Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Baroness Fookes Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 1 and 80 in my name, and to Amendment 133 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. As noble Lords will know, I was not present at Second Reading, having only just assumed this position. I hope that the Committee will indulge me if I range a little more freely than I would normally in my remarks on the amendments.

Amendment 1 is necessary because Clause 1 provides such broad powers for the Secretary of State on product regulations. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee regarded this clause and other clauses in the Bill as “skeleton legislation”. I thank the Minister for his letter dated 24 October detailing the Government’s position in answer to the committee’s original report, which was published on 15 October. But I note that the committee maintained its original position after an evidence session with Ministers on 16 October, which concluded that Clauses 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9

“are inappropriate and should be removed from the Bill”.

His Majesty’s Official Opposition agree with the committee, and we reserve the right to return to this at later stages of the Bill. For now, I have tabled a series of amendments designed to elicit more information.

The committee rightly pointed out that Clause 1 confers considerable discretion to legislate in critical areas, such as product marketing, efficiency and accuracy, via statutory instruments. This amendment aims to address those concerns by ensuring that any regulatory powers in this space are appropriately balanced and subject to full legislative scrutiny. Clause 1 grants wide- ranging powers to the Secretary of State to make regulations through statutory instruments, SIs, a process with limited parliamentary oversight. Such discretion risks undermining democratic accountability, as SIs are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as primary legislation. Again, I think it is worth quoting the committee:

“skeleton legislation should only be used in the most exceptional circumstances and where no other approach would be reasonable to adopt”.

The report goes on to state that the Government are, in effect,

“asking Parliament to pass primary legislation which is so insubstantial that it leaves the real operation of the legislation to be decided by Ministers”.

On these Benches we argue that it is all so insubstantial, that the Bill could lead to regulations that significantly impact businesses and consumers without thorough debate or consultation. It is so insubstantial that it does not give businesses the certainty and predictability they need to thrive. It is so insubstantial that granting considerable discretionary powers could lead to frequent unpredictable changes in regulations, creating compliance challenges on a ministerial whim.

Removing this clause would promote stability and confidence, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, which may otherwise struggle to adapt to rapidly changing environments. Clause 1(1)(b) on

“ensuring that products operate efficiently or effectively”

is surely something that can best be left to market forces. Consumers are going to purchase products that work better than others, and this will incentivise producers to provide products that work well. Why is this the business of the state?

On Amendment 80, we see that there are similar issues. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee stated that Clause 5 is another example of skeleton legislation. Clause 5(2) confers sweeping powers to the Secretary of State to dictate the quantities in which goods may be marketed and the units of measurement used. We will return to this theme in later amendments. Granting such broad discretion risks bypassing parliamentary scrutiny and undermining democratic accountability. Decisions affecting trade, business practices and consumer choice should be subject to thorough debate, not delegated to ministerial regulations. The power to use metrology regulations to replace and repeal primary legislation merits a full explanation and compelling justification, but the memorandum fails to provide this—something that the Government admitted in the sixth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on 30 October.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his Amendment 133, which requires that regulation must be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses for review. The amendment aims to address a serious flaw in the Government’s approach to regulatory changes under this Bill. Specifically, it would ensure that regulations are subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament through a Joint Committee of both Houses, with further safeguards in place if significant departures from existing law are proposed.

By bypassing established mechanisms for scrutiny and relying heavily on statutory instruments, the Government exhibit a clear lack of respect for the legislative process and, indeed, the opinions of their own Attorney-General. As the Constitution Committee noted in its demolition of the Bill in its report on 18 October:

“We endorse the view of the Attorney General expressed at his recent Bingham Lecture on the rule of law: ‘[E]xcessive reliance on delegated powers, Henry VIII clauses, or skeleton legislation, upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the executive. This not only strikes at … rule of law values … but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty. In my view, the new Government offers an opportunity for a reset in the way that Government thinks about these issues. This means, in particular, a much sharper focus on whether taking delegated powers is justified in a given case, and more careful consideration of appropriate safeguards’”.


This amendment would restore Parliament’s rightful role in scrutinising significant legislative changes—“proper balance”, in the Attorney-General’s words—reaffirming its sovereignty and its duty to represent the interests of the people. In short, I agree with the Attorney-General. The fact that two committees have slated the Bill suggests that it is not justified, so we support this amendment. We think Clauses 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 should be junked. Does the Minister agree with his own Attorney-General? I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

If this amendment is agreed, I shall not be able to call Amendments 2 or 3 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 133, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has just spoken and to which I put my name. This evening’s inaugural Lord Judge memorial lecture in legal history will address the early modern practice of legislating by proclamation without Parliament. According to the advance publicity for the lecture, Professor Sir John Baker will say that this practice

“may be compared with those resulting from our ‘elective dictatorship’, Parliament having become an instrument whereby a modern Government can exercise more absolute power than that formerly attributed to the King’s prerogative”—

a point often made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, himself. The truth of those words is demonstrated by this Bill, about which the Constitution Committee remarked—with our customary understatement —that

“several powers in the Bill are widely drawn and could facilitate the making of law that goes beyond the updating of existing rules to involve the making of new policy”.

When the EU makes new policy, as it did with the general product safety regulation, which will come into force next month, the process is properly and appropriately democratic. A road map and a public consultation in 2020 were followed by a Commission proposal in 2021, the usual substantive reports by parliamentary committees, a provisional agreement between the Council and the Parliament, approval by COREPER and IMCO and, eventually, adoption of the GPSR by both Parliament and Council in 2023. The process was more extensive, but so is the end product. The GPSR contains a detailed list of factors to be taken into account when assessing the safety of products. It sets out the obligations of manufacturers, authorised representatives, importers, distributors and—a difficult one—online marketplaces. It outlines a traceability system and makes provision for market surveillance, reporting and recalls. Detailed powers, of course, are delegated to the Commission, but the guiding principles were decided on by the legislature at an appropriate level of detail for a legislature.

My point is not that we should or should not follow the substance of what the EU has done. It is that where such wide-ranging matters of policy are engaged, it is not appropriate for Parliament to abdicate its power to the Government as entirely as this Bill proposes to do. Matters that in Europe are decided upon by the Council and the Parliament are here reserved to unamendable and, in practice, unblockable statutory instruments under this Government as they were under the last.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, like the Constitution Committee, quoted the Attorney-General’s recent Bingham Lecture, in which he criticised excessive reliance on skeleton legislation and expressed the view that,

“the new Government offers an opportunity for a reset”.

I believe that the Attorney-General has talked the talk with complete sincerity about this issue, but his words do not sit happily with this Bill. The practical question is how are we going to walk the walk? A comprehensive solution would be to adopt the Hansard Society’s proposals for a new system of delegated legislation, a concordat agreed between Parliament and government to reset the boundary between primary and delegated legislation, and a new Act of Parliament to ensure that Parliament can calibrate the level of scrutiny to the content of a statutory instrument.

Limiting ourselves to this Bill, two other solutions are possible, short of the wholesale omission of clauses that was recommended by both the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee. The first would be to copy the amendments to what is now Section 14 of the retained EU law Act 2023, tabled in the names of the noble Lords, Lord McLaughlin and Lord Hamilton of Epsom, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and myself. These would have provided for a sifting committee of both Houses, or of the House of Commons, to identify proposed regulations that are particularly deserving of parliamentary attention, and for regulations falling into that category to be amendable by agreement of both Houses under a power modelled on Section 21 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Those amendments were passed by large majorities in your Lordships’ House in May and June last year, with the support of Her Majesty’s Opposition, and drew support from all parties in the Commons before eventually falling at ping-pong.

The second solution, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in his Amendment 133, is, by comparison, gentle indeed, and if the noble Lord were a fast bowler, he might describe it as a loosener. No power of amendment is claimed for Parliament. A joint sifting committee would simply have the authority to refer a statutory instrument to a process requiring parliamentary approval if the regulations made a substantive change to the law, or if they had not been consulted upon. A substitute for European levels of democratic engagement I am afraid it is not but a pragmatic improvement to the Bill it is, and I look forward to seeing whether the Minister sees merit in it or whether, as I fear, this is an issue to which we will have to return with renewed energy on Report.