Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

Does the shadow Secretary of State agree that the role that the World Service could play in a country like Pakistan, where obviously we cannot and would not wish to send troops, is vital to the stability of the region, and would help our effort in Afghanistan?

[Mr Murphy]

The right hon. Gentleman is correct, and we can compete in our admiration of the BBC’s World Service and all that it does, including the launch of the Arabic service relatively recently, the broadcasting in Pashtun, and the fact that President Obama used the medium of the World Service to broadcast. We are occasionally frustrated with some things that the BBC does, but in principle, as an institution, the World Service is something that everyone in this country who feels a sense of pride and patriotism should be remarkably proud of.

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[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

So far, this has been the best informed and best defence debate I have attended in this House. As the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) knows, I had a very high opinion of his tenure of office as Secretary of State for Defence, and it is a pleasure to follow him. He spoke with his habitual integrity and persuasiveness. I also wish to welcome the shadow Secretary of State for Defence to his position. As he knows, I also have a very high opinion of him, to the extent that I was a bit surprised that he did not stand for the leadership of his party. [Interruption.] I have ruined his chances now. I hope that, contrary to his own wishes, he will be in that position for rather longer than his predecessor was, because we should not have too many changes of position in these very important places.

The first and most important thing that the Ministry of Defence did was to start a strategic defence and security review, so the first and most important thing that the Select Committee on Defence did was to begin an interim report on that review. After we have done more work on our current inquiry into Afghanistan, we will be resuming our inquiry into that review. We have not yet done that, so what follows are my own views, rather than those of the Committee.

The 1997-98 review took place in a benign economic climate, whereas this year’s review happened against bank meltdown and the simply dreadful economic consequences. That is why the Government decided that the defence and security review had to coincide with the comprehensive spending review. As a result, it became primarily a spending review and, secondly, a defence and security review. Is that a bad thing? It is absolutely essential to get the country’s economy right. What won the second world war was the United States’ economy, and the same applies to the cold war. The greatest weapon that a country can have for its defence is a strong economy, and any business man knows that the key to having a sound business is keeping one’s costs under control. If the Government had done nothing, instead of paying £43 billion a year in debt interest alone, by the end of the Parliament we would have been paying nearer £50 billion a year. As the former Chief Secretary, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr Byrne), said, there is no money left.

The Defence Committee recognised all that, but we also wanted to look at the process of the review and we concluded that it was, pretty much, rubbish. This review took five months, whereas the highly regarded 1997-98 review took 13 months. The haste of this review meant that an opportunity to consult the wider public, defence academics, the defence industry and Parliament was missed.

[Nicholas Soames]

I know my right hon. Friend’s views on this matter, but does he accept that the review was the first stage of a process that will require a great deal more work? Both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have made that point. It is merely the architecture behind the transformation of defence that will take place, so an ongoing defence review will be needed all the time; indeed, there is to be one every five years.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I accept what my hon. Friend says and I listened with great admiration to his earlier comments. There is a lot of work to be done, as the Secretary of State has made plain, and I hope that my hon. Friend will play as valuable a part in it as he played before the election.

My greatest concern about defence is that the British, and perhaps the European, public believe that defence is a job done and that the end of the cold war meant the end of the need to spend serious amounts of money on defending our interests. They think we can rely on the Americans to protect us, but they are wrong: the Americans will protect us only for as long as it is in their interests to do so. Until our constituents demand that we spend more on defence, no Chancellor of the Exchequer will wish to do so, but that will not happen until the public are properly engaged in talking about defence or until they understand its importance and purpose. If one conducts a defence review behind closed doors, while everyone is away on holiday and at a pace that would startle Michael Schumacher, no such understanding will arise. Let us hope that the next one comes across better.

Given all my criticisms of the process, the result was far better than I expected. First, the Secretary of State for Defence did an absolutely valiant job of fighting his corner and I doubt that he alienated the Prime Minister or the Chancellor in the process—he was doing his job. Secondly, given that the Secretary of State started with a defence posture and budget that were both utterly incoherent and unsustainable there was a surprisingly strategic feel to the outcome, the thrust of which seems to be that we shall be gambling our security in the short term in exchange for its enhancement in the longer term. That is preferable to the reverse, provided that we always have at the front of our minds the need not to fail in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, despite the tightness of the settlement, there was a recognition of the changing and unpredictable nature of the threats we face. There was extra money for cyber-security and a recognition by the Secretary of State personally regarding the threat from electromagnetic pulses. I expect also that there will be extra money for space security. Those are some of the new threats.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I think that is superb. The real problem that having smaller armed forces will bring is an absolute requirement to get our intelligence tip-top. We have been utterly surprised so many times in history. We have to make our intelligence much better, so that we reduce the chance of being surprised again. For example, why do we have so many intelligence agencies? I would bet my bottom dollar that we will be surprised again, but we have to reduce the risks as much as we can. That is as much a part of the review as anything else; indeed, it is probably one of the most important factors.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I agree. My hon. Friend talks about the number of intelligence agencies we have, but he might like to look at the United States, which has such a plethora of intelligence agencies that it gives one a headache simply to look at a wiring diagram. Nevertheless, he is quite right: some of the threats we face are unpredictable. We are useless at predicting where threats will come from, or where we may need to be deployed, and for that reason we have to be adaptable.

My overall view of the review is that it is 80% common sense, pragmatic and broadly agreed upon, and 20% controversial, risky and able to generate headlines in the media. The success in pulling together the 80% that is agreed upon should not be overshadowed by discussion and argument over the 20% that is not, but that is what sells newspapers.

Let me give one example in relation to the French-UK treaties that were signed this week. I am in no doubt that they are a good thing, and that we are moving in the right direction. I have a reservation relating to the aircraft carriers, but I repeat that the treaties are a good thing. Actually, I believe that we should go further and give reality to the treaties, so that the warm words that they contain might be translated into tangible progress in training, doctrine, equipment-sharing, acquisition and research with our good friends and allies, the French. My reservation about the aircraft carriers, however, has been wrongly depicted as some great showdown between myself and the Secretary of State. I shall explain my reservation.

When the SDSR was announced last month, the Prime Minister said of the aircraft carriers:

“We will build both carriers, but hold one in extended readiness.”—[Official Report, 19 October 2010; Vol. 516, c. 801.]

And we all know that “extended readiness” in Ministry of Defence-speak means exactly the reverse. But, in the press conference after the signing of the treaties this week, my right hon. Friend referred to our “carrier”. As I understand it, we have not yet decided to sell one of the two carriers, and I hope that we do not. To talk of our “carrier” might be to build an expectation that we shall definitely mothball and almost certainly sell the other one. It is pre-empting a discussion that needs to take place much later, when we can see the economic circumstances of this country and, more importantly, the threats against us.

Two carriers would be a good idea, and no carriers would be a fairly good idea, but one carrier? Surely not. Every time it went into refit would we not prove to the Treasury that we were able to struggle on without it? Furthermore, are we really yet close enough to the French position that we can utterly rely on being allowed to use theirs? The answer is no, not yet. Our deployment to Iraq took place in the last decade. I do not say that we never will be close enough to the French, because I hope and expect that at some stage in the reasonably near future we shall, but it will come about only after a decent length of time operating alongside them, and after the treaties have been given detail, teeth and funding, none of which has yet happened.

How about another idea? How about deciding between the two of our countries that the French will contribute to the cost of the second carrier and, in return, have the right to use it when their carrier is in refit? That would mean that the two countries had three operational carriers between them, which should surely be acceptable. Having said all that, let me repeat that the French treaties are, in the words of “1066 and All That”, a “Good Thing”.

Of course, it is easy to mock the SDSR: “If only it had not been necessary to scrap the Ark Royal! If only we could have kept on the Harriers! Perhaps we could get by with some inflatable Harriers”—all that sort of jolly joking. However, the consequence of having to find money is that the alternative is to salami-slice all that is left and destroy the fundamental effectiveness of our armed forces in the process.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has had the courage to take some very difficult decisions. My guess is that in the decision between the Tornadoes and the Harriers, the fact that the Tornadoes have an air-to-ground strike capability was what saved them; we might well need that capability sooner than the Typhoon can provide it, and there must be questions about why that has been delayed for so long. Why did we need to scrap one or the other, the Harrier or Tornado? The cost of the logistics of keeping another type in the air is huge—billions of pounds; a billion here and a billion there, and soon we are talking about real money.

The noble Lord West described the decision to scrap the Harrier as “bonkers”. That would be easier to accept if, when he was in a position to do something about the bonkers economics of the Ministry of Defence, he had tried to do something to put it right. Instead, he drove forward the carrier decision, which he must have known was unaffordable.

How did all this come about? First, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) set out so convincingly and with such great knowledge in his speech, there is the awful system of perverse incentives inside the Ministry of Defence. I congratulate the noble Lord Hutton on commissioning the Bernard Gray report. Those perverse incentives did not begin under a Labour Government; they have been around for decades, and I must bear some part of the blame for them myself.

Secondly, there is the disgraceful command from No. 10 that before the election there was to be no more money, but also no bad news about base closures or programme cancellations. The former Secretary of State for Defence did his valiant best to try to take some real, hard decisions, but he was thwarted at every step of the way by the Prime Minister of the time and some of his Ministers. In the private words of one of his Ministers at the time, the problems were to be chucked over the fence, into the responsibility of the next Government. I have been Chief Whip, and I am not often shocked. But I was certainly shocked when that remark was reported to me.

I still have considerable concerns about the strategic and defence review. I am very concerned about the gap in vital capability if the Nimrod aircraft go. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex, I am very concerned about the overall size of the fleet, which will be tiny in future; the unquantifiable influence exerted by the Royal Navy when a smart ship sails into a foreign port will be rarer and rarer. For the next 10 years, the strategic defence and security review will rely heavily on our enemies giving us advance warning of an impending attack. The enemy have a vote in all this; let us hope that they are polite enough to do that.

There will be other concerns. Service families watching this debate will fear redundancies, uncertainties and upheaval, having given themselves and made such sacrifice for their country. The same will apply to civil servants, who have also given outstanding service, and to the defence industry, which has done so much to support our defence efforts. All this will have substantial effects on whole communities—for example, in Scotland. We must do our best to mitigate those effects.

Whatever the concerns, one thing is absolutely clear. We have now had the defence review and we must now make it work. In my view, there is only a limited amount to be achieved by blaming the Labour party for the ghastly mess that it left us or the coalition for the hasty and secretive review that it has brought in to put it right. We now have a plan and we must scrutinise it, but we must leave defence on a stronger footing at the end of the process than it is on now. We must make it work for the good of the country.

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[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

The long-awaited and long-overdue SDSR has been an extremely difficult task, and I place on record my thanks to the Secretary of State, his team and all those who have worked on the review. Portsmouth base alone considered 900 options over the summer, and I pay tribute to the Navy and civilian staff for doing an incredible job in a very short time.

I am delighted that the review has not been sea-blind and has shown an appreciation of the role that the Navy plays and its contribution to other Departments such as the Foreign Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Treasury. That contribution is not just about our country’s security but about our entire way of life—our ability to trade, our hydrographical and meteorological services, tackling crime and providing help in times of crisis. However, the breadth of its role should never detract from the depth of its contribution to the defence of the realm.

To see the scale of the challenge that the SDSR presented, one just has to examine the disparity between what the 1998 strategic review suggested for the Navy and the current number of ships in service. For example, it suggested 12 Type 45 destroyers, and we are building only six. In future, to close the gap between need and affordability and to preserve the development and maintenance capabilities that we want in our bases and dockyards, we need a planned but flexible approach to procurement and to maximise every opportunity to increase UK exports. We must get away from small orders built at lightning speed, which short-change the Navy and the yard and place stress on the defence budget. I am delighted that we will focus more on industrial strategy and defence diplomacy, and I look forward to the opportunity that the Type 26 will bring to improve procurement practices and increase exports.

We should remember that we have not sold a new Navy-designed ship abroad since the 1970s, but it is achievable. We are already selling standard kit to the US navy, and British gas turbines will power the DDG-1000 destroyer and are already powering the USS Freedom. I urge the defence team to focus on trade deals where they are viable and strategically advantageous.

During the course of the review there has been much discussion of the inflexibility of the carrier contracts, as well as costly delays to the programme. Many Members have formed the view that that is why we are to have the carriers. I wish to use this opportunity to set the record straight. There are considerable running, docking and maintenance costs attached to having the carriers, and I do not believe we would have them if we had not concluded that they were absolutely necessary. I echo the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), who said that we needed two carriers if we were to have them available every day of the year. However, that can be no excuse for poor procurement and inflexible contracts, even for vital items.

My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is absent from our Benches today. Sadly, he is attending the funeral of the late Councillor Alan Shotter, his friend and election agent. If he were here, he might well be arguing that we should lock ourselves into a contract for Trident’s replacement, such is his concern about the matter. I know that he would be pressing the Secretary of State on that matter and joining in the views expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh). My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East wrote in a recent article that

“time and again, we hear the facile refrain that complex modern weapons systems are ‘legacy programmes, irrelevant to the threats we face now’.”

We have heard that said about the carriers and about Trident during the review. I know that my hon. Friend will continue to make the case for early sign-up to Trident and remind the House why continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence is so important, and I will continue to remind the House of the importance of carrier strike.

The arguments that we heard over the summer that carriers would be deployed only in the event of a world war are plain wrong, and ignore the fact that we have deployed carrier strike force in every humanitarian and conflict situation that we care to mention—the Falklands, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. It has extended Britain’s reach into land-locked countries across the globe. Even when the carrier fleet has not been pressed into action, its constant presence has served as a deterrent to those who would harm us and our interests. I urge the defence team to do all they can to plug the gap in the carrier strike force, which some defence analysts have said has existed since 2005.

I want the House to be excited about the new carriers. I am disappointed about the retirement of the Harrier, and I note the Secretary of State’s comments on the matter. The decommissioning of the Ark Royal is also sad. Her battle honours are many, most notably in Iraq in 1993, and they will never be forgotten. However, the QE class carriers will continue her legacy. For those not familiar with those amazing ships, the Ark Royal can fit comfortably on one of their flight decks. They are amazing, and I urge all Members of the House to take every opportunity to see them being built—built with great skill in British yards. They are well able to meet the challenges of this unpredictable world. They are multi-use, they provide value for money and they will last 50 years. We will use them, they will prevent conflict and they will lead our response if and when the most dread circumstances arise.

The green light for both carriers to be built gives Portsmouth base the stability to develop further as the home of the surface fleet. The SDSR and countless other studies have always concluded that Portsmouth should be the home port. Hon. Members who take The Times will be familiar with my favourite political sketch writer’s column. In her coverage of Monday night’s well-attended Adjournment debate, she confused the names of the base port, Faslane, and the maintenance dock, Rosyth, to produce Forsyth. Whether that was by design or error, it was very apt, because for many years we have had Scottish Members of Parliament and Portsmouth Members of Parliament yelling “Higher, higher” or “Lower, lower” at successive Secretaries of State in debates about where the carriers’ home base should be. Although I am a fan of Brucie, I am glad that we can draw a line underneath that and that Portsmouth will be the carriers’ home port.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Did my hon. Friend share my alarm when she saw the headlines about two weeks ago saying that Portsmouth might close down? Did she think that basing the carriers there would make that much less likely, until she decided that the story was something to do with a football club?

[Penny Mordaunt]

Over the summer, there have been headlines about Portsmouth and many other bases, which has caused great stress for people working in the industries affected, and I am glad that they now have a clear path and reassurance. I never worry about such headlines about Portsmouth, because I know the excellent partnership that exists there between the private sector and the Royal Navy. However, my right hon. Friend is absolutely right that the carriers now give us the green light to develop services further.