European Court of Human Rights

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 24th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, with the kind of cases that the European Court of Human Rights deals with, its judgments can inevitably be supported in some cases—as indeed they have been in many cases by the public—and not supported in others. On the point that my noble friend makes, the fact that there is a backlog of around 140,000 applications suggests that something is not working effectively. That is why the Government are committed to supporting and building on the process of court reform which is already under way in Strasbourg. As part of that reform process, the Government wish to see a strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity; that is, that the convention should principally be implemented at national level.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that that backlog has been caused in part by Georgia and Russia flooding the court with applications and that there are new procedures in place to deal with it? Will he also confirm that we in the United Kingdom have an exemplary record, albeit with a delay in one case, in responding to judgments of the court and not seeking to pick and choose? If we now refuse to implement the judgment in respect of the rights for prisoners instead of negotiating to see what the best outcome is, what effect does he think that will have on serial defaulters such as Russia and Turkey when until now our record has been exemplary?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes an important point: this country’s implementation of ECHR judgments has been very good and consistent with our obligation to respect and implement our international treaty obligations. He referred to the number of additional cases. The process that was started at Interlaken, where the United Kingdom was represented by the distinguished former Attorney-General, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, is under way, and it is hoped that when Britain has the chairmanship of the Council of Europe for six months starting in November this year, we will be able to build on these reforms.

The Government’s position on prisoner voting has been set out, but we have also requested that the court’s judgment in the case of Greens and MT v UK should be referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court. If the Grand Chamber agrees to the referral, it will look at the case again and issue its own judgment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, perhaps the wisest words in the English language are those of Oliver Cromwell, which we can now address to the government Front Bench:

“in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken”.

There is no agnosticism but a firm absolutism in the way in which these proposals have been put forward when they are clearly matters of judgment and not matters of utter rigid determination.

It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, with his historical sweep. I was musing on the fact that, if Montesquieu had it wrong and that was translated into the US constitution, nevertheless the US constitution has lasted and it has been rather difficult to amend, so perhaps there are some lessons to be learnt from that. However, I follow the noble Lord in congratulating someone whom I can call my noble friend, Lord Cormack, on his most felicitous maiden speech. I served with him for 30 years in the other place and believe he is an outstanding parliamentarian and—dare I say it—a natural for this place. He would have glided down the Corridor to this place and I welcome him warmly.

I begin by saying that I was most impressed with the report of the committee presided over by my noble friend Lady Jay. When I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place, I had enormous admiration for the foreign affairs reports of this place. I cannot honestly say that I said so at the time but I certainly had that admiration, and this report is very much within that same tradition. Indeed, that is the case to the point where I wonder whether political science professors such as the noble Lord, Lord Norton, will ever again ask their first-year students to write on fixed-term Parliaments because they can only harmonise on the themes in this report. I look forward to his contribution and to that of my noble friend Lord Morgan, at whose feet I sat for some time. Indeed, I also very much enjoyed the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy.

I was astonished—this is my initial point—at the letter of 16 February from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who I dare say was one of the few on the other side who improved his reputation very much during the passage of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. The letter of 16 February was one of the most selective letters I have ever seen. It says that the Constitution Committee published a report on the Bill on 16 December and that the committee,

“endorsed significant elements of the Bill”,

specifically X and Y. The committee indeed endorsed one or two details. However, from reading that letter and the introduction to the response to the report of the Constitution Committee that the Government published last month, which states that,

“The Government was pleased to note therefore the Committee’s endorsement of significant elements of the Government’s proposals”,

who would have thought that the all-party committee’s conclusion was the most devastating indictment? The committee’s report states:

“We take the view that the origins and contents of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand”.

Why was that not mentioned? It was such a selective letter. In short, the all-party committee concluded that this is no way to run a railroad and certainly no way to change our constitution. Equally, no one can deny the lack of public debate; so much of this has been drawn out of a hat.

As to the proposal’s origins, the Conservative Party traditionally has a tremendous reverence for the constitution and is wary of change—a tradition reflected in the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, and in the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—but that reverence was abandoned to give free rein to the Liberal Democrats and to give them free rein on economic and social policy. The Liberal Democrat Party has again shown an obsession with constitutional change. It was clearly part of a deal and lacked consultation. I cite evidence of the lack of consultation when the Deputy Prime Minister said that he would consult the devolved Administrations about the details that affect them. Would it not have been better to have had that consultation with the devolved Administrations beforehand rather than to do it on the hoof? The context is ill thought through and it smacks of partisan calculations. On page 39, the committee’s report states:

“There is strong evidence to suggest that the Government’s proposals have not been properly thought through”.

On page 41, the committee concludes:

“the constitutional relationship between the provisions of this Bill and the Government’s other proposals for constitutional reform have not been adequately thought through”.

The charge is clearly that the Bill is partisan, ill judged and piecemeal.

The Government’s argument essentially is that the Bill removes powers from the Executive and gives power to Parliament and the wider electorate. The point has been well made about the vote of confidence—my noble friend Lord Grocott made the point about 1979. While he was speaking, I was musing on the recent election in Ireland. Clearly, as a result of the awful mess of the economy made by Fianna Fáil, there was an enormous revolt of public opinion against that party. Had that dramatic drop in confidence taken place halfway through the fixed term and had there therefore been a vote of no confidence in Fianna Fáil, under this provision there would have been 14 days in which Fianna Fáil, with its substantial numbers in the Dáil, could have cobbled together a new coalition with some elements who would not otherwise have found their way into Government. That new coalition could have been formed in spite of the enormous public rejection—so much for public accountability.

The point has been well made that the Government can, in any event, manipulate the economy. The broad principle, in my judgment, is that the less frequent are elections, the less accountable Parliament is to the electorate. I would not go quite as far as the Chartists in arguing for annual elections, nor do I agree with the two years of the House of Representatives, because there is constant electioneering within that branch of the US legislature, but five years means, effectively, that there is less opportunity—the French have a phrase, “sortir les sortants”—to get rid of the rascals, to bring accountability.

There is clearly a correlation between the length of a fixed-term parliament and accountability to the people. A Government can bring in all the unpopular measures within the first couple of years of a five-year term and therefore seek to feed the great beast and give the Government what they want. Equally, there have been allegations of inconsistency on the part of some of my friends on this side, but in 2007, when there was a change of Prime Minister without an election, the Conservative Party called for an election. That would not be possible under the proposals which the coalition is now bringing forward. In my judgment, there is much grounds for the unease which the committee talks about.

Should it be four or five years? I have not heard any, or any sufficient, case for a length of five years. Nowadays events seem to move far more speedily. On the international scene, one thinks of the year of revolutions in 1989, or the current troubles in the Middle East. Equally, in terms of the financial crises, the whole context of a Parliament can change very speedily. The Conservatives have not mentioned any particular date; the Liberal Democrats have argued in the past for four years, which is the pattern for devolved Administrations, and there has been little serious argument in favour of a longer period, which, as I have sought to submit, would make the Parliament less accountable. Will it last? My noble friend Lord Grocott said no. I fear that it may, because the Executive have such a vested interest in continuing. There is real concern that a Government may well be content with the five years; any Executive would like to have the certainty of five years rather than four.

If your Lordships will allow me one final reflection, I share the sense of unease, but I am prepared to accept the case for a fixed-term Parliament, which I will support, even though I would argue for greater flexibility. It is clearly not a matter of absolutes, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, has argued very persuasively, a matter of judgment. Therefore, the response to the debate will provide a clear test of whether the Government are listening and open to persuasion; or whether, as we saw with the constituencies and AV Bill, the Bill will be brought down to us like tablets from the mountain, with no possibility of serious change, however well the argument is made against it. The danger is that, rather as with the AV Bill, we will be faced with coalition sclerosis—the inability of the two coalition parties to reach agreement on the changes.

The debate has only just started. Surely the proper course is to debate first and then enshrine in legislation. The Government have chosen to do otherwise. The Deputy Prime Minister told the committee:

“We want to make sure that it”—

that is, the Bill—

“is subject to the greatest possible scrutiny, which it rightly deserves”.

Surely this is not an academic matter but one, as I have argued, of judgment. The Government may well have an argument, but at least let them concede that, if they are not wrong, there may be a better view on certain of the matters. I end, as I began, by quoting Cromwell: the Government should think that they “may be mistaken”.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I have been a loyal supporter of the Government on this Bill but I confess that this is one amendment where I have sympathy with the proposer given the role that referendums may have in other constitutional issues and the precedent that may be set. I ask myself how comfortable I would be with a referendum on joining the euro if less than one in five of the population—that is, 20 per cent—voted for it; or, indeed, with a referendum on leaving the European Union if a similar result emerged. Therefore, the Minister needs to address how the precedent set by a referendum on this issue might affect precedents set on other grave constitutional issues that might also be the subject of referendums in the future.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, my starting point is clear and I think has widespread acceptance throughout the House—namely, that what is proposed is a major constitutional change. I hope that the House is with me in saying that a constitutional change of this magnitude should have legitimacy, particularly as the hallowed rules of the game, which have stood the test of time over a long period, are being changed. Therefore, a means has to be devised to show that such a change has at least reasonable support among the electorate. The object is to make any such change as long-lasting as possible so that any future Government are not tempted to alter the rules of the game as they would recognise that there was a sufficiently broad consensus. Otherwise, there is a danger that the change will be deemed to be no more than the view of one Government which can be properly reversed by a successor Government. I warn the Government that if they steamroller ahead—already there have been great affronts to our normal conventions on this—a future Labour Government—such a Government will arise, although we do not know when—will be tempted to say that they are not persuaded that the change has sufficient support, and therefore that they are minded to change it.

Therefore, the key question for the Government is: do they seriously think that it is important that such a change has wide popular support? Putting it another, simpler way: do not most reasonable people in the House agree that it would be absurd if only 25 per cent of our electorate were to turn out and there were to be—if I have done my arithmetic correctly—13 per cent for and 12 per cent against? Would that be considered a sufficiently strong basis for a change of this nature to be agreed? I hope that most reasonable people agree that it would be absurd if such a change were to be agreed on such a flimsy basis. It would be contrary to the spirit of our constitution, the way that we work and, indeed, the way in which this House tries to ensure a reasonable response to proposals.

I fear that there could be quite a small turnout. Between now and the proposed date of the referendum we have but two months. However strong the efforts that are made by the umbrella organisations for and against the referendum and however strongly the Government try to whip up enthusiasm, I fear that there will be substantial apathy. There is widespread disillusion at government generally; and the Deputy Prime Minister, who has been most personally linked with this proposal, is not the most popular member of the Government. Whatever the merits of the case, people may find that a convenient way of showing their disapproval of the Deputy Prime Minister is by voting with their feet. This is perhaps part of the problem of a referendum; it very much depends on who is putting the proposal and the time at which it is put. We saw that, for example, in our own referendums. In 1979, an unpopular Labour Government put forward proposals for devolution in Scotland and Wales, which, certainly in Wales, were mightily rejected. Equally, in 1997, when the bliss was in that dawn, a new reforming Labour Government managed to get not a 4:1 rejection of the proposals, as in 1979, but a majority for them—just.

On a further point of sadness, it appears that the Government are probably not in a mood to make concessions. This rather wooden response of theirs may be part of the problems of coalition politics. I cite in evidence the debate on the Isle of Wight proposal. We understood, from the excellent speech of the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, that all parties on the isle were in favour of an exception being made. The noble Lord made an extraordinarily strong case for that. It was quite clear to all of us that whatever arguments we might seek to raise it was easy to see that the Isle of Wight would not provide a precedent for other areas of the country and was unique. That surely should have been an opportunity for the Government to say, “We are a listening Government; we have heard the arguments and we are minded to change our position”. But no—the Government insisted on putting the proposal to a vote and were then roundly defeated. Worse, they then tried to claim some benefit, saying, “This is one of the great concessions that we have made”, when clearly any listening or reasonable Government not bound by a coalition agreement would have made some concession on that point.

I turn speedily to the amendment on what happens if fewer than 40 per cent vote. This provides an escape route for the Government, and I return again to the Cunningham amendment in 1979, with which I had some experience, all those years ago. I make but two short propositions. First, in many countries, there is special provision when there are proposals for constitutional change. It is not enough to have a bare majority in one or both Houses of the legislature. Secondly, there is special provision in many countries where a referendum is held to ensure that more than a bare majority is required—hence the proposal for a threshold.

I could detain the House for a long time with the results of my research on this issue. My objective is not to detain, and to accept that practice varies from country to country. I shall give a few examples, if I may, of the two propositions. First, I cite Article 5 of the US constitution, which demands that before an amendment to the constitution can be made:

“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention”,

and so on. There is also a precedent in Germany, which I shall not quote, under Article 79 on amendment of the basic law. There is also Section 128 of the Australian constitution.

Again, because of pressure of time, I shall neither cite these amendments to constitutional provisions nor detain the House by going through a litany of other countries. I concede that all the examples that I have given relate to federal constitutions, but it can plausibly be argued that in this country we are sleepwalking toward a quasi-federal system. Already, Scotland has primary legislative powers. With the Welsh referendum in March, we have the prospect of substantially increased powers. As a slightly humorous aside, after the unfortunate rugby match on Friday one companion said to me: “Well, we may have lost the game, but we shall win the referendum”. That may be a small consolation for the result on Friday.

The object of thresholds for referendums has always been to show that there is an appropriate majority in the country for the proposal: otherwise, as I have said, it could be short lived. It would be a temptation for a future Labour Government to return to the issue if there was not a basis of sufficient consent. Clearly, there are different forms of special majority. I concede that a number of countries have a different view. For reasons of time, I will refer to, rather than quote from, the 1975 Nairn committee proposals. In this country we had a referendum in 1975 on the EU without a threshold clause, but which produced a 2:1 majority on a very significant turnout. We had the threshold commitment in 1979: I believe that Hansard will show that the Leader of the House conceded to me that this was an opportunistic response on behalf of the then Conservative Government, which fully supported the Cunningham amendment of 1979 on a 40 per cent turnout. Perhaps consistency is not something that one should hang around the neck of any politician. However, there was a threshold for the proposal for a regional assembly in the north-east and for other matters such as tenants’ choice and the education Bill.

Overseas examples are legion. Again, I will not go through the various constitutional proposals of Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland. The Government claim to be particularly close to Sweden at the moment. Sweden has strong constitutional provisions, which I will not quote, which related to proposed changes. So does Australia. The Government loudly say that they are very committed to the Commonwealth. Not only Australia but many other Commonwealth countries have appropriate provisions for constitutional change.

I end by saying that the principle is very clear. We want to avoid the absurdity of a low turnout and a lack of public interest determining a key change to our constitution. We must recognise the special nature of such a vote if we wish the result to last. If the rules of the game are to be changed, we must ensure that there is an adequate majority and an adequate consensus in our country as a whole.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I hope that I did not give the impression that I had concluded my remarks. Of course I shall give way in a moment to the noble Lord, Lord Low, with great pleasure but I suspect he wishes to speak to his amendment and perhaps the right time to do that will be when I have concluded my remarks, which will not be very lengthy.

Just before I leave the issue of the Electoral Commission, I have to respond to the Leader of the House. Those of us with a background in the private sector know that when you move offices and no longer answer your telephone you go out of business very quickly, and I do not think that that is a very satisfactory excuse coming from a public sector body either.

I very much support both my noble friends Lord Rooker and Lord Lipsey in the amendments they put forward and the initiatives they have taken, although I have a number of reservations about the wording of one amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, which I shall come to in a moment. I think they must have had the same reaction as I did when I read the Bill. There is a rather marked antithesis, and a slightly disturbing one, between paragraph 9(1) of Schedule 1:

“The Electoral Commission must take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness about the referendum and how to vote in it”,

and paragraph 9(2), which then states:

“The Electoral Commission may take whatever steps they think appropriate to provide, for persons entitled to vote in the referendum, information about each of the two voting systems referred to in the referendum question”.

Particularly coming straight after “must”, “may” reads very weakly—it seems almost a sort of casual afterthought—and I do not think that is good enough. If we are to have a referendum in this country on quite a complex new constitutional issue, it is absolutely essential that members of the public have the opportunity to understand what it is all about. I therefore think it very reasonable that we should say “must” in paragraph 9(2) which, of course, is the effect of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Rooker.

I very much agree with my noble friend Lord Lipsey that it is right to produce a pamphlet on the subject. As one of his own amendments states, the information effort should include the publication of a pamphlet and does not exclude other things. I hope that the Electoral Commission will have a budget which can indeed be used, as the noble Lord, Lord Martin, has suggested, for television coverage of the issue as well, or even possibly local radio, as he suggested. That is highly desirable.

I have to say, however, that my breath was slightly taken away by the phrase in the third sentence of my noble friend Lord Lipsey’s Amendment 110ZZA:

“The leaflet shall be impartial and unbiased”.

I found myself reading that two or three times and thinking carefully whether a leaflet could be “impartial and unbiased”—indeed, whether any opinion of this kind could be “impartial and unbiased”. Of course, as a practical issue, we regularly expect certain people and certain functions to be impartial and unbiased—judges and juries would be an obvious example. However, they are being impartial and unbiased in relation to the establishment of a fact: whether so-and-so killed the victim or whether so-and-so stole the goods is a matter of fact. Here, we are asking for the production of an impartial and unbiased opinion—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is it not a fact also that, when a jury comes to its determination, it has had the points for and the points against put not by some impartial body but by counsel for the prosecution before counsel for the defence? Therefore, maybe the two sides of this argument should set out the case themselves.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I do not know whether I should be grateful for my noble friend’s intervention or not. I totally agree with him on the one hand, but on the other he has just taken away the point I was about to make myself. I was hoping I was going to be the first in the debate to raise those particular solutions. However, he is perfectly right and I think, before the House accepts the words that would actually go in the Bill, it needs to think very carefully about putting a responsibility on any human being or set of human beings to produce an opinion on something which is impartial and unbiased.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Low of Dalston]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I did not mean to interrupt him. I thought that he had got to the end of his remarks. Indeed, I am extremely grateful that he continued because I thought that, before he moved to the outer reaches of philosophy, he made a very strong point when he referred to the sharp antithesis between “must” and “may” in the clause. I thought that that point lent considerable additional weight to Amendment 108, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I got a bit more worried as the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, continued because I was getting a message from my BrailleNote here that the battery was about to run out. I think there is just enough left for me to say that I rise briefly in support of this group of amendments. Amendment 109 is in my name and is substantially to the same effect as Amendment 108, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Both require the Electoral Commission to provide information about each of the voting systems referred to in the referendum question. In conjunction with Amendment 110, which we discussed last night, these amendments place on the Electoral Commission a duty to take steps to ensure that disabled voters are able to access information and support to facilitate their understanding and participation in voting and elections.

I also welcome Amendment 110ZZA, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. All I would say is that steps need to be taken to ensure that the leaflet referred to in the amendment is made accessible to people who have difficulty in reading print. For example, the leaflet would need to advertise on it—in at least 14-point type, I would hope—the availability of other formats such as large print, Braille and audio, and a number to call to request these formats. Furthermore, alternative formats would have to be available at the same time as the print version, otherwise people who cannot read print would be put at a disadvantage compared to those who are able to read the printed leaflet.

On Amendment 110ZZB, the requirement to seek the advice of the Plain English Campaign on information materials, although it might strike a blow at the legal profession, seems a sensible suggestion considering the complexity of explaining the rival voting systems and it could certainly help in making the material accessible to people with learning disabilities, who may have need of an EasyRead version. Therefore I support all the amendments in this group.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Low, who has been a great champion of those with disabilities in the House. He shows some of the reasons for this House in the way in which he is able to contribute. I should like to say briefly how much I agree with what my noble friend Lord Davies has said. We have had many allusions in the debate, often in the small reaches of the morning, but I do not think that Hegel and—was it Nietzsche?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

It was Heidegger.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

I do not think that Hegel and Heidegger have been alluded to so far. However, following that philosophic allusion, I wonder whether one might follow the Marxist dialectic and have a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. If there were two umbrella organisations, we would have to give thought as to who would compose these arguments on both sides of the divide; and this assumes that there are people who are acceptable and that there are relevant umbrella organisations. This will probably be the case, even though there may be differences within those umbrella organisations. If there are such organisations, it may be that they would have to submit, in draft, their proposals to the Electoral Commission, which could ensure that they are broadly acceptable.

Let me come first to the synthesis and then I shall give way to my noble friend. The Electoral Commission itself, having looked at the thesis and the antithesis, in the normal direct way, can then come forward with its synthesis of those areas which it thinks are of importance for the voter and which have not been touched on by the protagonists.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. My concept was that the individual elector would provide his or her own synthesis from the materials provided by the two campaigns. I totally agree with my noble friend, from a practical standpoint, that my suggestion will not work unless there are two clear campaigns run by some accepted umbrella organisation. It would, of course, be for the Electoral Commission to satisfy itself that those two campaigns were generally national umbrella organisations, accepted by all the groups within each particular side of the campaign. That worked in 1975, as my noble friend, who was also alive at the time, will recall, but it would not work if there were just a whole lot of different groups and multifarious and multifaceted voices of various kinds on both sides. That would be a very untidy and very difficult campaign. I hope that the rather more clear-cut choice, which the public were offered in 1975 on another important constitutional issue, could be replicated. It would be for the Electoral Commission to decide that point.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My noble friend’s thesis assumes that there are people who are prepared to be in an umbrella organisation for the alternative vote. The problem is that no one actually favours the alternative vote.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Mr Clegg?

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

In God-like isolation, he may well. I suspect that even Mr Clegg, if it is before three o'clock in the afternoon, may well reach the view that he prefers other systems. There is a variety of systems and it is clear that the alternative vote is a totally orphan system. Certainly, the Conservative Party does not favour it. On the whole, it prefers the first past the post system. At the time of the last election, the Labour Party did, but clearly the public—

[Lord Tyler]

I wonder whether the noble Lord is aware that the leader of his party supports AV.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

That just shows the interesting way in which there are many rather odd bedfellows. If people were given an absolute choice, I do not think that they would put that first on their list. Certainly Mr Clegg would prefer another system; Mr Cameron would prefer another system; and, although I have not spoken to the leader of my party on this, or indeed on any other matter, I suspect that he also would prefer another system. So we come to the point that no one would presumably claim support for the alternative vote. I can imagine, on the other hand, a whole series of problems because if there were to be an umbrella organisation against the alternative vote, it would be a ragbag of views. There would be a great variety of views in that. To have a legitimate group on either side of the argument will prove extraordinarily difficult. Let us assume that eventually one can fund a group, an umbrella organisation, on both sides. Clearly, some of the arguments are likely to be omitted, hence the reason for the Electoral Commission to vet those drafts which have been put out by the other organisations. In seeking to be impartial, in seeking to reconcile and in seeking to bridge that gap and to be a Marxist synthesis following Hegel and Heidegger, clearly the Electoral Commission itself may have to play that role and seek to put forward a more objective middle way to the two groups if they can be found to work together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

That is information about the detail of the competing voting systems which are under discussion in the referendum. It is one thing to say to the Electoral Commission, “You must tell people about the existence of the referendum, their right to vote, and when it is going to take place”. That is perfectly sensible and it must do that.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

I heard the noble Lord submit that the discretion of the Electoral Commission on whether to give information by way of an information pamphlet will depend—or should depend—on how much information is available from other sources. How will it know, in a timely manner, how much information will be available from other sources? Clearly the other sources could include the umbrella organisations; they could include newspapers which, no doubt, will take sides during the campaign. If the Electoral Commission is to publish a leaflet, it must surely know in very good time how much information is to be provided from other sources.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I of course know that this Committee stage has to finish tomorrow and I am therefore reluctant to make a contribution. However, I am aware of the fact that this is the only opportunity we have had so far to discuss this hugely important issue of the kind of information that the voters will receive and how they will be able to obtain impartial information, if such a thing exists. This is against the background—I assume we all know and can agree on this—that there is absolutely no resonance whatsoever, anywhere in the United Kingdom, about the issues that will be raised in this referendum. The public are either not interested, which I think is almost certainly the case—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My noble friend is a very experienced parliamentarian, one who knows the grass roots and has campaigned on many occasions. Can he indicate to the Committee whether he believes that there will be door-to-door canvassing on this campaign? How many people will be sufficiently enthused by this issue to go out from door to door? How many public meetings are likely to be held on both sides? Does he see any prospect of people being so interested in this question that they will indeed do that sort of leg work, which is a feature of our elections?

[Lord Grocott]

No, I do not see any real prospect of that happening on any big scale at all and that should be a real concern to all of us. As someone who will be as active as I possibly can be in the no campaign, I am aware of the big disadvantage that the no campaign has, which is that everyone in the country at least knows something about first past the post but next to no one can answer serious questions about the mechanism of this particular form of the alternative vote system. That is why any impartial leaflet trying to tell the public about a system for which there is no evidence they know a great deal about must include the information as to where this is used. If it was not used anywhere in the world, presumably that is a valid factual piece of information to give to the electorate.

I am aware of the time, but I want to spell a point out and get a grievance off my shoulder. One must not bear a grudge, but I am still smarting under the advice that the Electoral Commission gave indirectly to the House, as it went to all Members of the House, when it was commenting on the various amendments as they were going through. The House may not remember Amendment 40B in my name but I do. It was a very simple amendment to allow the results of the referendum to be published constituency by constituency. It was a very simple proposal and I am sorry to say the House rejected it. I am not going to go into the merits of it but I simply want to make this point: in advance of the vote, the Electoral Commission, whose job it is under this legislation to provide information, made a mistake—believe me, the Electoral Commission can make mistakes —in respect of the advice it gave on my amendment.

As I said, my amendment was about publishing the constituency results. The commission said:

“We do not support this amendment … making such a significant change to the rules for the referendum this close to 5 May”.

In other words, it was assuming that the referendum had to be held on 5 May, which is a contentious piece of information to begin with. That is a date chosen by the Government, and the Electoral Commission is not necessarily obliged to give information which helps the Government to achieve this contentious advice as to when the date should be held. More seriously, and perhaps more factually, this piece of information came to the House after the amendment of my noble friend Lord Rooker, giving flexibility as to the date, had been approved by the House. So the referendum, according to the Bill as it then stood, did not have to take place on 5 May; in fact, it could take place any time between 5 May and some time in October, and that is the Bill as it stands.

I do not dispute for a minute the good intentions of the Electoral Commission but it was at the least a contentious piece of advice to Members taking part in that debate. If on a fairly straightforward, simple proposal like that it could be contentious then I would suggest that, for anything that tried to explain how various electoral systems worked and the merits thereof, it would be almost impossible to get a non-contentious document out to the voters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for moving the amendment. This important amendment follows on from the previous debate and I welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Soley. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said in introducing his amendment, it is appreciated that the Electoral Commission should take the lead role in providing useful factual information. We believe it plays an important role in providing information to the public and there is a governance framework for the Electoral Commission, under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, which we believe has operated effectively for 10 years. It is also important to recall in the context of this amendment that latterly the Electoral Commission has had the benefit of advice and involvement of representatives from the political parties: the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for the Labour Party, the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for the Conservative Party and Mr David Howarth, the former Member of Parliament for Cambridge who represents the Liberal Democrats.

The Speaker’s Committee is an important part of that framework. It produces an annual report to Parliament on the commission's performance, but the nature of the role of the Speaker's Committee is different from that proposed in the amendment. The Speaker's Committee is currently not given any say in how the commission should exercise its powers. It is there to report on the performance of the commission rather than to have a say in the exercise of its powers.

The purpose of paragraph 9(2) of Schedule 1 is to provide legal clarity so that the Electoral Commission can issue information about both the first-past-the-post and the alternative vote systems which it identifies as being necessary to help public understanding of the referendum question. I hope that that goes some way to answering the point of the noble Lord, Lord Soley, which was whether we could delete paragraph 9(2) and leave it to the respective campaigns. Although the respective campaigns will have facility under the free post to put out their argument—no doubt a positive argument for why they wish to retain first past the post or to move to the alternative vote and an argument against the other system—that is clearly not a role that would be appropriate for the Electoral Commission.

Paragraph 9(2) provides a clear legal basis for the Electoral Commission, having identified a need for factual information, to provide it. In his response to the previous debate, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that it could be accused of bias because first past the post was described before the alternative vote. In fairness, if one looks at the electoral question, the question for the referendum, which is part of the Bill, first past the post is mentioned there before the alternative vote, so it is probably not unreasonable that the Electoral Commission should reflect in its information the question which Parliament is debating and which appears in the Bill, published on advice from the Electoral Commission.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

If a leaflet is to be produced by campaigning organisations, the noble and learned Lord will understand that, normally, when making an argument, you put the argument you want to make second. It is assumed that in a “on the one hand, on the other hand” argument, you put the argument that you favour second. Cannot that be got around in a leaflet by having one side of one page for and the other against?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The answer to that, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, pointed out, is that it takes a bit longer and more pages to describe the alternative vote than it does to describe the first-past-the-post system. Although that is an innovative and ingenious way to try to overcome the problem, I think that a practical issue is associated with it.

As my noble friend the Leader of the House said, the Electoral Commission has already published the proposed content of its information leaflets on its website. It is keen to have comments on the draft. If noble Lords wish to make representations about that information, they can of course send their comments to the Electoral Commission before the leaflets are published.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, first, I support the principle behind the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, has moved. The arrangements as set out in the schedule are somewhat ambiguous. His amendment is one way, at least, of clarifying that. There may be other, better ways, for all I know, but certainly these arrangements need to be clarified. I strongly support the view behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey—that the situation in the last election, where people who came and were there before 10 pm could not, because of the law, be given ballot papers, was absolutely disgraceful. Whatever the reason, on the night the lady from the Electoral Commission who spoke did not appear to me to have grasped exactly what the situation was. She said that it had given clear instructions that the ballot papers were not to be handed out after 10 pm. It suggests to me—and I do not know what the right answer to it is—that some flexibility is required to deal with special circumstances. The people who are running the different polling stations may not necessarily be the top brass of the arrangements, but some kind of discretion must be given, because that kind of thing can happen. I do not expect for a minute that anybody realised exactly what was happening until it was really too late, and then they had this terrific sledgehammer of “You cannot issue a ballot paper after 10 pm”; witness what the Electoral Commission had said. In a sense it made the matter worse. I do not say that the people in the polling booth could have given them out after 10 pm, although I think if I was in a polling booth and in charge as a clerk I would have had a shot at that.

It is important that this matter should be sorted out one way or another. If the Government do not think that the Electoral Commission solution is the best, then let us have one. We need a solution. I agree, of course, that it needs to be a solution that applies to all elections—not just the referendum—although, unfortunately, I do not think that that could be done in this Bill. We are trying to do enough already. We cannot sort the whole thing out, but it is certainly important to sort it out. A very short Bill that would not take the time that this one has taken could go through both Houses and sort this out in good time for 5 May.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, when he says that he agrees with the intention of both these amendments. It may well be that the wording can be improved—and it probably can—but there will be general approval for the intention. I also begin by welcoming the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and indeed that of the noble Lord, Lord Rennard. Someone mentioned the vow of omerta. When we had a Liberal Democrat intervention in an area of policy which in many ways they have taken as their own, I was reminded rather more of the brave Horatius at the bridge:

“And even the ranks of Tuscany

Could scarce forbear to cheer”.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, mentioned the question of facilitation. This is clearly a possible problem because there will be a number of right hands and a number of left hands. It is important that this be a key role—even if the actual wording is not wholly appropriate.

I was puzzled by another matter in this same section. In paragraph 10(1), we are told that:

“The Chief Counting Officer must take whatever steps the officer thinks appropriate”.

At the end, in paragraph 10(5), we are told that:

“The Minister may reimburse any expenditure incurred by an officer for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) or (2)”

On the face of it, this gives an unlimited expenditure for the worthy objects of this paragraph and goes against all the normal government policies of being frightened and hesitant about open-ended commitments. It is wholly unlimited. One’s mind boggles at what, in following up this worthy objective, a very zealous officer may wish to do. So I simply commend to the Government—

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

The key word that the noble Lord quoted is “may”. It gives a discretion to the Government as to what they reimburse, so the matter is not as open as he thinks.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

That is one way of seeking to limit the zeal of any particular officer. It may well be that there should be written into the clause some test of reasonableness or otherwise, but we have to have some limit.

The final comment I would like to make on the amendment is on the point made by my noble friend Lord Lipsey, which was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I had the privilege of being an observer, or monitor, at both the South African election in 1994 and the first free election in Namibia in 1989. What amazed me at the time was that many people who had not had the opportunity before—those who were non-white—had such enthusiasm to get to the ballot box. I recall seeing young men carrying their aged mothers on their shoulders to get to that ballot box. I recall the long queues of people waiting to vote. All of those, in fact, who were in the tent at the relevant time, were allowed to vote. For any democrat it was a wonderfully emotional and uplifting moment.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has just said, it was very different when we saw the people who had been excluded from voting at the time of the last election. As a democrat, I was extremely happy to see the display of real anger on the part of those who were excluded. We wait with interest to see how the Electoral Commission will respond, but surely it is not beyond the wit of man, or woman either, to give out cards to those waiting in the queue at 10 pm to enable those who have made the effort to vote on time to do so. Indeed, everything must be done to encourage people to vote. Someone who is turned away at the last moment because there is a queue may, in the future, join the ranks of those who do not vote. Let us look very carefully at this in order to encourage democracy.

[Lord Maxton]

My Lords, as someone who takes an interest in the field of IT and new technologies, I have to say that the idea that we still vote by putting a cross on a piece of paper, having had to travel somewhere to actually put that paper into a box, appals me. I would not dream of booking a holiday or anything else in any way other than online through my computer and paying with a bank card. There is some security risk, maybe, but not very much, yet we still have this absurd system for voting. But, of course, almost the first thing this Government did was to abolish the one way we could have had electronic voting by getting rid of the rather small system of ID cards that we were introducing. If we had ID cards, we would not have any of this bother.

This real point is this. My noble friend is right at one level to say that in Scotland we are going to have two ballot papers presented to us—but we are not because we are going to have three of them. There will be one using the first past the post system to elect the Member for the constituency, and a second paper giving a list of parties to elect. That, by the way, raises the point made earlier by my noble friend Lord Rooker about where you stand on the ballot paper. In my view, it is almost certain that Alex Salmond is the First Minister of Scotland because he made sure, when using the list system, that he was listed as “Alex Salmond for First Minister” rather than “SNP”. He was at the top of the list and probably got just about enough votes to make sure he won the election.

We are now to have the AV paper to contend with as well, and some people will find it difficult. The referendum is very important, but a problem that may arise is that some people in Scotland will decide that the Scottish elections are considerably more important than the referendum for AV. After all, the Scottish Parliament deals with the education system, housing and all the social issues that affect people’s lives. They may say, “I can’t be bothered with the referendum paper. I will deal with the Scottish Parliament ones”. If the turnout for the AV referendum is smaller than it is for the Scottish Parliament, that will begin to cast doubts on the referendum itself.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 19th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Low of Dalston]

My Lords, I did not vote for the closure Motion because I felt that it was wrong to vote for what was, to all intents and purposes, a guillotine—or what was rapidly becoming one. I came to the Chamber shortly before the closure Motion was put to see how the debate was going. I had other business this afternoon and had not been able to join the debate before. I had left the Chamber as Amendment 65B was moved. I came back a couple of hours later and was more than a little dismayed to discover that we were still on the first amendment of the afternoon. I feel that we need to be making more progress on the Bill. As I said yesterday, the Opposition must be in no doubt that they have long since lost the patience of the House. There have been plenty of stalemates or near-stalemates in this House, and the only way they can be resolved is the way that they traditionally and on a daily basis are resolved, which is through a process of negotiation with give and take on both sides.

A little time after I said that yesterday morning—I do not impute a relationship of cause and effect—the Government began to say that they would look further at some of the amendments being moved. With that, the spirit of the debate began to change—at least my impression was that that was the case yesterday—and things began to move along at a somewhat brisker pace yesterday afternoon. Indeed, I am advised that the kind of negotiations that I called for yesterday morning have been in progress between the Government and the Opposition. In those circumstances, I urge that the Government and the Opposition redouble their efforts to reach a compromise so that the debate can proceed in a timely fashion and we are able to conclude the Committee stage of the Bill in a timely fashion with the necessary compromises on both sides having been achieved.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, at the time of a clash and a rather sour atmosphere at some stage on Tuesday morning, a still small voice of reason was heard in the Chamber. It was the noble Lord, Lord Low. I think most of us approved of and were delighted by the way he spoke. There clearly must be negotiation and it must be in the spirit of give and take, not “We take and you give”. There has to be some serious discussion—not just throwing a few sprats, such as the Isle of Wight, to the Opposition—because this is a matter of very considerable importance.

We are here at the moment because the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, moved his closure Motion. I do not know whether that was done with the approval of the Government, but the Government certainly adopted it by going into the Lobby with him. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, may have in his spare time read a very famous American book, How to Influence People Without Making Friends. That may be the spirit in which he moved his Motion. As a lawyer, he must know that if he were called upon to give a judicial interpretation of the words “a most exceptional procedure”, it cannot be an Alice-in-Wonderland world in which one defines words as one wants to define them; it must mean “most exceptional”. We are in the unprecedented position of having had two closure Motions. In the spirit of what the noble Lord, Lord Low, said, I fear that unless we are very careful and hold back from the brink, we are indeed slipping inexorably along the road to guillotine.

The guillotine was used in the other place, which meant that rather important amendments relating to Wales, my own country, were not touched, and that whole swathes of the Bill were not touched. Are we moving to the position where a guillotine will, in practice, be created in this House? It will indeed be unprecedented and will undermine the process of self-regulation. I hope that all of us, even the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, will now proceed in the spirit of that remarkable speech in intervention yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Low. We wait to see the colour of that which the Government bring forward, but I hope that they will work in the spirit of this place and will not try to juggernaut through that which they have agreed within the coalition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fowler]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 89, which deals specifically with the Isle of Wight. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for the action that he has taken, which enables this amendment to be debated earlier. I hope that I can bring the Committee on to a happier and more consensual road than during the past hour.

Perhaps I may say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that I do not consider the Isle of Wight, a sprat of an issue, to use his phrase. It has support from all parts of the House, very much including his own party.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

I wholly accept that the Isle of Wight deserves to be treated in the way in which the noble Lord wants. I also accept that the same principles should apply to other areas, such as Ynys Môn in Wales. My position was that if that was to be the only concession the Government made, it would be insufficient to show the spirit, which they should show, of give and take.

[Lord Fowler]

Having started and tried to get consensus, I shall not continue to debate with the noble Lord, because I am obviously not doing very well at it. It was the word “sprat” that offended me.

Few issues in politics—many of us who have been in the other place will understand this—are more important or sensitive than constituency boundaries. I speak with some experience on this. My first constituency was not Sutton Coldfield but Nottingham South. Sadly, when I entered the other place in 1970 for my first Queen’s Speech, it was to hear that the boundary review was to be implemented and that, as a result of that, my seat was to be abolished. It is not exactly what you hope and expect to hear on your first day in Parliament. Things could only get better.

The seat was being abolished because the Boundary Commission thought it wrong to have a constituency that crossed the river at Trent Bridge, going from the city to the county at West Bridgford. That was in spite of the fact that it took only a couple of minutes to walk over the bridge, there was no toll on the bridge and you certainly did not need a ferry to make the crossing.

When it comes to the Isle of Wight, of which I have been a resident for more than 25 years, the theory is exactly the opposite. The consequence of what is being proposed in the Bill is that a new constituency would be formed that would be partly on the mainland and partly on the Isle of Wight, in spite of the fact the two parts would be eight to 10 miles apart, over a stretch of sea and with expensive ferries being the only means of communication. It is claimed that there must be this kind of new constituency because it is essential that all constituencies should have electorates of around 76,000, when the Isle of Wight has 110,000. No exceptions are possible, except the two in the Bill both concerning island constituencies and where the electorates are not abnormally high but abnormally low.

My amendment would allow there to be one or two constituencies on the Isle of Wight. Most importantly, it follows the amendment put down in the other place by Andrew Turner, the excellent Member of Parliament for the island who was elected on a manifesto that promised opposition to a cross-Solent constituency. You might think that his amendment would have been carefully considered in the other place, but you would be absolutely wrong. Due to the timetabling arrangements in the other place, which perhaps underlines a little the debate that has gone before, he was allowed no time at all in Committee, four minutes on Report and no opportunity to bring the proposition to a vote.

I cannot believe that this is a sensible way of governing this country. If nothing else, this amendment gives the other place the opportunity at least to consider the proposition concerning the Isle of Wight. I emphasise that the proposition is supported by every political party on the island; we speak as one on this. It would be the first time since the Reform Act 1832 that the unity of the Isle of Wight in parliamentary terms would be destroyed. It would be a bad deal for the island and for whatever area of the mainland forms part of the proposed new constituency.

There are several practical reasons why the proposal is not in the public interest. The most basic point is that however you put together a new, divided constituency, no one believes that you can create a community, yet all the political parties in this country talk at some length about the importance of building communities. This proposal goes smack against that objective. If a new constituency was created out of part of Portsmouth and the east of the Isle of Wight, the travel difficulties involved in moving between one part and the other would be both immense and expensive. We are not talking about walking over Trent Bridge but about having to take a ferry or a hovercraft. A return journey by car ferry is likely to cost £50, and it could cost £100. A trip by hovercraft is less expensive but presents the problem of how to get about on the other side. The bus service tries hard but everyone would concede that it does not meet all the needs of the public. The internal rail service is typified by the provision of antique, cast-off London Transport carriages, as everyone who has been to the Isle of Wight knows. None of this is a recipe for free and easy movement in the new constituency or in a community.

Nor are the interests of the island and the mainland necessarily the same. For example, on another part of the island, the islanders want an improved ferry service from Yarmouth to Lymington, but they are strongly opposed by the mainland Lymington River Association, which wants nothing of the kind. There is no community of interest.

There has been no consultation with the people on the island about this proposal. Had there been, the Government would have discovered that all three political parties are opposed to a cross-Solent constituency—as are the county council, including the independents, the other councils on the island and, overwhelmingly, the public, 18,000 of whom have signed a petition against the proposal, which was collected in literally only a couple of weeks. Obviously it is not as easy to gauge the view of the public on the mainland because we do not know what part of the mainland the new constituency is meant to tie up with. However, if we are talking about Portsmouth, Southampton or somewhere else, I guess that there would not be overwhelming support for the proposition.

Two points in particular need to be borne in mind. First, given the electoral size of the island constituencies that are made exceptions to the 76,000 size rule in the Bill—Orkney and Shetland and what used to be the Western Isles; Orkney and Shetland has 33,000 constituents and the other constituency has 22,000—if there was only one constituency on the Isle of the Wight, the difference from the standard would not be anything like as great as that, and the same would be true if there were two constituencies.

However, a second and perhaps even more fundamental point is that the Boundary Commission looked at the proposition of a cross-Solent constituency in 2007, using figures from 2000. The electorate in 2000 was, even then, 103,000—33 per cent larger than the average—and the commission considered severing part of the island and putting it with a mainland constituency. However, it concluded that to do so would,

“disregard the historical and unique geographical situation”.

It found that it would,

“create confusion and a feeling of loss of identity”,

among the island’s electorate. It also stated that,

“communications would be difficult both for the electorate and the Member of Parliament”.

I am sad to say that, despite that conclusive and independent thumbs down, the Government have persisted with this proposal.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My distress at the lack of interest in the substance of the Bill is a matter of some import.

Amendment 58A would replace the current proposal in Clause 11 to fix the House of Commons at 600 seats, with an alternative rule which would anchor the size of the other place at its current membership of 650.

As your Lordships’ House’s Constitution Committee made clear in its report on the Bill:

“We conclude that the Government have not calculated the proposed reduction in the size of the House of Commons on the basis of any considered assessment of the role and functions of MPs”.

That reality was exposed in the debate last Monday, when the Government again failed to provide any adequate explanation as to why 600 seats is the optimum size for the other place or, in particular, why a 600-seat Commons would serve the public more effectively than the current 650-seat Chamber.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, conceded from the Front Bench that:

“We have never suggested that there was anything magic or ideal about a House of Commons of 600 any more than the current size of 650 is ideal”.—[Official Report, 10/01/11; col. 1222.]

Is that, I ask, rhetorically, the best that the Government can do in a situation where they are using their political majority in the other place in order to push through a reduction in the number of Members of Parliament? It is obviously a dangerous precedent that is being adopted, because it involves using your political power to fix the size of the legislative chamber in circumstances where people will allege, as we do on this side, that it is being done for political advantage.

It is worth saying that that approach to the question of the size of the legislative chamber has not been adopted in this country since the Second World War, when a Speaker’s Conference agreed the arrangement that then became law in 1949 and, though there have been changes to the detail, it has never been disputed that the people who should decide the number of constituencies in the country should be the boundary commissions, which are believed—correctly, in my view—to be beyond party politics. We do not want to get into a position where, when you win an election, you then use your majority to fix the size of the House of Commons to suit your political advantage.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is there not, as a result of this affront to our constitution in the way that this is being done, the danger that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander? There must be a considerable temptation for any incoming Government to do the same. I would hope that we would resist that temptation, but the pendulum will swing and the party or parties opposite will not be for ever in Government. The danger is that one hallowed principle of our constitution will be wilfully thrown away.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I agree with all of that. I very much hope that we would not succumb to that temptation, but once the door is open, it becomes harder and harder to resist.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I accept that as well but I can see no process by which, when you are setting up a Parliament, you can do so except by the passage of a Bill in Parliament.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

May a voice from Wales seek to assist my noble friend in respect of what happened regarding the Welsh Assembly? There was a consensus; it was agreed that there should be 60 seats, 40 of which would be exactly the same as the Westminster constituencies, while the other 20 would be based on regional representation and on a form of proportional representation. It was done not in a partisan way at all but on the basis of consensus, which manifestly has not been done in this case.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I think that that is fair, and it applies to the putting together of the Welsh Assembly, the putting together of the Scottish Parliament and the reduction in the number of Scottish seats in the Westminster Parliament. As I say, I defer in every single respect to the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, in relation to what happened in Northern Ireland.

We believe that the case for a 650-seat Commons has not changed since the current Prime Minister spoke in its favour—indeed, in favour of a slightly larger elected Chamber—at the 2003 Oxfordshire boundary inquiry. Opposing proposals to alter his own constituency borders, he told that inquiry:

“Somebody might take the view that at 659 there are already too many Members of Parliament at Westminster. They may take the view, depending on what happens in the European constitution, that Westminster has less to do, with less MPs—I certainly hope that is not the case. This is all some way off”.

What has changed in the mean time to alter the view that there is no need for a reduction in the size of the House of Commons? The Government have failed to answer that question.

Our amendment stems from a conviction that the current Commons of 650, which is broadly the figure that it has been since 1983, is the appropriate basis on which to stabilise the size of that Chamber. Although the membership of the House has been pretty stable over the past number of years, both rising and falling, concerns have been expressed about the potential for a ratchet effect resulting from the interplay of some of the existing rules for drawing parliamentary boundaries.

Our amendment therefore follows the recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee, in its 1987 report on the rules for drawing constituency boundaries, which proposed that the UK electoral quota should be calculated using the “fixed divisor” method. The Committee recommended that the divisor should be fixed on the basis of a 650-seat House of Commons.

Put simply, under our proposed alternative rules, an initial UK electoral quota would be calculated by dividing the total UK electorate by the fixed number of 650—in other words, not altering the current size of the House of Commons. This mechanism, which should be read alongside our other amendments, would not necessarily fix the House at 650 seats for ever. It would stabilise the House at around that size but with the mathematical rounding up or down involved in the calculation of seats in the four parts of the UK, and once special allowance is made for seats like the Scottish islands, it could be possible to see very minor fluctuations in the size of the Commons—one or two seats either side of 650. We see that as a virtue of the fixed divisor method and an advantage that it holds over the Government’s proposal for a fixed number of seats.

The latter approach—the fixed number of seats adopted by the Government—was criticised by the head of the English Boundary Commission when he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry in 1987. He warned that stipulating an exact fixed number of seats for the Commons would require the boundary commissions to use a “Bed of Procrustes” for drawing constituencies, stretching the borders of those that were too small and lopping parts off others that were too big. He warned the committee away from that method and instead urged the use of a fixed divisor, which would result in a broadly stable Commons while allowing the boundary commissions a bit of practical leeway.

Now, of course, even if we could convince the Government of the practical benefits of our amendment, we would still need to persuade them on the issue of the most appropriate size of the Commons. Before we consider the relative merits and demerits of this amendment against the Government’s proposal for a 600-seat House of Commons, though, it is worth reminding ourselves of what the two parties opposite were saying on this subject before the election.

The Liberal Democrat general election manifesto contained a commitment to creating a 500-seat House of Commons elected on the basis of the single transferable vote. The Conservative Party manifesto contained a commitment to the continuation of the first past the post system for elections to the Commons but pledged to cut the number of MPs, saying that it envisaged a 585-seat House. So why did the coalition agreement settle upon 600 seats as the perfect number, as opposed to 500 or 585? I ask the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who I assume will be answering, to explain the reasoning behind that specific decision.

In particular, why did the two coalition partners agree on a figure that was higher than both their original proposals? Compromises usually involve a meeting in the middle—what happened here? Could the proposal for a 600-seat House have had anything whatever to do with the Conservative Party’s fears that the mathematical reality of a reduction below 600 would require the loss of seats in shire counties? Or did that have no bearing on the decision?

Leaving aside the reasons why the Government are so fixated on a 600-seat House, there is a broader question about what is wrong with the size of the current Commons. The Government claim that it is, to use their words, a bloated Chamber and that the UK suffers from something that they describe as “overrepresentation”. The facts show they are wrong on both counts. The claim that Britain is overrepresented in comparison with similar-sized countries is based on simple international comparisons of numbers of elected national representatives per head of population. In fact, the extent to which the UK has more elected representatives in the national legislature per head of population can be exaggerated. As a briefing note from the House of Commons Library makes clear, the United Kingdom has roughly the same ratio as France and Italy. However, the central point is that these calculations take account only of national legislatures and do not include any reference to levels of representation beneath that tier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lipsey]

My Lords, I should like to bring to light some of the facts that should come to bear on this decision. I do not think that anybody on the government side has yet spelled out a very good reason for thinking that 600 is the magic number and that 650 is the wrong number. That is a subject on which a judgment can be reached only in the light of all the facts about what is going on and what is likely to happen if we do not do anything about it.

One of the underlying assumptions made by the Government in all their speeches on prior clauses of the Bill is that there has been a tendency for the number of Members of Parliament to increase. Let us look at the facts. Yes, it is true that if you choose as your base date 1950 there has been a small increase from 625 Members of the Commons then to 650 today. It is an increase. But why take 1950? You might, for example, take 1983, which is, after all, more than a quarter of a century ago. Since 1983, the number of Members of the House of Commons has not changed; it has remained at 650. Alternatively, and this is a historically-minded House, one might go back to 1918, when the number of Members of the House of Commons was 707. I readily accept that there are explanations both for the increases and decreases, to some of which I shall come shortly, but this is a case not of an upwards trend ad infinitum but of fluctuations based on various things. One of those things which has tended to force the number perhaps to be higher than might be essential is Welsh representation—we shall come to that later in the Bill; I think that the proposal to cut it from 40 to 30 is too draconian, but, equally, 40 may be rather too many and there might be a saving to be made there.

It has to be accepted that, in the previous rules of the Boundary Commission, which have to be put right, there has been a contradiction which has caused some small change in the rise in the number of Members of the House of Commons. As I understand it, rule 1 requires that the House of Commons does not grow in total size, and rule 5 requires indivisible units—for example, counties—to be allocated the number of seats which makes each constituency as near as possible to the desired quota. This, in technical language, requires rounding-off at the harmonic mean, which is always beyond the arithmetic mean. If anyone wants me to go into that in more detail, I can guarantee to take up all day and all night in doing so, but I very much doubt that it would greatly be for the elucidation of the Committee. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord on the Front Bench would suggest that I do not do any such thing since it would cut across our desire to give this Bill the correct scrutiny in the minimum time that is necessary. Without going into those conflicts in the rules, I suggest that it would be possible to amend the rules in a quite a minor way to reduce that inflating factor in so far as it exists.

I have said that the number of MPs has not increased much. What has indisputably and hugely increased is the number of electors each MP has to service. Let us take 1950, which is the basis for comparison that is most favourable to the Government’s case. As my noble and learned friend said, the number of MPs is up 3 per cent and the electorate is up 25 per cent. If my schoolboy arithmetic is correct, electorate per MP is up 22 per cent. Let us again, because this is a historic House, take the longer perspective. In 1918, the average MP represented 30,000 electors. In 1950, the number was 55,000 electors. In 1983, it was 65,000 and, in 2005, it was 68,000. Under this Bill, that will go up to 75,000 electors. That is an increase two-and-a-half times over. It is possible that that is not right, but it seems a pretty big increase, the last bit of which is entirely due to the reduction brought about by this Bill.

That of course is electors per MP. However, the MP’s workload—and there are many former Members of another place who will no doubt give the House the benefit of their own experience—does not just depend on the number of electors, it depends on how many people live in their constituency. There are some very large discrepancies between the number of people and the number of electors. I have not been able to find, given the truncated timetable we are working to, an actual figure of number of people per electorate since 1918, but I can absolutely guarantee, I think, that it will have grown faster than the number of electors per MP, with immigration and the lack of people registering as a result. It is population that is the generator of workload.

Then, workload per person in your electorate has increased. Last time I spoke on a related matter in this House I mentioned that when I started work for Tony Crosland back in 1972 we got 30 letters a week from his Grimsby constituents and they could all be happily dealt with by an excellent part-time secretary in consultation with the local party. The situation today is nothing like that. It is not just numbers—the 300 letters my noble friend cited—but it is the sheer complexity of the cases. The complexity of an immigration case is enormous, which is of course why the cost to the Commons has gone up. It is not that there are more MPs—that has been a trivial factor. In order to perform the services that the people of this country expect them to perform, MPs need far more caseworkers to help them with constituency cases.

There is another factor which is much less remarked on but I think is quite important. The psephological evidence, until reasonably recently, was unambiguous. It did not matter how hard an MP worked or how lazy he was; there was practically no incumbent effect on subsequent general elections. Whether you won or not depended nearly entirely on the popularity of your party and not on how good a job you did. I hate saying it because I know it might offend some people who were MPs many years ago when that was so. However, I am afraid that the psephological evidence is unambiguous. That evidence has now changed. I will not go into the full detail—I would advise noble Lords that they can read the Curtice appendix to the Cowley and Kavanagh book on the 2010 general election. You will find that even MPs who had been at the heart of expenses scandals did better than new candidates who had not been in the House before. It is absolutely unambiguous evidence. I do not think that anybody in this Chamber would doubt for a minute that the great majority, even near to saying all, Members of Parliament, whatever their other faults and virtues, are deeply assiduous in servicing the needs of their constituencies and constituents. It is a plus factor for me that they get a bit of appreciation for that. I have known Members who lost their seats who were deeply upset for years afterwards because they thought their constituents had not shown them the gratitude they felt they had earned. Well now, their constituents are starting to show gratitude and that is a great thing.

Then there is the question of workload other than constituency work. There are 240 places now to be filled on departmental Select Committees—they did not exist really when I started in business—and 227 other places in committees. There is the sheer volume of legislation, I admit often guillotined down the other end, but you have to read the thing if you are going to take any part. The size of Bills has increased exponentially, largely as a result of the demise of the typewriter and the growth of the word processor which means there is no incentive whatever for draftsmen to cut anything out and every incentive to put things in because nothing has to be retyped. There is the huge effort of looking after our demanding press. There is the huge effort of dealing with the new profession of public affairs consultants, all of whom have good reason to come and see you about matters of one kind of another. The average MP today works far, far harder than the average MP did in the past. That is not going to change and it is the reason why most MPs today have to be full-time Members of Parliament. It makes me wonder whether it is a good idea to cut their numbers when they are having to work very much harder.

Then there is the question, which was again raised by the noble Lord, Lord Maples, of the ratio of members of the Government to Back-Benchers. This measure would make that ratio worse at a stroke. At the moment, the number of Ministers and Whips in the lower House is roughly just over a third of the number of Back-Benchers. This legislation would change that to 40 per cent. Among the remaining Back-Benchers there are some who are essentially the equivalent of Ministers, in the sense that they will do whatever the Government ask, however awful, in the hope of getting promotion out of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the number of independent Back-Benchers in another place, on whom we rely so much to hold the Government to account, is going to diminish. We have heard airy words that perhaps Prime Ministers in future will appoint fewer Ministers. I have been hearing them for 25 years too and of course it never happens because by appointing somebody a Minister a Prime Minister can bind them to him. On top of that there is the increased number of victims these days of sexual scandal or alleged blunder of one kind or another appearing in the newspapers. There is a greater turnover of Ministers as a result and, in my opinion, the Prime Minister will continue to appoint just as many. Whether all of them have full jobs to do is another matter, but there are good reasons to do it. He also has to maintain party balance and now, coalition balance, because some of the most fed up people with the emergence of this coalition Government are those people, mostly in the Tory party, who thought before they would get jobs and now find themselves on the Back Benches. Disgruntled does not begin to describe their mood. So there will not be fewer Ministers; it is a pity therefore that there will be fewer Back-Benchers. It also reduces what Professor Anthony King in a notable phrase has called the “gene pool” that is available. The fewer Back-Benchers available to promote the less possibility there is of new and excellent talent emerging to replace talent that is exhausted, talent that has destroyed itself and so on. That is another cost of the diminution.

Finally, we come back to the last argument which is extant of those who say that there is an evident case for reducing the number of MPs—and that is money. They say they will save money by doing it. That is not obvious to me because if the work has still to be done, it has still to be paid for. You may have fewer MPs but you are going to have more constituency workers per MP. You must do in order for them to cope with the sheer volume of correspondence and so on. The only saving I can see is that there will be the saving of 50 MPs’ salaries—that comes to a little over £3 million a year. Of that, £1 million will be lost in income tax so that is about £2 million. You could raise that by a decent tax on one banker’s bonus. This makes me feel that the money argument is really just a populist argument, as indeed is the whole argument for reducing the number of MPs. It is not based on fact, it is not based on analysis, it was pulled out of a hat in an attempt to satisfy a popular anti-MP mood, and it is your Lordships’ duty, and a duty in which we should take pleasure, to say hold on, let us look at the facts, let us see whether this decrease is really justified. If it is not, we are entitled to ask the House of Commons to think again.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is there not a danger that if the workload remains the same and the number of MPs is reduced there will be an increase in the number of Members’ staff, which will in itself almost certainly lead to less of a direct contact between the Member and those he seeks to represent, which cannot be a good thing for democracy.

[Lord Lipsey]

My noble friend is absolutely right about that. It will also mean that the queue of people waiting to become MPs will be even longer since in my experience most of these MPs’ staff are waiting only for the moment when they can jump into the shoes of the man whom they so loyally serve.

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[Lord Wills]

I am extremely grateful to my noble friend. All that I ask the Government to reflect on in approaching this is that these issues are profoundly important. They are difficult and complex and there will, inevitably, be valid points of view on all sides on all these issues. If they will not listen to me, I hope that they will take an example from the admirable speech of the noble Lord, Lord Maples. That was the sort of debate of which we could have had far more thus far from the other Benches. In whatever time is left for us to debate the Bill, I hope that we will see more contributions such as the noble Lord’s from his colleagues on those Benches.

Any responsible legislative process would have set out these and all the other relevant issues and then consulted on them and come to a decision on the optimum size of a constituency and so of the House of Commons. Allowing the British people themselves to have a say in this would have been desirable, but the Government have not done that. Instead, they have determined a figure, for which they have failed so far to produce any good reason, and then shaped everything else around it. This is not just a wasted opportunity but a lazy and irresponsible way in which to approach legislation of such importance. It is also damaging to our democratic process—all the more so, I have to say in passing, because of the way in which the Government seem intent on getting this legislation nodded through this Chamber.

Why have the Government failed to produce any coherent explanation for how they arrived at this figure of 600? It is curious, as other noble Lords have pointed out, that before the election both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats had decided on a figure lower than 600 and had arguments for doing so, which we have heard today from the noble Lord, Lord Maples. So why did they change their minds? There is a coherent case for keeping to the pledges that they made to the electorate before the election. That coherent case was made by the noble Lord, Lord Maples, today. Why did they not stick to it? They will not say.

In an attempt to elucidate this information, I put in a freedom of information request, as I have already told the House. The last time I mentioned this in the House, I mentioned that I had not yet had a response, but such is the power and influence of this House that the next day I got a response, for which I am delighted. The response that I received from the Cabinet Office, dated 11 January, confirmed that the modelling that I was looking for on the impact of a reduction to 600 and to lower figures exists but that some of that information is being withheld under Section 35(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act. I think that the Government have ignored the existence of Section 35(2) of the Freedom of Information Act, which would remove their justification for exempting the information that I requested, so I have put in a request for an internal review of the Cabinet Office’s decision and I look forward with great interest to seeing the results of that review.

Leaving aside the legislative niceties of this, I believe that the public should know how and why the Government went back on the promises that they made to the electorate at the election and decided to increase the size of their reconstituted House of Commons to 600. The public want to know how the Government think this will affect their relationship as voters with their MPs. I think—and I say this in kindness to Ministers—that the public want to be reassured that, in reaching that figure of 600, the Government were not motivated in any way by the pursuit of partisan advantage. They will want to be reassured about that. The Government must realise that, as long as they fail to come up with any coherent argument for why that figure of 600 was arrived at, the suspicion must remain. They cannot avoid this. I know that it is unwelcome.

I see Ministers sitting on the Benches opposite and I know that they are without exception decent and honourable men and women. It is with some trepidation that I keep coming back to this point, but they must realise the cynicism that exists about all politicians at the moment. They must realise that the suspicion that they are motivated by nothing but partisan self-interest exists and they should be doing everything that they possibly can to dispel it, so I hope that when the Minister concludes the debate on this amendment he can provide some reassurance about that.

On Thursday last week, I wrote to the noble and learned Lord’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, asking whether he could release the information that I had requested. When you put in a freedom of information request, it refers only to work that has been done within the Executive by government, not to work that clearly feeds into the process of formulating legislation that is done by special advisers and Conservative and Liberal Democrat party officials. I have therefore also asked the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in the interests of openness and transparency and of reassuring the public about the Government’s motivation in alighting on this figure, whether he can confirm—it may be that the Minister can confirm this in his remarks at the end of this debate—whether any modelling has been done on the differential impacts of different sizes of the House of Commons on the party composition of the House of Commons, either within government or by the Liberal party, the Conservative Party or special advisers. He can confirm or deny it. I very much hope that he will take this opportunity to start clearing up this issue once and for all. It is an important issue and we need to move forward from it. We can do so only if he can provide us with the reassurance for which I am asking.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I join my noble friend in trying to answer the question he raised about why the numbers have changed from the electoral commitments made by the two parties opposite to the grand round figure of 600. Perhaps the answer may be found in part in the adage of US politics that an election platform is something to run on, not to stand on. I join my noble friend in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Maples. If we are to have a debate, here is someone who has, as always, in a radical and rather wonderfully iconoclastic way made his own contribution to the debate. I hope that there will be a contagion and that Members alongside him will adopt what he said and at least join in the debate, not just on this magic number of 600 but on the way in which this Bill has been handled. I had the privilege of serving with the noble Lord, Lord Maples, for eight years, I think, on the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, and I can say with deep sincerity that I valued very much the independent, non-partisan contributions that he made. I think that for at least part of the time he was vice-chairman of his party, but he is very ready to join independently in debate. I disagree with one or two points that he made about the numbers, but at least it was an honest contribution.

When I approached the House this morning, I was reflecting on what I might say, having packed my toothbrush. I picked up, as I normally do, the Daily Telegraph, and came across page 23, which reminded me that today has been called “suicide Monday”. The headline is:

“How to get through Blue Monday”—

that is today—

“Lovebomb your partner, take up salsa or sing to the skies—these are just a few of the expert tips for beating the blues”.

Nothing was said about how to face a long, dark night and still be sufficiently alert to make what one hopes will be a coherent contribution.

I am certainly not wedded to any particular number—600, 650—but the onus, as always, is on those who wish to make a change to make the case not only for reducing the number below 650 but for why this magic number of 600 has been selected. It is not good enough to say, as I think the Leader of the House did, that it is a nice round number. No doubt there will be some advantages, but there will also be many disadvantages, and there is no way in which there has been a testing of the arguments for and against by any independent experts. There is an unseemly haste about the way in which the Government have moved.

I think a number of noble Lords will remember with affection Lord Weatherill, who was a very distinguished Speaker and the Convener of the Cross-Bench Peers. I see another distinguished Speaker close by. Lord Weatherill began in the family business with an apprenticeship as a tailor. He told me that on the first day he was there, he was apprenticed to an old Jewish tailor who was asked to make a suit from the cloth very speedily. The old, tried tailor said to his boss: “Do you want it quick or do you want it good?”. There is a certain lesson for us in legislation. Do we want it quick or do we want it good, particularly when there is no objective reason for speeding along on this? This is not a national emergency or something relating to an external threat or internal terrorism; this is something that the Government have chosen according to their own timetable in a fairly authoritarian way.

I go back long enough in politics to remember, again with affection, Lord Hailsham. I sat behind him on occasion when he was a very robust and amusing Queen’s Counsel. I also watched him in action in the House. At a certain stage, he defined a term—I think it was called elective dictatorship or the dictatorship of the majority. He was, as always, extraordinarily eloquent about elective dictatorship and carried us along quite far. However—surprise, surprise—when he and his party got into government, he forgot all about elective dictatorship. He was there for at least part of the time of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, when she abolished the old GLC because she did not like it, and when she took away many local government powers. Gone was the eloquence about elective dictatorship. He had a remarkable, almost Damascene, conversion. I hope I can spirit back Lord Hailsham, who I admit was a great parliamentarian and for whom I had great affection.

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[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

I have known my noble friend for a long time. We were in a team together for much of the 1980s. I have never known him to be constrained by anything. I am glad to hear that he was at least constrained on that occasion.

I start with this preliminary point about the style of government. If the Government are serious about democracy and listening to the arguments for and against, they will not juggernaut the Bill through at odd hours of the night when, as my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has said, there will be a differential turnout in any vote, depending on who is more tired than anyone else. There will not be the sort of objective discussion that we would hope for. I was thinking of paraphrasing Bob Marley about how a hungry man is an angry man. A tired man is not a good legislator. I recall, on one occasion in the other place, having three all-nighters in succession on the Steel Bill. No one, anywhere in the House, can think that the Steel Bill was at that time a proper piece of legislation. However, sheep-like, we went through the Corridor. It was done mechanically, with no serious debate. I hope that, as in the spirit of this place, we will reject that sort of movement.

Turning to the numbers, the central question, which has not received an answer is: why 600? There is clearly an argument for a certain flexibility, as the noble Lord, Lord Maples, has said. Perhaps I can share some degree of experience on this. I had the privilege of representing two very different constituencies in the other place. One was the constituency of Monmouth, which at that time had not been won by my party previously and had been represented by a great parliamentarian, Lord Thorneycroft, although he was not called that then. It was a typical county seat with quite a sizeable electorate. I was able to manage it reasonably well because it was a highly educated constituency. The sort of problems that were brought to me were, as often as not, those of planning permission. I recall one village meeting when there was a question as to whether a local bus should be discontinued. The grandees in the village said, “No one takes the bus anyway. Why should we bother?”. Only afterwards did a couple of rather poor people detach themselves and think, “We use the bus”. They just did not, alas, have the self-confidence to make that point. That was one constituency, which was quite manageable. If the electorate had been not 75,000 or 78,000 but 100,000, I could still have managed the constituency effectively.

I then had the good fortune to move to the much safer seat—the electorate chose, not me—of Swansea East, which is a seat of multideprivation. In the schools there are many statemented pupils, and special needs are substantial. Often, folk did not have the self-confidence of those in the traditional county seat. I had been a diplomat or a civil servant for some time, so if nothing else I had learnt how to write a letter. Sometimes I felt that in trying to represent my own people—I was born in a working-class street and brought up in the city of Swansea—I had a role like that of the letter-writer in an Indian village. I was able, because of my privileged background, to write letters on behalf of these people. There has to be a personal touch.

One of my sons worked for an American Representative. He hardly met this Representative at all because the office was so large. The US Representative had an automatic signing machine. I very much hope that these have not reached Westminster. They have, have they? Certainly, they had not come when I left the other place in 2005, as far as I can recall. It meant that people in his constituency or district received letters that had had no personal attention at all from the Representative. As a matter of honour, I made sure that I was in my constituency on Saturday mornings, sometimes for six or seven hours. I made it a point of honour to walk, as often as I could, through the market in Swansea to meet people and learn about their problems. That local touch is so important. Clearly, as night follows day, the larger the constituencies are, the less there can be that local touch, which humanises government, makes people feel less alienated, and makes them feel that the Government—indeed, Westminster and the whole establishment—are on their side and doing their best to help them.

Therefore, drawing this odd figure of 78,000 out of the air and stretching it in this way—I think my noble friend mentioned a Procrustean bed—can have malign effects. I am certainly convinced not only of the arguments for democracy generally but of those for fitting an electorate according to the needs of particular people. I fear that this figure of 600—chosen from the air and for which no explanation has been given—will certainly not do that.

Wales will be hardest hit. I will not dwell on this because I know that other amendments will allow me to wax, I hope rather eloquently, on Wales and my own city. Wales, by any rule, is hit by far the hardest by this proposal. It is likely that the number of seats in Wales will be reduced from 40 to 30. Wales is a relatively disadvantaged part of the United Kingdom. I know that my noble friend Lord Touhig, if he is able to make a contribution and who has experience of the western valley of Monmouthshire, will make the same sort of point. We are relatively disadvantaged; therefore, there is a greater need for that human touch.

We all accept that, just as the number of seats in Scotland was reduced when primary legislation passed to the Scottish Parliament, the same must happen in Wales when it follows the Scottish precedent. However, there is no case for moving from 40 to 30 seats now. Wales has always been slightly privileged in this way for good reasons and that should continue. I will not develop the point, but my own city of Swansea has three seats at the moment, each one of roughly 60,000 people. If we were to go to an average mathematical formula of 76,000 or 78,000, there would be rather less than two and a half seats in my city. That means that it would have to scrabble around for areas that have no natural affinity with the city but which would satisfy some mathematical formula of 78,000 people. In my judgment, that again ignores the human aspect, but I hope to develop the question in relation to Welsh constituencies rather later.

In my judgment the Government are going ahead in a rather draconian way. If they want a Passchendaele, they will have a Passchendaele. Lip service is given to accountability but the timetable set for the Bill is not warranted by any objective criteria. Why is it so urgent to get the number of seats reduced from 650 to 600? Is there any objective urgency about that? Is there any reason why there should not be proper debate? Is there any reason why we should not—as the noble Lord, Lord Maples, has done—put across our own arguments and perhaps convince one another of the virtue of those arguments? Although an argument might be made in relation to the referendum on the alternative vote—that is a rather orphan concept because no party in this House wants the alternative vote—by no stretch of the imagination can an argument be made for urgency in respect of the reduction of seats, whether it is from 650 to 600 or, under the timetable set by the noble Lord, Lord Maples, from 650 to 600, 600 to 500, or 500 to 400. At least let us debate that. That could well be compensated for in democratic terms by building up the intermediary bodies, be they the Welsh Assembly or the Scottish Parliament. Clearly, the English electorates have rejected regional assemblies, but that is another argument. Why not give more powers to local government and try to have more parish councils or urban parish councils? I had the privilege of serving on the first ever urban parish council and in my judgment that was almost as close as one could get to Rousseau’s forest clearing of democracy, whereby the people who know one another get together and make decisions related to their locality. Why not have this Bill accompanied by a massive devolution to local authorities—les corps intermédiaires, as the French would say? But no, there is none of that.

As regards the numerical range 650 to 600, there is a deep suspicion that 600 has been chosen for wholly partisan reasons. I interjected in the speech of my noble and learned friend to say that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. This is not the way in which we in this country carry out constitutional change. The pendulum will swing. Over the years I have frequently lectured on behalf of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. I have run groups for new Members of Parliament in a number of African countries such as Somaliland. Apart from urging the case for more female representation in those Parliaments, as I am sure noble Baronesses would accept, one of my themes has always been that the majority should not force through constitutional amendments and should not fix amendments which happen to suit their own interest. When I next have the privilege of lecturing to Commonwealth parliamentarians—it is fair to say that they still, for the most part, refer to our own legislative body as the mother of Parliaments—I will be rather reluctant to talk about the principle that the majority should not fix constitutions in their own interest. There should be proper debate and an independent, outside body to monitor this legislation. It should be done not in unseemly haste but properly. If that is not the case, almost certainly one of those Commonwealth parliamentarians will use this as an example of what should not be done.

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[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I have listened to the debate on the amendment, and it is the amendment to which I wish to speak, not the Bill in its entirety, although I have expressed concern about some parts of the Bill. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Maples. We shared membership of the House of Commons around the same time. He mentioned finance, the cost of the running of the House of Commons. It might be worth mentioning that when he came into the House in 1983, Denis Healey, now the noble Lord, Lord Healey, was the deputy leader of the Labour Party. The funds available to him were such that he had to share one researcher with another member of the shadow Cabinet. Everyone agreed that that was unjust, and the Short money has now been increased to a fantastic amount.

That Short money goes on to the costs of the House of Commons. When I left, the Conservative Party in opposition benefited greatly from Short money—I think that the noble Lord would acknowledge that. That was so much so that when the coalition was created, there was deep concern among members of the Liberal party that they would not get a share of the Short money, because that would have a profound effect on how they got researchers for their Front-Benchers. I do not know how they got on with that argument. When noble Members talk about the cost of the House of Commons increasing, they cannot have it every way. You do not get democracy for nothing. Everybody praises the great Portcullis House.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Perhaps I may give an illustration of the poverty of the Opposition at that time. When my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I were in Denis Healey's team, I once travelled with my noble friend Lord Healey, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Defence. We wanted to go to South Africa, which was highly in the news. My noble friend had to travel in economy class with Air Zambia. Those were the straits we were in at the time.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I agree with the noble Lord: it was ridiculous, and it has improved, especially for the Leader of the Opposition.

When we talk about finance, it should be remembered that in the other place, every honourable Member has the equivalent of two and a half members of staff. That does not come cheaply. Then there are premises. If we were to supply Members’ staff with premises here in Westminster, the most expensive square mile in the world, it would be far more costly than allowing them to go to their constituencies to get premises. They cannot get any old premises; there must be security because we have already had members of staff attacked. There has even been a fatality, as one noble Lord on the Liberal Benches will be able to testify. When we talk about the cost of computers and broadband, it should be remembered that it is not free.

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[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

I was going to coin a phrase and talk about a “preferential option for the poor”. Are not the most vulnerable less likely to have access to the internet than the more prosperous? If the right reverend Prelate wants in our democracy to relate to the less privileged, does he not agree that the old ways are probably the best?

[The Lord Bishop of Chester]

In the year of the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible, I am sure that the old ways often are the best. My only point is that the arrival of the internet has changed much and that that should be the subject of reflection. However, the thought that an agreement would be reached by some scientific, objective process is fanciful. As the noble Lord, Lord Baker, wisely said, there is a judgment to be made. My judgment is that, into the fourth hour of this debate, the law of diminishing returns suggests that the Minister should now speak.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Monday 20th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lipsey]

My Lords, I apologise for my eagerness to get on with the House’s consideration of the Bill. I know we have a lot of work to do and that the House is eager to do it. With this amendment, to which my noble friend Lord Bach and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer have appended their names and added a complementary amendment, we come to the political heart of the Bill. This is the buckle that ties together the two bits of the Bill—the AV referendum on the one hand and the reduction of MPs and redrawing of constituency boundaries on the other. The first bit is the fervent wish of the Lib Dem partners in the coalition; the second is the fervent wish of the Conservative partners in the coalition.

Before I explain why I believe that to be misguided, I will get my retaliation in first to an intervention that I would otherwise expect. My objection is not to both measures being in one Bill. I know that there is a case to be made that the Government I supported included many more than two measures in their Constitutional Reform and Governance Act before the general election. It is interesting to speculate about what the full purpose of that Bill was since it clearly could not pass before the general election. Partly, no doubt, we felt that the wise British people would be very appreciative of all the proposals that we were putting forward, but we were particularly interested in the reaction of the Liberal Democrats. We realised that we might have to form some kind of agreement with them after a general election and we wanted to show that we shared their views. After a few months of observing the Lib Dems in government, I think we were totally wrong about what their views were. We thought they were constitutional and economic liberals; it turns out that they are constitutional conservatives and economic reactionaries.

I will pass swiftly on. What I object to is not that the two measures appear in one Bill but that they are conditional. They enter the concept of conditionality into our legislation. You can only do the one if you do the other, too. This seems wholly wrong. Either these two proposals—the AV referendum and the constituency redrawing—are justified on their individual merits or they are not. There can be no case whatever for saying, “We’ll only do one if we do the other”, in logic or constitutional parlance, although we understand the political realities of this. It says a lot about the nature of the coalition and, in particular, the atmosphere in which it was formed. This stuff is here because the two coalition partners, when they were negotiating their agreement, did not trust each other. They could see that there was a grubby deal to be made.

The Lib Dems could make some headway on electoral reform. They did not want AV and there was a system they liked more but they understood the realities. The Tories were trying to change the number of constituencies and their boundaries so that they won more seats at the next general election. The deal that was made between them was that they would do both. Because one proposition was likely to lead to fewer Conservative seats and one to more Conservative seats, they decided to bung them together—all that I understand. What is sad, and does not increase one’s confidence in the long-term viability of the coalition, is that the parties so distrusted each other that they wanted it incorporated into legislation in the subsection before the House at the moment.

This is a more political speech than I would like to make in Committee but this is a political clause. We have to understand it. Some bits of the Bill are technical. We will come to those and deal with them in a technical way but this is a political clause. My next observation about this provision is that it says a lot about the balance of power within the coalition. The Lib Dems did not say, “Our condition for giving you the boundary changes that suit you is that we get the electoral system that suits us”. They feebly said, “Our condition for your getting the boundary changes you want is that we get not AV but a go at AV through a referendum”. However, if the referendum is lost, which, as a strong supporter of AV, I hope it will not be, the Conservatives can still have their boundary changes and reduce the number of MPs.

We will come to the substance of the case about the number of MPs later in our debates. Suffice it to say that no case of merit has yet been put forward for reducing the size of the House of Commons. It may be that there is such a case to be made—I look forward to Ministers developing it—but we have not heard a word about it yet. So far we have just heard the Government admit that they got a figure straight out of the air and incorporated it into a Bill. We have seen no case made—not for greater constituency equalisation, which I would grant—for the figure of 5 per cent included in the Bill, which, as we shall see when we get to it, is not a sensible figure for the variance in the size of constituencies. Nor has the case been made that the exemptions in the Bill get anywhere near meeting the very strong case that can be made for further exemptions.

The suspicion must be that the measures in Part 2 of the Bill are entirely designed for the sole purpose of increasing the number of Conservative seats at the next general election. If the Government can produce a statistical analysis from a reputable team of psephologists that says that it will not have that effect, the House will be delighted to see and discuss it. However, I say with no little confidence that they will not be able to do that because the effects are as I have described them.

I do not want to detain the House for too long on this but my third point is about how much the Government must regret the need to link these two measures. How sorry they must be. In any sensible world, if it is true that the coalition wants the referendum to take place on 5 May 2011, it would have introduced two separate pieces of legislation. There would have been one on the alternative vote, which might well have concluded its stage in your Lordships’ House if not tonight then in the first session in the new year, after the good examination that we have given it. The Government could then go ahead with the AV referendum. They could then take a more measured approach to the constituencies bit of the Bill. They could even have allowed it to be subject to some measure of joint scrutiny, without prejudicing their timetable to get it into effect by the next election. They could have allowed, as we propose later in the Bill, that there should be some conference—a royal commission or Speaker’s Conference—on the number of MPs to take a rational view as to what should happen. That consideration could have moved in parallel to your Lordships’ House considering the AV bit of the Bill.

Where are we? Your Lordships have an awful lot of the Bill to consider as yet. We are to do so against the looming timetable; the Electoral Commission has made clear when it requires the Bill to be passed to allow the campaign for 5 May to occur on an orderly path. We are struggling to meet this wholly artificial timetable, imposed by the Government solely because of the political deal that they have done and the fact that neither party trusts the other to abide by its words.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is it not even worse, from the Liberal Democrat point of view, that they are clearly not very good negotiators? The deal that has emerged is wholly lopsided, as the chances are that their part of the deal—they wanted AV—will not happen and therefore they will have nothing to show for it at the end of the day.

[Lord Lipsey]

My noble friend would say that, but I cannot possibly comment because I believe of course that AV will win a referendum whenever it is held.

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[Lord Soley]

I do not want to follow the line pursued by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, because it sounds to me like he was embarking on a filibuster in debating party political issues. I simply say to him that if he is worried about traditions—and he ought to be worried about them—one of the traditions he should remember is that it is particularly important that you do not drive through major constitutional changes without a large measure of agreement between the parties. One of those changes relates to the size of the House of Commons. As the noble Lord will know, if you act as an international observer at elections overseas, one thing that you note is who decides the size of the Parliament and how they decide it. If the Government decide it without the consent of opposition parties, you usually mark the election down. However, that is another matter that we shall pursue at a later stage. The Minister will recognise the filibuster by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who has long experience of doing that. From my experience in the House of Commons, he was one of the people who got a reputation for filibustering there.

I have a particular question for the Minister raised by this amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Lipsey. It came to my mind when my noble friend Lord Bach was speaking. My noble friend mentioned the important issue of the commission having to report first. The Minister will know that there is an agreement whereby Orkney and Shetland and, I believe, the Western Isles have already been accorded special status. He will also know that there is very strong pressure from the Member for the Isle of Wight—a Conservative Member—and all the major political parties representing the councils on the Isle of Wight to be treated in the same way as the Western Isles and Orkney and Shetland. He will also be aware that there is a major campaign in Cornwall for Cornwall to be treated in a way that recognises its historic—and, I should add, traditional, to keep the noble Lord, Lord Deben, happy—boundaries. My question to the Minister is this: if there is a legal challenge based on the fact that Cornwall and the Isle of Wight have not been accorded the same conditions as the Western Isles and Orkney and Shetland, could these changes go ahead? I know that people are talking of a legal challenge, so it is an important issue. I do not know whether such a challenge would be possible. It occurred to me when my noble friend Lord Bach was speaking so I have not been able to take advice on it. However, given the reasons that we have already heard as to why the two Scottish areas have been given special circumstances, it would seem at least possible for the Isle of Wight, certainly, and possibly Cornwall, where it would be a bit more difficult, to mount a legal challenge. I should like the Minister to address that in his reply.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Indeed, if there were to be such a challenge, perhaps I may make the case on behalf of Ynys Môn, otherwise known as the Isle of Anglesey, where there is a similar situation and which is clearly a compact, single constituency. If the Isle of Wight were to issue a challenge, I do not know whether the representatives of Ynys Môn would do the same. Clearly, if there were such a challenge, it would be likely to be at least prima facie justiciable. It would therefore very likely take some time and the Government’s timetable would be knocked sideways.

My main point during this brief intervention is that I am perhaps the last person to lecture the opposition Front Bench and the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on the principles of Conservatism. However, I should have thought that one of those principles would be a respect for the constitution—a broadening down from precedent to precedent. The great Conservative thinkers, be they Burke, Hailsham or Oakeshott at the LSE, have all adhered to an enormous respect for the accumulated wisdom of the ages and have therefore had a certain unwillingness to go full steam ahead in changing structures for their own sake. The point has been well made by my noble friends Lord Foulkes and Lord Howarth that this seems to be an enormous bundle of changes, many of them ill thought-through and ill digested.

Finally, another Conservative principle which, again, perhaps is not honoured on this occasion is respect for the wisdom of Parliament. One conclusion that I have reached in listening to this debate is that there seems to be no willingness on the part of the government Front Bench to listen and to modify their position in the light of arguments that have been adduced. I do not think that I have ever come across a case where the juggernaut of the coalition has moved at such a pace, is so deaf to the quality of the arguments that have been raised and is unwilling to make any concession at all. I say with all humility that I cannot see the coalition Government gaining from this if they act in a traditionally non-Conservative spirit which wholly ignores the quality of the contributions not only from this side but in excellent speeches from the Cross Benches. They may well live to regret the attitude that they have taken to this Bill, and I hope it is not a precedent for other Bills that come before this Parliament.

[Lord McAvoy]

My Lords, I shall be even more brief than my noble friend who has just spoken. I shall not be bullied or harassed by the tetchiness shown by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I specifically put on the record a refutation of the view put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I remember very clearly the noble Lord when he and I were Members in another place. My summary of the situation was that, when the Conservative Opposition wished to delay or prolong debate, he seemed to be wheeled on to speak at great length. To give him credit for consistency, he has always managed to speak with self-assurance and self-confidence and with an air of always being right. That is very impressive.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I do not recognise the allegation that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, has made, I am not really in a position to answer. The noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has identified that these two are linked together. He went on to argue that it was not the Liberal Democrats who got the better of the deal. He made the point that if there is a no vote in the referendum, the boundary proposals still go through. If there was a no vote—as I hope not, and our parties in the collation are agreed about what the outcome of the referendum should be—as a Liberal Democrat, I do not think I could ignore the view of the people. It would be wrong. If the people vote no, I expect that my colleagues will accept it.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a point about fairness and the equality of constituencies. He said that that is a Conservative principle, and I am sure he would claim that it is not unique to the Conservative Party because the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, endorsed it, and I have no difficulty in accepting that as a principle. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord McNally has said on a number of occasions, this Bill is about fair votes and fair boundaries. It shows that the two are, in fact, linked. It shows how the two will be linked because it will shape the way in which the other place will be elected in 2015.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Will the noble and learned Lord also address the question of indecent haste and the fact that there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny? Is he aware, for example, that in Wales, the Welsh Assembly seats are based on 40 existing Welsh parliamentary seats and 20 proportional representation seats? Had they bothered to consult the Welsh Assembly, they would have been told of the substantial implications for the electoral system in Wales arising from the way in which the Welsh constituencies will be reduced from 40 to 30.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is similar to the changes that occurred in Scotland after the noble Lord’s Government, which he supported, reduced the number of Scottish Members in the House of Commons from 72 to 59 when Scotland had 73 first past the post seats and 28 seats. I am not sure whether he objected when that legislation was brought before this House back in 2005 or 2006, but I hear his point. When we come to that part of the Bill, I have no doubt whatever that there will be discussions on the subject of Wales and the Isle of Wight.

The noble Lord, Lord Soley, asked whether a boundary review could be judicially reviewed. I remind the House that the question of hybridity was raised at the first stage of the proceedings on this Bill in this House and was rejected. Indeed, the position is that the Boundary Commissions can be judicially reviewed. It is our hope that they will not be and that there will be no grounds for doing so. Whether any challenge would delay a review would depend on the nature of the challenge, the time it took to be heard and whether any action had to be taken as a result. Clearly, we will have ample opportunity to debate issues that the noble Lord, Lord Soley, raised about the Isle of Wight, Ynys Môn and Cornwall—I have no doubt whatever, because I received the representations, too—when we debate the second Part of this Bill.