Armed Forces Front-line Combat Roles: Women
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Selkirk of Douglas
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps the Ministry of Defence is taking to evaluate whether women should be allowed to serve in frontline combat roles in the infantry, prior to making a decision in 2018 in accordance with the European Union rules on reviewing that policy.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, first I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in paying tribute to Captain Thomas Clarke of the Army Air Corps, Flight Lieutenant Rakesh Chauhan of Joint Helicopter Command RAF Odiham, Acting Warrant Officer Class 2 Spencer Faulkner of the Army Air Corps, Corporal James Walters of the Army Air Corps and Lance Corporal Oliver Thomas of the Intelligence Corps, who were killed while on operations in Afghanistan on 26 April. These tragic deaths remind us of the continued commitment and sacrifice of our Armed Forces, and I know that our deepest sympathies are with their families at this very difficult time.
Defence is required by EU law to conduct a review into the exclusion of females from ground close combat roles no later than 2018. This would include posts in the Naval Service, the RAF and the Army. While the nature, scope and timing of the review have not yet been determined, we are considering whether to bring it forward, recognising the need both to improve the diversity of the workforce across defence and to maintain operational effectiveness.
Lord Selkirk of Douglas (Con)
My Lords, will the Minister accept that the whole House will wish to be associated with his message of condolence to the families of those who have very sadly lost their lives?
I shall mention a past interest in this subject: 70 years ago my aunt was a pioneering woman who used to fly military aircraft to front-line aerodromes in the Second World War. If women have the inclination, aptitude, ability and strength required, is it not time for the Government to consider following the examples of such countries as Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and, not least, the United States of America, all of which either have allowed women to take their place in combat roles on the front line or are in the process of doing so?
Lord Astor of Hever
My noble friend is right, which is why we keep this subject very much under review. Women already serve on the front line with great distinction, and we will take into account the factors that my noble friend has mentioned, as well as other aspects, particularly the effect on unit cohesion. My noble friend mentioned other countries. That will be very relevant, although we need to be sure that the answer is right for our Armed Forces and the way they operate.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
On this side, we also wish to express our sincere condolences to the families and friends of the five members of our Armed Forces who have recently lost their lives on operations. We are reducing the numerical strength of our Armed Forces in Afghanistan, but the dangers remain, and the enormity of the sacrifices which young service personnel continue to make on our behalf has been brought home to us all once again.
Women currently serve in theatre as engineers, intelligence officers, medics and fighter pilots. The ban on women serving on submarines has been lifted, and increasing numbers of women have been appointed to senior military posts in recent years, but more needs to be done to make sure that our Armed Forces reflect the communities they serve, in line with a key objective of Army 2020. Serious consideration needs to be given to the further roles that women can play, including serving in front-line combat, since we need to maximise the talent and expertise available. The Minister said that the Government are looking at bringing forward the review, which is due by 2018. I wonder whether he can be a bit more specific on that. Is it currently the intention to wait until 2018, or is there an earlier target date for a decision? What are the considerations that will be taken into account by the Government in looking at the issue of women serving in front-line combat roles?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, as I said in my Answer, we are looking very clearly into the possibility of bringing the review to an earlier date than 2018. As soon as I have any information, I will come back and report it to the House.
Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)
My Lords, I associate these Benches with the condolences to those who were killed in the helicopter accident. Given the news, mentioned by the noble Lord, of the first women to serve in submarines and the appointment of the first two-star officer in the Royal Air Force, will my noble friend say what opportunities the Army is giving to extend career opportunities to women, whether in combat roles or elsewhere?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am very grateful for my noble friend’s kind words, very much in memory of her late husband, who was a very distinguished helicopter pilot. She asked what front-line roles women already serve in. They already serve in a variety of front-line roles, including as medics, fire support team commanders, military intelligence operators and dog handlers, with at least two having won the Military Cross. Looking round the House, I know that a number of noble Lords have been to Afghanistan, and I am sure they have met many of the women who play a very distinguished part in supporting our troops out there, particularly the medics, who do an incredible job.
Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde (Lab)
When the Minister is able to inform us when the review will take place, will he also inform us of the factors that will be taken into account? A number of us have heard “force cohesiveness” over the years, but it is a bit like Heinz 57 varieties; it can mean a lot to different people. If we are not clear what factors are to be taken into account, the outcome may in fact be a different decision than many of us would want to see.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, in 2002 there was a review that took approximately two years. There was another review in 2010. The conclusions of both were mixed. As a result, Ministers concluded that a precautionary approach was still necessary and the exclusion of women was retained. It might be helpful to the House if I were to write to the noble Baroness and other noble Lords who are interested, giving a link to the Written Statements made in November 2010 and setting out the full report of the review and the information and research that was carried out.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)
My Lords, great progress has been made in the Armed Forces in dealing, for example, with homosexuality or pregnancy discrimination and other matters of that kind. Will the Government, in considering whether to bring forward the review, bear in mind a case in which I appear, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in which it became clear that women already are performing vital undercover works of a combative nature, facing real danger, and are at least as important in the work that they are doing as their male colleagues?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, my noble friend makes an important point. As I say, we are reviewing seriously a date earlier than November 2018. I can say to my noble friend that the Ministry of Defence remains fully committed to treating everyone fairly and properly, whatever their gender, ethnicity or other characteristic. We will continue working to eliminate any form of discrimination.
Armed Forces
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, for introducing this very important issue. I share the right reverend Prelate’s thoughts for those members of the Armed Forces serving on operations and, of course, for their families. It is right that we should do everything we can to ensure that our country is not caught unawares in the event of unforeseen crises and threats. The noble Lord’s Question concerns the sufficiency of our manpower. In addressing it, we should look first at the existing scope and scale of our commitments worldwide.
Currently, we have more than 30,000 service men and women committed on operations. They are providing significant contributions to security and stabilisation in Afghanistan, combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, countering narcotics in the Caribbean and keeping open vital choke points in the Strait of Hormuz. Recently we have seen British Armed Forces support the French in Mali. We have deployed HMS “Daring” and HMS “Illustrious” to the Philippines to assist in the humanitarian effort in the wake of the hurricane. We have seen regulars and reserves protecting possessions and property against the recent floods. In the past week we have dispatched a submarine to help hunt for the missing Malaysian aeroplane. These are examples of the activities that our Armed Forces are currently engaged in, and all happening in a period of transition. If anyone was under the illusion that the post-Afghanistan world would be a quieter place, then events in Syria and latterly in Ukraine have swiftly dispelled that illusion.
Several noble Lords, including my noble friends Lord King and Lord Burnett, asked about Ukraine. What has happened there is completely indefensible. This is the most serious risk to European security that we have seen so far in the 21st century. The priority now is to deter further Russian military action, de-escalate and find a diplomatic solution. The Government have made it clear that they remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the current crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, and in this respect are pursuing a number of diplomatic and economic initiatives, including targeted sanctions and representations in international fora. In terms of reassuring allies, the UK was one of the first to offer tangible contributions, with our offer to supplement NATO’s peacetime Baltic air policing mission. NATO will continue to provide appropriate reinforcement of visible assurance of NATO’s cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence against any threat of aggression to the alliance.
My noble friend Lord Burnett asked about Russian defence spending. Russia has previously stated that it intends to increase defence spending. It intends to spend $650 billion up to 2020, including the acquisition of eight nuclear submarines, 600 jets, 1,000 helicopters and 100 warships, in an attempt to modernise its armed forces.
The noble Lord, Lord Soley, mentioned the next SDSR. Clearly the SDSR in 2015 will consider whether our foreign policy and security objectives have changed in the intervening five years, and the implications for our Armed Forces.
The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, asked what we are able to do under Future Force 2020. It will enable us to conduct simultaneously an enduring stabilisation operation of up to 6,500 personnel, equivalent to operations in Afghanistan over the past decade; one non-enduring complex intervention of up to 2,000 personnel, equivalent to that undertaken in Libya; and one non-enduring simple intervention of up to 1,000 personnel, equivalent to the UK’s support to France in Mali. This level of capability has been tested against a wide range of scenarios and a whole of government assessment of the likely future threats and commitments facing the UK. We are confident that it allows us to protect and promote the UK and its interests in an effective, sustainable manner.
The noble Lord also asked about risks. The Armed Forces are going through significant restructuring. Throughout this period, there will be shortages in some roles. However, we can be clear that there are safeguards in place to ensure that front-line operational capability is not affected. All three services continue to recruit, and the Army recently launched a major recruiting drive for both regulars and reservists. We are confident that we have, and will continue to have, the right personnel and skill sets to satisfy all strategic defence priorities.
Several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Lee, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, and my noble friend Lord Lyell, asked about reserves recruitment. The latest reserves recruitment campaign began in January. All three services have used a range of advertising methods from radio, TV and online recruitment targeted at the youth audience to deploying uniformed personnel at prominent locations such as shopping centres. The initial response to the recruitment campaign is encouraging, as my noble friend Lord Freeman said. Local reserve units have been heavily involved in recruiting activity as they know their local areas best of all. From this, the Army is analysing the lessons identified and the reports of good practice, and is encouraging units to share and promote their good practice.
We have introduced a number of new initiatives to simplify the recruiting process. These include the revised medical process, introduced in January, and the new online application forms. It is still early days. The length of time that it takes applicants to progress through the application and training pipelines means that it will take a while for the actual impact to become realised, but we are very positive.
My noble friend Lord Glenarthur asked about recruiting levels against the 2018 target for reservists and regulars, and he also asked about retention in the regulars. The figures released on 13 February in the defence statistics demonstrate that the Reserve Forces are on track to meet or even exceed the interim target for April this year. We have always said that growing the reserves would be a challenge, and the start of that challenge is reversing the long decline in numbers. The trained strength figures are expected to dip initially because it takes around two years for a recruit to complete the training and join the trained strength.
Regular Army recruiting is forecasting a 30% shortfall in soldier entrants caused by a combination of factors. This is being tackled through an improvement to the recruiting process. This shortfall has been taken into account in our manpower forecasting and planning. Under Army 2020, the Regular Army is reducing from 102,000 to 82,500. Today, the Army has a shortfall of some 4,000 people against the structure, but this will be cancelled out as the structure is reduced over the next three years. Current voluntary outflow levels are above the 10-year average. The range of criteria used when forecasting VO is wide and includes economic advice from the Office for Budget Responsibility, historic behaviour and expected trends. The result of this forecast was used when modelling the requirements and it led to a reduced requirement for tranche 4.
My noble friend Lord Lee asked me about the carriers and the cost increases. Until a new contract is signed, the current agreement remains extant. This agreed a 90:10 share of costs. The Secretary of State stated in November 2013 that,
“under the new agreement, any variation above or below that price will be shared on a 50:50 basis between Government and industry, until all the contractor’s profit is lost”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/11/13; col. 251.]
The revised deal, including the revised 50:50 share line that better incentivises industry to control costs by allocating an equitable share should costs grow beyond the new target, is expected to be approved this spring, and the new contract will be signed on completion.
My noble friend also asked about escorts. The Royal Navy has 19 operational frigates and destroyers: 13 Type 23 frigates and six Type 45 destroyers. These ships are held at varying degrees of readiness. Three ships are currently deployed overseas, conducting operations in the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Four ships are undergoing training in preparation for forthcoming international deployments or are held at high-readiness for contingency operations. One is conducting defence engagement in Dover in support of the HMS “Cavalier” 70th anniversary celebrations, eight are in routine maintenance in their home port, and three are in deep maintenance. I hope that that addresses my noble friend’s questions.
My noble friend also asked about Joint Strike Fighter dates. Initial operating capability for the UK’s F-35 aircraft is scheduled for December 2018, with carrier strike capability scheduled for 2020. I am happy to tell my noble friend that these remain on track.
My noble friend asked for an update on ScanEagle. The ScanEagle has been successfully, swiftly and safely introduced into service, fulfilling an urgent operational requirement. This day and night capable UAS is operated from Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and provides an important uplift in persistent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. It is currently in use on deployed operations, providing real-time intelligence to the ships’ staff and has already proved itself to be an important addition to our maritime capabilities.
My noble friend asked about the numbers of Type 26 frigates. The Government’s current planning assumption is the construction of 13 Type 26s.
I will do my best to answer as many questions as I have time for, but I am conscious that I will not be able to answer all noble Lords. I shall write to those whom I am unable to answer now and copy in all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate.
Several noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, asked about morale. This is a challenging time for defence. Morale and esprit de corps are monitored within the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey. We take this issue seriously and we are aware that we have work to do.
My noble friend Lord Burnett asked about the Trident replacement. Over the next year the programme will continue to evolve as the submarine design matures. Detailed preparations will continue for main gate in 2016, ensuring that the design, costings and procurement strategy are mature. A further report to Parliament will be made later this year.
My noble friend Lord King mentioned small and medium-sized enterprises and their concerns over reliance on reservists. We recognise the contribution of SMEs and that Reserve service can affect them more greatly than larger firms. That is why we are bringing in employer incentive payments of up to £500 per reservist per month when a reservist is mobilised.
My noble friend also asked about accommodation in the UK for forces returning from Germany. The MoD has set aside £1.6 billion to implement the army basing plan, providing nearly 1,900 new service family accommodations and 4,800 new single living/bed spaces.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, asked about our resilience to cyberattack. Defence takes cybersecurity extremely seriously. Across the UK as a whole cyber skills are in short supply. The best way to address this is through a mixture of Regular and Reserve forces.
The noble Baroness, Lady Dean, asked about working hours and the minimum wage. We have worked to ensure that the sacrifices and dedication of our personnel are recognised. They have continued to benefit from pay rises and other benefits, including subsidised accommodation, generous pensions and plenty of paid leave. It is therefore entirely misleading to suggest that any of them earn less than the minimum wage.
I am running out of time. This Government have taken difficult decisions in order to preserve the sustainability of the Armed Forces. That was the responsible course of action. No one thought that the transformation of our Armed Forces to Future Force 2020 would be easy—if they did, it would have been done much sooner. The services are rising admirably to the challenges of change. They are shaping their own future while continuing to deliver everything required of them in current operations.
Defence Reform Bill
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Astor of Hever
“(3A) Before a draft is laid before Parliament in accordance with subsection (3), the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the options for carrying out defence procurement, and(b) publish the report.(3B) A report on the options for carrying out defence procurement is a report about—
(a) the arrangement of a kind mentioned in section 1 that the Secretary of State proposes to make following the coming into force of that section, and(b) any other options for carrying out defence procurement that the Secretary of State has considered as an alternative to those proposed arrangements.(3C) The report must include—
(a) an assessment of the impact of the proposed arrangements and the other options, and(b) any other information the Secretary of State considers appropriate for the purpose of enabling a proper comparison to be made between the proposed arrangements and the other options.(3D) The report must deal with at least one other option under subsection (3B)(b), namely the carrying out of defence procurement by the Secretary of State in the way it is carried out at the time of the report.
(3E) In subsection (3A) to (3D) “defence procurement” has the meaning given by section 1(8).”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, this amendment fulfils a commitment I made on Report. During that debate I made it clear that the Government supported an amendment, tabled in the names of the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig and Lord Stirrup, the noble Lord, Lord Levene, and my noble friend Lord Roper, that would have required a future Government to publish a White Paper and an impact statement before laying a draft order commencing Part 1 of the Bill. I agreed to bring forward a suitable government amendment at Third Reading, and that is the amendment that is before us today.
I do not intend to repeat the debate that we had on this issue in Committee and on Report. In essence, the debate centred on the need for parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of a future decision to proceed with a GOCO and the provision of sufficient information to Parliament to enable it to have an informed debate prior to the commencement of Part 1. In the end, there was consensus that this should take the form of a statutory requirement on any future Government to publish a White Paper and an impact statement. The government amendment reflects that commitment, although the need for precision in legislative drafting requires us to describe the content rather than the form of these documents. Nevertheless, the information that would be provided under the amendment is effectively the information that would be included in a White Paper and impact assessment.
Amendment 1 therefore makes it a requirement to publish and lay before Parliament a report on the options for carrying out defence procurement that the Secretary of State has considered. This must be done before any draft order commencing Part 1 of the Bill is laid before Parliament. The report will need to cover not only the GOCO option but any other options that the MoD is considering at the time for the reform of DE&S and it must include an assessment of the impact of the options and any other information that is appropriate to enable a proper comparison to be made between them.
It should be noted that the report must deal, in particular, with the option of what is commonly called DE&S-plus-plus—that is, the new DE&S as it will be once the transformation, which began at yesterday’s vesting day, is in place. This requirement specifically to consider the reformed DE&S is covered by new subsection (3D) of the amendment. I know that this is something that noble Lords were particularly keen should be captured in the amendment.
I hope that the amendment will command widespread support. It reflects the detailed debates that we have had on this Bill about the need for Parliament to have oversight of a decision to proceed with a GOCO and shows that the Government have listened carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords from all sides of the House. The amendment will ensure that Parliament is provided with sufficient information to enable it properly to scrutinise and consider a future decision to proceed with a GOCO. I beg to move.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of the amendment. As he has mentioned, the amendment reflects Amendment 9 on Report, which was tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Levene and Lord Roper, my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup and myself. The amendment that the Minister is now proposing is indeed fuller than the one that we put down but it carefully covers all the points that we had in mind. It may not mention the words “White Paper” but it spells out, in 25 lines compared with our five, the very thorough and comprehensive look at the proposals that is to be taken before Part 1 is passed into law. I thank the Minister and all those who have worked on the amendment. I shall certainly give it my support.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister explained the background to this amendment which arose from an undertaking that he gave when we last discussed the Bill. I should like to take this opportunity to explain our position on the amendment and our views on it.
We welcome the amendment as it represents a move from the Government’s previous stance that the affirmative order without any associated requirements stated in the Bill would be sufficient, if passed by both Houses, for a future Government to change significantly defence procurement services by making arrangements for such services to be provided by a company to the Secretary of State under contract. The Government’s amendment does not go as far as we would wish, given that the Government were not prepared, as we sought, to withdraw Part 1 when it became known that they could no longer proceed before the general election with their preferred option to go down the road provided for in Part 1. We argued for a super-affirmative procedure involving an independent examination of a future Government’s case for bringing in an outside company to provide defence procurement services and for a report on that independent review by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee prior to Parliament being asked to make a decision on the affirmative order. That did not find favour with the Government either.
What we do have is the Government’s amendment providing for a report to Parliament on the options for carrying out defence procurement with a requirement, as the Minister said, that one option that must be covered in the report is the carrying out of defence procurement by the Secretary of State in the way it is carried out at the time the report is prepared. In other words, the effectiveness or otherwise of the new DE&S-plus-plus organisation that started to come into effect a couple of days ago, at the beginning of this month, will have to be compared with any other proposed arrangements that a future Government may wish to introduce. That is important because the Minister said in the debate on this issue in Committee that if it had been a matter for this Government rather than a future Government, they would have looked at the outside company option—the GOCO—only if the new DE&S-plus-plus organisation now being introduced did not transform the defence procurement operation.
If a future Government adopt the same approach, the report on the effectiveness of the new DE&S-plus-plus organisation will be crucial, as will be the objectivity of that future Government’s assessment of DE&S-plus-plus and their case for believing that the GOCO option would be more successful. Proper time will be needed to evaluate and consider the report to Parliament from that future Government, as provided for in this amendment, if that Government decide they want to go down the GOCO route and not to continue with the new DE&S-plus-plus organisation.
A big concern we have about the Government’s amendment is that it does not lay down any minimum timescale, either directly or indirectly, between the report on the options for carrying out defence procurement being laid before Parliament and the associated affirmative order being considered by Parliament. A future Government, having made up their mind that they wanted to go down the GOCO route, might be tempted to try to rush through the affirmative order. In that context, I cannot help but recall that this Government, in declining to withdraw Part 1, argued that there might in future be a need to bring in the GOCO option with a minimum of delay—an odd argument, bearing in mind that the Government themselves had just had to delay their intentions on the GOCO option by at least two or three years, but nevertheless an indication of a Government’s thinking that they might seek to make the change as quickly as possible at the possible expense of proper scrutiny. Hence my comments and concerns that the Government’s amendment does not provide any real check on such an intention by a future Government.
However, despite our reservations, we shall not oppose the Government’s amendment, as it clearly represents progress towards our position and a move away from the Government’s earlier stance. We are grateful for the support there has been from other noble Lords in pressing the Government to move from their initial stance that affirmative orders, without any associated requirements that would also have to be met, were sufficient.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I thank noble Lords and the noble and gallant Lord for their helpful contributions to our short debate. It is clear that this amendment attracts support, particularly from the Official Opposition, and that it would significantly improve the arrangements for parliamentary oversight should Part 1 ever be commenced. I accept the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that our amendment does not go far enough but I think we can agree that this amendment makes a good Bill much better.
As we have, I hope, reached the final stage of the Bill in this House, I thank noble Lords for their work on the Bill. In particular, I am grateful for the contributions of the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig and Lord Stirrup, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe, and my noble friends Lord Palmer, Lord Roper and Lord Lee among many other noble Lords who have spoken during the course of the Bill and done so much to ensure that it leaves this place in good shape. We have covered a lot of ground including on some quite technical matters.
I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Jolly for her assistance on the Bill and to my officials for their support and hard work. The Government have listened to the concerns that have been raised and have responded, where appropriate, by bringing forward amendments such as the one before the House today. I therefore ask noble Lords to support this amendment.
Lord Rosser
Before we go through the final stage, I should like to thank the Minister for his usual patience and courtesy in taking the Bill through your Lordships’ House, and not least for the detailed responses he has given to the amendments that have been pursued and the questions that have been asked. I should also like to thank his ministerial colleague, Philip Dunne MP, for meeting us on more than one occasion, in particular my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe on Part 2 on single-source contracts. We extend our thanks in that regard to the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. Having meetings with Ministers has also involved officials, and likewise we extend our thanks to them for their courtesy and helpfulness in responding to the many points that we raised.
Armed Forces: Biofuels
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, the Ministry of Defence uses biofuels for road transport where EU legislation obliges manufacturers to include a percentage of biofuels in the fuel they produce. The use of biofuels for marine and aviation use is governed by the requirements and approvals of the department’s equipment manufacturers. The Ministry of Defence is encouraging these manufacturers to work towards adopting biofuels in the future.
Lord Soley (Lab)
Will the Minister put this on his agenda and take it forward? Is he aware that by 2020 the United States navy will be using ships and aircraft that use some 50% biofuels? These are not from farm produce; they are from algae and other fuels. The US air force is flying F18 high-performance jets on 50% biofuels. The Italians and the Dutch are using it, so will he—particularly on this day, bearing in mind the United Nations report—go back to his department and say, “We ought to be up there with them using biofuels in ships, planes and ground transport”? Will he also take that matter to NATO and, preferably, keep the House informed of his progress?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, we are aware that the United States and the other countries mentioned by the noble Lord are experimenting with biofuels in their naval vessels and aircraft. The results of the performance of the fuels are being shared through equipment manufacturers and international forums such as the Air and Space Interoperability Council. The defence equipment and support fuel team regularly engages with manufacturers to understand the most recent research and how this might apply to the MoD’s fuel requirements in the future. Biofuels, however, are not the only answer, and the MoD will use the most appropriate solution available to reduce fossil fuel consumption, whether that is through using alternative technology or equipment, reducing activity levels, using alternative fuels or interoperability with our allies.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
My Lords, is there not more than one respectable view as to the desirability of biofuels, given the extensive agricultural facilities required to produce them?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am aware of the concerns about biofuels competing with food production but, as I said in my opening response, the MoD uses biofuels for road transport where EU regulations oblige fuel manufacturers to include them, and only for that.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
Does the Minister accept that most innovation in this country relating to fuels and materials starts from the motorsport industry? Have the Armed Forces picked up any tips from that thriving industry?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am delighted that the noble Lord asked that question. I assure him that we are working very closely with the motorsport industry, which—as the noble Lord knows better than most—is expert in lightweighting and energy-efficient use of fuel. All Formula 1 engines have advanced energy recovery systems that reduce their fuel capacity by 40% and reduce their engine size, too, but must deliver the same power output. Race cars recover and store significantly increased energy from braking and from their turbochargers.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, they are using more biofuels in the United States, particularly in the Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopter and—as the noble Lord, Lord Soley, said—in the navy’s farm-to-fleet project. That has had a significant effect on the change of use from food crops to biofuels. Taking a slightly different line from other questions, will the Minister tell the House that the Army, Navy and Air Force will look closely into the development of biofuels and how it affects the reduction of food production in the UK?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I stand by my response to my noble friend earlier. As I said, this is for use only where UK regulations oblige fuel manufacturers to include them. As that use is both limited and obligatory, the MoD has no plans to conduct any form of appraisal.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord must agree that we have solved some of these fuel problems by having fewer and fewer ships and fewer and fewer aircraft. I looked historically at the 1950s—I needed to for a certain reason—and, on average, every year we commissioned between 15 and 20 warships. How many ships were commissioned in the latest financial year?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the noble Lord is using his imagination to try to tempt me to discuss the number of ships. This Question is about biofuels.
Lord Elton (Con)
My Lords, in replying to two supplementary questions, my noble friend relied on the effects of biofuel cultivation on agriculture but surely another major, and possibly longer-term, anxiety is the destruction of forestry, particularly in South America, which is reducing a diminishing resource that is a means of absorbing excess carbon in the atmosphere.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am well aware of the concerns for both agriculture and forests. As I said earlier, the Ministry of Defence is such a small user of biofuels that I would rather not get into this debate.
The Countess of Mar (CB)
My Lords, I understand that there is a second generation sort of biofuel that does not use food and food products but is generated from bacteria, using waste materials. How much of this biofuel is used in Ministry of Defence operations?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I cannot answer that question but I refer to a Question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, last year. When the noble Lord, Lord Soley, asked a supplementary question about this, my noble friend replied that these are termed “advanced biofuels”, which I think relates to the question of the noble Countess. They,
“do not have a land-take impact—certainly not in terms of taking land out of agricultural use or requiring a reduction in rainforest. Moreover, they do not have an impact on food production. Consideration is being given to greater incentives for the production of advanced biofuels”.—[Official Report, 27/3/13; col. 1077.]
Defence Reform Bill
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, let me add very briefly my weight to the comments of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham and my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig, with whom I agree. It may be worth the House reflecting, first, on the fact that the current Chief of the Defence Staff has given his view that his top concern in terms of personnel pressures actually lies with the Navy. Secondly, a few moments ago we were debating the consequences of Russia’s action in Ukraine and the importance of NATO preparedness in the face of that. NATO’s greatest weakness—and, indeed, our own—and Russia’s most likely avenue of attack, should anything go awry, is likely to be in cyberspace. Noble Lords might like to reflect on whether this country is investing enough in that area.
It is clear that this country was previously not investing enough in the defence of the realm and that, in the light of the current situation, it is not investing enough now. As my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham has said, if the Government—whoever forms the Government in 2015 and beyond—do not live up to the requirement to increase defence expenditure in real terms in that year and in each year beyond, our situation will only get worse.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, Part 3 of the Bill makes important changes that have been broadly welcomed by noble Lords. They will help revitalise our Reserve Forces and, along with the other measures in the White Paper, make them feel valued and valuable and, crucially, more usable.
The changes we are making to our Reserve Forces are part of what is known as Future Force 2020, which will provide military capability in a different way from the past to deliver the range and scale of military forces and skills required. The whole of the Armed Forces, not just the Army, is being transformed to meet the likely future demands on defence. There is often a narrow focus on numbers when concerning changes to the Armed Forces. I am therefore pleased that this amendment focuses more on capability.
The changes we are making to our Armed Forces are guided by the defence planning assumptions, the unclassified version of which is published in the SDSR. Detailed assessments of our force structure’s capabilities are undertaken against a range of scenarios, but they are not put into the public domain for very good reasons of national security. In capability terms, the unclassified defence planning assumptions outline that Future Force 2020 will still enable us to conduct an enduring stabilisation operation of up to 6,500 personnel, one non-enduring complex intervention of up to 2,000 personnel, and one non-enduring simple intervention of up to 1,000 personnel at the same time.
The Army will be structured around the reaction force and the adaptable force. The former are high readiness forces that will provide the Army’s conventional deterrence for defence and will be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks. The latter will be geared more towards defence engagement and homeland resilience, but with the ability to conduct combat operations, particularly enduring stabilisation operations. So we have designed a flexible, adaptable and capable force structure that enables the Army to meet likely future threats.
Noble Lords will recognise that there has been considerable debate about Future Force 2020. To focus narrowly on the Army is, I believe, not helpful and misleading, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said. The other two services are vital to the UK’s defence capability. The Army cannot and does not operate in isolation, even in landlocked countries such as Afghanistan. If we are to consider the capability of our Armed Forces, we must do so in the round, collectively. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, made the point very well about the recent comments of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Royal Navy. We expect the changes we are making under Future Force 2020 to take effect by 2020. We have acknowledged that between coming out of Afghanistan and fully implementing the Future Force 2020 changes, there is some risk attached, but asking for an annual report on the capability of the Army now would be premature and rather misleading. It is only fair to judge the effectiveness of Future Force 2020 from that year onwards.
Recognising the importance of routinely assessing the capabilities of our Armed Forces against the threats and challenges they may face, this Government instigated the five-yearly strategic defence and security review process. It allows for detailed consideration of changes in the strategic environment and the force structure required to counter the threats and issues identified. If we were to increase the frequency of those reviews to a yearly report on the Army’s fighting power, as this amendment suggests, we could reduce defence to a series of knee-jerk reactions, concentrating on only a small timescale and not allowing any kind of strategic decision-making and long-term planning.
The second reason for rejecting this amendment is that while one crucial role for the Armed Forces will be conventional deterrence, including intervention tasks should they be required, the range of tasks we ask of our Armed Forces is much broader. The armed services make a unique and valuable contribution to the security of the UK, her citizens and those around the world, through activities contributing to conflict prevention, defence engagement, involvement in international defence diplomacy and defence alliances, as well as contributing to peacekeeping, security operations such as counterpiracy off the coast of Somalia, and homeland resilience such as assisting with the recent UK flood relief work. The future force has been designed to be able to respond effectively to these international commitments and align them with national priorities. It therefore seems unhelpful to focus a report on the narrow concept of fighting power. A report focused solely on fighting power would not best reflect the development of the whole range of these capabilities.
Also, as the British Defence Doctrine points out, fighting power will always be considered relative to that of other parties. The notion of effectiveness itself will also change over time, as the strategic context and our national objectives change, making comparisons challenging. An assessment of fighting power would also represent a statement of the relative strengths of defence and could play into the hands of those who wish to reduce the security and relevance of the Armed Forces. We would therefore be unwilling to release a public assessment.
Lord Lee of Trafford (LD)
In terms of being open and honest, how is reserve recruitment going at present?
Lord Astor of Hever
I was coming on to that point in response to the point that my noble friend Lord King made.
The final issue that I need to address is the point that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser: if we are having an annual report on the reserves, why should we not have such a report on the Regular Army? The reserves are a unique set-up: part-time volunteers who juggle work, family and military commitments. In recognising the importance of the reserves and in seeking to revitalise them through the Future Reserves 2020 programme, it was considered important to have an external independent view of how we were doing because the changes impact on reservists, employers, families and communities.
The reserve associations are community-facing organisations which provide an essential bridge between our Armed Forces and the civilian population. An association exists for each of 13 administrative areas of the United Kingdom. They provide advice and support on behalf of our volunteer reserve forces and cadets, work with the chains of command of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force and establish and maintain links with the community. They therefore have the knowledge, skills and experience to report effectively and independently on the Future Reserves 2020 programme. Clause 47 puts that into statute. The reserve associations would not be able to fulfil that same role for the Regular Army, as that is not where their expertise lies.
My noble friend Lord King mentioned the reserves, and that recruiting got off to a bad start. My noble friend Lord Lee also asked about this. In the Ministry of Defence, we have given a lot of time to this issue. We are working hard on it. We have recently increased the bounty to encourage regulars to join the reserves, which was a point which my noble friend also made. Over the past three or four weekends, I have been out to see reserves training in Scotland and different parts of England. I can report that morale is high. The senior officers to whom I have spoken are optimistic that we shall reach the numbers that we have set out, so I am confident. I had organised for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and two or three other Peers to visit the recruiting centre in Upavon. We had to cancel that because we had a Statement in the House, but I think that it is in the grid to have another visit there.
My noble friend Lord Palmer asked what manpower would be needed to prepare the report. The answer is a small number. My noble friend also asked what information is already in the public domain. The answer is plenty—the annual report and accounts and the Army 2020 update both cover progress in detail. He asked whether revealing deficiencies might help our enemies. We would not wish to reveal any weakness that may help our enemies, which will and does limit what we can release.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, referred to “radical change” that had not been discussed by the National Security Council. I had better write to the noble Lord as I have quite a lot of information here that I am not going to be able to read out.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, asked whether we were spending enough on cyber. The Government have recognised the importance of addressing the cyber threat to the UK and we have established a joint cyber unit of regulars and reserves.
I hope that I have answered most of the questions, but if I have not I will certainly write. I have set out why I do not believe the amendment should be accepted and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, first, I thank the Minister for his reply and all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford for responding to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, and do not intend to pursue it any further in the light of the response that my noble friend gave on that point.
A number of concerns have been raised. One is about the potential security implications of producing the report called for in the amendment and, indeed, the report called for by the Defence Select Committee. Since the report would be prepared by the Government and by the Secretary of State for Defence, one would assume that that in itself was a safeguard against anything being revealed that would put at risk our national security.
The issue was also raised that the report refers only to the Army and not to the other services. Obviously, that was in the light of the fact that this has come from a Defence Committee report which was geared to looking at the Army and Army 2020. Of course, if that is felt to be a major stumbling block, there is no reason at all why the Government—if that is their objection—could not come back at Third Reading with an amendment that included the other two forces. The alternative, of seeing this amendment not go through because it does not refer to the other forces, would simply mean that we end up with no report at all.
It is also worth stressing that the key element of the Defence Select Committee’s concerns was actually on the progress being made on the implementation of the Army 2020 plan. I went through the comments that it had to make at some length, because the comments were geared to real concerns about whether the plan would or could be implemented as intended and what the implications would be if it were. It was in that context in particular that the committee called for reports on the progress of all aspects of the Army 2020 plan.
I feel that I have addressed some of the concerns that have been raised. There can be no security implications when the report will be produced by the Government and the Secretary of State for Defence—they are not going to start revealing things that will be of use to those who are hostile to us. The concerns that have been expressed over the implementation of the Army 2020 plan are over how it is going to be implemented, whether it will be implemented as intended and what the implications will be. Primarily what is being sought are reports updating us on the progress that is being made and, as the Defence Select Committee said, detailing any setbacks there have been.
There are reports about what is happening with the reserves. I do not accept the Government’s argument that that is totally different from what is being asked in respect of the Army 2020 plan. They are both reports on progress being made towards implementing objectives set out for our future Army strength. In view of that, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, before the noble and gallant Lord sits down, it may assist him and other noble Lords to know that the Government are prepared to support the amendment in principle and that we intend to bring forward a government amendment, achieving these aims, at Third Reading. I will, of course, respond fully to the issues raised at the end of the debate, in the usual way, but I want to make our intentions clear now.
Lord Craig of Radley
My Lords, that is obviously most welcome news and I thank the Minister and the Government for making it clear at this stage. On that basis, I will be prepared to withdraw my amendment. However, for the purposes of the debate, I beg to move.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the amendments in this group deal with the issue of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of a future decision to proceed with a GOCO. The question of what information should be available to Parliament has been discussed extensively during the passage of the Bill, and that debate has been carried on this afternoon. As I have already indicated, the Government support Amendment 9 in principle and intend to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading. We think that Amendment 9 strikes the right balance between ensuring Parliament has sufficient information to consider a GOCO proposal and not setting undue constraints on a future Government, the Defence Select Committee or the commercial process.
Amendment 9 requires the Government to publish an impact statement and White Paper before proceeding with a GOCO. The Government have always been clear that Parliament should be able to debate and consider in detail a decision to proceed with a GOCO in future. We agree that that would be a major decision and that it is right that Parliament should have the opportunity to hold the Government of the day to account for such a decision, should they decide to proceed with Part 1 of the Bill. We have also been clear that we expect any future Government to publish an impact assessment on the options before proceeding with a GOCO and to issue a White Paper setting out those options in detail.
We have discussed the issue of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of a future decision to proceed with a GOCO in great detail, both in Committee and with interested colleagues, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to that debate.
The requirements set by Amendment 9 seem reasonable, as they would impose two statutory requirements on the Secretary of State before an affirmative order to commence Part 1 could be laid before both Houses of Parliament. That would ensure that Parliament had sufficient information to properly debate the GOCO proposal under consideration before Part 1 could be brought into force.
We acknowledge the merit of some form of statutory requirement to provide detailed information on the GOCO proposals in future and that it is reasonable to put such a requirement into the Bill. We did not initially think that a statutory requirement was necessary, but we have been convinced otherwise by noble Lords from all sides of the House. That is an example of what the Members of this House do best—ensuring that legislation is properly scrutinised, and amended where necessary. We will therefore bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading that will make it a legal requirement for a future Government to publish appropriate information on the GOCO options before the order commencing Part 1 is brought forward.
We think that Amendments 10 and 11 go too far. They would do two things. First, they would place in statute the need for a future Government to publish a number of documents before proceeding with a GOCO. Secondly, they would make the affirmative commencement order that brings Part 1 into force subject to the super-affirmative procedure.
I will deal with those two things separately. On the publication of documents, the requirement would be for an impact assessment that covers specific options. This in itself does not present any difficulties; as I said earlier, we are prepared to accept a statutory requirement to produce an impact assessment.
However, proposed subsection (2B)(a)(iii) in Amendment 10 goes too far in that it requires the impact assessment to include any options that may be recommended following consultation with the Defence Select Committee. That is a very unusual provision. It effectively sets a statutory requirement for a future Government to consult the Defence Select Committee on the way forward. Although the Ministry of Defence would, of course, welcome any report that the Select Committee produced on the department’s proposals, we need to be very careful in this House about setting out statutory requirements on a House of Commons Select Committee. The Defence Select Committee already has the power—if it wishes—to look at any aspect of MoD business and I do not think it would be right for us to tell it what it must do. It is for the committee, not us, to decide what its programme of work should be.
On the other parts of Amendment 10—which would require an independent report on the options and the Defence Select Committee to review and report on that report—again I think this is too much. I really do not see what an independent report would add to the impact assessment set out earlier in the amendment, which would already set out the issues and analysis objectively. I do not think it is right to make it a legal requirement for the Defence Select Committee to review such a report. This raises fundamental questions about fettering the ability of a Select Committee to decide its own programme of work and it would be wrong for this House to direct what a Commons Select Committee must do.
Amendment 11 would also make the commencement order for Part 1 subject to the super-affirmative procedure. This would require the Secretary of State to consult on the order, including with anybody recommended by the Defence Select Committee. This would seem completely unnecessary given the requirement to publish an impact assessment and totally inappropriate in relation to a commencement order. Super-affirmative procedures may be appropriate where secondary legislation covers significant policy matters but not in relation to commencement orders. It is not clear what we would consult on given that the order will simply say when the provisions should come into force. Amendment 11 confuses the issues. I accept that there is a need for Parliament to consider any GOCO proposals but I fail to see what would be achieved by the requirements in Amendment 11. It would not provide the House with any more scrutiny of the proposals in question and introduces an unnecessary and overly complex procedure where none is required. I must therefore strongly resist Amendment 11, which I think is both unprecedented and wholly inappropriate.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said that the super-affirmative procedure would be unprecedented for a commencement order. The other circumstances in which super-affirmative procedures are used are very different. There is no precedent for using a super-affirmative procedure for a commencement order. A super-affirmative procedure is relevant only where an order covers significant changes in policy or has significant legal effect. A commencement order does neither.
I thank my noble friend Lord Roper for his support and wise advice during the passage of the Bill. I also thank my noble friend Lord Trefgarne for his support. Given that the Government have made it clear that they support Amendment 9 in principle and that we intend to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading, I ask the noble and gallant Lord and other noble Lords not to press their amendments in this group.
Lord Craig of Radley
My Lords, I thank the Government and the Minister once again for deciding to take away Amendment 9. I also thank very much the noble Lord, Lord Roper, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Levene—who regrettably was not able to be present—for their support and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Flooding: Military Deployment
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Holmes of Richmond
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the military deployment during the recent floods.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, our people lent invaluable support to the relief efforts, with a peak of 5,000 personnel from all three services and the reserves. They were available to provide everything from sandbagging to aerial reconnaissance, as well as highly visible reassurance to the public. Now, in the recovery phase, we still have 223 people in the field. Once the operation is complete, we will make a detailed assessment of our contribution to civil resilience within the overall national response.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
I thank my noble friend for his response. As we saw with the recent flooding and with the Olympic and Paralympic Games, when we deploy our military in the appropriate civil circumstances the results are always excellent. What further plans do the Government have to review the use of our military in other potential appropriate civil circumstances?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I agree with my noble friend—the work of the Armed Forces is always excellent. The lessons learnt will provide a valuable opportunity to look at how the contribution of our Armed Forces to civil resilience can be enhanced and accelerated in future emergencies. We are working with the Treasury to consider whether there is potential for improvement to the funding processes. We routinely support civil authorities on a wide range of resilience activities, such as support in the event of industrial action by fuel tanker drivers and firefighters.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, on 12 February the Prime Minister told Parliament that money would be no object in the response to the floods and that local authorities had only to request military assistance, yet the flooding started in late December in the West Country. Why did it take not far short of two months to make that statement on money being no object, and why was it so long before the military was called in? Why was no action taken by the Government in the first week of flooding to consider and determine the potential role that the military could play? Was it because the Government were not prepared to find the funding to enable cash-strapped local authorities to call in the military until weeks later, or was it because the Government just did not get round to doing it?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the department received its first request for assistance on 29 January and had deployed the requested support by the following morning. As the weather continued to deteriorate, defence became increasingly involved in providing support to local authorities.
Lord Selkirk of Douglas (Con)
Can the Minister confirm that the contribution made by reservists to flood relief was in this case substantial?
Lord Astor of Hever
Yes, I can assure my noble friend that that is the case. The average number of reservists employed in mid-February, at the peak of the crisis, was around 80 per day. In most cases reservists were employed on man training days—the payment method used for routine reservist activity—although there were a small number of formal mobilisations, namely of signallers and engineers. I managed to visit some of the reservists who helped with the flood work, both infantry and engineers, who told me that they were very well received by the public for the work that they did.
Lord Dannatt (CB)
My Lords, would the Minister like to say a little more about the issue of funding? We are aware that when the military is called out in support of the civil power, if it is to reduce the threat to life there is no charge, but very quickly the charging becomes extremely high. That could well have been the reason why local authorities were concerned about calling the military out. That would seem to be counterproductive when trained bodies of people are available to help in civil situations. Can the Minister say what the Government are thinking of doing about that?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the noble Lord asks a good question. Certainly the perceived risk of a substantial full-costs bill at the end of an operation can be a concern to local authorities. We would like to do more to support the civil authorities, but we must ensure that the defence budget is not disadvantaged, nor indeed gains any inappropriate benefit, from so doing. The Secretary of State is currently in discussions with the Treasury, exploring the possibility of a full marginal costing recovery scheme, which would make the costing situation much clearer to all parties in advance.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, does the Minister agree that numbers themselves have a real strength? In our push to try to reduce the number of people in the military to get maximum efficiency, we are losing that. France in its White Paper, for example, saw the use of the military in various départements as a very important part of the whole structure. Have we really looked at this in detail? I believe that we have reduced numbers to a level at which they cannot assist the civil power where they should be able to do so, because they are formed bodies which are very often self-supporting.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, as I said in my initial Answer, we are looking at this whole process to see how to improve it in future. This is one area that we will certainly look at closely.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
Can my noble friend confirm that the deployment to which the Question and his Answer relate had no effect on routine operations?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the personnel allocated to assist with flooding were selected in such a way that their participation would have no impact on military units’ preparedness for future operations. That includes contingency operations should assistance be requested in the event of future flooding or other severe weather.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, as the flood water recedes and people begin to reoccupy their homes, can the Minister say whether he anticipates that the armed services will be needed for a similar role next winter?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I cannot say that I am very good at forecasting the weather, but if the Armed Forces are called on I am sure that they will do as good a job as they did this year.
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, military assistance to the emergency services in the Environment Agency was very welcome. I well recall an even more acute situation in the foot and mouth disease outbreak. However, had that outbreak occurred a few months later, the military would all have been in Iraq. It is, therefore, important to recognise that military priorities change and we need to invest in the emergency services. I have just been given information that there is to be a huge cut in West Sussex Fire and Rescue Service of about £2.5 million this year and another £1.5 million next year. We depend utterly on those emergency services; help from the Army is good, but we need to continue to fund them.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point, but the Armed Forces are always ready to do what they can to help the civil authorities.
Defence Reform Bill
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, for raising and giving an airing to this subject. I can only hope that this will not be the end of the discussion of this important matter. The point was made as to whether this amendment was within the remit of the Bill. I like to think that this is going to be not one that we will necessarily vote on today, but one that we will come back to in greater detail bearing in mind the reply from my noble friend the Minister.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, went into great detail, and I certainly do not intend to repeat his comments, but I share many of his concerns about the assurances that he seeks. Do my noble friend the Minister and the Ministry of Defence believe that, with our reduced Army, Navy and Air Force, we are more vulnerable without such interception? No one likes the breaking of privacy and no one likes secrecy, but with our Army being reduced by 20,000, our Navy by 5,000 and our RAF by 5,000 personnel, and with the increase in the Reserve Forces, which we will deal with later in the Bill, rising very slowly to reach the 30,000 level, how important is that interception, and how important is it that it is reported and transparent, as my noble friend Lady Miller asked?
That is brought very much to the forefront of our minds with the problems in Ukraine. What help or hindrance does such interception cause in the present climate of hostilities? Overall, how should such transparency be effected on forces such as those of the United States operating on UK soil?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 1 deals with the issue of interception of communications and follows on from the amendment on the issue that we considered in Grand Committee.
As I am sure that my noble friend appreciates, the issues that she has raised this afternoon, although important and interesting, are not entirely related to the Defence Reform Bill. In fact, the Interception of Communication Commissioner’s Office—the role and powers of which are covered by the amendment—is the responsibility of the Home Office, rather than the Ministry of Defence. I hope that she will therefore understand if I do not respond to all the points that she raised. In particular, as the Prime Minister recently made clear in the House of Commons, intelligence-sharing between the UK and its allies will not be discussed in public. I will, however, try to cover those aspects of the amendment that deal with defence matters and to touch upon the wider points where I am able to do so.
I can give my noble friend and other noble Lords an unequivocal assurance that the Government are fully aware of the activities at US bases in this country and that interception activity in this country is subject to the full rigour of oversight provided under RIPA. We all know that there is intelligence co-operation between the UK and US Government and that that is a key component of our relationship with them. I will not be drawn into commenting on the specifics of that co-operation, but I can confirm that operations at the base that my noble friend mentioned are carried out in accordance with United Kingdom law.
The amendment is in two parts. The first would require the Interception Commissioner to report on the use or proposed use, subject to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, of services or systems procured for defence purposes. However, the Interception of Communications Commissioner is already required by Section 57 of RIPA 2000 to keep under review the issue of RIPA 2000 interception warrants. Therefore, the additional legal effect of this part of the amendment would be to impose a requirement on the commissioner potentially to be involved twice for the same interception. He would be required to comment once in reviewing the use and proposed use of equipment to intercept communications, and then again when reviewing the actual issue of any subsequent interception warrant. Therefore, this part of the amendment is unnecessary; it provides no additional scrutiny, and could, in some circumstances, introduce uncertainty and lack of clarity. This would be an unhelpful extension of the commissioner’s remit, which, as it stands, is clear and distinct.
Defence: Nuclear Submarines
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, I am repeating a Statement made in the House of Commons:
“Mr Speaker, before I make my Statement, I am sure the House will want to join me in sending condolences to the family and friends of the soldier from 32 Engineer Regiment who died while on duty in Helmand province yesterday as a result of non-battle-related injuries sustained in Camp Bastion. The incident is not believed to have involved any enemy action. The serviceman’s next of kin have been informed and have requested the customary 24-hour delay before further details are released.
With permission, I wish to inform the House that I have decided to refuel the nuclear reactor in HMS ‘Vanguard’, one of the United Kingdom’s four ballistic missile submarines, during its planned deep-maintenance period, which begins in 2015. This will be the second time ‘Vanguard’’s reactor has been refuelled since it entered service in 1993. I will explain to the House now why I have reached this decision to conduct a second refuelling.
Alongside the operational reactors on board our ballistic missile submarines, a prototype reactor of the same class has been running at the naval reactor test establishment at Dounreay in Scotland since 2002. Its purpose is to help us assess how the reactor cores within our submarines will perform over time. It has therefore been run for significantly longer periods and at a significantly higher intensity than those cores of the same type in our submarines, to allow us to identify early any age or use-related issues that may arise later in the lives of the operational reactor cores.
In January 2012, low levels of radioactivity were detected in the cooling water surrounding the prototype core. These low levels of radioactivity are a normal product of the nuclear reaction that takes place within the fuel, but they would not normally enter the cooling water. This water is contained within the sealed reactor circuit, and I can reassure the House that there has been no detectable radiation leak from that sealed circuit.
The independent Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency have been kept informed. When the coolant radioactivity was first detected, the reactor was shut down as a precaution. Following investigations and a series of trials, and with the agreement of the relevant regulator, the reactor was restarted in November 2012 and is continuing to operate safely. Both radiation exposure for workers at the site and discharges from the site have remained well inside the strictly prescribed limits set by the regulators. Indeed, against the International Atomic Energy Agency’s measurement scale for nuclear-related events this issue is classed as level 0, described by the agency as:
‘Below scale … No safety significance’.
The naval reactor test establishment is, and remains, a very safe and low-risk site.
But clearly, the fact that low levels of radioactivity have been detected in the coolant water means that the reactor is not operating exactly as planned. As you would expect, we have conducted extensive investigations to seek to determine how the radioactivity has entered the cooling water. We now believe that this is due to a microscopic breach in a small area of the metal cladding that surrounds one fuel element within the core of the reactor. It is not yet clear why this breach has occurred. It may be related to the age of the reactor, a function of the high-intensity use to which we have subjected the test reactor, or a random event. We do not yet know.
On current plans the Dounreay test reactor will start to be decommissioned in 2015. We are confident that the reactor can be operated safely until that date. We may decide to bring forward decommissioning if it will allow us to better understand the causes of this breach by examination of the reactor core.
This occurrence does not present any safety risk. It does, however, potentially present additional risk to future submarine availability. Consequently, I have had to consider carefully the implications for both the Vanguard-class and the Astute-class submarines, which use the same design of reactor core.
We constantly monitor our submarine reactors. We have never detected a similar occurrence to that found in the prototype reactor, and we are confident that if one did occur we would detect it straightaway.
But we now have to consider the possibility, however remote, that the useful operating life of this particular design of core may not be as long as previously expected. As a result, I have decided that, as a precautionary measure, we should refuel HMS ‘Vanguard’, the oldest SSBN, and the one with the ‘highest mileage’ on her reactor, as it were, when she enters her scheduled deep maintenance period in 2015. This is the responsible option: replacing the core on a precautionary basis at the next opportunity that arises, rather than waiting to see if the core needs to be replaced at a later date, which would mean returning ‘Vanguard’ for a period of unscheduled deep maintenance, potentially putting at risk the resilience of our ballistic missile submarine operations.
The refuelling will increase our confidence that ‘Vanguard’ will be able to operate effectively and safely until the planned fleet of Successor submarines begins to be delivered from 2028. The refuelling will be conducted within the currently planned dry-dock maintenance period for ‘Vanguard’, which starts in late 2015 and will last for around three and a half years, and is therefore expected to have no impact on deterrent operations. The additional cost of refuelling ‘Vanguard’ is estimated to be around £120 million over the next six years.
A decision on whether to refuel the next oldest submarine, HMS ‘Victorious’, when she enters her next planned deep maintenance period, will not be needed until 2018. It will be informed by further analysis of the data from the naval reactor at Dounreay and examination of the core after the reactor is decommissioned. I have decided that, in the mean time, and again on a precautionary basis, we will take the steps necessary to keep open the option of refuelling ‘Victorious’. This will include investment at Devonport and at the reactor plant at Raynesway in Derby to preserve our ability to conduct nuclear refuelling into the future. The total cost of this investment is still being scoped, but is expected to be of the order of £150 million.
Those costs will be met from existing provision for financial risk in the submarine programme budget. They represent substantially less than 10% of that risk provision and will not impact on the more than £4 billion of contingency that we are holding in the overall defence equipment plan.
The implications for the Astute-class submarine will be the subject of further analysis, particularly once we have had the opportunity to examine the core from Dounreay. But, as the Astutes are only now entering service and thus their cores have seen far less operation, a decision on whether or not to refuel any of them will not be needed for many years.
These decisions do not affect our plans for the Successor submarine that will replace the Vanguard class. Refuelling HMS ‘Vanguard’ does not enable us to further extend the overall life of the submarine, which is limited by a number of factors other than the age of the reactor, nor do they have any implications for our confidence in the reactor that we are developing for the Successor submarine, which is based on a completely different design.
Finally, the House will wish to understand that our naval reactor cores are a highly specialised, UK-bespoke maritime design and there is no read-across from this occurrence to the performance of the naval reactors operated by other countries, or indeed reactors operating in the UK civil nuclear sector.
The safety of the UK’s naval nuclear reactor at the test establishment at Dounreay and on our submarines is of critical importance to us, as is the maintenance of continuous at-sea deterrence. That is why I have taken the decision to apply the precautionary principle, even though there is no evidence at this stage that the problem detected with the test reactor is likely to present in the operational reactors. We will continue to work with the independent military and civil regulators to ensure the continuing safety of nuclear operations at Dounreay, Devonport, Faslane and at sea. The Government are committed to maintaining our nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of the UK’s sovereignty and freedom of action against threats of nuclear aggression, wherever they may come from. Our submarine-based, continuous at-sea deterrent remains the most capable and cost-effective way of doing that. The decisions that I have announced today are responsible and precautionary and will ensure our ability safely to maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent into the future”.
I commend this Statement to the House.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I compliment noble Lords on considering two Statements, one after the other. Like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I pay tribute to the friends and family of the serviceman who sadly died in Afghanistan.
The noble Lord asked me for an assurance that there are no safety issues at stake. To the best of my knowledge we have been given assurances by the bodies that the noble Lord mentioned that there are no safety issues. They are satisfied about that.
The noble Lord asked me why we have made this Statement to Parliament only today. Against the International Atomic Energy Agency’s measurement scale for a nuclear-related event, this issue has been classed at level 0, as the Statement said. As the Statement also said, we have been working with the regulator to keep it informed. As I say, the advice that we received was that there were no safety implications. When this issue was detected, the prototype reactor was shut down to allow us to assess and confirm with the regulator that it could continue to operate safely. It was clear that workers remained safe and the local community was not at risk, and it has since been restarted. No issues have been identified on “Vanguard”, which continues to operate safely, and there are no imminent safety issues. Safety is always our highest priority. I can assure the noble Lord that if anything significant comes up about this issue, we will keep the House regularly informed.
The noble Lord asked whether we had discussed this issue with the Scottish Government. We informed the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in 2012, given its responsibility for regulating discharge from the site. As I said, this was a level 0 issue and there is no requirement to notify such issues. The prototype core in Dounreay comprises a very small area and is not operating as well as it could. This is allowing small quantities of radioactive material to enter another sealed—I stress “sealed”—part of the reactor. This is not a leak from the reactor. Workers remain safe and the local community is not at risk. We made the Scottish Minister for Environment aware of our decision before the Secretary of State gave his Oral Statement to the House earlier today.
The noble Lord asked whether the continuous at-sea deterrent was at risk. The answer is no. The decisions announced today are responsible and precautionary, and will help assure our ability safely to maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent into the future. “Vanguard” was due to go into refit anyway, so they have not yet delayed submarine availability.
The noble Lord asked about the Astute class. At this time there is no impact on the Astute programme. We have thoroughly re-examined the reactors while they are being built. I should point out that this was a microscopic breach in a test reactor that had been hammered, for want of a better word. It does not mean that it will happen in other reactors in submarines. The issue has never occurred previously on a UK naval nuclear reactor, and it has not occurred on one of our other submarines. We are confident that if it did occur we would spot it quickly and be able to take appropriate action. I was unable to jot down the noble Lord’s other question but I will write to him.
Lord Roper (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, I add our condolences to the family of the soldier of 32 Engineer Regiment who died yesterday.
The matter of the Statement is obviously serious and the Government have been absolutely right to act in accord with the precautionary principle. I wonder whether my noble friend can say something about the possible implications for the other two Vanguard-class submarines. Is there any question of their having to be recalled at some stage and, if so, what would be the further cost? If that were to occur, would there be any other delays in the totality of the programme?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, to answer my noble friend’s last question first, there will be no delay. This is a decision that we would take in 2018 and depends on the research that we are able to carry out into the prototype reactor core. I thank my noble friend for his support for the Statement.
Lord Boyce (CB)
My Lords, I believe that this proposed refuelling is an entirely sensible course of action to ensure that HMS “Vanguard” can meet her final decommissioning date in the late 2020s. However, I should like to press the Minister and to follow up and expand on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Can the Minister absolutely assure us that the refit length will not be extended as the result of this refuelling and thereby potentially compromise the operating cycle that allows us to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence? Can he say whether the successor submarine—I emphasise the fact that there is a successor to the Vanguard-class submarine—will not be affected by this particular reactor issue?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, as a former commanding officer of HMS “Superb” speaks with more authority than anyone in this House on nuclear-powered submarines. I listened very carefully to what he said and thank him for his support on this issue. The Government are committed to CASD and I can confirm that the decision to refuel HMS “Vanguard” will not affect our posture and can be contained within the refit timescales. It is a precautionary measure timed to coincide with the planned refit period precisely to avoid any impact on CASD. Neither will it affect the successor programme.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab)
My Lords, I add my condolences on the events in Helmand province. It is a very sad announcement but we have grown used to it in the past and such events are rare at the present moment.
I very much support the Government in the precautions that they have taken here. They are absolutely right to err on the side of caution, however inconvenient or costly that might be. The safety of submariners and the staff at Dounreay, Devonport and Faslane must be of paramount importance. The House will also be reassured that this announcement will not affect the four submarine continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. Does he not agree that the events of recent days show clearly why nuclear deterrence is still crucial in the world today? Perhaps I may follow up one of the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked. Can the Minister confirm that, without the test reactor at HMS “Vulcan” in Dounreay, the new reactors will involve sufficient assurance to allay any public or indeed private concerns that might exist?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I missed the noble Lord’s last word. What was the word that he used after “sufficient”?
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
I asked whether the new reactors would involve sufficient assurance to allay any public or private concerns that might now exist.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord for his support. As he said, this is a precautionary measure. Although this is not a safety issue, obviously the safety of the civilian workers and of our crews is very much in our minds. The noble Lord mentioned the events of the past few days. There is no current nuclear threat to the UK, but we can never discount the possibility that one could re-emerge in the future. I can vigorously give the noble Lord the assurance that he asked for.
Lord Maclennan of Rogart (LD)
My Lords, since the naval reactor test establishment has been described as being very safe and a low-risk site, and since low levels of radioactivity were detected in the cooling water surrounding the prototype core, and that was done, as I understand it, at the Dounreay site, why is it being decommissioned? There does not appear to be provision for reinstating similar testing facilities at Devonport or at the reactor plant at Raynesway in Derby, which were comparable to those that were successful in detecting this fault at Dounreay. This will have an impact on the local economy. The decommissioning will be expensive in that it has to be reconstructed elsewhere, whereas there is a team of highly skilled operators at the existing site. In the light of the non-disclosure or unawareness of what caused this fault, I do not fully understand from the Statement why such a step is being taken.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, my noble friend asked me why it is being decommissioned and what is going to happen afterwards. I assure him that this has been very carefully thought out. I asked this question earlier of the people who briefed me. The answer is very technical and sensitive, and it may be better if I write to my noble friend. The short answer is that there has been so much technical progress that people can learn in much quicker and better ways than in the way things were done at Dounreay, but I am happy to write to my noble friend because it is a very important question.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Since 1968, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, we have had a ballistic missile submarine deployed in the vast expanse of the north Atlantic carrying the nation’s deterrent—our ultimate and final insurance policy. Of course, SSBNs are amazingly complex bits of kit. Successive Governments and the Royal Navy have managed to ensure that they have operated safely and that they have had continual operational readiness. This announcement continues that tradition. Clearly there is no risk to anyone at all. That is quite clear from the announcement. It is quite clear from what has been spotted that there is no risk at all, so safety is fine and is paramount. Yet the Government have ensured that looking to the future they will maintain continuous at-sea deterrents. I congratulate them on making that decision, which no doubt was quite a difficult decision to make.
As always, there will of course be people, some of whom will be in Scotland and perhaps involved with Alex Salmond and his people, who will start muttering, “Gosh, nuclear is so unsafe. Isn’t this awful?”, even though there is no risk. All I would say to them is, “Let us take the past 50 years of operating nuclear submarines in the Royal Navy and compare the number of accidents and deaths in the oil and gas industry with the number of deaths involved with Royal Navy nuclear submarines”. I know that the answer for Royal Navy nuclear submarines is zero. I do not think that the other side could make that claim. It is important always to remember that, because a lot of nonsense is talked about this issue. Again, in this decision we are very safe.
Does the noble Lord agree that what has happened is a stark example of why we need four boats to maintain continuous at-sea deterrents, because of unforeseen and unexpected things? Does he also agree that it is a very good reason why there should be no further delay whatever in terms of introducing the next, replacement deterrent submarines?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, that is a lot to absorb but I agree very much with what the noble Lord said. As a former First Sea Lord, he was well aware of the success of CASD. He said that these are very sophisticated bits of kit. I understand that nuclear-powered submarines are the most sophisticated kit that humans have ever made. I assure him that safety is always uppermost in our minds even if it is expensive. He also mentioned the Scottish issue. Since 1963, the Ministry of Defence has operated more than 80 nuclear reactor cores without accident. As he said, nuclear-powered submarines remain the best way to deliver our nuclear deterrent. We should not allow a vested interest to derail the defence of our nation by manipulating today’s decision. The nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate guarantor of our nation’s security.
The noble Lord, Lord West, also asked about four boats. That decision will be made in 2016. I assure him that there is no delay in the programme.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
My Lords, I add my sadness to that expressed by other noble Lords as to the death of the British soldier in Afghanistan. I should like to ask the Minister about the design authority with regard to the nuclear reactor in all our submarines. Who holds that design authority? Presumably, that company was also responsible for the manufacture of the prototype. Will it be continuously involved in the work that my noble friend has described?
Lord Astor of Hever
My noble friend has asked a very good question. Rolls-Royce is the MoD’s technical authority for the design of reactors and the manufacture of the cores. It has delivered reactor cores for UK submarines for more than 50 years. We are confident that it will deliver the cores we require in the future. There is no effect on jobs at the Rolls-Royce facility in Derby.
Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)
The operational questions arising have largely have been covered by my noble friend Lord West and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce. In more immediate terms, the concern obviously will be the safety of personnel at Dounreay and on the submarines. Although it has been deemed that there is no risk and that the reactor, with all its accoutrements, has been restarted, will he confirm, first, that there will be continuous monitoring of a specific nature at Dounreay? Secondly, even though there is no risk discerned in the test reactor at Dounreay, will he confirm that there is even less risk on the submarines themselves; and that there has been no evidence that the same phenomena have occurred on any submarines, and that that will be monitored? Thirdly, will he confirm that the refuelling will take place at Devonport rather than anywhere else?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, it will take place at Devonport in Plymouth, yes. There is no risk, I can assure the noble Lord, to the workers or the local community up at Dounreay. The naval reactor test establishment remains a very safe and low-risk site. Workers remain safe and the local community and environment is not at risk. There has been a very small increase in the radioactivity of the coolant in the sealed reactor circuit. This has not gone outside the sealed unit and it has certainly not gone into the atmosphere. This refuelling is a prudent, pre-emptive and purely precautionary measure and it has been carried out to manage risk to the operational submarine programme and not to mitigate any safety issue.
As far as any risk to the submarine crews is concerned, the safety of our nuclear submarines is not in doubt and we have not identified any issues with our operational submarines. The refuelling of HMS “Vanguard” will begin in late 2015 as a precautionary measure during her scheduled deep maintenance period. If a leak occurred on a submarine, it would be detected immediately.
Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)
My Lords, I endorse the words of my noble friend Lord West about the importance of having four SSBMs rather than three, which has been brought out by this incident. Had we only three boats, as people more out of ignorance of the situation than anything else have sometimes urged upon Governments of both parties, and were we then faced—which we have not been on this occasion, mercifully although we might have been—with a need for an emergency refuelling, continuous at-sea deterrent would almost certainly have been threatened.
I would have had the ministerial responsibility for this matter had it arisen in my time in office and, on the basis of the facts set out in the Statement this afternoon—the House will be grateful for the fullness of the explanations given by the noble Lord—I think that the Government have done absolutely the right thing. However, I am mystified by why the decision has been taken now rather than two years ago. Surely, once it was clear that the prototype had this important fault, it should have been clear at that point that when the first opportunity arose to do a deep refit of the oldest submarine HMS “Vanguard” it would have been sensible to have taken the opportunity to refuel. That has been done now. But surely that could have been seen to be the right solution two years ago, or 18 months ago when matters had been thoroughly worked through in terms of the conclusions from the leak that has been established in the prototype. Why the delay? That is the one thing that mystifies me about this whole incident.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, taking the first part of the noble Lord’s question, nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate guarantor of our nation’s security. The Government’s policy is clear: we will maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent and proceed with plans to build a new fleet of submarines. Final decisions on successive submarines and the numbers, which the noble Lord mentioned, will be taken in 2016.
The noble Lord asked why there was a delay. I set out an answer in some detail to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Scottish Independence: Faslane
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)
My Lords, we are confident that the Scottish people will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom. Therefore, we are not making any contingency plans for a yes vote. Moving the deterrent and its facilities would be an enormous exercise. Faslane is the largest employment site in Scotland, with around 6,700 military and civilian jobs, increasing to around 8,200 by 2022, with hundreds of millions of pounds of planned investments as it becomes the home to all Royal Navy submarines.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)
My Lords, why are the Government prepared to anticipate what the effects of Scottish independence will be on the currency but not on our national security and our defence policy, given the threat that this represents to the independent nuclear deterrent? Is not the truth of the matter that, if Alex Salmond achieves his nuclear-free Scotland, the practical consequences will mean the end of the British nuclear deterrent at a time of great economic and geopolitical uncertainty? Do the Government have a plan B?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, we do not want Scotland to leave the United Kingdom. We have achieved so much together and are very proud of the contributions that Scotland makes to United Kingdom defence. The United Kingdom’s integrated approach to defence protects all parts of the UK. Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate safeguard for our national security. We have made a clear commitment to maintain that. There is absolutely no question that the UK will unilaterally disarm.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, while he and I might disagree with regards to the outcome of the referendum and even with regards to nuclear weapons, does the Minister not realise that the attitude that he has shown on behalf of the Government could well go down as arrogance by the Government towards Scotland? Also, does he not feel that the rest of the United Kingdom are entitled to have an answer to this question, as it is a matter that is relevant to us all?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I absolutely was not being arrogant. I began my response by saying that we do not want Scotland to leave the United Kingdom. We have achieved so much together. In the Ministry of Defence we are very proud of the contribution that the Scots and Scotland have made to defence in the United Kingdom.
Lord Boyce (CB)
My Lords, will the Minister agree that if it becomes necessary to remove the independent nuclear deterrent from Faslane, we must also take into consideration the fact that we must move the other nuclear attack submarines? That must also be counted in the cost.
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord makes a very good point and we are well aware of that.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, my honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Danny Alexander, said in July of last year that,
“the Trident alternatives review shows that there are credible and viable alternatives to the United Kingdom’s current approach to nuclear deterrence”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/7/13; col. 1219.]
Can my noble friend, despite his earlier words, say how much could be saved if these viable alternatives had to be used if there were, sadly, a move from Scotland?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am sorry to disappoint my noble friend but I do not have any costs on the alternatives with me. I will check on them and write to my noble friend.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, it seems that it is a dereliction of duty not to be looking at alternatives on such an important issue. We all know that our ability to defend our islands, should Scotland separate, will be dramatically reduced. Whatever happens, should they separate, there will be huge costs for our defence budget. Does the Minister agree that the real special relationship with the United States is the nuclear and intelligence relationship? Even this speculation is damaging that. Does he agree that in a nuclear alliance—the NATO alliance—our withdrawing part of the NATO deterrent, effectively unilaterally, will be something that causes huge damage?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the United Kingdom Government are not planning for Scottish independence and cannot pre-negotiate the details of independence ahead of the referendum. To start planning now for a United Kingdom without Scotland would be to start to unpick the fabric of the UK before people in Scotland have had their say and would require UK Ministers to prioritise the interests of one part of the United Kingdom over those of others. In the event of a vote to leave the UK, the referendum would mark the beginning of a lengthy and complex set of negotiations between the Scottish and UK Governments.
Lord Selkirk of Douglas (Con)
My Lords, will the Minister accept that there is no evidence that the majority of the Scottish electorate want to see the disintegration of the British armed services and neither do they wish to see the extra costs that would certainly go with it?
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, we want to see Scotland remain a key player in the United Kingdom, to the mutual benefit of each country within it. Defence is a vital component of the United Kingdom. Can the Minister say what the size is of the UK defence footprint in Scotland?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, the Ministry of Defence spent over £20 billion with UK industry in 2011-12. It would be for the Scottish Government to explain clearly what their armed forces would look like. However, to date, they have failed to provide sufficient clarity. At some £34 billion, the UK’s annual defence budget is one of the largest in the world. As part of the UK, Scotland benefits from the full range of the UK’s defence capabilities that its budget provides.
Lord Desai (Lab)
My Lords, would it be charitable to believe that the Government, as a responsible agency, may have scenarios up their sleeve but the noble Lord is not willing to take the House into his confidence?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, even if I did know that I could not possibly tell him about it.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
My Lords, is there not a major defence manufacturing activity in Scotland, much of which may well be lost if Scotland chooses to become independent?
Lord Astor of Hever
My noble friend makes a very good point. The Ministry of Defence spent more than £20 billion with UK industry in 2011-12, with a £160 billion, 10-year equipment programme. Companies based in an independent Scotland would no longer be eligible for contracts that the UK chose to place domestically for national security reasons. Where they could continue to compete, they would be pitching for business in an international market dominated by major economic powers.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)
My Lords, does the Minister not understand that this is an important matter, and that there is a big difference between pre-negotiation and contingency planning?
Defence Reform Bill
Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Astor of Hever
“( ) The provision that may be made under subsection (1) by virtue of section 42(2) includes power to specify penalties of different amounts according to the value of the contract to which the contravention relates.”
Lord Astor of Hever
Lord Astor of Hever
“(4) A statutory instrument containing—
(a) the first single source contract regulations,(b) provision made by virtue of section 14(2), (6) or (8) (contracts to which single source contract regulations apply), whether alone or with other provision, or(c) provision made by virtue of section 33 (amount of penalty), whether alone or with other provision,may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.(5) Any other statutory instrument containing single source contract regulations is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
Lord Astor of Hever
“( ) No statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (1) in respect of Part 1 (with or without provision under subsection (4)) is to be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”