Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 20th November 2024 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

If this amendment is agreed, I shall not be able to call Amendments 2 or 3 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 133, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has just spoken and to which I put my name. This evening’s inaugural Lord Judge memorial lecture in legal history will address the early modern practice of legislating by proclamation without Parliament. According to the advance publicity for the lecture, Professor Sir John Baker will say that this practice

“may be compared with those resulting from our ‘elective dictatorship’, Parliament having become an instrument whereby a modern Government can exercise more absolute power than that formerly attributed to the King’s prerogative”—

a point often made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, himself. The truth of those words is demonstrated by this Bill, about which the Constitution Committee remarked—with our customary understatement —that

“several powers in the Bill are widely drawn and could facilitate the making of law that goes beyond the updating of existing rules to involve the making of new policy”.

When the EU makes new policy, as it did with the general product safety regulation, which will come into force next month, the process is properly and appropriately democratic. A road map and a public consultation in 2020 were followed by a Commission proposal in 2021, the usual substantive reports by parliamentary committees, a provisional agreement between the Council and the Parliament, approval by COREPER and IMCO and, eventually, adoption of the GPSR by both Parliament and Council in 2023. The process was more extensive, but so is the end product. The GPSR contains a detailed list of factors to be taken into account when assessing the safety of products. It sets out the obligations of manufacturers, authorised representatives, importers, distributors and—a difficult one—online marketplaces. It outlines a traceability system and makes provision for market surveillance, reporting and recalls. Detailed powers, of course, are delegated to the Commission, but the guiding principles were decided on by the legislature at an appropriate level of detail for a legislature.

My point is not that we should or should not follow the substance of what the EU has done. It is that where such wide-ranging matters of policy are engaged, it is not appropriate for Parliament to abdicate its power to the Government as entirely as this Bill proposes to do. Matters that in Europe are decided upon by the Council and the Parliament are here reserved to unamendable and, in practice, unblockable statutory instruments under this Government as they were under the last.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, like the Constitution Committee, quoted the Attorney-General’s recent Bingham Lecture, in which he criticised excessive reliance on skeleton legislation and expressed the view that,

“the new Government offers an opportunity for a reset”.

I believe that the Attorney-General has talked the talk with complete sincerity about this issue, but his words do not sit happily with this Bill. The practical question is how are we going to walk the walk? A comprehensive solution would be to adopt the Hansard Society’s proposals for a new system of delegated legislation, a concordat agreed between Parliament and government to reset the boundary between primary and delegated legislation, and a new Act of Parliament to ensure that Parliament can calibrate the level of scrutiny to the content of a statutory instrument.

Limiting ourselves to this Bill, two other solutions are possible, short of the wholesale omission of clauses that was recommended by both the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee. The first would be to copy the amendments to what is now Section 14 of the retained EU law Act 2023, tabled in the names of the noble Lords, Lord McLaughlin and Lord Hamilton of Epsom, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and myself. These would have provided for a sifting committee of both Houses, or of the House of Commons, to identify proposed regulations that are particularly deserving of parliamentary attention, and for regulations falling into that category to be amendable by agreement of both Houses under a power modelled on Section 21 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Those amendments were passed by large majorities in your Lordships’ House in May and June last year, with the support of Her Majesty’s Opposition, and drew support from all parties in the Commons before eventually falling at ping-pong.

The second solution, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in his Amendment 133, is, by comparison, gentle indeed, and if the noble Lord were a fast bowler, he might describe it as a loosener. No power of amendment is claimed for Parliament. A joint sifting committee would simply have the authority to refer a statutory instrument to a process requiring parliamentary approval if the regulations made a substantive change to the law, or if they had not been consulted upon. A substitute for European levels of democratic engagement I am afraid it is not but a pragmatic improvement to the Bill it is, and I look forward to seeing whether the Minister sees merit in it or whether, as I fear, this is an issue to which we will have to return with renewed energy on Report.

[Baroness Crawley (Lab)]

My Lords it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I have an amendment in this group, Amendment 126, which I shall speak to. It is in my name and those of the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, who cannot be in his place today, and the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, reflecting its cross-party support. It requires the Secretary of State to conduct,

“appropriate consultation on draft regulations made under this Act”.

Like other amendments in this group, it is all about more effective scrutiny processes for this Bill. As it stands, this enabling Bill allocates significant powers to the Secretary of State—too many, according to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee.

As this is the first time I am speaking in Committee on the Bill, I say that I support it and the need for it to improve the safety of UK consumers, as do most consumer-facing organisations in this country. However, the Bill, to put it mildly, has received a pounding from the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee. I quote paragraph 36 of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report. It states:

“We consider that … the Government have failed to provide a convincing justification for the inclusion of skeleton clauses in the Bill that give Ministers such wide powers to re-write in regulations the substance of the regulatory regime for products”.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Motion A, I will also speak to the other Motions in this group. It feels very recent that we had Third Reading on the Bill, as the other place has returned it remarkably quickly.

Motion A covers this House’s Amendment 1. The original amendment was to require a Joint Committee to consider the revocation list and to arrange debates in both Houses with respect to anything that represented a change to the law before the legislation on it could be revoked. I thank the noble Lords who sponsored this amendment for not pushing it again today.

Motions B and B1 cover the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendment 6. I sympathise with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in lieu of Amendment 6 on its intent to help establish legal clarity. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the Bill is to simplify the statute book. However, in my view, such an amendment is not necessary. The amendment seeks to clarify that the new clause “Retained EU law dashboard and report”, inserted by Lords Amendment 16, will include those rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, today that the Government intend to ensure that rights, powers, and liabilities referred to in Section 4 of the 2018 Act will be included in future dashboard updates and accompanying reporting. The Government will include those rights, powers and liabilities that they have explicitly codified or intend to codify, as well as those they have decided not to codify because they are no longer fit for purpose. I hope that this provides the necessary clarity around which matters, originally retained under Section 4 of the 2018 Act, will be codified into domestic law. I thank the noble Lord for his valuable and collegiate engagement on this matter. I hope that this commitment provides him with the reassurance he is looking for and that he therefore will not press his Motion.

Turning to the Motion to amend the drafting of what was Amendment 16, I know that many noble Lords have strong views on Amendment 16 and the Motions concerning it. The other place inserted further measures to strengthen the reporting requirements and to ensure that the Government inform Parliament of their progress on using the powers in the Bill and their forthcoming plans on a more frequent basis. The Motion in my name therefore simply tidies that drafting and, on that basis, I hope that the House is able to support it.

Finally, I call on the House to reject the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. The Government recognise the significant role that Parliament has played in scrutinising instruments and are committed to ensuring the appropriate scrutiny under the delegated powers in the Bill, including any instruments made under the powers to revoke or replace. This amendment would impose a novel and untested scrutiny procedure on regulations proposed to be made using the powers to revoke or replace. This novel approach is, in our view, simply unnecessary.

The Government will ensure that any significant retained EU law reforms will receive the appropriate level of scrutiny by the relevant legislatures and are subject to all the usual processes for consultation and impact assessment. However, it is important that we ensure that the limited amount of parliamentary time available is used appropriately and effectively.

The existing sifting procedures in the Bill have been purposely drafted as a safeguarding measure for these powers and already contain adequate scrutiny. They allow for additional scrutiny for the exercise of the power to revoke or replace, while retaining the flexibility of using the negative procedure where there are good reasons to do so—for example, in repealing redundant rules that no longer have any purpose on the UK statute book.

In addition, in certain situations, notably the use of subsection (3), the affirmative procedure continues to be required. The existing procedure will give the UK Parliament the opportunity to take an active role in the development of this legislation. It is a tried and tested method of parliamentary scrutiny which, in my view, delivers good results for everyone and draws on the experience of our parliamentary committees. We will, of course, respect the judgment of the sifting committees relevant to the Bill, in the same way as we did for the EU withdrawal Act. Therefore, I do not consider the proposed amendments to be necessary. I hope this provides the House with sufficient reassurance on this matter.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Motions B1 and E1 in my name in this group. Having heard the Minister, I can be brief on Motion B1, which concerns a sometimes-neglected part of the Bill. Clause 3 is headed “Revocation of retained EU rights, powers, liabilities etc”. That clause is unaffected by the Government’s concession on the sunset and continues to provide for all directly affected provisions of EU law—whether they are found in the treaty, in directives, or in international agreements—to be revoked at the end of the year. My concern in tabling this amendment has been to know precisely what is being revoked and what will be proposed by way of replacement.

To that end, Motion B1, which builds on the helpful amendment originally proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks a guarantee that the directly affected provisions will be fully included in dashboard updates, as they have not been to date, and that the Government will give us clear warning in advance of those which they intend to carry over into our law and those which they may have decided not to carry over.

Unpicking provisions so deeply embedded in our law will not be a simple business. I declare an interest as a lawyer who sometimes needs to advise in this area. Such a commitment will be helpful to anyone who needs to understand what our law provides and how it is intended to be changed. I am grateful to the Minister and the Bill team for their constructive engagement on this issue, and for the clear commitments that he has just offered. In the circumstances, I am confident that I do not need to trouble the House with a Division on this issue.

Motion E1 is of a constitutional nature and concerns what, to some of us, has always been the most troubling feature of the Bill. It is nothing to do with the dashboard, direct effect or even the end-of-year sunset. It is rather the delegated superpower, headed “Powers to revoke or replace”, which currently appears as Clause 14. I remind the House of its most remarkable feature, subsection (3), which states:

“A relevant national authority may by regulations revoke any secondary retained EU law and make such alternative provision as the relevant national authority considers appropriate”.


That power will last until June 2026, which even we in the ivory tower of these Benches understand is some time after the next general election. It allows the Government to make regulations that Parliament cannot amend or, in practice, block, even when those regulations have quite different objectives from the laws that they replace, as the Bill makes clear.

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 42B in lieu—

42B: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause—
“Parliamentary scrutiny (1) A Minister of the Crown may not make regulations under section 15 unless— (a) a document containing a proposal for those regulations has been laid before each House of Parliament, (b) the document has been referred to, and considered by, a Committee of the House of Commons (‘the Committee’), and (c) a period of at least 30 days has elapsed after that referral, not including any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or either House is adjourned for more than four days. (2) If the Committee determines that special attention should be drawn to the regulations in question, a Minister of the Crown must arrange for the instrument to be debated on the floor of each House and voted on before the period in subsection (1)(c) elapses. (3) If any amendments to the regulations, whether or not proposed by the Committee, are agreed by both Houses of Parliament, the regulations must be made in the form so amended.(4) If one House agrees amendments to the regulations under subsection (3), the regulations may not be made until the other House has debated and voted on a motion to agree or disagree with those amendments.””

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, it has all been said. This is a Motion on parliamentary scrutiny. I beg to move Motion E1.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 62, on which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I will also mention Amendment 67, which is about Ministers being able to extend the sunset for the matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5, which at the moment is lacking. There are such powers for Clause 1, but there are not similar powers for the very important matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5. Amendment 137 is a consequential amendment and introduces our familiar theme of the affirmative procedure.

I want to concentrate on Amendment 62, because it is about removing

“the automatic deletion by the sunset clause of the rights, powers, liabilities etc currently recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 4 of the”

European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The amendment calls for no abolition until these rights, powers and liabilities et cetera have been identified, and subjected to consultation and to a report laid before the relevant legislature—Parliament or the devolved ones—detailing the consequences of abolition. We do not have a huge amount of time, so I will not laboriously go through the text of the amendment, which is before noble Lords, but they will recognise the structure of it. On these Benches, there is a pattern to the amendments that we have tabled—Amendments 48, 42 and others which escape my memory at the moment—which are all about this considered way of making decisions.

The point about Amendment 62 is that it reflects one of our consistent objections. When I say “our”, I think I can say that right across the House, at Second Reading and in three days of Committee, there is a concern that it would be almost impossible to know what domestic law would actually look like after the end of this year. This offends key principles of the rule of law, including the requirement of legal certainty, human rights protection and other matters. The risk that this amendment is designed to address is that retained EU law will be revoked unknowingly; it is particularly prevalent for Clause 3 as the dashboard is far from comprehensive on this non-legislative form of law.

These rights encompassed by Clause 3 were originally recognised domestically by Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act and were retained by Section 4 of the EUWA. However, the potential effect of Clause 3 is arguably more serious than that of Clause 1. This is because identifying retained EU law to be deleted by Clause 3 is even more difficult than for Clause 1. We have been extensively through the difficulties of identifying retained legislation. Clause 3 is not a cataloguing of legal instruments. It requires legal research, often into case law of UK courts and the ECJ, to identify which EU treaty or directive articles have been found to contain directly enforceable EU rights and obligations. There may be further rights which are so obviously directly effective that they have never been litigated, and that provides a further challenge to identifying them before the deadline.

The Government have hardly started. Of the 3,800 pieces of REUL identified so far on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers et cetera caught by the Clause 3 sunset have been identified, and there is no power to extend the Clause 3 deadline if Ministers run out of time. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has amendments to that effect, as we do in Amendment 67. To delete all those which are not saved by Ministers by the end of this year is reckless and unnecessary, so I am sorry but I am going to take a little bit of time. Unfortunately this group comes at the end of the day, and we are all tired and we all want to get home, but these are really important matters.

I have two examples which have not yet been identified on the famous dashboard so have not been subject to any consultations with affected individuals, organisations or businesses and could have a very severe impact if they are deleted by Clause 3. The first example is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TFEU. This goes much further than the right to equal pay under the Equality Act 2010 because it is less restrictive with regard to comparators. For example, under Article 157, a woman teacher can compare herself to a man employed by a different education authority. They do not need to have the same employer. That type of comparison is not possible under the Equality Act. It requires comparison with a man employed by the same employer—it is usually a man; it could be the other way round but, let us face it, it is a normally a woman claiming equal pay with a man—so it has had a pretty revolutionary impact on the ability of women to get equal pay. However, Article 157 is not on the REUL dashboard as a directly effective right, so it would be repealed as a directly enforceable right by Clause 3 at the end of the year and women’s equal pay protections will be severely weakened as a result. Frankly, every woman in this country should be bombarding the Government with that fact. The Government have told us recently everything they say they are doing for women. I welcome anything that they are doing, but this drives a coach and horses through those claims.

The second example is Article 6 of the habitats directive. We have heard quite a bit about that directive, which is about the conservation of natural habitats and fauna and flora. One of the obligations in that directive has been found to be directly enforceable. It is the obligation of the competent authority, in our case the Environment Agency, in special areas of conservation and sites of international importance to habitats and species to

“take appropriate steps to avoid … the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species”

et cetera.

This is a proactive and preventive obligation. It is not enough to react to deterioration once it has happened; it requires anticipatory protections to prevent deterioration and disturbance of habitats and species. That obligation has not been fully transposed into our domestic legislation. There remains in domestic law only a weaker duty on the Environment Agency to have regard to the habitats directive, which has been found not to impose a direction obligation, as article 6 of the EU directive does. So neither the habitats directive nor the case law on it appear on the REUL dashboard.

I hope that in his reply the Minister can address those two specific examples, which are not airy-fairy but very practical and significant. As things stand, this obligation will fall off the radar at the end of the year and the requirements on competent authorities to protect special areas of conservation proactively will be weakened. I must confess that I would like to have the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, here and to hear what he thinks of that.

Lastly, I recall that among the matters that Amendment 62 would require consideration of is the effect on our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland. That is a consistent point that we need to make from these Benches.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I take this opportunity to say a few words about Clauses 3 to 5 more generally.

I spoke at Second Reading and, although I have not so far burdened your Lordships by speaking in Committee, I have watched much of the first two days’ proceedings with what I can describe only as horrified fascination. Reference has been made today to the recklessness of the Bill. I hope to explain as briefly as I can that this recklessness is not confined to Clauses 1 and 2 but reflected just as strongly in Clause 3, as the noble Baroness just said, and indeed in Clauses 4 and 5.

The Prime Minister does not strike me as a reckless man. We do not know his view of the Bill but perhaps we can take something from the fact that when he was Chancellor, he was careful to ensure that the rules for which he was responsible were excluded from its ambit.

A constant theme of the committee debates on EU-derived legislation was what I think of as the warning lights on the dashboard: a catalogue of retained EU law that is not comprehensive, a hole of uncertain size where devolved legislation should be and, however much Ministers may wish to reverse the presumption of revocation, its application by default to any provisions that have fallen down what has been referred to as the back of the national sofa.

Clause 3 has attracted only a small fraction of the public attention devoted to Clauses 1 and 2 but is, if anything, even more productive of uncertainty. So far as I can work out, that uncertainty comes in three varieties.

The first uncertainty derives from the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, no definitive list exists of the rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Clause 3 or, in all probability, is even capable of being prepared. The rights, powers and liabilities referred to include all those provisions of EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer rights directly on individuals, together with directly effective rights from EU agreements with third countries and directly effective rights in EU directives, subject to qualifications. All those rights had been preserved by Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act in the interests of legal continuity. All are now to be removed in a single big bang moment at the end of the year, with no provision equivalent to Clause 2 for extending that sunset to a later date, as highlighted in the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. These measures do not bear the brand “direct effect” on their foreheads; no one has ever made a full list of them. It is quite certain that the 28 directly effective rights listed in the dashboard, one of them repealed, can be only a tiny proportion of the total. No one has counted them, consulted on them or assessed the impact of their imminent removal.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Of course, if you are going to use those codification powers, you have to know what you are codifying. I think he said a moment ago that work is under way to identify the rights, powers, liabilities, et cetera which are saved by Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. Only 28 of those rights, powers and liabilities have so far found their way into the dashboard. How many have now been identified now, and when does the Minister anticipate that the work will be complete?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

As I said, the work is under way at the moment across all the rights codified in those sections. As the noble Lord said in his speech, this is a complicated area of law. I do not want to get into a complicated legal argument, so it is perhaps best if I seek advice from the lawyers and write to him, as he suggested, on the legal technicalities of that area.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I think I must have failed to get across, when I addressed the Committee earlier, that we are not here dealing with legal technicalities but with massive uncertainties at the very heart of the Bill, uncertainties that relate not to legislation but belong to legal principle. I tried to help by saying how I thought Clauses 3 to 5 related to Clause 7. If I was right about that, the task of applying any European authority under Clause 7 becomes astonishingly difficult, because a court has to read every one and see whether it contains general principles, direct effects or supremacy before it can even decide whether it is going to apply it or not. I hope I did not leave the Minister with the impression that these are legal technicalities, and I hope that, if he writes to the Committee about this, we will have a full explanation of how Clauses 3 to 5 and Clause 7 are intended to relate to each other.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will talk to the lawyers and attempt to get the noble Lord an answer to his concerns.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned the habitats directive. I am slightly loath to go back there, after the long discussion with my noble friend Lord Benyon on Tuesday, but let me restate again for the benefit of the record that the Government have been clear about the importance of environmental protection across the UK, not least through the Environment Act, which includes a legally binding target to halt the decline of nature by 2030. As I emphasised earlier in the debate, we are committed to meeting this target and we will of course not undermine our obligations to the environment.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I have some more remarks on Clause 3. Let me come to the end of them and, if the noble Lord does not feel that he has got an answer, we can talk about that further then.

I was going to move on to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, who tabled notice of her intention to oppose Clause 3 stand part of the Bill. For the reasons set out, the repeal of Section 4 of the 2018 Act is, in our view, a crucial part of the Government’s agenda to take back control of our statute book and improve legal clarity. I completely agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, about the Windsor Framework. We do not think this Bill has any effect on the agreements made. Of course, we will examine the text of that very closely, but it goes without saying that the Government are completely committed to the agreement and we would not wish to do anything in either this or future legislation to impinge on what I view as a fantastic agreement.

Moving on, Clause 4 abolishes the principle of the supremacy of EU law. I do not think that I have any notes to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, so let me say that we will include that in the general write-around about—well, I will not refer to them as legal technicalities because the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will tell me that they are extremely important legal principles. I will seek legal advice and get a proper answer for the Committee.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Committee heard from a former Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that these principles go to the heart of how common law is applied in this country. I do not think that that is a legal technicality.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I acknowledge the noble Lord’s point but I will get him a proper answer from the lawyers.