(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I sought to explain earlier that Schedule 1 is an amalgam of all the existing schedules that exist. Ghana was already on a list of countries to which people could be sent, and the present practice is not to send people back to places where they are at serious risk. That practice will continue under this Act when you make a suspensive harm application. It is a historical situation, but it has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. As I said to the noble Baroness a moment ago, the Government will reflect on what has been said in this debate.
That brings me to deal specifically with the question of Rwanda and the fact that there are currently proceedings pending in relation to Rwanda, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out. So far, the High Court has upheld the position on Rwanda: we will see what the Court of Appeal judgment says. If the case goes further, it will be a matter for judicial decision and we will see how that works out, but we will not take Rwanda out at this stage, while the matter is still pending. I think that is also the answer, if I may say so, in relation to Amendments 43A and 49A on Hungary and Poland. These are ongoing proceedings: let us see what the outcome is and then it can be properly determined whether Poland and Hungary are countries that should remain on the list. That is not clear yet and it depends on the outcome of those pending proceedings.
I think that I am nearly through, except for the very important points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others, as to whether we should beef up Clause 6(4)(b), which at the moment places certain requirements on the Secretary of State, in deciding on possible new countries and territories. The thrust of the amendment suggested by the noble Lord and supported by others is that effectively there should be a more detailed list of conventions and other international instruments to which the Government should have regard, with a specific obligation of consultation. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others wanted in particular to enshrine the obligation to follow the decisions of domestic courts and the Human Rights Act.
The Government’s position on this—and of course, as with other things, we will reflect on it—is that these are effectively de facto covered in the existing Clause 6(4)(a) and (b). They provide that the Secretary of State must—it is a positive duty—
“have regard to all the circumstances of the country”
and
“must have regard to information from any appropriate source (including member States and international organisations)”.
That, in the Government’s view, necessarily requires the Secretary of State to have regard to case law, whether it is domestic or European; to have regard to international conventions and obligations; and to have regard to what international organisations say—and they are not exactly bashful when coming forward in this kind of area. The Secretary of State would be seriously at risk of being found to have acted irrationally or found not to have taken into account relevant considerations, if there was a major international organisation, a major convention or a major decision that had somehow been overlooked. So the combination of the normal duties of rationality and duty to take into account all relevant considerations, plus the actual wording of Clause 6(4), in the Government’s present view, covers the situation adequately.
I am grateful to the Minister. The hour is late, and I promise not to intervene again on his remarks. Before we get to group 19, which is also linked to this amendment, or indeed before we get to Report, could the Minister arrange for his officials or perhaps for himself or his noble friend to meet the Salvation Army and the other providers and stakeholders to which I referred in my remarks? It was they who raised these concerns—and, given that they have a contract with the Home Office, they are in a pretty good position to know the territory.
My noble friend Lord Murray tells me that that is already in train—or, certainly, there is no objection from the Government’s point of view.