Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McNally I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on the Bill. In moving this Motion, it may be helpful to set out the Government's intention in relation to progress on the Bill; there has been a little recent comment in the press.

The Government announced as long ago as July last year that there would be a referendum on 5 May to decide the system to elect Members of the House of Commons at the next general election. The Government also made clear our desire to reduce the number of seats in the House of Commons at the same election. The Bill subsequently passed all its stages on the Floor of the House

In this House, we are now on day nine of Committee on the Bill. Although it is right that this House undertakes proper and detailed scrutiny of the Bill, it is also right that the House deals with legislation in reasonable time. The Bill was introduced to your Lordships' House on 3 November, and began Committee on 30 November. The Opposition's approach has been consistently and deliberately slow. This time last week, the House debated the Bill for six hours, dealing with just two amendments. That is not good scrutiny; there is no precedent for moving so slowly. I have had many representations from noble Lords on all sides of the House in recent weeks who are concerned about the slow progress on the Bill. The Opposition have dragged their heels; they have had their fun; it is now time for this House to behave responsibly.

For this House to stand in the way of a referendum on 5 May would be extremely serious. The Electoral Commission is clear that in order for the necessary provisions to be made to hold a referendum on 5 May, Royal Assent for this Bill should be granted by 16 February. In order to give proper time for Report and Third Reading, I believe that the House now expects us to make substantial progress towards completing Committee today. I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, perhaps I may respond briefly to what the noble Lord the Leader of the House said. The Bill has two parts: Part 1 provides for the introduction of an alternative system for electing the House of Commons, subject to a yes vote in a national referendum; Part 2 provides for the reduction in the number of House of Commons constituencies from 650 to 600 and the adoption of new rules for determining constituency boundaries that are designed to introduce equality in the number of electors in each constituency.

As Members will know, the Bill has been described by Mr Nicholas Clegg as the most important constitutional reform since the Great Reform Act 1832. There is no dispute that the Bill is of far-reaching constitutional significance. The Bill passed through all its stages in the Commons, where it was the subject of a guillotine Motion, between September and 1 November 2010. As the noble Lord the Leader said, in your Lordships' House the Bill had a Second Reading over two days at the beginning of November and has so far spent eight days in Committee before today. Six days in Committee have been spent considering Part 1. It will, as is normal, spend longer in this House than in the other place.

The Electoral Commission announced that the Bill has to have Royal Assent by 16 February 2011 to allow the referendum to take place on 5 May 2011. Last Thursday, without consultation, the Government fixed a third day on Tuesday this week for consideration of the Bill in Committee, making three consecutive days for its consideration this week. They have also made arrangements with the House authorities consistent with there being an all-night sitting tonight. I read in the Sunday Telegraph yesterday that the Cholmondeley Room and the Attlee Room are being prepared to be dormitories for male and female Peers. Your Lordships will be concerned to know that the Sunday Telegraph did not indicate which was for male and which was for female Peers.

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[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

I want to make a brief point. There are precedents for splitting Bills which have got into difficulties. I refer to the 1977 Scotland and Wales Bill which, after a lot of discussion, was in fact split in the House of Commons. That enabled the Scotland Bill to go forward in that Parliament, and the Wales Bill went forward a little later. It was unfortunate for Scotland, perhaps, that the people did not want devolution at the time. A way was found to split the Bill and there is no reason why a way should not be found to split this one.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

On the question of splitting the Bill, the advice I have received is that it is not open to this House to send back to the Commons a Bill that has been divided into two unless the Government give their consent to that. That position was made clear by my noble friend Lady McDonagh and that is why there was no vote on it. The Government did not give their consent. However, if the Government consent to it, it is possible for that course to be taken.

[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun of Abernethy, asked an extremely good question a few minutes ago. She said, “Why the urgency?”. Of course, the answer is that last July, when the Government announced their intention to bring this legislation forward and published the Bill, there was no urgency. There was no urgency when it was debated in another place. There was no urgency when it came here. The situation has become urgent because the Labour Party has decided to go on a marathon go-slow on the Bill ever since we started Committee.

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Moved by

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

58A: Clause 11, page 9, leave out lines 17 and 18 and insert—
“United Kingdom electoral quota
The United Kingdom electoral quota shall be defined as the total electorate of the United Kingdom on the designated enumeration day divided by 650.”

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My distress at the lack of interest in the substance of the Bill is a matter of some import.

Amendment 58A would replace the current proposal in Clause 11 to fix the House of Commons at 600 seats, with an alternative rule which would anchor the size of the other place at its current membership of 650.

As your Lordships’ House’s Constitution Committee made clear in its report on the Bill:

“We conclude that the Government have not calculated the proposed reduction in the size of the House of Commons on the basis of any considered assessment of the role and functions of MPs”.

That reality was exposed in the debate last Monday, when the Government again failed to provide any adequate explanation as to why 600 seats is the optimum size for the other place or, in particular, why a 600-seat Commons would serve the public more effectively than the current 650-seat Chamber.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, conceded from the Front Bench that:

“We have never suggested that there was anything magic or ideal about a House of Commons of 600 any more than the current size of 650 is ideal”.—[Official Report, 10/01/11; col. 1222.]

Is that, I ask, rhetorically, the best that the Government can do in a situation where they are using their political majority in the other place in order to push through a reduction in the number of Members of Parliament? It is obviously a dangerous precedent that is being adopted, because it involves using your political power to fix the size of the legislative chamber in circumstances where people will allege, as we do on this side, that it is being done for political advantage.

It is worth saying that that approach to the question of the size of the legislative chamber has not been adopted in this country since the Second World War, when a Speaker’s Conference agreed the arrangement that then became law in 1949 and, though there have been changes to the detail, it has never been disputed that the people who should decide the number of constituencies in the country should be the boundary commissions, which are believed—correctly, in my view—to be beyond party politics. We do not want to get into a position where, when you win an election, you then use your majority to fix the size of the House of Commons to suit your political advantage.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is there not, as a result of this affront to our constitution in the way that this is being done, the danger that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander? There must be a considerable temptation for any incoming Government to do the same. I would hope that we would resist that temptation, but the pendulum will swing and the party or parties opposite will not be for ever in Government. The danger is that one hallowed principle of our constitution will be wilfully thrown away.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I agree with all of that. I very much hope that we would not succumb to that temptation, but once the door is open, it becomes harder and harder to resist.

[Lord Trimble]

The noble Lord refers to this as a “hallowed principle of our constitution”, but it was not applied to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly. My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace said, with regard to the Scottish Parliament, that there were some really arcane discussions, which he said he might reveal to us some time, that resulted in the rather unusual figure there. I know myself, and I will not weary the House, about the political considerations that drove the size of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I confess ignorance with regard to the Welsh Assembly. But that “hallowed principle” has not been applied by Governments drawn from both sides of this House over the past few years.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I do not want to go into Northern Irish politics because I feel that if I did, I would make a number of mistakes. I can talk about Scottish politics, and I can say this: the effect of the reduction in the number of Members of Parliament in Scotland was, in political terms, wholly to the detriment of the Labour Party. However, it was introduced by a Government with a substantial Labour majority. Yes, it was done by a Government, but it was plain that it was being done in a way that was to the detriment of the interest of that Government. So, in my view, it does not raise the issues that the noble Lord is raising.

[Lord Trimble]

I am afraid that the noble and learned Lord has misunderstood the point that I was making, which was with regard not to the number of Westminster Members from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but to the size of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, which is a different matter.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I accept that as well but I can see no process by which, when you are setting up a Parliament, you can do so except by the passage of a Bill in Parliament.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

May a voice from Wales seek to assist my noble friend in respect of what happened regarding the Welsh Assembly? There was a consensus; it was agreed that there should be 60 seats, 40 of which would be exactly the same as the Westminster constituencies, while the other 20 would be based on regional representation and on a form of proportional representation. It was done not in a partisan way at all but on the basis of consensus, which manifestly has not been done in this case.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I think that that is fair, and it applies to the putting together of the Welsh Assembly, the putting together of the Scottish Parliament and the reduction in the number of Scottish seats in the Westminster Parliament. As I say, I defer in every single respect to the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, in relation to what happened in Northern Ireland.

We believe that the case for a 650-seat Commons has not changed since the current Prime Minister spoke in its favour—indeed, in favour of a slightly larger elected Chamber—at the 2003 Oxfordshire boundary inquiry. Opposing proposals to alter his own constituency borders, he told that inquiry:

“Somebody might take the view that at 659 there are already too many Members of Parliament at Westminster. They may take the view, depending on what happens in the European constitution, that Westminster has less to do, with less MPs—I certainly hope that is not the case. This is all some way off”.

What has changed in the mean time to alter the view that there is no need for a reduction in the size of the House of Commons? The Government have failed to answer that question.

Our amendment stems from a conviction that the current Commons of 650, which is broadly the figure that it has been since 1983, is the appropriate basis on which to stabilise the size of that Chamber. Although the membership of the House has been pretty stable over the past number of years, both rising and falling, concerns have been expressed about the potential for a ratchet effect resulting from the interplay of some of the existing rules for drawing parliamentary boundaries.

Our amendment therefore follows the recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee, in its 1987 report on the rules for drawing constituency boundaries, which proposed that the UK electoral quota should be calculated using the “fixed divisor” method. The Committee recommended that the divisor should be fixed on the basis of a 650-seat House of Commons.

Put simply, under our proposed alternative rules, an initial UK electoral quota would be calculated by dividing the total UK electorate by the fixed number of 650—in other words, not altering the current size of the House of Commons. This mechanism, which should be read alongside our other amendments, would not necessarily fix the House at 650 seats for ever. It would stabilise the House at around that size but with the mathematical rounding up or down involved in the calculation of seats in the four parts of the UK, and once special allowance is made for seats like the Scottish islands, it could be possible to see very minor fluctuations in the size of the Commons—one or two seats either side of 650. We see that as a virtue of the fixed divisor method and an advantage that it holds over the Government’s proposal for a fixed number of seats.

The latter approach—the fixed number of seats adopted by the Government—was criticised by the head of the English Boundary Commission when he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry in 1987. He warned that stipulating an exact fixed number of seats for the Commons would require the boundary commissions to use a “Bed of Procrustes” for drawing constituencies, stretching the borders of those that were too small and lopping parts off others that were too big. He warned the committee away from that method and instead urged the use of a fixed divisor, which would result in a broadly stable Commons while allowing the boundary commissions a bit of practical leeway.

Now, of course, even if we could convince the Government of the practical benefits of our amendment, we would still need to persuade them on the issue of the most appropriate size of the Commons. Before we consider the relative merits and demerits of this amendment against the Government’s proposal for a 600-seat House of Commons, though, it is worth reminding ourselves of what the two parties opposite were saying on this subject before the election.

The Liberal Democrat general election manifesto contained a commitment to creating a 500-seat House of Commons elected on the basis of the single transferable vote. The Conservative Party manifesto contained a commitment to the continuation of the first past the post system for elections to the Commons but pledged to cut the number of MPs, saying that it envisaged a 585-seat House. So why did the coalition agreement settle upon 600 seats as the perfect number, as opposed to 500 or 585? I ask the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who I assume will be answering, to explain the reasoning behind that specific decision.

In particular, why did the two coalition partners agree on a figure that was higher than both their original proposals? Compromises usually involve a meeting in the middle—what happened here? Could the proposal for a 600-seat House have had anything whatever to do with the Conservative Party’s fears that the mathematical reality of a reduction below 600 would require the loss of seats in shire counties? Or did that have no bearing on the decision?

Leaving aside the reasons why the Government are so fixated on a 600-seat House, there is a broader question about what is wrong with the size of the current Commons. The Government claim that it is, to use their words, a bloated Chamber and that the UK suffers from something that they describe as “overrepresentation”. The facts show they are wrong on both counts. The claim that Britain is overrepresented in comparison with similar-sized countries is based on simple international comparisons of numbers of elected national representatives per head of population. In fact, the extent to which the UK has more elected representatives in the national legislature per head of population can be exaggerated. As a briefing note from the House of Commons Library makes clear, the United Kingdom has roughly the same ratio as France and Italy. However, the central point is that these calculations take account only of national legislatures and do not include any reference to levels of representation beneath that tier.

[Lord Rooker]

It is interesting that my noble and learned friend mentions France. In France, one in 100 adults is an elected official of some kind, whereas in this country the figure is about one in 1,600, if we take into account parish councils and urban districts. France is remarkably democratic and has less pressure at a national level because there is so much devolved democracy—16 times more so than here.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is an interesting point and, significantly, my noble friend Lord Rooker has prefaced the point that I was just about to make. As I said, the central issue is that the calculations of the numbers of national representatives per head of population take account only of national legislatures and do not include references to levels of representation beneath that tier. If we look below the national level, the United Kingdom has far fewer elected officeholders per head of population than almost all comparable countries. An academic study by Democratic Audit found that, at local government level, the population per elected member is around 2,600 in the United Kingdom, 250 in Germany and 116 in France. Therefore, when sub-national elected representatives are factored in, as my noble friend Lord Rooker has pointed out, it is apparent that the UK does not suffer from overrepresentation; if anything, it suffers from the opposite.

In any event, there is a fundamental problem in seeking to draw simple comparisons between the numbers of elected representatives in different national legislatures. Some countries are unitary states, whereas others are federal states; some have a Westminster model, like that of the United Kingdom, whereas others have a presidential system, like that of the United States of America. As a consequence, their administrative and electoral systems are organised in different ways. Therefore, comparing rates of representation in one national legislature with those in another is a largely pointless exercise akin to comparing apples and pears.

A more sensible basis on which to decide what level of representation is right for the UK is to examine how the size of the House of Commons has changed over time. If the number of Members of Parliament were growing inexorably and out of all proportion to the size of the electorate, there would clearly be a problem. However, the evidence shows that that is not the case. The Commons has not grown disproportionately in size over recent years. The size of the Commons has increased by around 3 or 4 per cent, or by 25 Members, since 1950, but the electorate—and, therefore, the average size of constituencies—has increased by 25 per cent over that period.

There has also been a significant increase in the case load of Members of Parliament, which has grown out of proportion to the size of the population as a consequence of changing social norms, political developments and new forms of communication. According to the Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, in the 1950s and 1960s Members received on average 12 to 15 letters per week. Today, the average is 300 per week—I am still quoting figures from the Modernisation Committee—and then there are e-mails, faxes and telephone calls to take into account. There is no evidence that having fewer MPs will reduce the demand for their services. Assuming that that remains the same, the pressure on the remaining Members and their staff will increase.

If the service that Members of Parliament provide to their constituents is not to deteriorate, and if MPs are to be able to take part in Select Committees and Public Bill Committees, which have become considerably more active in recent decades, Members of Parliament will need greater resources to employ people as caseworkers and secretaries. The savings made through a reduction of 50 Members of Parliament would inevitably be lost, which would undermine the argument that this is a worthy, cost-cutting measure.

The provision on the size of the House of Commons is one of the most important in the Bill. We are being asked to cut 50 seats from the primary political body in the United Kingdom and to fix its size in statute, in perpetuity, at 600, but we are not really being given any proper explanation as to why that is the most appropriate size for the House of Commons. Does anyone in this Chamber honestly think that this is the right way to enact such a fundamental constitutional change? What, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, is the justification for reducing the size of the House of Commons and increasing the size of this place?

In conclusion, one of the central arguments that can be made in support of an unelected House of Lords is that its Members are able to exercise a greater independence of thought than representatives who are elected—they are that bit freer of the party constraints that have a more restrictive impact on the actions of colleagues in the other place. That is one reason why, down the years, your Lordships have been able to act as the guardians of the constitution and face down Executive moves that are rooted in party interests and not the national interests.

The new era of coalition government is a challenge to your Lordships’ House—a challenge as to whether it is willing and able to act as an independent-minded revising Chamber. The alternative is to become a rubber stamp for the Executive. This Bill, and this issue perhaps more than many others, will serve as an important litmus test on how your Lordships’ House intends to respond to that challenge.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Simon)]

I must advise your Lordships that, if Amendment 58A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 59 to 63ZA inclusive and Amendment 66B due to pre-emption.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I will just deal with the central points. First, the suggestion has been made by some noble Lords that we should not be debating this at all because we are the Second Chamber. I utterly reject that contention. Our position has always been that we take a—I see that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, is shaking his head at that suggestion. He is the one who suggested that it should be left to the elected Chamber. I disagree with that. He said that we did not care about it at Third Reading in the Commons. I shall just quote Mr Sadiq Khan, who said that,

“this Bill is a bad means of delivering both objectives. It is too inflexible and too hasty, and it will lead to great and ongoing political instability. This House has failed to improve the Bill because it has not been allowed to do so. To our shame, that task now falls to unelected peers in the other place, whom we must now rely on to inject some democratic principles into what, to date, has been an inglorious episode in recent parliamentary history”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/11/10; col. 870.]

I agree with all that my right honourable friend said.

The second contention is that if one looks at history, this House has a proud history of dealing with politically driven attempts to change the complexion of the House. Some Members will remember the attempt by a Labour Government in 1969 to introduce an Act of Parliament designed to jigger with the boundaries. It was this House that blocked that proposal, so the idea that we should not be giving this proper scrutiny is completely wrong.

The third contention is that the numbers in the House of Commons should be reduced. It is an important issue to debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who we have all come to respect in this House for the way that he has dealt with this Bill, put his case this strongly. He said that introducing a reduction in the number of Members of Parliament would “not impair” the working of democracy. That is not remotely a basis on which it could be said that the number of Members of Parliament should be reduced.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, that it is almost impossible, I would have thought, scientifically to work out what the approach of individual Members of Parliament will be to their constituents. It will change. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, that it will be for each individual Member of Parliament to determine how it is done. I completely agree with Mr Tony Wright who, before the previous Parliament came to an end, presided over the Public Administration Committee. He said that there should be an examination of what the right role and function of Members of Parliament should be.

The debate this afternoon reveals that there are differing views about it, not just in relation to what you do in relation to your constituents, but about what is the right number to have as an effective national legislature that also selects the Executive. Surely before one embarks upon something that one seeks to justify by saying that reducing the number would not impair the working of democracy, it would be sensible for there to be some independent examination of this issue—for example, the Speaker’s Conference in 1944—but there has been nothing at all. In those circumstances, when Members on this side and on the other side of the House ask for the reasons why we are reducing, the answer given by the Government is that it will not do damage.

There have been two particularly signal speeches; one by the noble Lord, Lord Maples, and one by the noble Lord, Lord Baker. They sought to grapple with the issues. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Baker, was funny and witty and was made slightly unfortunate by the fact that he wanted to tell us all off after five minutes, but we will forgive him for that. He has a consistent history of supporting reducing the number quite significantly, and I gathered from his speech that his view is that the Commons would be a better place for dealing with policy issues if it was smaller. I also rather understand that the noble Lord, Lord Maples, was putting the same argument. They were both putting the argument quite effectively that as far as the size as their constituencies was concerned, geographically in relation to the Mole Valley in Surrey and in relation to numbers as far as the noble Lord, Lord Maples, was concerned, they could cope. That was their argument. They may be right. I do not know whether they are right, but they are two, if I may say so with respect to both of them, admirable mavericks who have had that view over a long period of time. It is not a view around which moss has gathered.

That is why, instead of it suddenly bouncing out of a clear blue sky that we should reduce from 650 to what is in effect an arbitrary number, the right course is that there is a proper examination so that people outside this place will have some confidence. The consequence of doing it in the way that the Government have done it, the consequence of there not being an intellectual argument to support it, the consequence of there not being any independent body that has concluded that this is the right thing to do, is that you could not say after this debate that even the House of Lords supports this with any degree of unanimity. It is an unstable proposal as far as our House of Commons is concerned, and it is a very unwise thing to be doing.

My amendment was a probing amendment. In parenthesis, if the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, were here, I would, with respect, answer her complaint that we did not vote last Monday. My experience in the Lords is that we vote in Committee from time to time but, generally, we try to avoid votes in Committee. That has been the practice in relation to the something like 60 groups of amendments that we have had so far in this Bill. I apologise to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that that was not adequately explained to her by us.

This was a probing amendment. Three points came out of it. First, I am sorely unimpressed by there not being any sense of consensus about what should happen to the number. Secondly, the danger of it being done by fiat from the other place is very high. Thirdly, I think we need to come back with another amendment that seeks to ensure—

[A noble Lord]

Oh for God’s sake!

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I hear a noble Lord say “Oh for God’s sake!”. The tradition in this House is that we have the debate in Committee and then we produce a further amendment on Report. If it is the intention of the House to change that procedure, I would be interested to hear whether we are dissatisfied with our current procedures. Fourthly, a process whereby an independent body determines the size of the House, as is the current arrangement, may be best. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Noble Lords]

Object!