Defence Reform Bill

Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom Excerpts

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The role of the Territorial Army has evolved and it will evolve further. My point was that when Haldane introduced it in 1908 by consolidating the county militias, he had in mind a home or territorial defence role, which the name reflects. I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend that the role that the TA has played over the years has been substantially greater than the role envisaged for it originally.

Hon. Members on both sides of the House have raised concerns over the possibility of employment discrimination against reservists. The Bill provides improved employment protection by allowing a right of access to the employment tribunal without a qualifying employment period for an unfair dismissal claim where the dismissal relates to the employee’s reserve service. Separately, there is already a criminal offence of dismissal because of call-out for reserve service.

However, we recognise that there is a perception among many reservists that they are disadvantaged in the workplace by their reserve service. We believe that the changes that we have set out in the White Paper will greatly improve relations between reservists and their employers, but we take the issue of discrimination against reservists very seriously. We have established a webpage through which reservists can report incidents of perceived discrimination and we will investigate them. If we find that there is a case for further action, we will take it. We will consider whether further measures may be taken in the next quinquennial Armed Forces Bill, which is due to be introduced in this House in 2015.

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

I am delighted with what my right hon. Friend has just said. Will he consider, among the further measures that might be taken, action to help reservists who find that their promotion is held back by their being in the reserve forces?

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. That example fits exactly into the category of discrimination in the workplace. We must look objectively at the examples that we are given to establish whether they constitute actual and systemic discrimination against reservists, rather than mere perceptions. The time scale that we have set out is appropriate. We have set up the webpage and are starting the process now. In 2015, when the next quinquennial Armed Forces Bill is introduced, the time will be right to analyse the information that we have received and to consider what action is appropriate.

The support of employers is crucial to delivering our future reserve forces, and we seek to strengthen the reservists and the MOD’s relationship with them. The White Paper set out a range of measures to deliver a sea change in those relationships. While small and medium-sized enterprises will benefit from all of the measures, I have acknowledged previously that reserve service can have a particular impact on them as a result of their scale. Therefore, by amending clause 44 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to allow the introduction of a financial award of £500 per month per reservist for SMEs when any of their reservist employees is mobilised, we will target additional resources at this sector and explicitly recognise the additional impact SMEs may have to absorb when a reservist employee is mobilised.

The measures in part 3 support the package of proposals set out in the White Paper. They will ensure that we have the well-trained, well-equipped and integrated reserve forces we need, which are able to deploy with their regular counterparts as part of Future Force 2020.

The driver for change running through the Bill is the requirement to deliver the capabilities our armed forces need while ensuring value for money for taxpayers, whether that is through better procurement or more efficient and effective use of the reserves. The measures contained within it allow fundamental change to how we procure our military equipment, and ensure that we will be able to make full use of our reserve forces in the future.

Whatever else we may disagree on, all of us in this House place the utmost importance on properly equipping and supporting our armed forces. The Bill will ensure that we can be confident of our ability to do so in the future. I hope the measures will command widespread support, and that we will be able to take them forward through this House and the other place on a consensual basis. I commend the Bill to the House.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

Like the whole House, I listened intently to the Secretary of State’s necessarily detailed analysis of the specific points he announced in advocating the Bill. At the start of his speech he reflected on the tragedy in Brecon, and I associate the Opposition with his comments. After the controversy relating to today’s Health statement, I wish—I suspect to your satisfaction, Mr Deputy Speaker—to seek a more consensual approach to the tone of our debate. The principles driving the reforms in the Bill have the potential to unite all parts of the House.

Reform to defence procurement is vital to ensuring value for money, while upholding the highest possible standards and timely delivery of world-class equipment to our personnel. It is essential that increasing the number and enhancing the role of the reserve force be a success, in order to strengthen our front-line Army capability at a time when it has been subject to cutbacks. The Opposition’s aim is to ensure that these objectives are met through effective delivery, scrutinising the military as well as the financial implications of the Government’s proposals.

On Government-owned contractor-operated procurement, it is crucial that defence procurement practices be modernised to serve both the front-line overseas and the bottom line back home. Both parties agree that some of the issues that have plagued defence procurement have been insufficiently tackled by successive Administrations. In all Governments, momentum on modernisation has been lost. Major projects such as Eurofighter-Typhoon have grown greatly in cost and have been delivered years late. The roots of that lay in the late Baroness Thatcher’s Administration, showing just how far back some of these issues go.

Shared blame, however, is not as important as shared resolve, which is necessary to achieve meaningful reform. Such reform will come from greater professional project and programme management within Defence Equipment and Support, faster decision making, fuller accountability for outcomes, and longer-term integration of military expertise.

The Opposition are genuinely open-minded about the management structure that will deliver this change, which is why we accept the proposed legislation that will enable a GoCo model to be established. Supporting assessment of GoCo’s feasibility, however, is not the same as supporting its creation. The comparison between a GoCo and DE&S-plus, as it is inelegantly named, should, we believe, be based on the following principles.

First, reform must strengthen value for money within programmes, with industry adhering to targets on time and on cost. Secondly, the chosen procurement management model must retain parliamentary accountability for decision making—the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart)—so that oversight and scrutiny of multi-billion pound contracts is not hampered, but if possible enhanced. Thirdly, any change in management model must protect the rights of staff and engage with their trade union representatives, and finally, the procurement process should be characterised by talent and skill, with clear lines of responsibility, proper reward and career structures and a culture of consequences for those tasked with project management. Within that, military expertise has to be maximised without a single-service interest dominating decision making. The Opposition welcome a rigorous examination of all the options for achieving that and wish to see a genuine comparison made between the two options of GoCo and DE&S-plus.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I am delighted with the right hon. Gentleman’s tone. I do not want to put words in his mouth, but can I take it that he has no objection, in principle, to a GoCo, but that he wishes to see how it works out in practice?

[Mr Murphy]

The right hon. Gentleman anticipates my point entirely. We wish to see reform. It is difficult to defend the status quo, which, despite the many efforts of the professionals involved, has ill suited successive Governments and has not delivered value for money. In addition to testing the logic of GoCo and DE&S-plus against the three principles I mentioned, we will consider the points the Defence Committee raised.

Further to the point made by the right hon. Gentleman, it is important that the comparison be genuine and be seen to be genuine. I say gently to the Secretary of State, however, that so far he has failed to guarantee that the Government will publish the findings of the two value-for-money studies. I hope they will take the opportunity, today or in Committee, to commit to doing so. It is essential that Parliament, industry and our armed forces have full confidence that affordability is a determining factor in this process, but that can be achieved only if we have public transparency in the findings prior to a final decision being made and Members being asked to vote in favour.

I hope, too, that we will receive reassurances about the role of Parliament and the National Audit Office in scrutinising the internal decision-making process of a GoCo. It is understood that the Secretary of State is ultimately accountable—to be fair, he said the same again today—but the decisions taken by the contractor in the handling of multi-billion pound projects should not be free from public oversight. It will also interest the House to know how reform will impact on one of the centrepieces of the 2011 Levene review, which was for service chiefs to

“take responsibility (and ultimately own the budget) for detailed capability planning”.

Any enhanced power for a contractor could contradict the increased control over budgetary management and planning given to the service chiefs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

I echo what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State about the quality of our armed forces and the amount that we demand of them. We are putting them through a lot at the moment.

Once upon a time, before most Members were born, I was a Defence Procurement Minister, and I was delighted by the publication of the Bernard Gray report under the last Government. Sadly, the then Prime Minister tried to suppress it, although he should have recognised that it covered not just the period of a Labour Government, but the period during which I was in charge of defence procurement. The report revealed a great many failings in the procurement process. It showed, for instance, that the programme was overheated, that a weak interface between the MOD and DE&S was resulting in poor discipline and very little change control, and that there were insufficient skills in the DE&S. Subsequently, I was both delighted and highly amused when Bernard Gray was put in charge of sorting out the mess that he had identified.

The Bill was designed to achieve that. Like Gaul, it is divided into three parts—although, according to its drafting, there are four—dealing with defence procurement, single-source contracts and reserves. Each of those issues, but particularly procurement, raises a great many questions. I shall ask some of them now, because in the case of a change as fundamental as this, the devil is in the detail. The change is fundamental and it is being made against a background of fundamental change at the MOD as a result of the Levene reforms, severe reductions in funding and huge redundancies, not to mention the fighting in Afghanistan and the withdrawals from Afghanistan and Germany. As I have said, we are asking a lot of the Ministry of Defence, and it will need help to achieve the major changes set out in this Bill. It will need help from Parliament and from industry, and from academia and the country, and it should be willing to ask for and accept help, and everyone else should be willing to give it.

I shall start with the defence procurement process set out in the Bill. In December 2011 the Chief of Defence Matériel set out four options: first, the status quo; secondly, a trading fund; thirdly, an executive non-departmental public body with a private sector partner; and fourthly, the GoCo. We are now down to two options: a value-for-money comparison between the GoCo and what we hear is called DE&S-plus. Most unusually, there is no option to stay as we are. It is perhaps surprising that the MOD non-executive directors have not insisted on there being a stay-as-you-are option.

The GoCo option is reasonably clear, and I will come on to it in a moment, but DE&S-plus is not at all clear. The White Paper devotes a massive four lines to it and does not define it. In fact, so far as I understand it, DE&S-plus is designed to be unclear in order to be the basis for a negotiation between the MOD and the Treasury as to the freedoms the Treasury can offer. In other words, if DE&S-plus can pay more for its personnel and so attract much needed skills—more than current civil service terms and conditions allow for—the GoCo will become less attractive. But how, in practice, can the Treasury loosen the rules for the MOD without loosening those same rules for other Departments with similar problems? If the answer is that in practice it cannot, does that mean that in practice this decision has already been made—so it is GoCo or nothing, and there is no public sector comparator? Has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made up his mind? How will the private sector companies bidding for a GoCo be confident that their bids are being fairly compared with DE&S-plus, whatever that may be?

ADS, the organisation of defence companies, suggests that the proper metrics might be better value for money for the taxpayer; shorter and cheaper bidding processes; improved skills and expertise; and greater stability in the funding of the defence budget. That is a potential set of metrics, but what does my right hon. Friend say are the proper comparators, and how will he avoid this being a wholly subjective guess about future behaviour?

This brings me to the GoCo itself. I am not instinctively opposed to this idea—in fact, I am rather attracted by it—but the Defence Committee has asked lots of questions, some of which remain unanswered. No other country has gone down this route, so this is courageous, Minister. That does not mean it is wrong, but there are some questions. First, if a foreign company is the lead partner within a GoCo, how will the MOD deal with any conflicts of loyalty that arise? The Atomic Weapons Establishment does not create such conflicts and is not as widespread in its coverage. Secondly, there are concerns about the issue of intellectual property, as some of my colleagues have said. That is covered in the single sourcing part of the Bill, but it is not covered in the defence procurement part.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman is about to mention how the GoCo will affect current alliances and agreements for joint contracting between the UK and our partners. I was in the USA last week for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and I spoke to many alliance partners in NATO and to Congress members in Washington. The best that they could say was that Britain was very brave, that they would like to see whether we succeeded and that they would leave us to get on with it. Concern was also expressed, however, about whether they would be willing to share confidential contracting and technological information. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that that is a concern?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

As I have said before, the hon. Lady performs a valuable service on the Defence Select Committee. She has put her finger on an extremely important point, which was also raised by the Select Committee in our report on defence acquisition. She is right; this matter has to be covered. I asked my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State a question about how the United States and France were reacting to the proposal, and he was able to say that he had received a supportive letter from the United States that very morning. I also know that there is a working party in operation with the United States to try to ensure that any problems are ironed out. It is true that other countries think we are being very brave. If we are indeed being so courageous, and if this works, we may well forge the way for other countries to follow us. It may well be that whichever company succeeds with the GoCo in this country could find vast new opportunities opening up for it. For example, it could take over the defence procurement of the United States, which would make somebody extremely rich.

The next question, which has been raised by ADS and by the Federation of Small Businesses, relates to how the GoCo proposition would affect small and medium-sized enterprises. The FSB has said that it is broadly supportive of the Government’s proposal, as contained in the Bill, but that it is vital that the needs of SMEs be considered when the reforms are implemented. I echo that, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will do so as well.

The time line involved is ambitious. I understand that there is a suggestion that we might reach a final conclusion in April 2015. That must remind us all of another fixture in our diaries for May 2015—the general election. Surely the risk of this project running up against the next election is huge.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Perhaps I can help my right hon. Friend. The expectation is that the competitive process will be completed by the spring of next year, with the contract award in the late summer and with the GoCo standing up, if that is the solution we choose, towards the end of next year or at the very beginning of 2015—around December or January.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Oh, good. One problem is that the date for the invitations to negotiate has already slipped. That was meant to take place this month, but it is now taking place in August. Let us hope there is no further slippage. We have not heard that any is expected; let us just hope.

[Peter Luff]

My right hon. Friend is making an important point. I hope that when the Minister winds up the debate, he will provide some clarity about the invitations to negotiate. They must not be allowed to slip beyond August, as any further slippage would put at risk the rather challenging timetable that the Secretary of State has outlined.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

My hon. Friend, as a former Minister responsible for defence procurement, has a great deal of expertise. Despite the enormous qualities of his successor, I was very sad to see him leave his job. He has got this point absolutely right.

I am going to divide the final question on this defence procurement issue into three. We understand that the process of moving towards a GoCo, if a GoCo is accepted, will be taken in two stages, with perhaps one domain paving the way to be followed by the rest of defence procurement. My questions are: first, what will be included in the first domain? Secondly, how long will it take for the Government to work out whether it has succeeded, so that the remainder of defence procurement joins the first domain? Thirdly, how will anybody work out, within a period of less than 10 years—many of these defence contracts run for so long—whether this approach has succeeded? My suspicion is that the success of this entire process will be able to be judged only in about 2020. I wish it well and, as I said at the beginning, I am attracted to the idea.

On single-source contracts, the House will be relieved to hear that I have not got very much more to say. I am not sure why this matter requires legislation, because for many decades we have been spending 40% of the defence budget without legislation. It may be that there is a tearing and pressing need for legislation or that the setting up of the regulator is what requires legislation, but no doubt that can be explained. It is startling that the MOD will be able to challenge a contract price already agreed between the parties up to two years after the completion of that contract. I would have thought that would make it a bit difficult for industry to decide how to invest, but, again, no doubt the Minister will deal with that in his wind-up. Will these new rules apply to overseas contractors? Apparently they will not. Does that not create an incentive for UK defence contractors to move abroad? That would be a shame.

Part 3 of the Bill deals with the reserves—once again, I declare an interest because my daughter is one of them. I keep asking this, but I am told that repetition is no shame in a politician: what plan does the Prime Minister have to form an alliance with the Leader of the Opposition and to go out and make it absolutely plain that this reserve forces project must succeed, in the national interest. It must succeed because there is no plan B. Much of the plan has already been welcomed by industry. I think there is a greater job to be done by industry in saying that this must succeed in the national interest, and by the FSB, which, as I say, supports it. Some measures in the Bill—for example, the extra notice for the deployment of reservists—will certainly make things easier for employers. The £500 extra payment has been welcomed by the British Medical Association, as well as by the FSB and others. Perhaps there is more to be done in order to sell this, but the success of the entire process is essential. I welcome this Bill and this part of it as being in the national interest, and I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to get out there and say so himself.