Data Protection and Digital Information Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bassam of Brighton
Main Page: Lord Bassam of Brighton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bassam of Brighton's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI take the Minister’s point and I will settle for the appellation “investigatory powers nerd”; I am quite happy with that. Does the Minister agree with me, however, that the legal difficulty —we see this with the other bulk powers already in our law—is that Article 8 of the European convention locks in not when a human eye gets stuck into the detail, but as soon as a machine harvests the data in bulk? Most of that data relates to people in respect of whom there could be no possible suspicion. Satisfying the requirements of necessity and proportionality must be done even at that stage. I understand that that is awkward and I am sure a lot of people would prefer that it was otherwise, but that is, as I understand it, the law. That renders the distinction that the Minister seeks to draw between data gathering and surveillance perhaps slightly difficult to maintain.
If I may just answer that question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson; I think it is important to take one question at a time.
I have every sympathy with what the noble Lord has said. As I mentioned on Monday, points could easily raised about that—I think it may have been the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who raised points about computers and their robustness. This is the very point that we agree with. It is incredibly important and we have started already to draw up a proper code of practice to work with the banks on how this will actually work. We need continued time to work these issues through. I also made the point on Monday that, at the end of the day, a human being will be there—must be there—to determine where we go from there.
Indeed, I was going to come on to that later in my remarks, particularly to address the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. We need the necessary time to continue to develop this code of practice, and that is particularly important in respect of this measure. The answer is no, I cannot guarantee to have the code of practice ready by Report. Indeed, I am saying that it will be ready sometime in the summer. It is important to make that point but also a further one, which is that there are many instances, as the noble Lord will know, when a code of practice is finalised and brought forward after the primary legislation is brought through, and this is one of those cases. That is not abnormal but normal. The noble Lord may not like it but there is considerable precedent for that to happen.
I have a question. I am slightly puzzled about the difference between data collection and surveillance. Surely the collection and gathering of data would be to enable officials to survey someone’s bank account. If that is not the case, what is the purpose of collecting the data if not to interrogate the behaviour of an individual to understand how their money is being brought in and spent, so that the department can exercise some judgment over whether the individual is revealing the truth about their income and outgoings?
Indeed, I think we are going back to the debates that we had on Monday. However, this chimes with a question from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, so it might be helpful briefly to rehearse what we are doing here and to be clear about the limitations and the checks and balances on the power that we are bringing forward.
As per paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 11 to the draft legislation, the DWP can use this power only for the purposes of checking whether someone is eligible for the benefit that they are receiving. In practice, this means that the DWP will request information only on specific criteria, which I laid out on Monday, linked to benefit eligibility rules, which, if met may—I emphasise “may”—indicate fraud or error. If accounts do not match these criteria, no data will be shared with the DWP. The effect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft legislation is that the DWP can ask for data only where there is this three-way relationship between the DWP, the third party and the recipient of the payment. In addition, the DWP can ask for data only from third parties designated in secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure. There are debates to come as further reassurance to your Lordships.
As per paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 11 to the draft legislation, the power does not allow the DWP to share personal information with third parties, which means that the power can be used only with third parties who are able to identify benefit recipients independently. Just to add further to this, we are obliged, under Article 5(1)(c) of the UK GDPR, to ask only for the minimum of information to serve our purposes. In accordance with the DWP’s existing commitments on the use of automation, no automatic benefit decisions will be taken based on any information supplied by third parties to the DWP. As I said earlier and on Monday, a human will always be involved in decision-making. I hope that helps.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his exposition. He explained the purposes of Clauses 138 to 141 and extolled their virtues, and helpfully explained what my amendments are trying to do—not that he has shot any foxes in the process.
The purpose of my amendments is much more fundamental, and that is to question the methodology of the Government in all of this. The purpose of NUAR is to prevent accidental strikes where building works damage underground infrastructure. However, the Government seem to have ignored the fact that an equivalent service—LinesearchbeforeUdig, or LSBUD—already achieves these aims, is much more widely used than NUAR and is much more cost effective. The existing system has been in place for more than 20 years and now includes data from more than 150 asset owners. It is used by 270,000 UK digging contractors and individuals—and more every day. The fact is that, without further consultation and greater alignment with current industry best practice, NUAR risks becoming a white elephant, undermining the safe working practices that have kept critical national infrastructure in the UK safe for more than two decades.
However, the essence of these amendments is not to cancel NUAR but to get NUAR and the Government to work much more closely with the services that already exist and those who wish to help. They are designed to ensure that proper consultation and democratic scrutiny is conducted before NUAR is implemented in statutory form. Essentially, the industry says that NUAR could be made much better and much quicker if it worked more closely with the private sector services that already exist. Those who are already involved with LinesearchbeforeUdig say, first of all, that NUAR will create uncertainty and reduce safety, failing in its key aims.
The Government have been developing the NUAR since 2018. Claiming that it would drive a reduction in unexpected underground assets being damaged in roadworks, the impact assessment incorrectly states:
“No businesses currently provide a service that is the same or similar to the service that NUAR would provide”.
In fact, as I said, LSBUD has been providing a safe digging service in the UK for 20 years and has grown significantly over that time. Without a plan to work more closely with LSBUD as the key industry representative, NUAR risks creating more accidental strikes of key network infrastructure, increasing risks to workers safety through electrical fires, gas leaks, pollution and so on. The public at home or at work would also suffer more service outages and disruption.
Secondly, NUAR will add costs and stifle competition. The Government claim that NUAR will deliver significant benefits to taxpayers, reduce disruption and prevent damage to underground assets, but the impact assessment ignores the fact that NUAR’s core functions are already provided through the current system—so its expected benefits are vastly overstated. While asset owners, many of whom have not been consulted, will face costs of more than £200 million over the first 10 years, the wholesale publication of asset owners’ entire networks creates commercially sensitive risks, damaging innovation and competition. Combined with the uncertainties about how quickly NUAR can gain a critical mass of users and data, this again calls into question why NUAR does not properly align with and build on the current system but instead smothers competition and harms a successful, growing UK business.
Thirdly, NUAR risks undermining control over sensitive CNI data. Underground assets are integral to critical national infrastructure; protecting them is vital to the UK’s economic and national security. LSBUD deliberately keeps data separate and ensures that data owners remain in full control over who can access their data via a secure exchange platform. NUAR, however, in aiming to provide a single view of all assets, removes providers’ control over their own data—an essential security fail-safe. It would also expand opportunities for malicious actors to target sectors in a variety of ways—for instance, the theft of copper wires from telecom networks.
NUAR shifts control over data access to a centralised government body, with no clear plan for how the data is to be protected from unauthorised access, leading to serious concerns about security and theft. Safe digging is paramount; mandating NUAR will lead to uncertainty, present more health and safety dangers to workers and the public and put critical national infrastructure at risk. These plans require further review. There needs to be, as I have said, greater alignment with industry best practice. Without further consultation, NUAR risks becoming a white elephant that undermines safe digging in the UK and increases risk to infrastructure workers and the public.
I will not go through the amendments individually as the Minister has mentioned what their effect would be, but I will dispel a few myths. The Government have claimed that NUAR has the overwhelming support of asset owners. In the view of those who briefed me, that is not an accurate reflection of the broadband and telecoms sector in particular; a number of concerns from ISPA members have been raised with the NUAR team around cost and security that have yet to be addressed. This is borne out by the fact that there are notable gaps in the major asset owners in the telecoms sector signed up to NUAR at this time.
Clearly, the noble Viscount is resisting changing the procedure by which these changes are made from negative to affirmative, but I hope I have gone some way to persuade the Committee of the importance of this change to how the NUAR system is put on a statutory footing. He talked about a “handful” of data; the comprehensive nature of the existing system is pretty impressive, and it is a free service, updated on a regular basis, which covers more than 150 asset owners and 98% of high-risk assets. NUAR currently covers only one-third of asset owners. The comparisons are already not to the advantage of NUAR.
I hope the Government will at least, even if they do not agree with these amendments, think twice before proceeding at the speed they seem to be and without the consent or taking on board the concerns of those who are already heavily engaged with Linesearch- beforeUdig who find it pretty satisfactory for their purposes.
My Lords, the Minister really did big up this section of the Bill. He said it would revolutionise this information service, that it would bring many benefits, has a green rating, would be the Formula 1 of data transfer in mapping and so on. We were led to expect quite a lot from this part of the legislation. It is an important part of the Bill, because it signifies some government progress towards the goal of creating a comprehensive national underground asset register, as he put it, or NUAR. We are happy to support this objective, but we have concerns about the progress being made and the time it is taking.
To digress a bit here, it took me back 50 years to when I was a labourer working by the side of a bypass. One of the guys I was working with was operating our post hole borer; it penetrated the Anglian Water system and sent a geyser some 20 metres up into the sky, completely destroying my midday retreat to the local pub between the arduous exercise of digging holes. Had he had one of the services on offer, I suspect that we would not have been so detained. It was quite an entertaining incident, but it clearly showed the dangers of not having good mapping.
As I understand it, and as was outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, since 2018 the Government have been moving towards this notion of somewhere recording what lies below the surface in our communities. We have had street works legislation going back several decades, from at least 1991. In general, progress towards better co-ordination of utilities excavations has not been helped by poor and low levels of mapping and knowledge of what and which utilities are located underground. This is despite the various legislative attempts to make that happen, most of which have attempted to bring better co-ordination of services.
It did complete a pilot phase this year. As it operationalises, more and more will sign up. I do not know the actual number that have signed up today, but I will find out.
NUAR does not duplicate existing commercial services. It is a standardised, interactive digital map of buried infrastructure, which no existing service is able to provide. It will significantly enhance data sharing and access efficiency. Current services—
I am concerned. We get the principle behind NUAR, but is there an interface between NUAR and this other service—which, on the face of it, looks quite extensive—currently in place? Is there a dialogue between the two? That seems to be quite important, given that there is some doubt over NUAR’s current scope.
I am not sure that there is doubt over the current scope of NUAR; it is meant to address all buried infrastructure in the United Kingdom. LSBUD does make extensive representations, as indeed it has to parliamentarians of both Houses, and has spoken several times to the Geospatial Commission. I am very happy to commit to continuing to do so.
In addition to the situation that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, described, I was braced for a really horrible situation, because these things very often lead to danger and death, and there is a very serious safety argument to providing this information reliably and rapidly, as NUAR will.
My Lords, it took them half a day to discover where the hole had gone and what the damage was. The water flooded several main roads and there were traffic delays and the rest. So these things are very serious. I was trying to make a serious point while being slightly frivolous about it.
No, indeed, it is a deeply serious point. I do not know the number off the top of my head but there are a number of deaths every year as a result of these things.
As I was saying, a thorough impact assessment was undertaken for the NUAR measures, which received a green rating from the Regulatory Policy Committee. Impacts on organisations that help facilitate the exchange of data related to assets in the street were included in the modelling. Although NUAR could impact existing utility—
My Lords, what a relief—we are at the final furlong.
The UK is a world leader in genomics, which is becoming an industry of strategic importance for future healthcare and prosperity, but, frankly, it must do more to protect the genomic sector from systemic competitors that wish to dominate this industry for either economic advantage or nefarious purposes. Genomic sequencing—the process of determining the entirety of an organism’s DNA—is playing an increasing role in our NHS, which has committed to being the first national healthcare system to offer whole-genome sequencing as part of routine care. However, like other advanced technologies, our sector is exposed to data privacy and national security risks. Its dual-use potential means that it can also be used to create targeted bioweapons or genetically enhanced military. We must ensure that a suitable data protection environment exists to maintain the UK’s world-leading status.
So, how are we currently mitigating against such threats and why is our existing approach so flawed? Although I welcome initiatives such as the Trusted Research campaign and the Research Collaboration Advice Team, these bodies focus specifically on research and academia. We expect foreign companies that hold sensitive genomics and DNA to follow GDPR. I am not a hawk about relations with other countries, but we need to provide the new Information Commissioner with much greater expertise and powers to tackle complex data security threats in sensitive industries. There must be no trade-off between scientific collaboration and data privacy; that is what this amendment is designed to prevent. I beg to move.
The Committee will be relieved to know that I will be brief. I do not have much to say because, in general terms, this seems an eminently sensible amendment.
We should congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his drafting ingenuity. He has managed to compose an amendment that brings together the need for scrutiny of emerging national security and data privacy risks relating to advanced technology, aims to inform regulatory developments and guidance that might be required to mitigate risks, and would protect the privacy of people’s genomics data. It also picks up along the way the issue of the security services scrutinising malign entities and guiding researchers, businesses, consumers and public bodies. Bringing all those things together at the end of a long and rather messy Bill is quite a feat—congratulations to the noble Lord.
I am rather hoping that the Minister will tell the Committee either that the Government will accept this wisely crafted amendment or that everything it contains is already covered. If the latter is the case, can he point noble Lords to where those things are covered in the Bill? Can he also reassure the Committee that the safety and security issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, are covered? Having said all that, we support the general direction of travel that the amendment takes.