Football Governance Bill [HL]

Lord Bassam of Brighton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

260: Clause 56, page 45, line 25, leave out “a specified competition organiser to apply to the IFR for”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is one of a series of amendments which mean that it is not only a specified competition organiser which can trigger the mediation process regarding the distribution of revenue.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the first of a number of amendments in a very large group—enormous, in fact—but they all have at their core an impact on the way in which the independent football regulator could make financial distribution decisions.

I will run through some of the more important ones briefly. Amendment 260 would mean that it is not only a specified competition organiser that can trigger the mediation process. Amendment 261 would provide for competition organisers to obtain consent before determining the distribution of revenue and would require the IFR to be satisfied that the distribution proposals comply with its general principles which are contained in Section 62(2).

Amendment 267 would oblige the Secretary of State to consult people who represent the views of regulated clubs and the views of fans of regulated clubs before making regulations which specify the source or description of relevant revenue. Amendment 268 would amend the definition of distribution agreement. Amendment 269 is also part of this series and would mean that it is not only a specified competition organiser which can trigger the mediation process regarding the distribution of revenue.

Amendment 276 seeks to provide that a competition organiser can apply to the IFR to trigger the resolution process if there has been a change to rather than any reduction in the revenue received by a competition organiser. Amendment 284 would require any notification that a competition organiser gives to trigger the resolution process regarding distribution revenues. Amendment 293 would insert an amendment to trigger the resolution process. Amendment 318 would narrow the circumstances in which the independent football regulator may revoke a distribution order where the competition organisers have agreed a distribution agreement to circumstances where that distribution order complies with Section 62(1)(a) or (b) or Section 62(4)(a) on the principles in general set out in that section.

Why are these amendments necessary? It is principally because we require a degree of flexibility for the regulator. We want to ensure that the regulator can trigger a mediation process and impose its own deal if the parties fail to reach agreement by mediation. Currently, it seems to me that the regulator will be presented with a binary choice, and neither of those choices might be perfect.

At the moment, the deal is primarily controlled by the Premier League. Overall, 88% of broadcast revenue goes to the Premier League and 7% of the remainder goes to clubs who get parachute payments, meaning that the remaining 5% is split between the next 138 clubs in the pyramid. I accept the case that has been powerfully made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, that the Premier League is a great league, that it produces incredible and impressive revenues and that those revenues have worked to solidify the excellence of the league and improve the quality of the clubs, the entertainment on offer and the players who are available to it.

However, it seems to me that we ignore at our peril the rest of the pyramid. Currently, for every £1,000 that goes to a Premier League club, just £313 goes to a Championship club and, if you take it down to a National League South club, it gets just 14p. Yet, if you look at the attendance figures, 45% of football fans, roughly speaking, go to a Premier League match and the remaining 55% go to games in the Championship, League One, League Two, National League, National League North and National League South, so there is a case for better distribution. I am not saying what that distribution should be—that is obviously a matter for which the regulator will be responsible—but the regulator needs to be able to make that decision based on the best possible circumstances. So these amendments are designed to facilitate that and to allow the regulator to act freely, working with football industry bodies and ensuring that they have the best possible information.

That is why my amendments seek to generate some flexibility and why a distribution deal must pass parameters set by the regulator, so that the gap between the various levels of football can perhaps be narrowed. It was never intended to be as wide as it is today. Initially, the gap between the Premier League and the Championship level was a lot narrower, and then again between the Championship and Leagues One and Two. It is the important development of football TV rights that has allowed the Premier League to become as rich as it has and to pay the wages that it can pay. International comparisons put the Premier League way ahead of any similar leading leagues.

We have a strange situation where some 64 clubs in the top four divisions have gone into administration since the start of the Premier League. That is clearly an unhealthy situation and a better distribution deal that is properly regulated would begin to address some of the gaps and some of the disparities. That is the spirit behind these amendments.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

The noble Lord will be well aware that the EFL has just signed a very great deal with Sky, with revenue coming in, and I do not believe that that money is distributed down the pyramid either. One hopes that the Championship and the EFL will continue to improve and get better deals. Does his amendment include the fact that perhaps that league needs to start looking to distribute and that if its income starts to increase, as we all hope it will do—we have heard that it is the sixth-richest league anyway—it is not just the Premier League that needs to be involved in this but the EFL itself? At the moment, it does not distribute any of the income from the money that it gets in from broadcasting. Perhaps it needs to look at distributing some of its income down the leagues as much as the Premier League does.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a compelling point. It is the case that the EFL is dominated by the Championship clubs. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that the EFL has secured a beneficial deal. It is not for me, her or anyone else in this Committee to say what the right sum of money is. I am merely pointing out that the distribution has changed over time. The available money for distribution has grown as the game has become more successful as a product unique to England and Wales, and it is for the IFR to get the distribution right. The point that the noble Baroness makes is that we should not be arguing the case for either the EFL or the Premier League; we should be arguing the case for football, because it is all of football that we want to see benefit, so that the pyramid truly acts as a pyramid and acts well in strengthening the national game.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, before I address the amendments in this group, I want to echo the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. With 44 amendments in this group, it really is hard to get your head around them all. Although they are given the broad title of “Regulatory powers”, I do not think that is conducive to good debate.

We had a similar situation on Monday night with a miscellaneous group and a similarly large number of amendments. I hope all noble Lords would agree that the very point of Committee is to scrutinise and grouping so many amendments together is not conducive to that.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

Many of the amendments are consequential. I have highlighted the main points for the benefit of the Committee and that was my objective so that it would get the message.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I appreciate the noble Lord’s efforts to do that. It was not specific to this group. There have been a number of examples which have been unwieldy, to say the least.

I turn to Amendments 260, 269 and 293 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. They alter the backstop method to enable the regulator to trigger the resolution process. The current drafting permits only the competition organisers to trigger it. That is quite a profound change, if you think about it. To date, we have been saying that the regulator should step in only as a last resort if the competitions cannot reach an agreement among themselves. What we are saying here is that the regulator can step in—I guess, in theory even if the competition organisers have agreed—if it feels for some reason it is not quite happy with the agreement. That seems quite a shift away from the principles we were talking about earlier. Our concern would be that we are suddenly setting up a role for a quite muscular regulator which can interfere maybe not at breakfast, lunch and tea but quite a bit of the time, to say the least.

Amendment 276 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, states that the leagues can trigger the resolution process if there has been a change to revenue received by other leagues, as mentioned. Again, I think we could get into situations where a five-year deal has been put in place and a league is suddenly trying to reopen the deal. I am delighted that the Championship has a good Sky deal. Do we think that gives cause to reopen the deal? That would be a concern there. I am always a great believer that a deal is a deal is a deal. You live by that deal for that time and when it comes up again, that is the time to negotiate. Amendment 264 from the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, again makes provision for multiple competition organisers to trigger the backstop and mediation process.

In all of these, there is a general concern that instead of the backstop being the backstop, as it is called, it becomes almost the first stop and the first resort. It goes to the concern that noble Lords have mentioned many times that while we start with the principle of a light-touch regulator, very quickly we get into a scenario of a pretty heavy-touch, muscular regulator. That would be our concern.

Amendment 261 provides that competition organisers must obtain the regulator’s consent before entering into a distribution agreement. Again, this adds another level of complexity. If the competitions have agreed between them, why do they need to get the consent of the regulator? It goes far beyond the original intentions of the backstop per the Dame Tracey Crouch report, in which she referred to it as the nuclear option, and how that would be the only case it would come up in. Instead, through these amendments, we would be setting up a lot of situations in which it would be the first resort.

While I understand that the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, are noble—as ever—I feel that this is another circumstance of mission creep and unintended consequences, where we would end up with a very muscular regulator. Those are our concerns.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Competition and Markets Authority has used it.

The process proposed by this group of amendments, excluding Amendment 260, would allow the regulator to intervene at its discretion and would require it to take into account the potential use of any revenue distributed. It is the Government’s view that this is regulatory overreach and a fundamental change to the intent of the process as drafted.

The other amendments from my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor seek to change the structure of the backstop process from a two-party mediation and final proposal/order process to one that could apply to any number of relevant parties. I understand the overall intent of these amendments and have chosen to address them as a group to ensure that that intent is understood comprehensively, and that the Government’s position is in turn communicated coherently.

To clarify, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National League can all apply to trigger the backstop process. Any of the specified competition organisers can submit an application to trigger the process, and simultaneous instances of the backstop process could be triggered to cover the relationships between each of the leagues. The process is inherently designed as a two-party process. Fundamentally, distribution agreements are agreed between two individual leagues and the process is designed to facilitate these agreements. As the final offer process is set up and designed between two parties to facilitate a decision between two proposals on the basis of relevant principles, it would not be effective for the regulator to engage in this process with more than two parties. This is also, in part, why it would not be appropriate for the regulator to make a third offer. Without the incentive of the two-proposal process, parties are likely to stay at polarised positions, rather than find areas for compromise. However, when the two proposals submitted are the only choices, the pragmatic decision is to submit the most reasonable proposal possible. This is the incentive we wish to create.

I now turn to Amendments 292, 296 and 314, tabled by my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor of Bolton. While there is a slight difference between “special” and “compelling”, we are satisfied that the bar is set sufficiently high with the use of “special”, which is the more usual terminology in these sorts of provisions. There is likely to be no tangible difference in outcomes, and therefore these amendments would be minor, insignificant changes to the wording of the Bill. As such, the Government believe the current drafting is sufficient. This is also the case for Amendment 264. While we understand the intent behind this amendment, we are content that the current drafting in the Bill sufficiently captures all revenue relevant for consideration during the backstop process. The proposed drafting change would not capture any revenue sources not already captured by the existing wording.

I turn now to Amendments 261, 262, 276 and 315. Amendment 276 seeks to significantly broaden one of the conditions by which the backstop process could be triggered. Condition 2 is specifically designed to be triggered by a material reduction in relevant revenue, as this poses a significant threat to the financial sustainability of the pyramid. Amendment 315 would, if the distribution process was ended due to incomplete or inconsistent proposals, require the regulator to issue a distribution order based on its expert panel’s own proposal, rather than ending the process. This would prevent the regulator ending the final proposal stage without an order, even if both leagues have chosen not to submit proposals.

These amendments, and the others referenced, would increase the likelihood of an enforced rather than an agreed solution. The Government’s preference is for an industry-led solution. It is our view that the regulator should have a role in facilitating the final proposal process only where no agreement can be reached on distribution, and that the process should be the least interventionist it can be while remaining effective. This approach encourages future collaboration and prevents the leagues relying too heavily on the regulator in the future.

I turn now to Amendments 284 and 286. While I agree that the state of the game report is a usual source of information to be considered as part of the distribution agreement process, it is our position that these amendments are unnecessarily prescriptive. As it stands, the Bill does not make specific reference to the report being included as a potential question for consideration. However, the existing drafting does not in any way exclude consideration of the state of the game report, and the regulator must have regard to it as part of its general duties. I would expect the state of the game report to be considered by both the leagues applying to trigger the backstop process, and the regulator, given its relevance. However, to include this expectation beyond what is already set out in primary legislation would be inflexible.

Turning to Amendment 267, while the Government understand the broader intention to involve fans in as many areas of the Bill as possible, it would not be appropriate for the regulator to be mandated to consult a group which is neither directly financially involved nor a governing body. This is not to say that fans should not make their views known to the regulator, and there will be many instances, such as in the state of the game consultation, where we expect the regulator to be able to consider a number of perspectives. This includes the views of fans on the financial situation in English football. Furthermore, the proposed drafting requiring consultation with representatives of regulated clubs is duplicative, given that the Bill as drafted already requires the consultation of the leagues.

Finally, Amendment 319 seeks to remove the provision that explicitly outlines that leagues can come to an alternative agreement at any time in the backstop process. The ability of leagues to come to an agreement independently has been protected in the legislation itself intentionally, to highlight that an industry-led solution is both preferred and encouraged. We believe this explicit protection will encourage the leagues to reconsider at every step of the process whether regulatory intervention is necessary, ideally bringing them closer to an independent agreement that works for all of football.

I hope that my responses have reassured my noble friends and other noble Lords that the Government’s approach is appropriate and provides the necessary protections, and that my noble friends will not press their amendments.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Markham, rumbled me early on in his comments when he worked out that these were probing amendments; that is what they were intended to be. The group is disparate—I did not author it; it was what we were handed. It has been useful because it has enabled me to hear from the Minister how she sees the regulatory arrangements working as far as distribution is concerned, and the extent of the regulator’s flexibility.

I did not make this observation in my opening remarks but I think—the Minister covered this point—that the “state of the game” report will be critical when the regulator gets to grips with the distribution. The distribution of the revenues will be most important, because that is designed to make the game sustainable, to make sure that clubs do not go into administration, that we do not have clubs paying more than they actually earn in revenues, and so that clubs do not get to the point where they cannot properly trade. That is the most important thing for me.

Although I appreciate that my amendments would appear to some to be a bit of regulatory overkill, I think the point was made that we need to make sure that the regulator can do its job properly. The Premier League should not be at all threatened by the powers that the regulator has. Given the amount of money there is in the game and the continuing success of the Premier League—and, for that matter, the Championship —the regulator should be able to get our national game to the point where it is much more financially in balance and there are not the big gaps and distortions in revenue distribution throughout the pyramid.

I thank the Minister for what she said. Obviously, I shall study it very carefully. I think it unlikely that I shall return to these issues on Report, but obviously I will look at it very carefully before we come to that point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 260 withdrawn.