has pointed out that it raises some issues that need to be clarified and sorted out, and this is one of them.
What are we trying to do here? Are we trying to create an online system that is advantageous, beneficial to the parties and much less cumbersome as well as saving time for the judicial system? Are we then going to encourage people to make use of it in the expectation that they will? The piloting of more limited projects in this area indicates that we have good reason to be optimistic. So is that what we are doing, or are we setting up a system in which it will be almost impossible to insist on conventional court proceedings even in circumstances where both parties think that is right? The question then arises whether you could have circumstances where one party to a dispute could insist, even when it was to the detriment of the other, that the more cumbersome procedure was used. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that question. Where both parties are quite clear that there are good reasons for a hearing in court, why should they be precluded from having one if our assumption is that this is a system that would be attractive to users and make the court system function more effectively, particularly in large numbers of money claims of relatively modest size?
One of the ambiguities that surrounds this Bill is what it is really for—whether it is the route to a very wide use of online systems or whether it will be confined in this way. Different statements at different stages of the Bill’s progress have had both a narrow and a wide interpretation. Although Briggs referred to money claims, I think there are wider expectations that make these general issues rather important.
My Lords, I support what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I declare an interest as a barrister practising in offline courts. That was the reason I did not participate at Second Reading.
The Briggs report has been referred to, which said at paragraph 6.13 that there are persons,
“living mainly in rural areas with no access to broadband, those who cannot afford a lap-top or desk-top computer, and those who for a variety of understandable reasons regard moving to computer after a life spent communicating on paper a step too far”.
I agree with previous speakers that it is unacceptable that the Bill says nothing about such potential litigants. The Minister accepts that their interests must be accommodated—they need to be accommodated in the Bill.
That is the view of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, on which I served with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Our report said at paragraph 16 that, against the background of what was said by Briggs,
“forcing people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims at all risks excluding large numbers of people from the justice system”.
For that reason, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has recommended that the Bill must place duties on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that adequate provision is made to enable access for the sorts of people I have mentioned.
I accept that, but I think it is part of the terminology used. That is why, in the intervention I made earlier, I said that it is important to appreciate the difference between a simplified procedure and the way the court works. Unfortunately, despite everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, did to try to simplify civil procedure, the White Book has grown from 2,000 to 3,000 pages.
We need to go back. It is an unfortunate tendency of lawyers to ossify everything. This is an attempt, using electronic means, to make access to justice easier and to simplify it, but we plainly need safeguards. I am sure the best safeguard of all is the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, which I am sure would solve most of these problems yet allow access to justice to use 21st-century methods to make it cheaper and—if I may, with some trepidation, say so in this House—to conduct litigation without the need to deploy expensive lawyers.
My Lords, the weakness in this part of the Bill seems to be that there are no limitations on or barriers to the total extension of the online procedure to all civil, family and tribunal proceedings. Nobody is actually suggesting that, but the absence of any barriers means that we can stray into that territory before there has even been a serious debate about how we could use online procedures in some of these areas. It is fairly obvious for small money claims and promising in a number of other areas, but the Bill is so wide that its lack of any specified criteria or other limitations is worrying.
My Lords, I begin by responding to the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This is a piece of enabling legislation—a very welcome one, I suggest—it is not a case of us bringing in powers without limits or regulation. It will establish an expert committee, including judicial representatives, legal representatives and others, that will be able to call upon the expertise of others in particular areas as and when it comes to address them. I will come on to that in a moment in the context of family law. It will operate under the umbrella of not only the Lord Chancellor—or, in the case of employment tribunals, the Secretary of State for BEIS—but the Lord Chief Justice. It does not give free rein to some individual in the Executive to determine how court cases will be determined, but I emphasised that it is concerned only with civil procedure. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, acknowledged, the reference in his amendment to criminal procedure is otiose and unnecessary.
Over and above that, I seek to anticipate something that will arise repeatedly in the debate—the position of the Lord Chief Justice regarding the operation of this matter overall, a point we touched on at Second Reading. I am conscious of the desire in some quarters that certain of the Bill’s provisions should provide not simply for consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, which, let us be clear, is a formidable requirement: if you consult with the Lord Chief Justice you consult with him, and if you do so you do not ignore his advice or opinion. Indeed, if you did, it would be open to him to make a report to Parliament under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which I think one of my officials referred to as the nuclear option. It is not one that anybody would want to encourage.
I am conscious of the suggestion that, in some areas, we should move from the idea of consultation with the Lord Chief Justice to one of concurrence. That, in a way, touches on many of the issues that arise in the Bill. I can go no further at this stage than say that I have that under active consideration and would anticipate returning to the point on Report. I do not give any unequivocal undertaking, but I indicate that I appreciate how and why certain aspects of the Bill, if moved from consultation to concurrence, would meet some of the concerns, particularly those expressed by the Constitution Committee, regarding this matter. I make that general observation at this stage, because it is a point that we may well return to with regard to certain further amendments.
As I set out at Second Reading, the intention is, as far as possible, to make online procedure the preferred procedure for the commencement and defending of cases that fall within its remit. Of course, our ambition is to develop services that are easier to access and to use, so that over time, digital channels become the default choice for at least the majority of users. I emphasise “majority of users”, for the reasons which we have already touched upon.
As we have set out, our initial intention is that this procedure would consider civil money claims up to a value of £25,000 before widening its remit to cover other proceedings, so it is a question of taking it step by step to see how these procedures will work. It is not our intention that the OPRC would start to remake rules across other jurisdictions immediately. We want to complement and build upon the work of the existing committees in this area, to see whether this incremental approach to the extension of the OPRC’s remit can be successful. But no proceedings will be brought into the Online Procedure Rules without the views of the judiciary, of the committee and, in particular, of the Lord Chief Justice being taken into account—whether by consultation or by way of his concurrence.
Amendment 2, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, appears to be intended to transfer the regulation-making power set out in the Bill from the Lord Chancellor to the existing procedure rules committees—or at least make it subject to that. In effect, it would be for those existing rules committees to decide when proceedings may be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. We consider that this would pose a number of serious practical difficulties.
First, it would place the legislation required to bring proceedings under the remit of the Online Procedure Rule Committee on an entirely different footing from that for the existing rules committees for civil, criminal and tribunal. It would be on the basis of a negative resolution statutory instrument developed by an independent rules committee, as opposed to an affirmative instrument laid by the Government, and that, in itself, would not allow for the appropriate degree of parliamentary scrutiny which should be applied here.
The second difficulty is, I am sure, entirely unintentional. Under the existing civil procedure rules committees, there is a means by which—for example, with regard to employment tribunals and employment appeal tribunals—the Secretary of State in the case of the employment tribunal or the Lord Chancellor in the case of the employment appeal tribunal, can direct the making of regulations or rule-making powers. I do not believe that that would be a consequence one would seek in the present context.
Thirdly, the three existing rules committees cover three entirely independent jurisdictions, and it is unclear how they might decide among themselves which proceedings should be extended to the Online Procedure Rule Committee and which should not. We anticipate that in itself creating very real practical difficulties over the administration of the future Online Procedure Rule Committee. This is why we do not consider that this amendment would have an acceptable outcome.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, touched on housing. At present there is no intention to proceed with the simplified Online Procedure Rules in respect of housing cases. However, housing cases are governed by the Civil Procedure Act 1997, and are therefore subject to the Civil Procedure Rules, meaning that they would potentially be subject to the OPRC in the future. If and when that were to occur, it would be after consultation or concurrence with the Lord Chief Justice. It would occur because the committee had determined to proceed in that way—a committee which at that stage could be joined by suitable experts in housing law, and other related experts. Only at that stage would it be contemplated.
I notice, however, that although that is not presently anticipated, it is currently possible to initiate some housing enforcement claims online, through the Possession Claim Online website. That has been operational for almost a decade. There have been no difficulties—certainly no reported difficulties—over access to justice because of the use of that Possession Claim Online website. So I accept the potential width of the Bill.
This brings me to Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the issue of family proceedings and the concern that has been expressed there. There may well be situations, such as those posited by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, where one would never anticipate online procedure or digital process being appropriate for types of family law cases, such as those concerned with children and their welfare. Nobody is suggesting otherwise, but it is not necessary for us to list particular exclusions, because in doing so one is liable to overlook something. It is far better for us to ensure there are appropriate safeguards in place, such as by judicial input, whether by consultation or concurrence; by having an appropriately qualified committee with the ability to bring in experts, particularly on areas such as family law or child welfare; and by ensuring that we proceed incrementally only where the introduction of these simplified procedures is in the interest of litigants. There are circumstances in which it may be in the interest of litigants, in family law cases, to have access to a simple, inexpensive online procedure for the resolution of some types of dispute.
To support that approach, perhaps the Government should be using different language from that used in the Explanatory Notes in paragraph 1, which says:
“We expect the Committee to focus on the civil and family jurisdictions in the first instance”.
That is pretty broad.
My Lords, I am supportive of Amendments 5 and 13, which outline the sort of assistance that is very much required. For Amendment 13, my preference is that the particular agency should be in some way connected with the Courts & Tribunals Service so that judicial supervision is available in respect of it. One institution that strikes me as very useful in this connection is the law centres, which were recipients of legal aid in my time. They are an economic way of providing legal assistance—much more economic than the expensive lawyers to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred. Of course, it is not very good to have recourse to the inexpensive and cheap lawyers, because you are apt to spend more in the end. This is an excellent idea and requires the Minister to think quite hard about how it should be done.
This brings me to my Amendment 14, which is a slightly different matter. There are various skills available in electronic matters. You may have recourse to the internet and yet not be very sure what you have reached when you get there. There is a risk—it may not be large, but there is a risk—that if there is a court portal for certain things, you may find yourself on a website which is supposed to be the court portal but is actually run by people with a more private interest in litigation than the courts would have. I suggest Amendment 14 for consideration, which would require the Lord Chancellor to make arrangements to try to secure as far as possible that this does not happen to the rather inexpert people who may be using the internet, of which I regard myself as one.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has reminded me that it is well known that the application system for the US ESTA visa waiver scheme has a number of such sites which exact charges, to which people are not liable because of the very modest charge on the official site itself. I will simply point out that HM Courts & Tribunals Service is already working on this sort of thing. There are 18 locations in which it is providing face-to-face digital support, or at least is said to be providing it. The Government have been working this up on the pilot schemes, so it seems to me another ideal opportunity, which the Minister should not neglect, to accept that the Government are actually on the right lines on this.
It would be rather more reassuring if the Bill contained some obligation to provide this kind of support. If it is not there, the Bill will be open to the charge from many people that it is creating a new system without ensuring that people can use it. The means are beginning to be developed by the Government, so I hope that they provide some statutory basis for them.
I make two brief observations. First, I support the introduction of the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and emphasise that HMCTS provides a lot of advice on various areas and, because it is now jointly accountable to the Lord Chief Justice as well as to the Minister, its independence ought to be seen. Secondly, if Amendment 13 is adopted, I would hope that due regard is paid to the provisions of the Welsh Language Act; subsection (5) does not do so properly at present.
My Lords, in agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, given his anticipation of beneficial light emerging from the Front Bench, I caution him that, as so often happens in these matters—particularly when the Government are giving something away, such as consultation—the light at the end of the tunnel ends up being the light of the approaching train. I urge that we temper our enthusiasm for any blandishments from the Government—not that my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench would ever be guilty of offering anything as vulgar as a blandishment.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has made all the points that need to be made and has made them better than I possibly could. However, if one strips away the words “the Lord Chancellor” and replaces them with the words “Secretary of State”—and Clause 6(2) condescends to do that, because clearly the Lord Chancellor cannot agree with himself and has to agree with his schizophrenic self, the Secretary of State—and if one strips away the ancient legal title and office of Lord Chancellor, one finds that one is in fact dealing with a political Minister in a spending department at the Ministry of Justice and that he or she will be placed under all the pressures of both self-interest and Cabinet responsibility that go with being in a spending department. If it is inconvenient for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to allow the Secretary of State to agree with the Lord Chief Justice, he will disagree with the Lord Chief Justice. We should not be under any misunderstanding about that.
In the what must now be 20 years since the removal of the office of Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary—and I am standing behind one of the finest exemplars of that office—with that position having now gone to the Lord Chief Justice, the metaphorical gap and indeed the actual distance between the law and Parliament has grown immeasurably. The understanding between the law and those who administer it and politicians has grown immeasurably. One only has to look at the record of some Secretaries of State for Justice who have succeeded my noble and learned friend and who do not have that intimate knowledge of the administration of justice to understand the difficulties and dangers that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, anticipates—and have happened already.
While I support the sensible policy behind the Bill, all kinds of little niggles pop up from time to time which will destroy its purpose. They will make it less beneficial for the public good than it would otherwise be, were the suggestions made in the previous debate by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and in this current debate by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, taken into account. As a supporter of the Bill and the Government, I urge them not to allow themselves to be swept down the river of consultation when the river of agreement is a much safer journey to take.
My Lords, the messages are getting more complicated and conflicting between approaching trains, rivers and nuclear options. Perhaps we should recognise that we are replaying debates in which some of us were involved when it was attempted to abolish the Lord Chancellor overnight and there emerged from that process the system we have now. It is very relevant to the noble Lord’s amendment and to the powerful points he has made in support of it. The change in the role of Lord Chancellor, quite correctly emphasised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, as Secretary of State for the Government as well as Lord Chancellor, stretches forward to influence what we ought to be doing in this legislation.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am obliged to the noble Lord and welcome the fact that he has given consideration to these issues and is able to contribute to this matter with his interim report. No doubt he may take that further. On his second point, I had mentioned that the 11 proposed areas will be coterminous with PCC regions. There are more than 11 PCCs, of course, but we will ensure that the regions are coterminous so that we can develop the appropriate relationships between the PCCs and the NPS in that context. It is certainly not our intention for this to be rushed. I would mention two points: first, although the existing CRC contracts, as adjusted, run to the end of 2020, we have the ability to extend them to the spring of 2021 to have time to bring in these reforms; and, secondly, there will be a pilot in some sense because the model we are now adopting is the one we had already decided to adopt for Wales, which will be implemented from 2019. We will be able to see how this actually operates in practice before we proceed further with the rollout across the rest of England.
My Lords, if the Government do not succeed in putting right the failings which many of us identified in previous reports, they will not win the confidence of sentencers and be able to proceed with getting rid of short custodial sentences, which is part of their policy. Surely, in order to get these things right, you do not want too complicated a structure. The intermediate body which is doing the commissioning from the voluntary and private sector seems a rather cumbersome structure, and we have to deal with telephone reporting being relied on, excessive workload for probation officers and features demonstrating that the system is not delivering what it ought to deliver.
My Lords, I acknowledge that under the present scheme we have seen instances of excessive caseloads being placed upon probation officers, and we are concerned to address that issue. Equally, we are concerned to ensure that appropriate contact between probation and the persons to be released from prison can be achieved. I entirely concur with the noble Lord’s observation about the need to ensure that probation works in an effective manner, such that we can instil in both the courts and the public a confidence in non-custodial sentences. That is one of the objectives we have in mind with regard to these reforms.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I very much welcome the Bill. He has brought to the attention of Ministers some important considerations about what it should contain and how it can be implemented. It is of course one of the delayed instalments of the Prisons and Courts Bill which fell because of the 2017 general election—one of the many things which fell because of that election. When the Minister used the phrase “as parliamentary time allows”, I thought, “Good heavens, if parliamentary time does not allow it now, when will it?”. I commend the department on leaping in to the gap with a Bill; surely the Government can slip a few others in while we have so little in our legislative programme because of Brexit.
It is a very welcome Bill and I am encouraged in saying that by the large number of people who have used the existing opportunities for online access to justice. Extraordinarily high levels of user satisfaction are recorded, certainly in the Parliamentary Answer given on 30 April in the other place, which talked about a user satisfaction rate of 87% for services dealing with civil money claims, and rates of 92% and 93% in some of the other categories. That is encouraging, despite the difficulties that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to.
The users of online facilities will include a lot of private individuals worried about the cost and difficulty of oral proceedings, and by a great many small businesses, which will want to take advantage, particularly in relation to money claims. They and their organisation, the FSB, are very concerned that the procedure should be developed with a proper eye to the needs of small business and that they should be fully involved in developing it.
Looking at some of the things which we need to get right in the Bill, under Clause 1(b), the Online Procedure Rules can require relevant kinds of proceedings to be conducted electronically. Does that mean that in some areas there would be no choice—even if both parties want an oral hearing? That may depend on what regulations are introduced under Clause 3, and to what extent they limit the impact of Clause 1. At this stage, we do not really know, so there is a degree of uncertainty. The Bill could be implemented in a way which gives little or no choice at all.
Alongside that is the risk of imbalance. What if one party is prepared to use online processes but the other party does not wish to? Neither the Bill nor the Explanatory Notes have convinced me that we have got this sorted out or got it right. The party who does not want to use online claims may be someone who has difficulty in managing them, or has had adverse experiences—as most of us have had trying to book a flight or accommodation, when the site has simply imploded on us or refused to let us go any further or go back and change what we got wrong. I make no claims to be an expert in these procedures—sometimes they are very helpful—but there is a variety of perfectly legitimate reasons why someone might not wish to use them, and who might be confronted by another party who is very keen to use them. In those circumstances, it is important to know what support can be made available.
The Government have done some work on this in the pilots that have been taking place. I would like to have confidence that something like that is going to be available around the country once these procedures are developed. However, I looked at the Explanatory Notes to try to get a better understanding of the circumstances in which there might be a lack of choice. Paragraph 15 gives an example that,
“might apply where a party might not have access to the requisite IT, so creating a parallel procedure which may still be subject to those features of the online procedure that are readily available to the parties”.
That is the course of action provided for. I find it somewhat mystifying. Similarly, paragraph 17 talks about providing for,
“circumstances in which such proceedings may nonetheless remain subject to the Online Procedure Rules, so enabling the rules to provide for alternative procedures under clause 1(7)”.
Can the Minister can clarify what will happen if both parties are unwilling to use the procedure, or if one party but not the other is unwilling or ill-equipped to use the procedure?
I will raise a couple of wider points. Clause 5 allows the Online Procedure Rule Committee to provide for existing non-online procedural rules to apply, even if they would not normally be applicable to that kind of proceeding. This might, in theory, allow the anonymity rules from family procedure to be imported into other types of case, which cannot be the intention. What is this for? Why has this provision been included?
Clause 1 to 3 together give a very wide power to preclude oral proceedings altogether, in all but a few types of case, if the powers were used in that way. That could conflict with the ECHR and common-law rights to a fair and public hearing, and would somewhat undermine the statement of compliance on the front page of the Bill—which the Minister has vouched for.
There are some areas where we need to look in more detail at whether the Bill is appropriately worded, but its intentions are right. I hope that I am not being unwise in having some confidence that a lot of people could benefit if the Government get this right.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberIs it the Government’s policy, if they are negotiating in a transition period because they have got an agreement, to seek to continue the kind of provisions that are in these regulations when we come to the end of the transition period?
The Government—in the event that we have a withdrawal agreement—will enter into negotiations on our future relationship with the EU, and that will include a desire to ensure that we have addressed the full panoply of judicial co-operation issues that exist at the present time. We cannot say unilaterally that we will secure all of those, but clearly we have an interest in carrying on that negotiation. That is why, at the end of any implementation period, it may be that we can simply revoke these instruments without them ever having to be applied.
The instrument relates to mediation, which is, as noble Lords will be aware, a structured process whereby the parties to a dispute attempt on a voluntary basis to reach an agreement to settle their dispute with the assistance of a mediator, but without a court needing to rule on the dispute. In the civil and commercial fields, such a dispute covers a wide range of contractual and other issues, but also touches on family issues such as access to children.
In 2008, the European Council agreed what it termed a “cross-border mediation directive” which sought to harmonise certain aspects of mediation in relation to EU member states’ cross-border disputes. I should note that the directive does not apply to Denmark, so when I refer to “member states” in this context, I am not including Denmark, which has an opt-out under Protocol 22 of the Lisbon treaty. The aim of the mediation directive is to promote the use of mediation in such cross-border disputes. An EU cross-border dispute can be one between parties who are domiciled, or habitually resident, in two or more different member states, or it can be a dispute where judicial or arbitration proceedings are started in a member state other than the one where the parties are living or domiciled.
The United Kingdom then enacted domestic legislation which gave effect to certain aspects of the mediation directive. I say “certain aspects” because, in many areas—such as ensuring the quality of mediation, and information about mediation for the public—our existing arrangements already met the requirements or standards set out in the 2008 directive. However, in order to implement the directive, the UK had to introduce some new rules for EU cross-border mediations involving UK parties. These new rules first specified that if a time limit, or limitation period, in domestic law during which a claim could be brought in a court or tribunal expires during the mediation process, the parties can still seek a remedy through the courts or tribunals should the mediation not be successful. Secondly, the new rules defined the rights of a mediator, or someone involved in the administration of mediation, to resist giving evidence in civil or judicial proceedings arising from information disclosed during mediation. Various changes were also made to court rules to supplement these changes and to implement the requirements of the mediation directive relating to the enforceability of agreements resulting from mediation.
Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the legislation implementing the mediation directive is retained EU law upon the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. However, should the UK leave the EU without an agreement on civil judicial co-operation, the reciprocity on which the directive relies would be lost. So, even if we were to continue to apply the enhanced EU rules to EU cross-border disputes, we would be unable to ensure that the remaining EU member states applied the rules of the directive to cross-border disputes involving parties based in the United Kingdom, or to judicial proceedings or arbitration taking place in the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, and in line with the Government’s general approach to civil judicial co-operation in the event of no deal, this instrument will repeal, subject to transitional provisions, the legislation that gives effect to the mediation directive’s rules on confidentiality and extension of limitation periods. It amends the relevant retained EU law in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and in Scotland in so far as it relates to reserved matters. Separate instruments will amend the related court rules in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Other legislation implementing the directive is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Government, and I understand that they have decided to bring forward their own legislation in this area.
This instrument is necessary to fix the statute book in the event of a no-deal exit. We have assessed its impact and have published an impact assessment. By repealing the domestic legislation which gave effect to the mediation directive, we will ensure clarity in the law applying to mediations between UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in EU member states. We will also avoid a situation where mediations of an EU cross-border dispute conducted in the UK are subject to different—and arguably more favourable—rules on confidentiality or limitation than other UK mediations.
As I indicated earlier, the instrument will change the rules applying only to what are currently EU cross-border mediations, and then only in two respects: time limits and confidentiality. On time limits, claimants involved in such mediations who no longer have the benefit of an extended limitation period would, if they wanted more time to allow for mediation to take place, have to make an application to the court to stay proceedings and would have to pay a fee. We are unable to assess how many cases this would affect. Limitation periods can extend from three years, to six years, to 10 years in some instances, and can either bar a case from being brought or extinguish the claim in its entirety. They are extensive periods in any event, but they may be impacted by these changes
Overall, the instrument will ensure that, post exit, UK-EU mediations are treated consistently under the law with mediations between UK domiciled or habitually resident parties, or UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in non-EU third countries.
I have set out to deal with the issue of EU cross-border mediations because, without a deal in place on 29 March 2019, such mediations involving UK-domiciled parties would no longer be subject to the mediation directive rules in EU member states. The regulations now moved will fix deficiencies and ensure that both the courts and UK citizens have clear and effective rules to follow in such circumstances.
My Lords, this is another example of something we are losing, although in this instance the amount is relatively small. As the Minister has explained, this concerns mainly time and the confidentiality element as it is currently provided, and there are some alternatives to that.
It is extraordinary in that it repeals provisions that would be continued under the withdrawal Act—which we have already passed—in numerous other statutes, including the Equalities Act 2010, so we are bound to look at it suspiciously for that reason. The Government’s argument against continuing these provisions without guaranteed reciprocity—I accept that the Government cannot guarantee reciprocity—is that applying them unilaterally would result in preferential treatment for parties involved in EU cross-border mediations that they believe would no longer be justified when the UK ceases to be an EU member state.
If, however, the provisions can be used to assist in a mediation and the other EU state involved is willing to observe a reciprocal arrangement, why should we deny that benefit? What is the unfairness of that? There are many instances in which we have better arrangements with some states than with others in judicial matters, and in the case of our European neighbours it would be surprising if we could not have more arrangements facilitated than apply in other cases. We do not say that person X is being treated unfairly because their attempt to resolve a matter by mediation relates to a state that is not helpful, whereas person B is in a mediation involving a state with which we are able to make some reciprocal arrangement.
The Government have taken the view with most—although not all—of these statutory instruments that where we cannot have reciprocity we cannot have anything. That is not necessarily the case. The Minister kindly answered the question I asked him earlier in a way that seemed to imply that the Government, if there is an agreement during the transition period, would seek to negotiate back into existence something along these lines. Of course, during the transition period the provisions would continue to operate.
What if there is a no-deal Brexit, which looks increasingly likely? There is no reason why the Government should not seek to facilitate mediation with our former fellow EU states as a matter of policy. Clearly I am arguing that they should have a policy of negotiating during the transition for such arrangements—or even if there is no deal. The atmosphere might be less conducive but at some stage why should we not try to resurrect provisions of this kind?
Although, as I have said, the impact of removing these provisions is relatively small, it is another example of an area in which we ought to try to continue arrangements that are beneficial to people who have real problems to solve. Where possible, we should do so by direct agreement with the EU and, if not, by agreement with individual states.
My Lords, as we have heard, this instrument sits against a backdrop of completely inadequate planning for justice co-operation after Brexit. The danger is that that inadequate planning could put vulnerable people in our society at risk. Across Parliament, including from the Justice Select Committee, there has been concern that the Ministry of Justice has failed to provide sufficient detail or certainty about how co-operation on justice will be managed after we exit the European Union.
As we all know, we currently benefit from well-established, frequently updated and comprehensive reciprocal justice arrangements within the EU. Without an agreement with our European partners on what the future of those reciprocal arrangements looks like, people forced to go to court or mediation to protect their rights can face extremely damaging consequences.
We on this side of the House have consistently said that Brexit must not be used to lower standards or reduce rights. There is a fear of that. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is a little sanguine about how significant that is in this instrument, but I am a bit less so. It nevertheless breaches that principle about a reduction in standards and rights.
Noble Lords will recall that the instrument was laid for sifting by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on 16 November last year. The European Statutory Instruments Committee recommended that it be upgraded to the affirmative procedure because of its large volume of amendments to primary and secondary legislation, but also because it could diminish rights by disengaging from European Union obligations.
I may have misheard the Minister. He referred to an impact assessment. I do not know whether that included a consultation or whether he is instead relying on the Government’s general civil judicial co-operation framework. If it is the latter, the European Union Sub-Committee on Justice found that the framework contained little detail on how the Government’s aims for co-operation would be achieved.
This statutory instrument will repeal legislation enshrining the mediation directive. The directive extends time limits for bringing some civil claims—including child maintenance claims and employment tribunals—to enable mediation. I am sure we all agree that this is a very good thing. The directive is one of many examples whereby we have raised legal standards and protections across Europe through co-operation with our European partners.
The European Statutory Instruments Committee considered whether this instrument could diminish rights and found that it repeals legislation that extends the time limit for bringing certain claims in civil courts and employment tribunals to enable mediation. Shortening time limits in that regard can have significant consequences, prohibiting parties from reaching mediated solutions in child contact cases, for example. This statutory instrument clearly breaches the principle that standards should not be lowered; it lowers the standards for enabling cross-border mediation from the higher EU standard to a lower international one.
The Government accept that the UK could unilaterally continue to apply the mediation directive post exit but have decided not to do so. The noble and learned Lord will correct me, but my understanding of the Government’s position is that, if someone wants to stop a time limit running in mediation, they should issue proceedings before a court and apply to stay or stop those proceedings. That is unfair and unrealistic for so many people in their current financial circumstances, let alone in the context of the obliteration of civil legal aid, which we have discussed in your Lordships’ House so many times.
Put simply, this statutory instrument does what Ministers promised—in this House and elsewhere—would not happen: it breaches the principle of not reducing standards in people’s access to justice. That is very disappointing.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his careful exposition of the scheme and for the quotations from the report, which the Lord Chancellor made to Parliament, detailing the consultation. We cannot consider this interim proposal—this carry-over proposal—without reflecting that it is part of a complex situation with judicial pensions which causes a great deal of anxiety. Whenever you inquire of those involved in carrying out recruitment to the judiciary or of those who are applying, a number of issues are mentioned, such as the state of the court estate, but pensions come up every time, because of the bizarre and convoluted nature of the system which has resulted from the changes that have been described. The changes produce really bizarre situations where relatively junior members of the Bench find themselves with greater entitlements than those who have served for a number of years. One of the results of this is a deterrence to recruitment. In some cases, there is an incentive for retirement because some are better off retiring than remaining in the scheme.
In extending the present contribution rate for the next year, a number of things have to happen, including litigation. One can only express the hope that pensions cease to be a disincentive to recruitment, because the recruitment problems of the judiciary affect the ability of citizens of this country to obtain timely justice—quality is maintained, but timeliness can become a problem. They also affect the substantial export earnings of our courts and of the legal services which surround them. They are therefore pretty important. As I said, you cannot get into any discussion about judicial recruitment without the pensions issue arising. It would be good if the Government could sort that out.
My Lords, is it correct, from my scanning of the web as to what the dispute before the Court of Appeal, to which the noble and learned Lord referred, is about, that the taxpayer could potentially face a bill of upwards of £750 million if this case is lost? It seems to me to be an extremely high figure. I assume it is a calculation to do with the massive additions to pensions that would be required if all judges got the transitional relief which, at the moment, is only going to be afforded to a small proportion.
My second question makes an obvious point for somebody who is not a lawyer or a judge. Am I right in assuming that the judges who will sit on this case are adjudicating on their own pensions? In no other walk of life would that be considered a satisfactory arrangement. Will the noble and learned Lord tell us whether that is the case? If it is the case, what is the protection against judges simply, to be blunt, ruling in their own self-interest?
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI am happy to take an intervention from the noble and learned Lord, even though he was not prepared to take one from me. I will speak later in the debate but I just want to put on record that I find his actions extremely disrespectful to the Committee. That alone would lead me to wish to negative the instrument, because the Minister is not subjecting himself to the proper process of interrogation and answering questions on the regulations. It is immensely disrespectful and the first time that a Minister has come to a Grand Committee and not been prepared to answer questions in the normal way.
My Lords, when I looked at the instrument, I began to wonder whether the Minister was open to the charge from some of his colleagues here and in the other place that he was part of Project Fear, because the instrument sets out some consequences of Brexit, both in general and in a no-deal scenario, pretty starkly.
The loss of reciprocity is central to this instrument. I did not notice the Minister express any concern or grief at this but it represents the removal of something that we have developed in recent years, to the great advantage of litigants, and which we are about to lose, to our detriment. The consequence is that separate enforcement will be required in many cases, including judgments of foreign courts; by foreign, I mean courts in the EU or the Lugano states. Incidentally, that includes Norway, a state with which we have particularly close and friendly relations.
The Explanatory Notes to the regulations show that the Government go only this far by stating:
“The impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies of this instrument is, on balance, expected to be positive when compared to making no changes to retained EU law”.
However, in the same paragraph the notes go on to explain that,
“an increased risk of parallel proceedings … could increase the number and complexity of disputes before the courts and the cost of litigation for parties … Common law rules also involve a less efficient mechanism for recognising and enforcing judgments than using existing EU rules deriving from the Brussels regime, which will cost those seeking to have their judgment recognised in the UK more money and time”.
There is a serious loss in that and a further loss in relation to the European Judicial Network, another development that has been beneficial to this country and to justice across Europe generally. Again, a bald statement is made in paragraph 7.14:
“The inability of the UK to continue to take part in this network is as a result of EU Exit, this SI simply reflects that new status”.
Another valuable judicial development is to be simply cast aside.
Thank you. The Justice Sub-Committee prepared a detailed report drawing attention to exactly what the noble Lord has referred to. There was an impassioned debate—I do not know whether the noble Lord was present—at which these points were made. The criticism is not against us, as it were, because in this House we have been taking our responsibilities seriously. However, I understand the point the noble Lord makes about the effect of leaving the EU and the distress he feels.
There is one thing the Government have not made clear. The impact statement, brief as it is, is structured around there being two options—the other option being not to change retained EU law. As I understood it, that option implied that in a no-deal situation, if we did not have this instrument, the courts would be left behaving as they had previously and hoping that courts in other countries would do the same. One of the things that was not explained very well in the impact statement—perhaps the Minister can clarify this later—is what the other option the Government rejected was.
My Lords, I have practised law for a long time—fortunately none of it in relation to the EU and the complications we are debating today. I defer to the more qualified Members of the Committee today, some of whom have already addressed us.
These regulations might best be described as a hors d’oeuvre to the four-course Brexit banquet we are being served today—although, curiously, neither the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments nor the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has raised any concerns.
In addition to reverting to the pre-EU membership system, the statutory instrument repeals a decision that currently allows the UK to co-operate on civil and commercial matters in the EU judicial network. What estimate have the Government made of the impact on the UK of that change, and what consultation took place with industry or other potentially interested parties given that the so-called Brussels regime operated on a reciprocal basis?
The Law Society, which is generally supportive of the statutory instrument, is concerned about the loss of the existing framework for determining which national court has jurisdiction and for recognising whether or not there is a choice of court between the parties to disputes.
The impact assessment contains a disturbing paragraph which states:
“Businesses and individuals litigating in the courts of EU countries will have an advantage over those litigating in the UK as UK litigants cannot guarantee the judgment they get from the UK courts is enforceable in the EU but litigants who get a judgment from the EU courts, will almost always be able to obtain enforcement of it in the UK”.
It is a one-sided deal, as it were. The English legal system has prospered remarkably through its participation in the EU but that looks to be one of the costs and losses that it will incur.
The Law Society notes that hitherto the existing system has fostered cross-border trade and encourages litigants to use the UK courts in the knowledge that their judgments would be enforceable across the EU and calls on the Government to accede to the Lugano convention—which, as the noble and learned Lord has indicated, is not an EU organisation although the EU is a party to it. Can the Minister indicate the Government’s response to that suggestion?
I take the noble Lord’s point when he says “negotiate”; that is the whole point. If he looks at the political declaration, there is a reference to the desire of all parties to negotiate on this among other issues so that we may be part of a regime perhaps similar to Lugano. Let us be clear: we have not only applied to become an individual signatory to Hague 2005, which involves reciprocity between the convention members and ourselves—although I say, quite candidly, that it is not as perfect as Brussels Ia, being more akin to Brussels I. That is why it is in many ways a second best to that extent, but that is as far as we can go. We have also applied to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to the Lugano convention—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. That will of course require the consent of the EFTA parties and of the EU, and it will be subject to negotiation, but we hope also to be a member of the Lugano convention.
If noble Lords have regard to the impact assessment, they will see that under option two we looked at simply leaving the UK law as it is—in other words, embracing all those relevant terms of Brussels Ia without any right to reciprocity from the EU 27. The difficulty there is that in the absence of reciprocity, people would not know what they were going to get from those provisions. Furthermore, it would raise two obvious difficulties. First, corporations, companies and associations within Europe could secure a decree there and automatically seek to secure enforcement in the UK, but companies, corporations and associations in the UK that secured a judgment from a UK court could not expect to enforce it in the EU 27 countries. That is why I stressed the concept of reciprocity. Yes, we want to negotiate and to secure reciprocity, but until we do, we have to make sure that the statute book is in some sort of order for a no-deal exit—which, as far as I am aware, no one truly wishes for.
Secondly, if we embrace the Brussels Ia regime without being a member of the EU, we would be discriminating between the EU 27 jurisdiction and all the other third-party countries. We would be giving some benefits to the EU 27 under Brussels Ia, albeit without reciprocity, but we would not be giving the same benefit to third-party countries such as the United States, India and China, and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. That raises real issues about discrimination in the context of wider issues on services and so on.
I thank the Minister for explaining the Government’s objections to option two. It might have been a good thing if he had written the impact assessment and developed those points. I shall still disagree with him on some other matters, including the fundamental issue here, but he has clarified that very helpfully.
I am obliged to the noble Lord. I know the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, made much of this, but that is why the impact assessment is between the statute book as it is upon exit and the statute book as it would be under the instrument upon exit, because Parliament has made the law and Parliament is determined to exit on 29 March. If that is reversed, so be it, but that is where we are and that is the impact that we have to properly address in this context.
On the wider point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of being in the EU and within Brussels Ia, I am not going to seek to disagree with him. Brussels Ia was a marked improvement on Hague 2005, for example; we all know that. Therefore, in many senses, exit from the EU without a deal is unattractive in the context of the provision of legal services in the UK, as indeed are the implications of that for those who have to engage those services and have recourse to the courts. No one is denying that either, but these are the consequences of the law that Parliament has made in these circumstances.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, asked what steps are being taken with regard to reciprocity. As I say, we are applying to become signatories to the Hague convention 2005, which will give us certain reciprocal rights. We are applying to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to that, which will give us reciprocal rights with the EFTA countries. In addition, we are intent upon negotiating around the whole issue of judicial co-operation in future, which is why it features in the political declaration. At this stage we cannot demand reciprocity from the EU 27 and they are certainly not prepared to offer it at this stage. At a very early point there were discussions about, for example, the recognition of legal qualifications and mutual issues of that kind, and the EU made it very clear at that stage that that was a discussion for another day. That is where we are.
Coming on to a further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about what happens to the SI, if we have an agreement on the terms of the present withdrawal agreement then we go into a two-year implementation period where we will remain a part of the Brussels Ia regime, so the instrument itself will essentially be suspended by the withdrawal agreement Bill. However, it will not be completely done away with because at the end of the implementation period—two, three or four years, whatever it might be—we will then have to decide whether or not we have achieved agreement with the EU 27 on future judicial co-operation. That might be on essentially identical terms to what we have now, in which case we will not need the instrument at all, or it may be that we cannot achieve agreement at that stage, in which event we will need to revive the instrument in order to bring the statute book into proper order. That is why I have referred to it as being “deferred” in that context; it is deferred for the implementation period, whatever that period might ultimately turn out to be. That is where we are on that.
On the issue of forum non conveniens, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to, that has always been a part of our common law because we apply it in the context of third party countries outwith the Brussels Ia convention. The noble and learned Lord may recollect the litigations that took place around the Pan Am/Lockerbie case and the attempts to take it further than just applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens but rather to apply the issue of interdict against the raising of proceedings in a third party country, which is attendant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens—although I recall being in a Texas court where the judge asked it to be pointed out to me that in Texas they do not have forum non conveniens, and we have to accept that there are some jurisdictions of that ilk. Nevertheless, the courts will fall back upon these common-law concepts which have not been done away with but have not applied in the context of the Brussels Ia regime for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord very carefully pointed out.
The European Judicial Network is a very fine body but it was set up in order that there could be engagement across the EU 28 about the operation of the regime that at the moment we are referring to as Brussels Ia, but it also looks at Brussels IIa and other issues. It concerns the operation of that regime and how it may be improved. For example, it contributes to how you move from Brussels I to Brussels Ia. If we are not part of the regime, we are not part of the European Judicial Network and we really have no part to play in that. But again if, going forward, we are able to achieve a negotiated position with the EU 27 where we are, if you like, semi-detached from Brussels Ia and the other Brussels regime, no doubt they will consider allowing us a seat perhaps not at the table but at least in the room of the judicial network in order that we can contribute to it. However, that too is a negotiation for another day. It is not what this instrument is addressing and not what it is intended to do. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, there is no elephant in the room. Parliament removed the elephant when it decided that, as a matter of law, we would leave on 29 March 2019. The Executive have to address that point in order to put the statute book in proper order.