European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 83C but will refer to Amendment 83D, to which the Minister devoted considerable attention. Amendment 83C goes some way to meet the concerns of the Constitution Committee, indicated by the tabling of Amendment 83D, even though the committee’s amendment is expressed in different terms. I will refer to that difference initially. The noble Baroness spoke at length about it, and it is a sore point with the Government. They do not want there to be any possibility of being accused of making big policy choices by delegated legislation, and indeed they ought not to do so. The Constitution Committee’s purpose in drafting its amendment was to ensure that delegated legislation is used to make technical changes which are necessary to ensure that retained EU law functions after exit day, and not to make policy choices.

I recognise that there are some cases where a technical change does in fact represent a policy choice—for example, the question of which body should handle this matter in the UK might be seen as a policy choice —but it would be no bad thing for Ministers’ attention to be focused on the need to police that boundary, so far as there is a boundary, between what provisions of EU law it is necessary to put on to our statute book in functioning form and what represents a policy change. That is what the House is anxious about.

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[Baroness Goldie]

I now look forward to giving that response. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his comments. On his first point, which is fairly legitimate, he will be acutely aware that Ministers have not just a personal but a political responsibility. They are, in the office of being a Minister, responsible for having made the statement. That, I think, imputes to the Minister both a political and a personal responsibility. Governments of all colours act in good faith and the Ministers involved act in good faith. I think this House will be satisfied that Ministers of whatever political hue acting under these powers will genuinely have a personal focus on what is being discussed—I think “focus” was the word used by the noble and learned Lord.

The statement must both make the original statement and give an explanation of the delay in having brought the statement forward. I have tried to make that clear in my remarks: this is not an alternative responsibility but a complementary responsibility; the two things will apply. A Minister cannot shoal off one of them and offer the other. Both responsibilities will apply.

The final point was that, when creating an offence, the noble and learned Lord thought it was appropriate to justify not just why the offence was being created but why it was being created in this way. Again, that is ex facie. Part of the impact of the responsibilities of the Minister under the Bill, if so amended, is that they can expect to be questioned closely. Indeed, given the now very robust scrutiny procedures that are in place, Ministers will expect to be questioned closely not only as to why they are creating the offence, but why they are doing so in this way. That is implicit in the structure within which Ministers are now being asked to operate. I hope that to some extent answers the noble and learned Lord’s points.

[Lord Beith]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I assume that she is going to answer the questions I put to her, not least about Third Reading but also about the importance of Ministers recognising that the inclusion of policy choices is something we would prefer not to see in delegated legislation.

[Baroness Goldie]

I am sorry. I did not have a detailed note about the point raised by the noble Lord, so may I undertake to write to him?

[Lord Beith]

I am sorry to press the noble Baroness, who is normally so helpful, but she has not clarified what she said about the Government reconsidering the wording in relation to criminal offences. It seems to me that, if the Government are reconsidering the wording, then we have to come back to that at Third Reading.

[Baroness Goldie]

We are not reconsidering. We are simply considering the appropriate text. The general point has been made clear by the Government: that they will not want to retract what is already their policy position. They will simply undertake to inform the House when a form of words has been adjusted.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I rise to move the Government’s Amendment 117. The Bill’s approach to certain EU rights of challenge and associated remedies has already been scrutinised closely. We have debated at length the substantive provisions in the Bill covering this area and this House has made clear its views. I do not intend to go over old ground again in this speech. The amendment deals with the approach to transitional cases in one important area, where Francovich damages are being sought. I will say a little about the particular substantive provisions that this relates to.

Francovich damages are a specific form of remedy that exists in EU law. They are available in certain strictly limited circumstances where member states have breached EU law, for example where a member state has failed to properly transpose a directive. The Government remain firmly of the view that, after we leave the EU, Francovich damages will no longer be relevant when we cease to be bound to follow obligations that apply to member states. This is for the simple reason that the majority of Francovich cases in the UK have been brought on the grounds of non-implementation or insufficient implementation of a directive. The UK will no longer be under an obligation to implement directives after exit and the directives will not form part of our domestic law as retained EU law, so the ability to claim Francovich damages would not be possible for a post-exit cause of action. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 therefore removes the right to Francovich damages after exit day. The Government consider this outcome to be a natural consequence of the decision to leave the EU, while ensuring Parliament is sovereign.

The impact of these provisions on transitional cases is one area that the House urged us to think again on when we debated the matter in Committee. I concede that the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Carlile, made powerful arguments, in particular on the need to look again at cases where an individual’s course of action accrued before we left the EU. The amendment responds directly to that concern.

We remain of the view that it would not be reasonable for there to be a long tail of cases based on outdated elements of EU law continuing to process through our courts, potentially for many years after we leave the EU. That would not be conducive to the legal certainty this Bill aims for. The Bill will therefore set what the Government believe to be a clear and sensible cut-off point. The amendment we have brought forward will therefore delay the prohibition in the Bill on seeking Francovich damages in domestic law for two years after exit day. This will provide individuals with a fair and sensible opportunity to seek damages for pre-exit breaches of EU law. It also ensures that we continue to have a clear and certain cut-off point after which such challenges would end. I hope that the House supports the proposals that we have put forward, which I think provide important reassurance to individuals and businesses. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could help the House, or those of us who were not following quickly enough, as to how Amendment 117 relates to Amendment 116, which, as I understand it, the Government did not move, and what the effect would be of having Amendment 117 without Amendment 116. Would that affect the Francovich damages time limitation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the intention with respect to Amendment 117 is that there should be a two-year period after exit, during which it will be possible for a claim to be made in respect of a right of action that accrued up to the point of Brexit. I hope that that clarifies the point.

[Lord Beith]

What was not clear to me was why the Government did not move the preceding amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, in Committee many noble Lords raised valuable concerns regarding the use of the consequential power, or, I should say, the misuse of this power. In response to these concerns, and being conscious of restricting the scope of the powers wherever practical, the Government have tabled an amendment to sunset the power to make consequential amendments from 10 years after exit.

I would like to point out that it is unusual for such powers to be sunset. However, given the unique nature of this Bill and the concerns about future Governments abusing the power to make consequential amendments, the Government have taken the decision that it is right in this exceptional case to apply a sunset to the power. The Government arrived at the figure of 10 years as the consequences of the Bill may only come to light long after our exit from the EU. The fact that this period is longer than that afforded to the other powers in the Bill reflects this fact. While 10 years should ensure that the majority of consequential amendments can be made, there is still a risk that some amendments that it may prove appropriate to make could not be made if they were only discovered after this time. The Government believe, however, that the value of sunsetting the power outweighs those risks.

I know that there are other concerns about Clause 17, and the Government have tabled amendments to address those, in particular arranging for negative SIs proposed under it to be sifted. I look forward to debating these on a later day.

I hope that this amendment demonstrates yet again the Government’s commitment to satisfying the concerns of this House, and I hope that noble Lords will welcome this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise that the Government have moved on this issue, even though 10 years is the longest sunset that I think I have ever heard of in any Bill—it has the quality of a north Norwegian, Arctic sunset, which pleasantly never comes. However, in this case, some date by which to end these rather wide powers is welcome. Of course, the Bill also has the limitation in Clause 17(2). It was the breadth of the powers that led us to table Amendment 85, which was not moved, and it was the Government’s willingness to move on this and some other amendments that made us feel that we ought not to press it. I hope the Minister recognises that any use of these consequential powers that appeared to go beyond what is genuinely consequential would raise the spectre that we had let through excessive powers. He will be well aware by now that this House has become increasingly vigilant about the breadth of powers granted to Ministers. In recognising that the Government have moved on this issue, we have not pursued other amendments.

Amendment 86A agreed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

These amendments may be technical but they are none the less important. They guarantee the integrity of our devolution statutes and provide the assurance that noble Lords have sought that those Acts will be subject to appropriate scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, these are very helpful amendments, in that they reassert respect for the constitutional importance of the devolution legislation. They are part of the context that we will return to next week when we try to sort out other devolution aspects of the Bill—perhaps with greater ease in relation to Wales than Scotland, but that is for another day. Some of them are technical and tidying-up, and have been achieved with agreement. All that is welcome.

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, it falls to me to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said, and to thank the Minister for moving the amendments and for the explanations that he has given. I hope he will agree to convey to his departmental colleagues our congratulations on their very hard work, the results of which are now before us. Of course, we should recognise that this is the calm before the storm, in the sense that Clause 11 is coming along. If there are some very simple technical amendments here, there are 16 pages of amendments to Clause 11, so there will be fun and games when we get to it. Still, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said, this respects the devolution arrangements between us.

I wonder if noble Lords will be patient with me if I use this occasion to express my gratitude for the work of Carwyn Jones, the First Minister of the Welsh Assembly, who has announced that he intends to stand down. The steadiness of his hand on the tiller, and indeed his involvement in the discussions that have yielded these amendments, has been considerable. Wales, its parliament and the people of the UK owe him a great deal, and I would like to place this short tribute on the record.

So I think we are sitting pretty with this one. I know King Henry VIII was a Welshman, and he might even have voted with the Government on this one too. Without further ado, we have no problem with this at all.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

The noble Lord has the advantage over me. I was not thinking so much of potato seeds but the fact that the Secretary of State has said that we are to have higher standards of animal hygiene, animal health and animal welfare, which I welcome. That follows on from the little debate we have just had. There will have to be physical checks. There cannot be checks managed by technology, in which case potatoes and their seeds could effectively fall within that category. So the noble Lord has actually made and developed that point very neatly for me.

In the context of Amendment 47, I urge the Minister to maintain Clause 8 in the Bill and to keep an open mind as regards potential membership of the European Economic Area or applying to join the European Free Trade Association.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, notwithstanding the noble Baroness’s arguments, I want to address this group from a different standpoint: that of government Amendment 47A, which is to leave out Clause 8. It may be because I have a suspicious mind, but, while the removal of Clause 8 would be quite welcome to the Constitution Committee, which had considerable concerns about its breadth, I am worried that in removing it the Government have satisfied themselves that there is nothing they could do under Clause 8 that they could not do under Clause 17 and its broad powers. What is more, there are things which the Government can do under Clause 17 which they are prohibited from doing under Clause 8. When we come to Clause 17, we will perhaps have to look more carefully at it than has been done so far.

It would be helpful if the Minister could set out the Government’s argument for deleting Clause 8. I am quite sympathetic to that, even though I understand the standpoint from which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, was arguing. But were we able to get the Government to move seriously in the direction of having a customs union-EEA, as our vote last week showed that the House wants to do, I am quite confident that ways could be found to do that with or without Clause 8. I would be only too glad to assist if that happens—but I am concerned about the reliance on Clause 17, which may lie behind the removal of Clause 8.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said about the charter in his Amendment 15 and I agree with him in Amendment 19, to which I have added my name. I want to refer to Amendment 18, which deals with yet another area of legal uncertainty that will be created by this Bill. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill asserts that there will be,

“no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.

That was also quoted by the noble Lord a moment ago. However, having snatched away a citizen’s right to seek redress through the courts, paragraph 1(2)(b) of the same schedule states that in some circumstances the Executive might allow you into the court with your challenge. A Minister can make regulations to provide for that, but on what criteria and when will the regulations be made? My attempts to get clarification have yielded incomplete results. In a Written Answer to my Question of 29 March, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, referred to the fact that individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument—indeed so. He added:

“This power could be used to enable a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in such circumstances”.


How will those circumstances be defined? I am particularly concerned about the repeated reference to “individual circumstances”. Is the Executive to decide on a case-by-case basis which individual cases merit a judicial hearing and make regulations specific to individual cases? That is a quite extraordinary thought. Are Ministers to choose who is allowed the key to the courtroom?

There is a possibility that regulations which deal narrowly with an individual case could be challenged by another individual or organisation with a similar case but which did not fall within the regulation. It would be claimed that the regulation was hybrid. This House provides special procedures to protect and give a fair hearing to parties affected by hybridity in statutory instruments—parties who want to argue that they are being dealt with in a different way from others who are in the same circumstances as they are. However, these protections are removed by a provision in paragraph 23 of Schedule 7, which states that hybrid regulations under the Bill are to be treated as if they were not hybrid and that their hybridity is to be ignored.

The upshot of all this is yet more legal uncertainty. Companies and individuals claiming to be adversely affected by a retained EU law whose validity was open to challenge will not be able to take that challenge to court unless they are lucky enough to be covered by exempting regulations, but they cannot know that in advance because the regulations will not have been made or even published in draft. The Government made it clear in the same Answer to which I referred earlier that they have no plans to publish any such regulations at this stage. Parties will have no way of knowing which areas or issues might be exempted. It is not even clear whether there will be any regulations, since the Government could decide not to use this purely permissive power at all.

Given that, absent any criteria in the Bill for the scope of these regulations, I do not believe that the power to make them should remain in its present form. I would rather we solved this problem by permitting legal challenge, thus providing potential revenue for abused rights. If the general prohibitions on legal challenge were to be retained, which I would regret, Ministers should come back at Third Reading with an amendment that properly defines or provides the criteria for their potential scope so that they are not wholly subjective and Executive-controlled. If, however, noble Lords agree to Amendment 15 and are similarly disposed to agree to Amendment 19, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to which I have added my name, I would suggest that this amendment becomes a necessary consequential amendment. With the scope for appropriate legal challenge reinstated, there will be no reason for the Executive to have powers to remove the prohibition in selective circumstances of their own choosing.

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Moved by

[Lord Beith]

18: Schedule 1, page 16, leave out lines 11 to 15

[Lord Beith]

I beg to move an amendment that I regard as, in broad terms if not technically, consequential on our earlier decision.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

There is a good deal to be said for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, when one bears in mind the power given in each of Clauses 7, 8 and 9 to make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament under regulations made under these clauses. Of course, one can look back to an existing Act, which could be amended by the exercise of this power, for a purpose related to the Brexit arrangements. If one takes an existing Act—one can visualise all sorts of situations when that might arise—it would seem right that the same procedure should apply if the amendment is made for the purposes which one sees in Clauses 7, 8 and 9.

For future Acts I can see there is a problem, because one cannot control a future Parliament, but as far as the past is concerned I respectfully suggest that there is a lot to be said for the amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry I missed the beginning of the speech of my noble friend Lord Sharkey as a result of unaccustomed speed breaking out on the Bill’s proceedings while I was having a cup of tea. Whether this will be repeated, I do not know.

I had discussions before with my noble friend to properly understand his amendment and its main aim, which is to embrace, within scrutiny procedures used for withdrawal Bill statutory instruments, all those statutory instruments for the same purpose that derive from other previous statutes. That is an interesting idea. When it comes to referring back to the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, it is worth recalling that the Act was surrounded by generous commitments, promises that prayers against negative instruments would always have time for debate on the Floor of the House and all sorts of undertakings that were completely unfulfilled in practice.

Whether the amendment can be made to work in precisely this form I am not quite sure, but I think that the purpose of ensuring that nothing is slipped through by anything less than at least the procedure of triage and scrutiny that we seek for statutory instruments under this Bill—if it becomes an Act—is extended to anything that does the same thing. We certainly would not want to create a perverse incentive for a Government to use the wrong legislation, or a different piece of legislation, for the statutory instrument simply because they could evade a form of scrutiny by doing so.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have already been given, I also support this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

Perhaps the noble Baroness was not listening to what I said earlier. We fully intend the vote to take place before the European Parliament votes.

As I have said, I remain convinced that we will achieve a deal in the interests of all the nations and people in the UK and that this Parliament will approve it. After Parliament supports the resolution to proceed with the withdrawal agreement and the terms for our future relationship, the Government will bring forward a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. That Bill was announced on 13 November 2017 by the Secretary of State and followed on 13 December 2017 by a Written Ministerial Statement committing the Government not to implement any parts of the withdrawal agreement until this vote on the final deal takes place. I hope it is clear how the withdrawal agreement will be implemented and that Parliament will have ample opportunity to scrutinise it before it is given effect in our law.

I reassure noble Lords that the withdrawal agreement itself will be subject to the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 before ratification, in addition to the vote on the final deal that we have already promised and the scrutiny of the implementing legislation. There will therefore be ample opportunity to scrutinise the agreement and its implementation.

I know that many noble Lords have clear concerns about Clause 9 as it is currently drafted—I listened very carefully to the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. The Government are listening very carefully to the debate on these concerns and we will take them away to see whether anything can be done ahead of Report to address them.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

What is the point of leaving in this Bill the power to make regulations which can now only be brought into effect once the withdrawal agreement Bill has been passed? Should we not just remove those provisions now and ensure that any provisions included in the withdrawal agreement Bill meet the concerns that the Minister has said he would like to meet?

[Lord Callanan]

If I can make a little more progress talking about Clause 9, I think the noble Lord will find that his question has been answered.

However, let me ensure that my previous statement is not taken as more significant than it is—

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[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 153, which also stands in my name. Having been away from your Lordships’ House for several days, I do not feel as though very much progress has necessarily been made in my absence. I come back to hear what I consider Second Reading speeches being made all over again. The reason for my absence was that I could not speak. I had not realised that we could ask other noble Lords to read our speeches for us, so I have not sent in my thoughts in advance. I do not propose to detain the Committee very long today because I might still croak, and the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has in many ways highlighted the key points.

We have not yet been told why Clause 9 is necessary. In our discussion on the previous group of amendments, my noble friend Lord Beith asked the Minister about that but did not get an answer. The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, also said that Clause 9 may not be necessary. That is indeed what the Delegated Powers Committee has suggested. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister who is to respond to the debate—it may be the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie—would explain in more detail why the Government feel that Clause 9 is necessary. We understand that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is willing to listen and consider possible amendments. If the Government still believe that Clause 9 is necessary, do they consider the fact that any Minister of the Crown may make regulations for amendment perhaps goes rather wide? There are usually up to about 200 Ministers. That seems rather a large number of members of the Executive who might want to exercise their droit du seigneur or other Henry VIII powers.

There seem to be some general issues with Clause 9, but subsection (2) raises particular problems, especially the part in parentheses—the subject of Amendment 154—which allows modification of the Act as a whole. As the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has just said, that could negate the many hours of scrutiny that have just taken place in your Lordships’ House and which have taken place in the other place. Even if the Government can explain why Clause 9 is necessary, surely subsection (2) goes way beyond the scope that would be desirable.

I turn to the final of the three “S”s mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane: the sunset clause. Clause 9(4) seems to suggest that there is a sunset clause as it states:

“No regulations may be made under this section after exit day”.


However, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has already made very clear, it is entirely possible that if any Minister of the Crown can make such regulations as they deem necessary following the enactment of a piece of legislation envisaged in subsection (1), they could then deem that subsection (4) could be repealed. Is that not the case? If it is, should that provision not disappear as well?

At the outset of Second Reading, the Government suggested that they were listening. The House of Commons has already amended this legislation but it still leaves open a whole set of questions that need serious review. The Delegated Powers Committee has suggested that Clause 9 is not necessary. That is certainly my belief and I think it is in line with Amendments 153 and 154. But, short of taking the whole clause out, please will the Government think about removing subsection (2), which would at least remove some of the greatest dangers to our democracy? If the intention of voting leave to take back control is to be taken seriously and parliamentary sovereignty is to be regained, surely that means that your Lordships’ House and the other place should make decisions and Ministers should not seek to wield unnecessary executive authority.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend on her specific point and reiterate the question. On the specific point, we are in even more of an Alice in Wonderland world than she and the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, indicated because under subsection (2) it might be possible to make regulations that delete the provisions of Amendment 7—that is, to remove the words,

“subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal”.

That might be something that was thought appropriate by Ministers because they felt they had to get on with something before Parliament had got to the stage of considering withdrawal. It is possible under this provision. It seems clear from all those who have looked carefully at it that the way Clause 9 is worded really needs drastic surgery, if I may use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane.

This brings me back to the question that I have tried, by brief intervention on two occasions so far, to get an answer to: why do the Government want to persist in including in the Bill the first half of Clause 9(1) and the remaining subsections? Following the inclusion of the Amendment 7 provisions, the proper place for whatever powers are needed for statutory instruments arising from the withdrawal agreement is the withdrawal agreement Bill. We would have plenty of time between now and then to make sure that they are expressed in terms not open to the abuses that several of us have pointed out. Why do the Government still want these words in the Bill?

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, first, I hope that “appropriate” will disappear in any event, and that it will be replaced with “necessary”. This clause appears to be drafted especially to deal with a situation where, once the withdrawal Bill is passed, a number of important things have to be done before exit day. I hope that the House of Commons will have the opportunity to consider these. The reference here is quite clearly to something that is required in implementing the withdrawal agreement. We have only to listen to the amendments that were dealt with this morning to know the tremendous complexity that this withdrawal Bill is bound to have—I only hope that it will have it and that we will have an agreement that will be incorporated in a withdrawal agreement Bill, which will deal with these complications. However, if they are dealt with, it is quite obvious that quite a number of things will have to be dealt with speedily that will be brought into effect on exit day. For example, where the authority controlling a particular line of business is no longer effective because of the withdrawal agreement, it may be necessary, to preserve that, to have some form of regulation that sets up an alternative, so that there is a control; for example, with regard to the things that were mentioned this morning, food safety.

It is therefore possible that in some situations the regulations will require modification of existing Acts of Parliament. The substance of this clause is therefore of importance, and we may have to consider it in a bit more detail. I hope that the Minister, when she comes to reply, will be able to give us some examples of the kind of thing that can happen. However, it would be dangerous not to make provision in case that kind of thing happens. The withdrawal agreement Bill will be complicated enough, so if we can make some preparation for it, that would be of benefit.

[Lord Beith]

I am sure the noble and learned Lord is right, but the Government cannot do any of these things until the withdrawal agreement Bill has been passed; therefore the kind of provision he is talking about might more appropriately be made in that Bill than this one.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I can see that. On the other hand, it is sometimes wise to be prepared if you can foresee a thing that is required and have it ready. We also have the scope to discuss it in this Bill, whereas I imagine the discussions on the withdrawal agreement Bill will be pretty complicated—I assume the latter will be a good deal more complicated than this Bill, and if it is going to require the sort of consideration that this Bill has had it will take some time. There is something to be said for trying to prepare, but of course it is necessary to ensure that the preparations are adequate—that is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, deals with.

I am conscious that we may be trying to regulate the House of Commons a bit. I have never had the honour of being a Member of the House of Commons, as so many of your Lordships have, but my impression is that the House of Commons has plenty of powers to control what the Government do. Of course, if necessary, it has a very extreme power in that connection.

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[Baroness Goldie]

I was merely trying to be helpful in giving your Lordships some indication of what already exists. I was simply reassuring your Lordships that the Government were not having some legislative aberration by introducing powers just for the sheer merriment of doing so.

There have been some suggestions that we should make changes now but I would submit that that is simply not responsible. We cannot be certain of the exact detail of the withdrawal agreement until the final text has been agreed, and attempting to second-guess its content by legislating for it now would be premature and ill advised. We need to be prepared. Let me give an example; I hope this will reassure my noble friend Lady McIntosh. In earlier debates in Committee, various noble Lords asked the Government to give clarity, for example, on the status of cases that are pending at the Court of Justice of the European Union at the moment of the UK’s withdrawal. The Government suggested that such clarity was desirable but can be provided only through a legally binding agreement with the EU. Before that point, we can legislate for what we would like the CJEU to do, but we can have no certainty as to whether it would actually do it.

It is our clear hope and expectation that we will reach a withdrawal agreement that includes provision that UK cases pending before that court on exit day will continue through to a binding judgment, as set out in the joint report published in December. As noble Lords know, that agreement would then be put to a vote in both Houses of Parliament. After that point, if the UK Government, Parliament and the EU have all assented to the proposition that these cases should continue to a conclusion, amendments may be required to the EU withdrawal Act to facilitate that agreement. That was the point my noble friend Lady McIntosh was making. Bearing in mind the limited number of those cases in practice—and the level of agreement that would already have been demonstrated to the general proposition—it does not seem to me unreasonable that it should be open to the Government to implement it by secondary legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, asked a very fair question about how many regulations we anticipate making. I do not think it will be extensive, for the very reason that this clause is cut off on exit day.

[Lord Beith]

Under the provisions of Clause 9, that could not be done before the passage of the withdrawal agreement Act. Therefore, should it be necessary, that can be done in that Act, either by specific provisions in the Act—which most of us would prefer—or by statutory instruments provided for under the Act. Nothing can happen before the withdrawal agreement Act is passed, so the idea that this will help with situations in the meantime is not valid.

[Baroness Goldie]

I understand what the noble Lord is saying, and I accept in principle that that is a fair assessment of the position, but that is not to say that that should preclude the flexibility to deal with something if it does arise. That is why the Government maintain that there is an argument to justify retention of this provision.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I want to direct the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the process of defending this Parliament and trying to bring back control to it, we are in danger of legislating one of the worst set of Henry VIII powers that could possibly be imagined. They would enable the Government to change the Northern Ireland Act, the Scotland Act and any of a series of things, so long as they were matters that had been considered in the withdrawal agreement.

Having come from a position of wondering why Clause 9 was in the Bill at all, because these are all matters to do with the withdrawal agreement—we have not got one yet, so we cannot legislate for it—we are now in a situation where I am surprised that the Government want to keep it. A poison pill has been administered to it by a very helpful amendment in the other place. None of the powers which we will put on the statute book can be exercised until a piece of legislation on the withdrawal agreement has been passed. It is entirely useless from the Government’s point of view, but from the point of view of those of us who are trying to protect Parliament, it is the one place in which we have a guarantee that there has to be an Act of Parliament to complete this process—if we do, indeed, complete it.

The grouping suggests that this is where we consider clause stand part. I think it would be wrong to pass over what Clause 9 contains, without recognising that it is not what we should be putting on to the statute book at all, certainly not without knowing what the withdrawal agreement is and without therefore being able to circumscribe the powers to things which reasonably arise from it.

There are things that cannot be done under these powers which are specified in subsection (3) but an enormous range of things can be done if a Minister considers them appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. I will no longer be ready to turf Clause 9 out of the Bill, for the reason I gave. The Constitution Committee, when it considered it, thought that it was entirely inappropriate to have these powers at this stage. The stage at which we should have them, if at all, in modified form is in the withdrawal agreement Bill, and not before, but we have the compensation that the clause contains the guarantee that the process can go no further without another statute being passed in both Houses of Parliament.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 196.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, with her normal quicksilver mind, has darted ahead to the bit of the speech that I have not yet got to, relating to where we are on Clauses 8 and 9. She makes a fair point and I intend to deal with it. I hope I have reassured noble Lords over the correction power, and I thank noble Lords who contributed to that part of the debate.

Amendments 130, 131, 132, 148, 149 and 159, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, seek to extend such a restriction to the international obligations and withdrawal agreement powers. I have listened carefully to what has been said. To avoid any shadow of a doubt, I am very happy to sit down with the noble Lord on what he says about the points raised on international agreements to look at the point on international obligations; I think it related to Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act. I am happy to look at that point with officials. However, I think he must accept, as noble Lords would, that the overriding ability in relation to international agreements must rest with the UK Government as the member state and the body able to conclude international treaties. I do not think there can be any question about that. However, I am happy to look at the valid issue he has raised on that point.

The position on international obligations and the withdrawal agreement powers must necessarily be more nuanced because we do not yet know what changes may be required, as we are not yet sure what the precise shape of the withdrawal agreement will be. However, I can confirm that this power will not be used to unpick the devolution settlements, nor to undermine or amend the Belfast agreement. As I have indicated, we are adhered to both the devolution settlements that we have and to the Belfast agreement that was reached in April 1998 and must be protected in all its parts.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The Minister speaks as though the Clause 8 and Clause 9 powers are basically the same. They are not, of course. The Clause 9 powers can be exercised only if a further piece of legislation, a withdrawal Bill, is passed. It is not clear to me why the Minister is letting himself be cornered over this when the powers do not need to be in the Bill at all.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

First, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham for bringing the matter of creating criminal offences under the powers in Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 to the attention of the Committee through their Amendments 87, 128, 156, 339 and 340, which seek to amend the relevant provisions in the Bill. As I said, I understand that similar concerns were raised during the debates on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, but that a mutually agreeable outcome has since been reached, with the Government bringing forward a requirement on Ministers to make additional statements alongside their statutory instruments. Of course, the offences envisaged under that Bill were different and carried considerably greater sentences. I hope that I can satisfy the concerns that noble Lords have expressed during this debate. However, the Government are still looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised—and, as I say, we are open to discussion on finding similar solutions in this Bill.

I shall start with the reassurance that the three main powers in the Bill are explicitly restricted from creating a “relevant criminal offence”, which is defined in the Bill as an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18, or in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland the age of 21, is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years. A vital part in achieving continuity and consistency for businesses and individuals as we leave the EU is to ensure that criminal offences continue to operate effectively after exit. As such, the Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 powers can create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for two years or less. In applying this two-year limit, the Government have sought a balance between appropriately limiting the three main powers and providing a functioning statute book on exit day.

The amendments would see that no criminal offences—or no criminal offences punishable by any term of imprisonment at all—could be created under the three main powers in the Bill. However, it is important that these powers are able to create certain criminal offences, as I shall come on to explain. For example, criminal offences provide an essential function of ensuring compliance with regulatory regimes which provide crucial protections for businesses and individuals. Some of the regimes criminalise particular conduct relating to the EU and some offences may no longer operate as intended after exit day if they are not corrected, particularly where functions transfer to a UK authority. For example, it could be an offence for a business to fail to provide an EU authority with certain information, but after exit day the authority collecting that information might be a UK one instead. Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I wonder if the Minister could help us. He seems to be arguing what might be a coherent case for some offences needing to be redefined to have the same effect as they would have had before exit day. Surely it cannot be part of what he is describing to create offences that did not exist simply to ensure that the statute book after exit day has the same effect, in terms of the criminality that people would face, as it had beforehand. Does that not need him to approach this differently and try to find a way of defining the process so that it is not about the creation of new criminal offences?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bilimoria]

I thank the noble Viscount for that intervention. At the moment, the courts very rarely intervene. They had to intervene with Article 50 being put through Parliament; that was fundamental. This House defeated the Government twice by almost 100 votes each time in two of the biggest votes in the history of our Parliament—614 of us voted in one and 634 in the other. Do we want a situation where this Parliament or the Government are continually challenged by the courts? We do not want to go there, and this is why these amendments are important.

I conclude that the power to amend all EU-derived primary and secondary legislation by the Government without sufficient scrutiny, checks and control, bypassing Parliament, goes against the ultimate supremacy of Parliament itself.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, from this side of the Committee I shall speak to Amendment 244A, in my name, which comes from the Constitution Committee and was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, in his opening remarks. The amendment’s purpose is to provide a more objective test and a requirement for Ministers to state that they have applied an objective test. Should they have failed to do so, they become accountable for not having done so. That is the value of it. It is in no way exclusive of the series of amendments in the remainder of the group, almost all of which replace “appropriate” with “necessary”. I will come to that in a moment. I want to appreciate the words a few moments ago from the noble Lord who is the former—and much respected—chairman of the Constitution Committee. His contribution is one that Ministers really ought to note.

We are dealing with wording in this legislation that worries us enough in this context. However, noble Lords should be in no doubt that, if this wording remains in this legislation, subsequent debates will take place around the idea that, “It was included in the withdrawal Bill and there were some very serious issues raised in that, so it must be acceptable” and that it must be reasonable to use such a shallow test of appropriateness for very far-reaching statutory instrument powers. Numerous other Bills will come before us in the course of this Parliament which have statutory instrument powers in them, and this and future Governments will draw on the precedent of how this legislation is worded.

As to the distinction between “appropriate” and “necessary”, the suggestion I have heard that Ministers do not realise they are open to legal challenge is, I think, quite wrong. Ministers are well aware that they might be open to legal challenge, and that is why they prefer “appropriate” to “necessary”. It gives them a “plump legal cushion”—that wonderful expression of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson—behind which they can hide. It is just not good enough; we have to find better wording. If Ministers are unhappy with necessity, they must come up with something more effective. We find the word “appropriate” used in many contexts. It conjures to mind the sort of instructions for a day out that say “Appropriate footwear should be worn”. That clearly indicates to the person who has to make the decision that they have a fair degree of discretion—it could mean hiking boots or other firm-soled shoes, as long as it is not stilettos or ballet pumps. They have a choice. Ministers are desperately trying to preserve choice for when they bring forward statutory instruments under this legislation.

The problems of the statutory instruments are not confined to Henry VIII provisions, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out. There is the inability to amend any of these statutory instruments, whether they are Henry VIII in their impact or whether they impact merely on previous statutory instruments. The inability to amend them grossly weakens Parliament’s ability to deal with matters that would normally be in primary legislation.

I am not only sympathetic to the amendment that the committee itself has put forward, which has my name on it, or something like it, but I am also very supportive of the attempt to find a better word than “appropriate”. So far, at any rate, necessity seems the right provision.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I have added my name to a number of amendments that delete “appropriate” and insert “necessary”. They are all in this group. I do not claim any particular merit for that amendment: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is, I believe, the lead name on this amendment. The fact is, we have one thing in common. Whether is it “essential”, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham will doubtless seek to persuade us in a few minutes, whether it is “necessary”, used in the context described by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, when he moved his amendment so admirably, or whether it is a bare “necessary”, I do not mind. I frankly have a slight preference for the wording of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson.

We are in a very sad place when, having been told that we were taking back control, what we are doing is bestowing control. Parliament is bestowing control—if this goes through—on the Executive. I have quoted before in your Lordships’ House the famous Motion moved in 1781, I believe, in another place by Colonel Dunning: “The power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished”. Substitute “Executive” for “Crown” and that is what this is all about. I also think of the immortal words of my friend the late father of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, who talked about an “elected dictatorship”.

Are we really seeking to leave the European Union—which I believe is a foolish step—to bestow on the Government the power which Parliament should take? That is the fundamental question. We should not bestow the power on or allow any Minister—whether he or she be ever so high or ever so low, whether he or she be at the top of the 109 or at the bottom, it matters not—to change the law of the land, and then indeed extend it, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, pointed out in his admirable speech, to public bodies and to the courts. We live in a parliamentary democracy. Your Lordships’ House rightly has much less power than the elected House, but we can act as a check and a balance and as an encourager to those in another place. These are probing amendments tonight, of course, but I am confident that this will come to a vote on Report, and we should say to our colleagues in another place, “Do not give up the power which you exercise as representatives, not delegates, of your constituents, because if you do that, it will be a real nail in the coffin of democracy”.

I personally believe that a referendum is inimical to representative democracy. But, as we have said before, we are where we are. We are moving away from the European Union, but we must move away as a parliamentary democracy, where power ultimately resides not in No. 10 Downing Street, the Treasury, or in any ministerial office but in the Chamber at the other end of the Corridor. Your Lordships’ House has a particularly important role in stiffening the sinews of those at the other end of the Corridor. There is an enormous wealth of experience in your Lordships’ House, which was demonstrated by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, this evening, and which would have been demonstrated, I am sure, with equal eloquence by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, had he been able to be with us. We in a sense must see ourselves as the servants of democracy, but with a duty to put some real strength in the directly elected House.

I hope that we will have a response from the Minister this evening that will indicate that he understands what this is about. He, of course, is one of the 109. He may be low down on the list, but he is there. Whether he is 109, 108 or 73, I know not and I care not—but he is there. I hope that at the very least he will repudiate any notion of exercising power that it is not for him to exercise. We have to address this issue, whether we think in terms of Henry VIII or Thomas Cromwell or Oliver Cromwell, all three of whom would have looked upon this as a marvellous mandate. We have a duty. Tonight we are probing, but there will come a night when we must vote if the response is not as it should be this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 82. Yet again it is the issue of using secondary legislation under Clause 7 to make changes, in this case to the Equality Act 2010 or to subordinate legislation made under that Act, or to reduce rights or remedies under EU retained law,

“in comparison with the position immediately before exit day”.

Your Lordships’ Committee made its views on the abuse of Clause 7 abundantly clear during the earlier debate. Surely the same reasoning applies.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Ludford in querying what is intended by Clause 7(3) and hope that the Minister will be able to draw on his limited stock of examples to provide me with one—indeed, with something that fulfils this definition:

“There is also a deficiency in retained EU law where the Minister considers that there is … anything in retained EU law which is of a similar kind to any deficiency which falls within subsection (2)”.


In that case, why does it not fall within subsection (2)? Can the Minister give me an example of something which subsection (3)(a) would provide for but which subsection (2) has not provided for?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short but interesting debate covering an important point. When my ministerial colleagues in the other place moved the amendment that inserted into the Bill the subsection that Amendment 80 would remove, the Government’s reasoning was accepted by the other place without a Division. That is an onerous responsibility upon me, and I hope I can replicate that performance and satisfy any concerns the noble Baroness has.

As we heard at Second Reading, most of the House accept that the power in Clause 7(1) is essential but, was as said then, the Government are looking forward to using the expertise of this House to tighten any slack in the power and ensure that it is capable of neither too much nor too little. I have just addressed the importance of retaining Clause 7(3)(b), but I repeat that the Government believe we can be a responsible Government only by ensuring that we can provide for all the types of deficiency we discover.

Subsection (3)(a) provides that the meaning of “deficiencies” in Clause 7 includes those of a similar kind to those set out in subsection (2). The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, asked what this means and whether there are any examples. This ensures that, for example, deficiencies relating to arrangements between public authorities in the British Overseas Territories and the EU and its member states, or between the UK and the EEA and EFTA states are caught by the definition of a deficiency. They are not included in the list in subsection (2) but are very much of a similar kind to the types of deficiencies listed, and it is important that the power is wide enough to allow the Government to correct them. This House accepted at Second Reading the principle of resolving all the deficiencies in retained EU law using the power in Clause 7, and we cannot do this without both a type of sweeper—I think the legal term is “ejusdem generis”—and a power to provide for additional kinds of deficiency if they are later identified. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that that is why the clause is drafted the way that it is.

May I seek clarification from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter? I was not quite clear whether she wanted to speak to Amendment 82 or whether she is forgoing that for the moment for the purposes of this debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was kind enough to refer to my amendment, which was probably misgrouped at an earlier stage when we were discussing Euratom, I wish to underline the points that he makes. At that time I asked the Minister to set out for Parliament the approach to the EU agencies that the Government were going to take in the negotiations. Frankly, the noble Lord was far too dismissive of that approach, and it would do him some good now if he were to say that at some point during the course of the Bill the Government will set out the line that they will take. After all, as has been said, the Prime Minister has set out her line in relation to some of those agencies. Unfortunately, within 48 hours, the EU has effectively said, “Sorry, that is not on”—not only for the post-transition period but for the transition period itself. While we were continuing to follow the rules and procedures of those agencies, we would no longer take part in their activities. We have an issue here.

I was a bit diffident about the coalition’s Public Bodies Bill—I did not want to embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Newby, who has been so kind to me—but, as my noble friend said, the achievement of the House of Lords was to knock out an enormous schedule. The Chief Whip, who was the Minister in charge of the Bill at that time—he is now in his place—looks less fraught with this Bill than he did when he was dealing with the Public Bodies Bill. In the end he wisely convinced his colleagues that he had to drop the huge schedule that gave carte blanche powers to the Government to abolish or tweak the responsibilities of a host of public bodies. That Bill was to abolish bodies or alter their remit; this Bill is to set up entirely new bodies. Unless we do that knowing what the overall approach is, this House cannot give the Government that degree of power.

Mention has been made of the new environmental body. Strictly speaking, under this clause as it currently stands, the Government would be able to establish, under secondary legislation, the kind of body that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, who is no longer in his place, was arguing for earlier—a body so powerful it could sanction other public bodies, including the Government, if it was able to reproduce the powers that presently rest with the European Commission. That is an enormous power, which this House would not allow the Executive arm of government on its own without primary legislation conducted through the two Houses.

I recognise that there is a timescale problem for the Government, but might it be possible to set up some of these bodies in shadow form? If there are 10 bodies, as the noble Lord suggests, there may be a need at least to stop the process before the final passage of this Bill. To have permanent public bodies to regulate large swathes of our public life, industry and personal behaviour—even if there are only a dozen of them—would require primary legislation. This House needs to assert that it does and the Government need to accept that.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Newby on one specific reason why it is primary legislation that we use, and should use, for the creation of public bodies, even in these circumstances. He referred to the somewhat limited procedures in both Houses, but particularly in the Commons, for dealing with statutory instruments, but one abiding characteristic of them is that they do not admit of amendment. When a public body is being created, even in the short timescale we are talking about here, its remit, terms of reference, composition and the powers it can exercise are incapable of amendment. The idea that the Government would produce so perfect a form that it would not benefit from amendment, or even discussion of amendment, is so fanciful that I am sure the Minister will not advance it. Surely primary legislation capable of amendment, even if addressed with greater speed than normal because of the circumstances, is the only defensible way of doing something as extensive as creating a public body.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments. I believe that public bodies should be established by primary legislation. Parliament must have the opportunity to properly scrutinise and access the expenditure associated with trying to replicate bodies to which we already belong. The Bill, and in particular Clause 7, contains elements that are frightening to those of us who believe in parliamentary democracy. Handing such powers to the Executive is a gross dereliction of duty. I encourage my noble friend to urgently ask his department to reconsider the Government’s current intention to leave so many excellent EU agencies and try to recreate our own versions.