Airport Capacity

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 25th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his comments. It is important, now that we are moving into the realms of the specifics, that he mentioned noise. In the Statement I alluded to the fact that technology is moving on and gave examples of new aircraft that are coming on board. The reality is that in 2030, with the measures proposed, fewer people will be impacted by noise, from current estimates of 770,000 to 610,000 people. There are reasons for that. I mentioned the night bans that will run for six and a half hours. I also talked about the £2.6 billion package which includes a £700 million proposal to insulate homes around the airport. An additional £40 million is proposed to insulate and ventilate schools and public buildings. Of course I take on board my noble friend’s comments. I believe that as we move through the process of consultation and scrutiny of the proposals in the Commons and then on to the vote, and as the NPS comes to its final stage, many of the issues that my noble friend raised will be factored in.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as living under the flight path, and as president of HACAN—the Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise. The announcement acknowledges that the current constraints do not fully work for residents by talking about “more reliable respite”. The Minister will be aware that the measurements of noise do not accord with residents’ experience. I am sure he will also agree that the best predictor of the future is past experience. In asking what confidence residents can have in assurances and conditions, I specifically ask the Minister about the words in the announcement that,

“the government proposes new legally binding noise targets”.

Can he explain how robust “legally binding” targets will be? Can he also tell the House whether the Government have ruled out, or will rule out, a sixth terminal?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

First, the noble Baroness has probably answered her own question. By saying that something is “legally binding”, we mean we will ensure that it is enshrined.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Targets.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I accept her proposition, however, that the judgment is often made by those who live under flight paths and have aircraft flying over them. The noble Baroness talked of her own experience. I assure her that I too have experience of planes flying over my own residence. I underline that the Government have outlined the importance they are attaching to the issues of noise and noise pollution. I also mentioned that we will consult on proposals on the noise commissioner and noise commission. That will be part and parcel of the consultation process. There are other measures such as setting up the local neighbourhood engagement board, which the commission detailed. That will also be part and parcel of the NPS and will be factored in as it makes its progress through the House of Commons.

Immigration Officers

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 4th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am not going to speculate on what will happen over the next five years. The important thing to remember, when it comes to immigration and applications for leave to remain, is that we look at the best interests of our country, but also at the best interests in regard to what we are on the global stage. We are a welcoming nation to people from all around the globe, and long may that remain so, to ensure that Britain continues to prosper and grow on the global stage.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, while I would like to encourage the noble Lord to change immigration policy from the Dispatch Box, I will restrain myself. With regard to the officials who are the subject of this Question, I understand that there is a difficulty with retention. Is that correct, and if it is, are the Government aware why there is a problem with retaining the officers?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

We currently have 1,280 full-time equivalent staff who are undertaking this casework. The noble Baroness talks about retention; there is normal turnover of staff. We are also enhancing some of the requirements, particularly on English language, for such staff, which will come into play in this area, and across the public sector, from October 2016. It is important in any role undertaken within government and the public sector that career paths are pointed out to people—the mentoring scheme we deploy for such staff is a valuable asset in this regard.

Drugs Policy

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 13th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The right reverend Prelate is right to raise this concern. Issues of stop and search have been prioritised; I recall that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has specifically focused on this area. I believe that, although in 2009-10 stop and search was about seven times as likely for someone of black ethnicity, that has fallen to four times more likely—but that is still four times more likely than anyone else.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Does the Minister agree that it is significant and a very progressive step that possession of a new psychoactive substance under the Psychoactive Substances Act is not a criminal offence? Does he not think that that is something that we should extend and build on with regard to other drugs?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I know that the noble Baroness was a very active participant during the passage of the Bill, and she is quite right to say that this is about not penalising possession but tackling the people who provide and supply such drugs. That is where the clamping down has occurred, and it is proving effective. On the other question, we continue to review and see the evidence, and we will be led by the evidence.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Hearing what the noble Baroness and, indeed, the noble Lord, have said, with the leave of the House, I will return to this issue. I will consider its practical application with my noble friend. When the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was speaking, I was listening attentively but, as he rightly said, I was waiting for inspiration from the Box. This is too important an issue to deal with in a non-comprehensive way so, as I said, I would like to return to it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, when the Minister is considering this with his advisers, on the point about an application to the court, will he consider both the practicality and the legal capacity of the people we are concerned about to make that application?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

That is a valid point. I have had discussions with officials on the issue of ensuring assistance. If someone has not had the mental capacity to consent, would they have the mental capacity to take up the issue? That is a point understood and well made.

I hope that, based on the assurances and clarification that I have given that we will look at the issue again, at this juncture the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75. These amendments are concerned with people who are affected, and how they are affected, by closure notices and closure orders. Amendment 62 addresses those who “habitually”—that is the term in the Bill—live on the premises and their entitlement to access. The subsequent amendments deal with the clauses relating to temporary orders and their extension and discharge, and appeals, as well as the extent of the building which may be the subject of an appeal.

I am concerned about the employees who live on site. Pubs, hotels and other leisure establishments often include accommodation for junior staff and not just for the managers. When I raised this at the previous stage, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, said that closure notices could be,

“tailored to the appropriate circumstances”.—[Official Report, 2/12/13; col. 14.]—

we were talking about security and safety—but that the Government considered that the exception should be limited to residents who are habitually resident and, in the case of an appeal, to those who have an interest in the premises, meaning a financial or legal interest.

The draft guidance, which we have seen, seems to consider these issues only to the extent of the police or the local authority, allowing discretion for the retrieval of items left on the premises. My concern goes wider than that. A young person employed in the sort of situation to which I have referred may well be living a long way from home and quite suddenly lose the place where they are living, if not habitually at that point. I am not suggesting that this may be a widespread situation but, for those affected, it will be very significant and I wonder whether my noble friend on the Front Bench can give me any more assurances. I am simply not confident that the legislation allows for enough to go into the guidance to cover the points that I am making. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, these amendments relate to the closure powers in Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Bill. She has also indicated that her particular concern is to protect the interests of employees—such as caretakers, for example—who may live on premises subject to a closure notice or order. Amendment 62 relates to the use of the term “habitually” in the context of Clause 69(4). That subsection provides that a closure notice cannot prohibit access by a person who habitually lives on the premises. The term “habitually” in this context means those who routinely or regularly live at those premises. It could, for example, cover students who live away from the family home for part of the year but routinely return to the family home as their main residence or those who spend the majority of the week living at the pub in which they work.

The term is commonly used in legislation setting out entitlement to social security benefits, such as the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987. It is also used in the family law context when a court decides cases under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, where it is often relevant to decide in which country a child habitually resides. When approaching this test in each context in which it has arisen, the courts have said that it is essentially a question of fact to be determined by reference to all the circumstances of a particular case. We expect the police and local authorities to follow the same approach in this context and assess each circumstance on a case-by-case basis. However, it is important to retain this word so that we exclude persons who may only occasionally live on the premises: for example, a friend of one of the residents who may just be spending time there over a weekend or at a sleepover.

Amendments 71, 72, 73 and 75 all seek to extend certain rights—for example, the right of appeal against a closure order—to persons who live on the premises concerned. Such rights already apply to persons on whom a closure notice has been served and on persons who have an interest in the premises. The Government are satisfied that these existing provisions are wide enough to protect the position of employees who may reside on the premises.

In Committee, I explained that the reference in the Bill to a person having an “interest” in the premises covers those who have a financial or legal interest. I would fully expect that any employee who has been furnished with accommodation as part of his or her employment would have their entitlements to such accommodation set out in either their contract of employment or an associated tenancy agreement. That being the case, I am satisfied that in any such formal relationship between an employee and the owner or occupier of any such premises subject to an application for a closure order, the employee will be a person with an interest in the premises and therefore already covered by the provisions provided in Clauses 74 to 77.

Finally, Amendment 74 seeks to clarify the circumstances in which an appeal against a decision to make or extend a closure order may be made. Of course, I understand that my noble friend has in mind the situation where an appellant may wish to challenge the extent of a closure order in terms of those parts of a building or structure which are covered by the order. Again, I can assure my noble friend that the provisions in the Bill as drafted allow for this. Clause 77(6) enables the court hearing an appeal to make whatever order it thinks appropriate. This would include varying the terms of a closure order so that it applies to a more limited part of the building or structure in question. Therefore, an employee living on-site could use the appeal to argue that a closure order should not include his or her living area. I hope that, in the light of the explanation that I have given, my noble friend is reassured and will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in the Minister’s explanation of “habitually”, which I understood from the previous stage, the example he used of a student whose real home—if I can put it that way—was somewhere else actually confirmed exactly what I was worried about. That part therefore did not reassure me, but I am helped by his more extended explanation of the term “interest”. I know when I am beaten, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, Amendment 22 is in similar terms to the one tabled in Committee by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. The amendment will specify in the Bill that when considering whether to make a criminal behaviour order, the court must be satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that the offender has engaged in behaviour that causes or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person.

The government position was that, as the case law is clear on this point, there was no need to provide for the criminal standard in the legislation. This approach is in line with that taken in other legislation providing for other types of civil preventive orders. However, on reflection, we are satisfied that there are sufficient grounds here for taking a different approach. Part 1 expressly provided that an IPNA was subject to the civil standard of proof so, unless express provision was made in Part 2, we accept that there could be some doubt that the criminal standard would apply in proceedings in respect of the criminal behaviour order. This amendment therefore removes any such doubt. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for having reflected and I thank them for the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Bill confers the power to issue a community protection notice on the police, local authorities and persons designated by a local authority. Provision is made for items used in the commission of the offence of breaching a notice to be forfeited or seized on the order of a court. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out in Committee, forfeited items must be handed over to a constable and disposed of by the relevant police force. Similarly, the power to seize items is vested in a constable. My noble friend suggested that amendments be made to confer similar powers on local authority personnel in the interests of parity. The Government are satisfied that this would be a sensible extension of these provisions and Amendments 40 to 45 to Clauses 47 and 48 modify the provisions accordingly.

My noble friend also tabled amendments in Committee which sought to enable persons authorised by a local authority to serve a closure notice. I said then that I could see merit in such an approach and that is why the Government have tabled amendments to achieve just that. Amendments 63 to 70 would allow the local authority to contract out the service of the closure notice, while the decision to issue the closure notice would continue to rest firmly with the local authority. I commend the amendments to the House.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My noble friend Lord Greaves often describes what this House is about as ensuring that Bills are workable. That was what was in my mind in tabling these amendments at the previous stage. I do not suppose that the world will change dramatically as a result of them, but I am glad that we are making the Bill more workable at local level. I am grateful for that.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend Lady Hamwee questioned whether it was appropriate for under-18s to be excluded from their own homes on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. After further consideration, I am content to make a change that ensures that only adults can be excluded from their home where there is a threat of violence or a significant risk of harm to others.

Councils have wider safeguarding duties and other legislation that allows for a child to be removed from the home when it is in their best interest. For instance, local councils already have duties under the Children Act 1989 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Where a young person is committing serious anti-social behaviour to the extent that agencies are considering applying for an injunction with the power to exclude that young person from their home, the local council should first consider whether the child is “in need” under the Children Act and, if so, provide appropriate support as an alternative to simply excluding a young person from their home. A Part 1 injunction could still play a role in transforming the young person’s life as well as protecting victims from further anti-social behaviour. However, if removing them from the family home is considered necessary, this should be done under existing legislation and not just be seen as a chance to disperse the problem to another area.

I do not believe that this change will weaken agencies’ ability to deal with anti-social behaviour caused by minors. Agencies can still apply for an injunction to stop the young person’s behaviour and the court can attach a power of arrest to the order in cases where an individual has either been violent or threatened violence when committing or threatening anti-social behaviour, or where there is a risk of significant harm to another person by that individual. The power of arrest will act as a deterrent and allow the police to take swift action to protect the victim or communities if the injunction is breached. Of course, youth offending teams will play an important role in identifying the problems that drive the young person’s behaviour and measuring the risk they pose to others to ensure that the right action is taken. However, we accept that excluding a young person from their home using an injunction will not be the right action and I therefore commend the amendment to the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the bad news for the government Front Bench is that this amendment was put down in the flurry of amendments that my noble friend Lord Greaves and I rushed to table when the timetabling of business was changed. That encourages me to continue that sort of scattergun approach to matters I think need to be discussed in Committee, but of course I am extremely happy to see this among the government amendments and to know that the change will be made. I am very grateful to the Government for listening.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 11th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 56YG I shall speak also to Amendment 56YH. I have to say that I am amazed by the influence of my noble friend the Chief Whip, who just by sitting there has prevented anyone walking in front of me.

Schedule 7 deals with the powers to seize invalid passports, and these are two quite small, probing amendments, although they are serious. The first amendment would leave out the provision for a constable, who has various powers of search and seizure, to authorise a person—any person,

“to carry out on the constable’s behalf a search under this paragraph”.

That is a search which may involve the use of force—reasonable force, but nevertheless force. I question whether it is right for such powers to be authorised—perhaps not technically delegated, but to the outside world they would seem to be delegated.

My second amendment would leave out the requirement to return an expired travel document, but not where it is thought that it might be intended to be used for purposes for which it is no longer valid. My question, of course, is: why not? If the document has expired, what harm is there? Are there no other systems that are sophisticated and efficient enough to pick up whether an expired travel document is, in fact, expired? This seems an odd sanction, merely on the basis of reasonable belief. My particular reason for questioning it is that it might really irritate people quite unnecessarily. I have written “unnecessary aggro” against this, and I genuinely think that we should avoid causing unnecessary aggro, because there are enough sensitivities around passport and immigration controls and so on without adding one which, to my mind at any rate, is not necessary. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who explained that these two amendments relate to the powers to seize invalid passports. As she has said, they are probing in nature. Such powers may be necessary where a passport has been withdrawn in the public interest; for example, to disrupt a person’s travel overseas due to the serious issue that they may be engaged in terrorism.

Amendment 56YG relates to the ability of a constable to authorise a person to carry out a search on their behalf. The purpose of this provision is to allow a constable to make use of support if required when carrying out a search at places other than a port. Such support would be exercised under the authority of a constable, and I reassure my noble friend that, in view of the type of case to which this paragraph applies, it would in practice be likely to be carried out in the presence of a constable. The authorised person—such as a police community support officer—would not be empowered under the provision to use reasonable force or to require a person to hand over the passport for inspection purposes.

Amendment 56YH, which I think my noble friend labelled the “avoiding unnecessary aggro” amendment, relates to expired travel documents. I agree with my noble friend that there is often little harm in returning an expired document to the passport holder. Indeed, there is provision in paragraph 4 of Schedule 7 for that very purpose. The provision recognises that the passport holder may wish to retain the expired passport because, for example, it may include extant visas for travel to other countries. It may even provide memories of places that they have travelled to previously; as well as a visual record, for good or bad, of how we may have looked some 10, or even 20, years ago.

However, on a more serious point, the British passport does of course remain the property of the Crown at all times. There is no entitlement to a passport and no statutory right to have access to it. If a person intends to make use of an expired passport for a purpose for which it is no longer valid—in other words, for a fraudulent purpose—it is right that a constable should be able to remove the document. This would prevent it being used elsewhere for fraudulent purposes, where the level of checks may not be so robust.

It is also entirely inappropriate that a constable should hand back an expired passport to a person where he or she reasonably believes that it is intended to be used for a fraudulent purpose. It would send out the wrong message to the passport holder and would simply allow—if not, indeed, encourage—them to continue to make use of the document for wrong and potentially unlawful reasons. I hope, in light of the explanation I have given, that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will do so but I have to say that, first, on the issue of the expired passport, there are some good reasons which a passport holder may not even think of at the time. One that immediately occurs to me is the need to be able to show the number of days you have been in the country, which involves showing when you have travelled out of and back into the country. There are tax reasons why a number of people need to be able to show that. It is a matter of the officer’s discretion and reasonable belief but I find it difficult to imagine how the conversations would be conducted. I should perhaps ask my noble friend whether he can tell the Committee how one challenges an officer’s decision. His notes may say, even if I did not think of it beforehand.

As regards whether someone other than a constable can exercise the powers of search and seizure, my noble friend says that, in practice, it would be the constable. If that is the case, the obvious question is: why allow for anyone else to do it? Another question is whether there will be instructions to officers—guidance, codes of practice or whatever—that might deal with this. I do not know whether my noble friend can deal with either of those at the moment—I know that colleagues are here particularly to talk about the next group of amendments—but if he has anything to say, that would be good. If not, perhaps he could write to me.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I will just assure my noble friend that I do not think I can add to what I have said other than, on the first point about why we should not restrict the power in that way, it is important that there is a level of flexibility that allows the constable to exercise it. In most cases, as I have said, the person would be someone such as a community support officer. As far as the document is concerned, my noble friend raised the point about other reasons. Of course it is at the discretion of the officer, but one hopes that at that point a case could be made. She raised the issue of tax, which is not one that I was thinking through as she spoke. I am sure that there is a list of other circumstances. However, ultimately, it boils down to the document being the property of the Crown, and it should remain so.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Perhaps after today the Minister could let me know what arrangements there will be for a challenge, and about a code of practice. He nods and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the Government remain committed to strengthening the system of firearms control where necessary in order to protect people from harm. We have identified two loopholes in the Firearms Act 1968 that we are taking the opportunity provided by this Bill to address.

The first change is in response to a recommendation made by the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2010. The committee recommended that persons with suspended sentences should be prohibited from possessing firearms in the same way as those who have served custodial sentences. The Government have accepted that recommendation, and subsection (1) of the new clause will ensure that the same prohibition applies to people who have suspended sentences.

A person who has served a custodial sentence of between three months and three years cannot possess a firearm for five years after the date of their release. For the purposes of suspended sentences, this prohibition will start from the second day after the date of sentence rather than the date of release. This is because a person with a suspended sentence will not be in custody from the date of sentence, so the prohibition needs to begin almost immediately. We have said the second day after the date of sentence so that, if the person does have a firearm, they are not instantly in breach of the law upon receiving their suspended sentence. In effect, they may have around 24 hours to sell the firearm or transfer ownership of it to someone else.

I should say, however, that this requirement on a person given a suspended sentence immediately to divest themselves of any firearms is subject to the transitional provision in subsection (3) of the new clause. This provides that a person who has had a suspended sentence imposed, and who holds a firearm or shotgun certificate on the day that the new legislation comes into effect, will be able to continue to possess their firearm or shotgun for the duration of that certificate. This is to ensure that we are not placing any additional burden and bureaucracy on the police by obliging them to go through their records to find certificate holders who have suspended sentences. As I have already said, this is purely a transitional arrangement; it will not apply to anyone given a suspended sentence after commencement.

The second change, made by subsection (2) of the new clause, will ensure that prohibited persons are prevented from possessing antique firearms. Currently a person with any criminal conviction would be able to possess an antique firearm. Intelligence indicates that there is a growing interest in antique firearms from criminal groups. This amendment will ensure that persons convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to at least three months’ imprisonment, including a suspended sentence, will be prohibited from possessing antique firearms in the UK.

We believe that closing both these loopholes will strengthen public protection by ensuring that, as the 1968 Act intended, persons convicted of a criminal offence carrying a sentence of at least three months’ imprisonment are prohibited from possessing firearms. Amendment 104 simply makes a consequential amendment to the extent clause. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister said that an offender would be allowed a couple of days’ grace, as it were, to sell or hand over the firearm. If the offender wanted to hand it to someone in the same household, would that person have to have a licence, so that there would be no question of it being kept around on the premises and available unless the licence was already there for someone else?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am sure my noble friend saw me nodding. That is quite correct.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am taking this opportunity to ask the Minister, who knows about my question, whether Clause 115 has the effect which it seems to me to have. The new section which is to be inserted into the Police Act will provide for powers to anyone to disclose information to the College of Policing where this is,

“for the purposes of the exercise by the College of any of its functions”.

Will the Data Protection Act be overridden in its entirety by this provision? What checks, possibility of challenge and possibility of complaint will there be? Is there any proportionality, propriety and so on? I am sure that I will be told that there is a difference between the college’s functions and its powers but I am not clear about the extent of this clause, which seems to be very wide.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I take it that my noble friend’s comments primarily were probing. Clause 115 provides the basis of information-sharing agreements between individuals and the College of Policing. In order for the college to fulfil its objectives it will need, from time to time, to have access to certain information. This information could cover a range of issues, including information about data in support of its work on the effectiveness of policing practice, data to inform the standards it sets for police officers and staff, and information that will help it produce the standards of ethics and values for the police. For example, as part of the college’s work to develop standards and ethics for the police, it may need information from the IPCC about its investigations and some of the lessons it has learned from the conduct of police officers. This information will be general and it should not be necessary for the IPCC to share information that would enable the college or its staff to identify individual police officers. I hope that noble Lords agree that it is important for the IPCC and other public authorities to have a clear legal power to share this valuable information with the college.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

Of course, at this stage I am probing. Anything more comes later. I understand to an extent the purpose of the clause, which is to give powers. Perhaps it is a failure of my imagination but I am not clear as to what sort of information the college might require to be disclosed. I will look at what my noble friend has said. As I have said, this seems to be a very wide clause. I will have to do some work on this after today but I am not clear on how the restrictions to which my noble friend has referred would work in this connection. For the moment, I am left with one question. Has the Information Commissioner specifically been consulted about this clause?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I suggest that between Committee and Report I meet my noble friend to address her specific concerns, which I hope will help with clarity and understanding at the next stage.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Does the noble Baroness agree that it might be helpful if the Minister, in writing to her, sets out a precise list of what is required and explains why it would not be possible for that list to be laid in regulations so that it is clear what information is being referred to? The way in which it is written at the moment seems extraordinarily broad.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I agree with that. I was going to press my noble friend a little on whether the Information Commissioner has been consulted. I hoped that there might be time for inspiration to flow across half the length of the Chamber but I do not think that it has.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

While inspiration may be somewhat limited, I take on board the noble Lord’s suggestion. As I have said, I will suggest a meeting to address some of the concerns.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments address aspects of the new closure power. As noble Lords will recall, the power has two key parts: the closure notice and the closure order. Where informal measures have failed, or are inappropriate, the closure notice allows the police or the local authority to close quickly those premises for up to 48 hours out of court. In some cases this will be sufficient to resolve the problem, but in others a longer-term closure order might be required. Following the closure notice, the police force or the local authority that issued it can apply to the court for a closure order to close premises for up to three months, although this can subsequently be extended by the court to a maximum of six months. This allows the local authority or the police to find a solution to the problem while protecting victims and communities.

Amendments 56ZG and 56ZH seek to exempt the operator of the premises and anyone else designated to secure the premises from the effect of a closure notice. The purpose of the closure powers is to restrict the number of people who are able to access premises, and therefore to reduce the nuisance or annoyance associated with it. The clause allows the owner as of right to access the premises so that they may secure and maintain it and obtain any items or information they may need. As my noble friend has explained, there may be cases where a person other than the owner is in control of the premises. Alternatively, the owner may not be able to attend and secure the premises. The closure powers cover a wide range of premises and therefore a wide range of situations. To include the term “operator” may make the definition too wide, enabling a large number of people to claim that they cannot be prohibited from accessing the premises by the closure order. This could have the effect of undermining the closure notice itself.

However, Clause 69 already contains provisions to allow the closure notice to be tailored to the appropriate circumstances, which was a concern my noble friend raised. Subsection (3) allows for the police or for the local authority to define who is prohibited, at what times and in what circumstances. The police or the local authority will therefore consider what the appropriate arrangement is on a case-by-case basis. It is in their interests to have the premises properly and safely secured, as this will help ensure adherence to the closure notice. They will be able to make arrangements to ensure that the appropriate people can access the premises, whether this be the operator or someone designated by the owner.

The list of those whom a closure notice cannot prohibit relates to those who should not be prohibited by an out-of-court notice in any circumstances. It is our view that this should remain as those who habitually live there or who own the premises. The clause adequately caters for my noble friend’s point as regards the operator of the premises.

Amendment 56ZJ seeks to amend Clause 69(4). Subsection (4) states that the closure notice cannot prohibit access to those who,

“habitually live on the premises, or … the owner”.

This means that those people can continue to access and, indeed, occupy the premises. However, a closure order can prohibit those who live in the premises and the owner. A closure order can be made only by the court. That is an important distinction between the two measures. It is for the court to decide who should be prohibited. The breach of closure notice is also a criminal offence, whether or not it is specified. It is important to be clear who can enter premises subject to a closure notice. It also needs to be clear to those who may seek to enter premises as well as those enforcing the closure notice. Whether this is specified or not does not change the fact that the closure notice cannot prohibit those who habitually live on, or own, the premises, as I have already said. Therefore, even where an oversight occurs, it will not result in an individual having breached a closure notice as the notice cannot prohibit access. As I say, a closure order can be made only by the court.

Amendment 56ZQ seeks to allow the owner, occupier or operator of the premises to appeal a closure order. I am pleased to reassure my noble friend that the Bill already allows for this. Clause 77 sets out two categories of people who can appeal a closure order. These are, first, a person on whom the notice was served and, secondly, a person who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served. Clause 72(2) covers the serving of a notice. It lists a number of ways the police or local authority can serve the notice and requires that they do all of these, if possible. Therefore, in the majority of cases, the owner, operator and occupier will be served the notice and therefore can appeal under Clause 77(1)(a). If, for some reason, it was not possible to serve the notice on the owner, operator or occupier, they would be able to appeal under Clause 77(1)(b), which provides that anyone,

“who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served”,

can appeal the closure order. In this clause, “interest” covers those with a financial or legal interest in the premises. Given those reasons, I hope that my noble friend will not move the amendments I have covered.

Amendment 56ZL would allow a local authority to appoint a business partner to serve a closure notice, as my noble friend explained. I acknowledge from my own experience that this can be helpful. Local authorities considered different ways of delivering these services and concluded that the decision to serve a notice should remain with the local authority. I would like to take the amendment away and come back to it on Report.

Amendment 56ZR seeks to ensure that those who may need to know about a closure notice or order are properly informed of its provisions to ensure that it is not breached inadvertently. The Bill requires that the police or local authority,

“must if possible … fix a copy of the notice to at least one prominent place on the premises … each normal means of access … any outbuildings that appear … to be used with or as part of the premises”.

They must also, if possible,

“give a copy of the notice to at least one person who appears … to have control of or responsibility for the premises, and … to the people who live on the premises and to any person who does not live there but was informed (under section 69(6)) that the notice was going to be issued”.

This ensures that, where it is possible to do so, the notice will be clearly displayed and given to the key individuals who may be seeking to access the premises. If, for whatever reason, the notice could not be served and displayed in the way I have indicated, resulting in an individual accidentally entering premises in contravention of a closure order or notice, it could be considered that in the circumstances the individual had a reasonable excuse. They would not then be in breach of the notice or order and would not have committed an offence.

Amendment 56ZS would allow those seeking compensation to have to satisfy only two of the conditions set out in the Bill rather than all four. I listened very carefully to what my noble friend said about the drafting elements, and I am sure that officials have noted that as well. However, the amendment would mean that the court would have to be satisfied only that one of the conditions set out in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of Clause 83(5) had been met alongside the condition in paragraph (d). However, I take on board the helpful comment made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee about the drafting. We will reflect on that in advance of Report.

We have deliberately framed these provisions around the four conditions that have to be met. We often decry the growth of compensation culture and we do not want to add to it here. Of course, where the owner or occupier of the premises subject to a closure notice or order has suffered financial loss, was not in any way associated with the anti-social behaviour on the premises and took reasonable steps to prevent such behaviour, that person should be entitled to claim compensation. However, we do not believe that the ability to seek compensation should extend more widely than this. To do so would open up the police and local authorities to numerous claims, and would make it more difficult for applicants to know whether their claim was likely to be successful. Importantly, this amendment might also deter police and local authorities from exercising their closure powers in appropriate cases, thereby exposing victims to continued distress.

Having said that, I note that my noble friend’s intent in tabling this amendment came from a drafting perspective. However, based on the assurances that I have given, I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I shall do so but, on that last point, when I looked again at my amendment in preparation for today’s debate, I thought that this would be something that would be completely bemusing to anyone who did not have the Bill in front of them. I apologise for that. It should be paragraph (a) or (b) and (c) and (d). It also seems that the applicant having incurred financial loss, as set out in paragraph (c), was a given—one has to incur loss to have a claim for damages. So it may or may not need to be said.

I am grateful to my noble friend for the other points that he has covered. On whether or not one refers to the operator—I am thinking about businesses—we are back to guidance. My noble friend talked about discretion on a case-by-case basis. He is aware that I would prefer to rely on guidance as little as possible.

I remain concerned about the term “habitually resident”. There is a danger of people who live in the premises being adversely affected when they should not be caught up in this. Where will they go?

I note that the Minister talked about “interest”, where it is used in the context of a financial and legal interest, as being something between interest in property and the normal, general meaning of the term. I will think about that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I never object to any noble Lord interjecting and asking questions. I have sought to explain why a defined period is specified in Clause 56. I shall certainly take back the suggestion on this matter made by my noble friend Lord Faulks and speak to officials. However, Clause 56 provides a key link through from Clause 55 to Clause 57 and sets out quite specifically the details behind the order. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee on the understanding that I will further consider Amendment 55A.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, having started as one who believes—I hope that I still do—very considerably in local democracy, I suppose that I have fallen into the trap over the years of viewing whatever comes to us on green paper as restricting it; it is the cynical view that too much legislation has somehow engendered. Like others, I do not see this debate as being two-dimensional in the way that the Minister has just described; that is, “Is it too long or too short? Well, it is in the middle so that must be okay”. It is a three-dimensional debate and the points that have been made about the expression of local democracy are important and serious. The Committee has challenged the structure of the provisions in a way that will bear a good deal of further consideration. The distinction made by my noble friend Lord Greaves between the different types of content of the orders—access on the one hand and particular activities on the other—may also get us to a better point.

On activities, I should have learnt by now not to look at my BlackBerry during debates, but a very long e-mail on this subject has just arrived from the naturists, who have been quite active in making representations on this Bill. It tells me that nudity is a state, not an activity, so how does this affect them? They are worried.

I do not want to leave it quite on that point so I come back to what the orders try to do and how that is best achieved. I shall of course withdraw my amendment at this point, but I hope that we might be able to discuss between now and Report how the orders will operate. Sadly, I see that the LGA, whose briefing I have just looked up, says that it does not think that the provisions are in need of further amendment. Perhaps we need to talk to it as well. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this will make me popular, as noble Lords are now able to leave the Chamber.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I ask all noble Lords to leave the Chamber quietly out of respect for my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I hope that my amendments live up to that. I speak also to Amendments 22QU and 22QV, and Amendments 56ZBA and 56ZBB. These amendments are all about fixed-penalty notices for failure to comply, in the case of the first pair of amendments with a community protection order, and in the second pair of amendments with a public spaces protection order. The Bill allows 14 days to pay the fixed penalty, which may be reduced in amount it if is paid within a shorter period; I imagine that it is anticipated that that would be seven days. It seems to me that 14 days is a very short period. I am not in this amendment seeking to argue the merits or otherwise of either of the orders but we do not want them to come into disrepute through there being difficulties in their application. Some people go away on holidays, not realising that a notice may have become payable, because they might not actually have been handed it. There are a number of reasons why 14 days for payment is in many areas regarded as on the short side.

My amendments would provide in both cases a period of 28 days with a discount if payment is made, say, within 14 days—or, at any rate, an earlier period—which is comparable with penalties under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Amendment 22QV, also to Clause 49, would replace a certificate being one that,

“purports to be signed by or on behalf of the chief finance officer of the local authority”,

with one that is simply “signed on behalf of”. I will probably be told that this is language used in many other Acts of Parliament, but it seemed to me a curious provision. More importantly, however, there would be no scope for challenge to it if the local authority got its procedures wrong. I have therefore tabled the amendment not as a frivolous matter but as a serious one. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for explaining the purpose of these amendments. I suppose I could say that I had a vested interest in asking other noble Lords to leave quietly, as I had to respond to this amendment.

This amendment relates to the amount of time that an individual issued with a fixed penalty notice should be given to pay. Where breach of a community protection notice or of a condition of a public spaces protection order has occurred, the offender could be issued with a fixed penalty notice. Payment of this penalty notice discharges the perpetrator from any other proceedings for that breach and so they are, quite rightly, given a period of grace in which to pay the amount specified. Different fixed penalty notice schemes have different periods during which recipients are expected to pay the penalty; for example, littering is set at 14 days whereas others have a longer time. In this case we believe that 14 days is sufficient time for a perpetrator to pay that amount and that it provides the right balance between giving the offender enough time to pay the fine and ensuring that the process for collecting such money is both timely and efficient.

In terms of Amendment 22QV, I have listened to the case made by my noble friend, who highlighted certain instances of concern. However, the language used in the Bill is, of course, commonly used elsewhere on the statute book. For example, this terminology is also used in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 in relation to fixed penalty notices under that Act. In effect it avoids the chief finance officer having to come to court to give evidence personally that he or she had signed the certificate. Despite that provision, it remains a matter for the court to decide what weight to place upon the document as evidence, although in practice it is highly unlikely that whether the document is genuine will ever be an issue. I have heard the case that my noble friend has made, but the Government feel that on balance the 14 days and, as has been stated, the signature of the chief finance officer as stands in what the Government have tabled is the right way forward. For those reasons, I hope that my noble friend is minded to withdraw her amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I will withdraw them, given that this is Committee stage. The last of my amendments would not impose any requirement to give evidence any more than would the words in the Bill, but I can see that I will not get anywhere with that. On the 14 days, is it just a question of the Government saying, “We think this is right”, or is it something more detailed than that? We have different views. I have said that I am concerned that the timing may too easily be missed, and that it could bring the penalties regime into disrepute. If the noble Lord has any more to say in support, I would be glad to hear it. Will he tell the Committee whether the shorter period envisaged is indeed seven days, which I rather guessed at? I do not know whether his notes give him that information.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

It would be appropriate if I wrote to the noble Baroness; I will come back to her specifically on whether it is seven or 10 days. However, on the 14 days, that is the Government’s position as it stands.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendment 21J in this group. Consultation can mean a lot of things and sometimes mean different things to different people, depending on what they want it to mean. I have pretty much given up tabling amendments which add, to “consult”, “and have regard to the outcome of the consultation”, having been told quite frequently that of course that must be implicit. However, I have met times when the consulter has not recognised that.

We heard from the Minister on my previous amendments that local authority social services have a role when someone under the age of 18 is involved as the respondent or potential respondent to an IPNA. My amendment would insert a reference to,

“the local authority for the area where the respondent resides”,

meaning of course the social services part of the local authority. I am seeking consultation, without trying to define it, of the local authority as well as of the youth offending team.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and my noble friend for their amendments. This group again relates to the balance that needs to be struck in ensuring that the appropriate consultation takes place, but relates specifically to cases involving young people under the age of 18.

Amendment 21H is concerned with the duty on applicants for injunctions under Part 1 to consult with the local youth offending teams in the case of under-18s. Crucially, that consultation must take place before the application is made to the court. That is an important change to the process where young people are concerned. Therefore, youth offending teams will help to ensure that the prohibitions in the order are appropriate and understood by the young person, and that any positive requirements are tailored to meet his or her needs. As we all recognise, as do I from my time in local government, youth offending teams are an important and established part of the youth justice system. They are well used to working with young people in these sorts of circumstances.

The noble Lord raised the issue of consultation. This would be an ongoing process and I would expect the consultation with the youth offending team to take place swiftly for the benefit both of the victims and of the communities that require protection. One of our primary objectives in reforming the response to anti-social behaviour is to speed up that response and I would not expect this consultation requirement to prevent that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, is my noble friend aware of whether the Local Government Association has been consulted—sorry to use the term again—on this provision? It seems to me that the Government should have been talking to it about whether it would want a statutory role. I take his point about occasional urgency but it is always open to a local authority to say, “This is urgent. You had better get on with it”, or, at the other end of the spectrum, to say, “We have no comment”. If he is not aware of what talks underlay the provision as we see it now, perhaps he could let me know after today’s sitting.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

In direct response to that, I can say that representatives from the LGA and other organisations have attended meetings with my noble friend with regard to this Bill. I again reassure her that, as the guidelines are reviewed, I am sure that the LGA will be making representations and will be part of that process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Baroness raises an interesting point. I have been wondering about other examples, and the one that immediately came to mind was the noise of aircraft coming into Heathrow in the middle of the night, which is a big issue in my area—but perhaps the order is not intended to be as extensive as that.

I have a serious question for the noble Baroness, which is whether it is appropriate for criminal offences to be created by regulations. That is in effect what subsection (3) of the proposed new clause would do, as it states:

“The Secretary of State shall, by regulations, set out the circumstances under which an offence has been committed”.

I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, so I do not want to be too tedious about it, but that struck me as a point of principle that one might want to consider.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Government are often accused of not listening. I listened with great interest to the previous debate, initiated by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, and as I went over to the Box I noticed a piece of litter on the floor. I acted promptly and handed it to the doorkeeper—so there is some hope of instant action on the part of the Government.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for tabling her amendment with the proposed new clause and raising an important point. I agree with her that, where businesses act in a way that is likely to cause harm to others, they should be held to account. However, the Government feel that a corporate ASBO is unnecessary. We believe that we have drafted the new powers in such a way as to be flexible enough to deal with this eventuality.

For example, the new community protection notice, which we will discuss when we come to Part 4, can be issued against a corporate body. If that corporate body is persistently acting in an unreasonable manner and having a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality, it can be held to account through the new notice. While the community protection notice replaces litter and graffiti notices, it can be used for much more, including noise and other behaviours. What is more, breach is a criminal offence and, on conviction, a business could be fined up to £20,000. It is a power which provides real teeth.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will also speak to Amendments 22H, 22J and 22K. My noble friend Lord Greaves has Amendment 22KA in this group.

On Monday, when we were discussing the relationship between provisions in the Bill and statutory nuisance, I explained that I had been asked to raise the matter by the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, of which I am vice-president. I will speak briefly to my amendments today, but I also ask the Minister whether we can discuss the matter before Report. The institute is clearly concerned about remedies such as the community protection orders and noise abatement orders being too similar for comfort. The institute talked to me about the potential for confusion and conflict and twin-tracking by different authorities and different professions. However, I assure the Minister that we are willing to contribute to the guidance around all this. We take the point that the guidance is still in draft form. We are concerned to get the legislation right, not just to rely on guidance where the legislation may in itself not be as clear as it might be.

Amendment 22NA would provide for a significant detrimental effect to trigger a community protection notice. Where there is a civil process, the de minimis principle would apply. It has been put to me that the alternative to dealing with this in legislation is for it to come out over time in case law, which would obviously have a cost implication.

Amendment 22ND would require a person in authority to assure himself that the conduct is not already subject to any other statutory control. As drafted, that person may think it appropriate as a discretion. This seems to be quite a weak protection against different agencies wasting each others’ time chasing the same end. What is most important is to avoid obstructing or contradicting action that has already been taken, such as an indefinite prohibition in an abatement notice.

Amendment 22NE would provide that no notice was served where it would be controlled under any other statute, which is again about conflict. Where the problem is noise, apportioning responsibility and sorting out a fair and effective remedy can take a lot of technical—

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am responding to this debate, so I am listening with great attention, but for a moment I thought I had lost my place. I must point out that we are discussing group 9, which starts with Amendment 22E. I believe that my noble friend is speaking to group 13, which starts with Amendment 22NA. My apologies for not intervening sooner, but I thought that I had lost my place. Perhaps she would like to speak to the earlier group.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend is absolutely right. I apologise to the Committee. There is such enthusiasm to move on today that I was moving too fast. I must give my noble friend an opportunity to accept or possibly reject my Amendment 22E. It would provide in Clause 21 that the court must receive evidence about suitability. There must be a proportionality element in the requirements provided in the orders. I may be told that this yet again is something that is dealt with in guidance.

Amendment 22G takes us to the duration of the orders. We are presented in the case of under-18s with a fixed period of not less than two years or an indefinite period. I suggest that there should be a limit for everyone, as there is for under-18s. The criminal behaviour order can include a lot of requirements and restraints, which could, if they go on indefinitely, have a disproportionate impact. To have something hanging over one’s head indefinitely could be a disincentive—you could give up hope of ever getting it right.

Amendment 22H would provide that reviews are not confined to under-18s, which continues more of that thought. Amendments 22J and 22K are consequential on that. I beg to move.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 18th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have amendments tabled later on community protection notices and how statutory nuisance is to be dealt with, but I use this opportunity to ask the Minister a couple of questions.

In the Commons, the Government took out the exclusion from community protection notices of statutory nuisance—it was in Clause 40(5)—saying that they had established a technical working group including representatives from the police, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and the Chartered Institute of Housing to draft clear guidance as to what to use when. I should declare an interest. I am a vice-president of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, which is why it has come to me on this issue. It has told me that it was asked for a comment at one point but that it is not aware of the technical working group. Can the Minister explain to the Committee what is happening in that area?

The institute’s concern is about confusion over who should do what, whose responsibility it should be and whether, in the case of some nuisances, those who might have powers to deal with them are likely to have the technical knowledge. The point was made to me that you can tell what litter is, but it is not always easy to tell when noise is a statutory nuisance, because so many conditions and criteria surround it. I would be grateful for some help and news, which might shorten our debate later—although, of course, it might not.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Greaves for his amendments and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her comments. It is interesting that she talks about noise. In one’s own personal experience, what is music to some is noise to others. I think we shall be returning to this.

With regard to the amendments to the new injunction, it is our view that they could make the actual process much slower and more bureaucratic—akin to the orders that we seek to replace. It would not help professionals deal with anti-social people and, more importantly, would not help victims who have to endure the perpetrator’s behaviour.

The new injunction is designed to be used quickly and, in many cases, preventively, to stop problem behaviours before they escalate. These problem behaviours will not always relate to a statutory nuisance. Therefore, to include an additional condition which suggests that statutory nuisance should be considered every time would, in all likelihood, result in some social landlords or police forces being unable to act quickly to protect the victim. We expect social landlords and police forces to work in partnership with local councils to deal with shared problems, such as anti-social noise nuisance. If social landlords and police forces felt obliged to seek advice from the local council’s statutory nuisance team before every injunction, this could delay the process of the application unnecessarily, and lead to victims suffering even more. Moreover, this new third limb of the test could open up the process to prolonged and costly legal challenges, as respondents sought to argue that their conduct amounted to a statutory nuisance.

The same is true of my noble friend’s amendment to Clause 40. As he will be aware, we had originally excluded statutory nuisance from situations in which a community protection order could be issued. However, after discussing the matter at length with environmental health officers and other professionals, we discovered that this exemption could result in an undesirable scenario. Some perpetrators might use the appeal mechanism to go unpunished via either the statutory nuisance or the breach of the community protection notice.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee is correct that the Opposition Front Bench raised such concerns in Committee in the Commons. Having considered the matter further, the Commons was content to make this change on Report. So I ask my noble friend to accept my assurances that we continue to work closely with statutory nuisance experts, to ensure that the guidelines reflect the important rule that the regime plays in protecting communities from behaviour that is a nuisance or prejudicial to health. In addition, I assure my noble friend Lord Greaves that the issue of a community protection notice, or the granting of an injunction by the court—which was a specific question he asked—in no way discharges the local authority from its statutory duty to serve an abatement notice where behaviour meets the required threshold.

I say to my noble friend Lady Hamwee that our draft guidelines already deal with the interface between statutory nuisances and the new powers in the Bill. I can reassure her that we continue to engage with environmental health practitioners on how this guidance can be further developed in advance of the commencements.

My noble friend Lord Greaves also asked about the choices available. There is no choice as to whether a local authority serves an abatement notice for statutory nuisance. It must serve one if it is satisfied that a matter is a statutory nuisance. He referred to the Explanatory Notes. There is a good example in there that is illustrative of what may be a nuisance, but not a statutory nuisance. A dog bounding over a fence, or through a hole in a fence, can be a nuisance. Recently, I experienced that with my young son, aged 20 months. Suddenly, a dog scurried under a fence, and appeared next to him. It was certainly more than a nuisance to his father, who was far more startled, whereas the dog was just being playful. In those cases, the first and most sensible thing for anyone who is trying to be a good neighbour to do is to talk their neighbour and see if the matter can be resolved locally. Where such behaviour persists, a non-statutory injunction is not appropriate, and a sensible solution is required before putting it on to a more serious basis.

Let me reassure my noble friend Lady Hamwee once again that the Government continue to talk to experts in the field. Based on my explanation, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendments.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 9. I thought that after the previous debate on the Bill I would be faced with saying, “Follow that”, but lunch overtook us. However, it is in fact a question of “Follow that”.

Amendment 6 would alter the definition of “force” in the new provision. Noble Lords might wonder why I am worrying about that. In fact, I propose that the definition be the same as the definition in Section 63A(6) of the Family Law Act 1996—in other words, the definition for the forced marriage protection order. I had wondered why different definitions were used in the Bill and existing legislation.

I wonder that even more after the previous debate on the Bill. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, referred to psychological means of coercion which are not referred to in the Bill but are referred to in the 1996 statute. She talked about emotional blackmail which might be exerted by members of the very observant part of the Jewish community.

My noble friend Lord Ahmad certainly used the term “psychology”. If there are intentional differences between the grounds for the two different offences—as we are calling both of them—then the Committee ought to be clear that that is intended. If it is not intended that there are differences, then, again, the Committee should be clear that that is the case.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, talked about “emotional blackmail”; I would include that with the term “psychological coercion”. There may be quite porous demarcation lines in attitudes and the way in which one deals with one’s children. However, trying to stand back and look at it objectively, given the emotional blackmail which she described, from what we have heard from other noble Lords and what we know from our own experience, psychological means should not simply be left aside without noble Lords addressing their minds to them.

My Amendment 9 is much more straightforward. Its purpose is merely to obtain confirmation that a habitual residence—“habitually” is the term used in the Bill—is as it is understood under the Hague convention and the case law which has developed from that. It is obviously not defined within the Bill. I believe that it is used elsewhere in legislation, although I have not been able to find it myself—although I found myself going down different byways of reading, looking at reports of cases on the internet. However, if my noble friend could confirm that, I would be grateful. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for explaining her Amendments 6 and 9 to Clause 108. It is important that we get the definitions of the new offences right and I welcome this opportunity to explore them in more detail.

Amendment 6 would amend the definition of a forced marriage. Clause 108 defines it as including the use of,

“violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage”.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee proposes that this should be replaced with alternative wording that, as she explains, would mirror the language used in the Family Law Act 1996 in relation to forced marriage protection orders.

The main difference between the two formulations is that the amendment refers to “psychological means”, while Clause 108 refers to,

“any other form of coercion”.

This is intended to make it very clear that the offence recognises the different types of pressure that can be put on victims. Victims are continually faced with different types of pressure in the course of being forced into marriage, including physical, emotional, financial and sexual pressures. It is therefore right that the definition of the offence should fully cover all of the behaviours that could be employed by the perpetrators of this absolutely horrendous practice. That is what Clause 108 does. On that basis, therefore, I do not believe my noble friend’s Amendment 6 to be necessary.

My noble friend’s Amendment 9, as she has explained, is designed to probe the meaning of the word “habitually” as used in Clause 108(5)(b). The clause provides that an offence is committed outside the United Kingdom if either the victim or perpetrator is a UK national or “habitually resident” in England or Wales. This means that the new law will apply, for example, in a situation where someone who lives in England or Wales is taken abroad in order to be forced into a marriage.

The term “habitual residence” simply means the ordinary residence of a person. As my noble friend alluded to, in fact, the term was introduced into English law from the conventions under the Hague Conference on Private International Law, where it was developed due to the perceived problems with establishing the domicile of some persons, in particular children. The term is commonly used in legislation without further definition and I am satisfied that that is the correct approach to adopt here. Based on those clarifications and explanations, I hope that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will probe the first one a little further. Of course I agree with my noble friend that we have to cover every situation, or as he said, “every type of pressure”. However, as regards the definition, is there a distinction between the provision in the Bill and the provision in the 1996 Act? If there are differences, can we know them? He has not addressed that point. If they are the same, can we know that?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, as I said about the language to which my noble friend alluded, Clause 108 has been drafted to ensure that it clearly covers the wider range of factual scenarios that exist in forced marriage cases. That addresses why there is a difference between Clause 108 and Section 63A. Clause 108 is intended to be all-encompassing.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that begs the question of whether the 1996 Act is not all encompassing. I do not want to make life more uncomfortable this afternoon—I stress this afternoon—for my noble friend, but would he be able to write to me about that, following today’s Committee proceedings? This looks like a lawyer’s point, but it is a very real one. We have already talked today and will continue to talk about the choice between the two routes. Of course, one of the factors in the choice will be if the definitions are different, and therefore if the criteria for choosing one route are not the same as the criteria for choosing the other. I gave notice to my noble friend—although probably not directly to him—of the points that I wanted to raise on these two amendments. I will not tease him about the fact that he has not told us which other legislation the term “habitually resident” is in. However, that is probably enough from me for now, and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the Government have moved forward a great deal, as have the police and the CPS, in understanding that in some cases, particularly in cases of trafficked people, those who may at first be seen as a perpetrator—often of relatively small crimes, but sometimes of bigger ones—are in fact victims and have done what they have done as a result of the way that they have been treated. It seems to me that what the noble Baroness proposes is absolutely in line with that thinking.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her comments and join with her and the rest of the House in wishing my noble friend a very happy birthday. My appearance at the Dispatch Box may be one of the best presents that I can give my noble friend, who is doing a gallant job as my Whip today. This may well be part of the Conservative birthday present allocation.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has explained, Amendment 1 would require a court making sexual harm prevention orders in relation to under-18s to have regard to,

“their emotional, welfare and behavioural needs, therapeutic or educational support”.

Schedule 5 makes provision to replace the current sexual offences prevention order, foreign travel order and risk of sexual harm order with sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders. The new sexual harm prevention order can be applied where an individual has had a conviction for a specific sexual or violent offence and the court is satisfied that the prohibitions are necessary to protect the public in the UK or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm. The new sexual risk order can be applied to individuals without a conviction but who have committed an act of a sexual nature and, as a result, the court is satisfied that prohibitions are necessary to protect the public in the UK or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

I hope that neither this amendment nor the two that I have in the next group will cause the Minister to run to and from the Dispatch Box. I see that he is already confident enough that that will not be the case. Amendment 2 takes us to violent offender orders, and my noble friend will, I hope, already know what my point is.

Clause 106, the new clause to be inserted in the 2008 Act, will allow the Secretary of State by an affirmative order to amend the list of specified offences, either by adding to or subtracting from the list—the specified offences being those which can trigger the order. It seems to me that this is a very wide power. As I said, it would require an affirmative resolution, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has not chosen to share any concern about this because it is an affirmative power. However, I think that it would be helpful to understand how the Secretary of State will be expected to go about making such a change. Of course, we always have to remember that, although there may be a benign Secretary of State this month, next month or next year the Secretary of State may be less benign in the eyes of some Members of the House.

In order to probe this, my amendment would provide for consultation, before an order is made, with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. I cannot believe that any Secretary of State would undertake such an act without consultation, but you never know. It would be good to have confirmation on record as to the means that would be followed. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for raising this issue. Amendment 2 would, as she has outlined, require the Secretary of State to consult those deemed appropriate prior to making an order to amend the list of specified offences for a violent offender order.

Clause 106 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the list of specified offences through secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure. Models of offending change over time, and this change will help to ensure that the legislative powers for managing violent offenders can be updated to reflect changes with the appropriate parliamentary oversight.

My noble friend asked specifically about the consultation. I reassure her and the Committee that any changes to the list of specified offences will be considered in close consultation with the police, the National Offender Management Service and others to help to ensure that the police and NOMS are able to manage the risk posed by serious violent offenders. Specialist input will be sought as a matter of course. We do not consider that specific requirement to consult is required on the face of the Bill. I hope that this reassures my noble friend that appropriate consultation will take place and that she will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is helpful. It has only just occurred to me that I should have asked whether any change is in mind at the moment. I do not know whether the Minister’s briefing allows him to answer that question.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

As I have highlighted, there is NOMS and the police will be involved. Additional experts will be sought as part of that process.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend Lady Berridge is not in her place at the moment, but I know, from a very short conversation I had with her yesterday, that her Amendment 11 is intended to address the second problem to which the noble and learned Baroness referred. When I first read it, I thought it was simply about annulment but she tells me that it is, in fact, about property.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece for tabling the amendment. The noble and learned Baroness made a point about forced marriages. As I said when we moved on to this part of the Bill, there is evidence to suggest that this is a reality and we have to deal with it. I can assure her that the Government take this very seriously. The issue of unregistered marriages which take place abroad or even on home soil, and which do not provide the protections afforded by the rule of law, is one that must be looked at and the Government are looking at how this can be done. An example of good practice within Muslim communities is where the nikah—one aspect of Islamic marriages—is not performed by the imam until a registration certificate is provided. Many Muslim communities adhere to that principle and we should be encouraging that kind of practice across the board.

I turn to the amendments which concern the publication of guidance for front-line professionals working in this area. We know how important guidance is if the new legislation is to work effectively. I join other noble Lords in saying that this must not just be issued but, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said, adhered to as well. I align myself with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, on the Forced Marriage Unit and pay tribute to the work done in this field, over many years, by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland.

First, I will explain the existing statutory provisions in relation to guidance. These are contained in Section 63Q of the Family Law Act 1996, which was inserted into the 1996 Act by the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. I join noble friends in paying tribute to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill whose Private Member’s Bill resulted in the 2007 Act and provided a widely used civil remedy for victims and potential victims of forced marriage. Subsection (1) of Section 63Q of the 1996 Act provides that the Secretary of State may, from time to time, prepare and publish guidance to such descriptions of persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate about, first, the effect of Part 4A of the Family Law Act 1996, and, secondly, about other matters relating to forced marriages.

Clause 107 amends Part 4A to make the breach of a forced marriage protection order a criminal offence, so the preparation of guidance about the new breach offence is already covered by the power to issue guidance provided for in Section 63Q. Clause 108 creates a new offence of forced marriage which is undoubtedly a matter relating to forced marriages, so the preparation of guidance about the offence in Clause 108 is also already covered by Section 63Q.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I declare an interest as one of the three joint presidents of London Councils. I have seen the briefing from that body and support the points that have been made. I entirely agree with my noble friend that “bottom-up” is best, but sometimes structure is needed to allow these things to function well. I am not sure whether the example I am going to give is appropriate, but I will give it anyway.

In the London borough of Sutton, where this issue is “bottom-up” but structured, there is a very interesting partnership between the local authority and the police. The structure is such that there is joint management of certain services provided by those two parts of the public sector. Sutton tends not to go in for strident self-publicity so it does not seem to have made very much of this, but what it has done is extremely interesting. The joint management whereby the two arms are brought together works well as there is joint accountability. Whether or not that is a good example, I take the point about the need sometimes to have a framework. It is much better if that can happen locally but facilitation through legislation does not go amiss. If the Government still maintain that there is no need for this, are they considering issuing any guidance? I would rather not have central government guidance on what should happen locally, but sometimes a little prompting is helpful.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, Amendment 16 seeks to ensure that all providers of probation services are required to,

“participate in, and be accountable to, community safety partnerships and to co-operate with crime and disorder reduction partnerships and local integrated offender management schemes”.

As was said in Committee, the Government are clear that nothing we do to tackle reoffending will work,

“unless it is rooted in local partnerships”.—[Official Report, 5/6/2013; col. 1217.]

I have seen how that works in practice. We absolutely expect future probation providers to engage with the relevant statutory partnerships. It will be in providers’ interests to work with other partners to achieve the best results. Our payment mechanism, which will reward reductions in reoffending, will incentivise them to do so.

In tabling the amendment, the noble Lord seeks to ensure that all probation service providers are both members of, and accountable to, community safety partnerships and other crime reduction initiatives such as integrated offender management. Section 5 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 sets out who should be the responsible authorities for the reduction of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour as well as for reducing reoffending. A provider of probation services will be a responsible authority for these purposes where the arrangements entered into with the Secretary of State provide for it to be a responsible authority.

As a responsible authority, current probation providers already have a number of obligations including being involved with the formulation of the local CSP strategy and plan for community safety, attending CSP meetings and sharing depersonalised information with the other four responsible authorities. Community safety partnerships are subject to overview and scrutiny by the local district council. As a responsible authority, providers of probation services already participate in this process. Nothing in this Bill will amend or change the Crime and Disorder Act. Providers will need to demonstrate how they will work in and strengthen local partnerships if they are to be successful in bidding to deliver probation services. Specifically, we are including a requirement for providers to evidence in their bids how they will relate to and incorporate integrated offender management arrangements into their proposal and contracts will reflect this. I hope my noble friend is reassured by that.

We are reviewing the current statutory partnership requirements to ensure they are appropriately assigned and discharged in the new system and we envisage that the contracts will reflect the statutory partnerships providers are required to participate in. Furthermore, the National Probation Service and contracted providers will be required to develop effective operational and strategic partnerships with each other and agree their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to statutory partnerships to minimise duplication and maximise effectiveness. Once the system is up and running we will monitor local partnership working as part of obtaining assurances of the delivery of services and we will liaise with police and crime commissioners, local authorities and other relevant partners as appropriate.

I understand the noble Lord’s concern. Indeed, he approaches these issues with great expertise and I appreciate the sentiment behind this amendment. However, I fear that some unintended consequences may arise from it. The amendment would in effect mean that every provider of probation services in an area, no matter how big or small, would have to participate in and be accountable to community safety partnerships and other crime and disorder reduction partnerships. Different areas of the country will have different partnerships, of different sizes and with different challenges. The right approach is to look at this carefully before deciding which provider, at which level, is a responsible authority. A tailored approach, rather than a blanket one, seems to me to be the right way forward.

I have outlined the existing legal responsibilities and requirements on providers of probation services and reiterated our commitment to local partnerships, together with the steps we are taking to ensure that our reforms are rooted in local partnerships, so that offenders can access the broad package of support they need to get their lives back on track. I have also outlined potential unintended consequences of the amendment. I hope, with the clarifications I have given and the assurances I have made, that the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

Probation Services: Outsourcing

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Thursday 21st March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

At the moment the situation is that all recalls which are received through the probation service are considered. I believe that the current figure is around 16,000 a year, of which some 5,000 sit within the prison population. The appeal processes are clear to prisoners. However, this is not the private sector taking responsibility away from the public sector or from the Government. Ultimately, the private and the public sector will work together on reoffending, as I have said. Moreover, we are seeing some great results. Peterborough provides a practical example of the three areas working together and showing positive results.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, is the Minister happy that the licence arrangements generally that we have in place in this country are effective and appropriate, in particular given the large number of recalls to prison from licence? This must add to the strain on prison places. Yesterday, I heard a criminologist from Finland describe the number of recalls in England and Wales as astonishing.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend raises a very important point. If we look at reoffending generally, 50% of offenders who serve a 12-month sentence still go on to reoffend. Currently, as I have already alluded to, the recall figure is in excess of 16,000, of whom 5,000 represent the 85,000 or so of the prison population, which is about 5%. No, it is not good enough, but we believe that the Transforming Rehabilitation programme that we have put forward, the consultation on which, as I said, closed on 22 February, will provide a practical way of addressing reoffending. It costs us, as an economy and as a society, very heavily.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in providing for a code of practice for prosecutors in relation to deferred prosecution agreements, the Government have sought to ensure consistency with other statutory provisions relating to guidance for prosecutors on operational matters. As I have said before, the scheme for DPAs is a new concept for our criminal justice system and as such does not fall within the scope of any existing guidance for prosecutors.

I will turn to specific amendments and refer first to Amendment 30. The Government consider that there should be a code for DPAs comparable to the code for Crown prosecutors issued by the DPP under Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. The code for Crown prosecutors sets out the general principles that prosecutors should follow when undertaking their functions. My noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to paragraph 6(1)(a) of Schedule 17, which reflects Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 as to the general nature of the guidance to be set out in the code of practice for DPAs. However, unlike Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, paragraph 6 of Schedule 17 sets out in further detail the matters that must be covered in the code of practice for DPAs. Let me be clear: the key elements of DPAs are clearly set out in the Bill. The code of practice will provide guidance to prosecutors on the exercise of their discretion on operational matters. As such, the code is fundamentally an operational document and seeks to preserve prosecutorial discretion in operational matters. This approach will ensure that the code provides guidance in relation to key procedural matters for DPAs and decisions to be made by prosecutors.

Amendment 31 would add to paragraph 6 a further matter on which the code of practice may give guidance by adding to the list, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said,

“the choice of expiry date for a DPA”.

The Government’s view is that paragraph 6(2) is already clear that the code may give guidance on any relevant matter. If prosecutors consider it necessary and desirable to have guidance on the duration and expiry of an agreement, they would have the power to issue such guidance under that paragraph. We do not therefore see any particular or specific need to highlight this issue, although, again, the points of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, have been noted on this matter.

Amendments 31A and 31B seek to make the DPA code of practice for prosecutors subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the letter issued by my noble friend Lord McNally. He is correct that the fundamental principle of prosecutorial independence means that it is appropriate for the code to be issued by the DPP and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. The code is an operational document, as I have already said. As such, we do not consider that it is either necessary or appropriate to make this code subject to parliamentary scrutiny. This approach is consistent with that under Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 in respect of the code for Crown prosecutors. I should add that a supplementary delegated powers memorandum has been provided to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which has not raised any concerns about the approach taken in Schedule 17.

Amendment 32, referred to by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, relates to the duty on prosecutors to take account of the code of practice for DPAs when exercising functions under Schedule 17. It is essential that there is transparency and consistency in the way DPAs operate. The code of practice will play an important part in meeting these requirements. Requiring prosecutors to “take account of” the code throughout the deferred prosecution agreement process will ensure that it is considered and applied in relation to making decisions and exercising functions. Parties to the agreement, the judge and the public can be confident that each agreement will be approached and made in a consistent manner. We do not consider that requiring a prosecutor to “have regard to” rather than “take account of” the code would make any material difference to the extent of its use by the prosecutor.

In conclusion, there is a strong case for ensuring parity between the legislation providing for the deferred prosecution agreement code of practice and the code of practice for Crown prosecutors issued under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. I hope that, in light of the explanations I have given, my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will agree not to press their amendments at this time.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that. In view of the hour, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, paragraph 13 of the schedule provides for the use of material in criminal proceedings. Sub-paragraph (4) states that certain material,

“may only be used in evidence … on a prosecution”,

either for the same offence or for an offence as it says in the paragraph—I will not take up the Committee’s time in reading it. The material in question is,

“material that shows that P entered into negotiations for a DPA, including in particular”.

I was concerned by the phrase “in particular”. The way I have dealt with that in the amendment to probe this is to insert “any” so that it is “any material”,

“that shows that P entered into negotiations for a DPA”.

I hope that the Minister can assure me that the items listed are merely the most obvious examples and that this is not an exhaustive list. It seems to me that it could be interpreted that way. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, this amendment relates to paragraph 13 of Schedule 17, which deals with the use of material arising from DPAs. In particular, it seeks clarification about what can be relied upon by a prosecutor in future criminal proceedings when a DPA has not been approved by the court and made. The Government’s intention is to provide necessary protections and safeguards as regards organisations voluntarily entering into the process towards the making of a DPA in the event, for whatever reason, that an agreement is not finalised. Without these safeguards, some organisations might not voluntarily engage and co-operate with the prosecution.

On the point raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I can give her the assurance that paragraph 13(6)(a) is a non-exhaustive list of materials that are likely to be produced during the process towards the making of an agreement, which would show that negotiations had been entered into. They are the most obvious documents, and the use of the words “including in particular” makes it clear that they may not be the only materials that might show that negotiations had taken place and would not be capable of being used other than in the limited circumstances referred to in paragraph 13(4). I suggest that inserting “any” at the start of, or removing “in particular” from, paragraph 13(6)(a) would not make the position any clearer.

I trust that with the assurance that I have given to my noble friend she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I think that that amounted to a yes in response to my request for assurance. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for drawing the Committee’s attention to this issue. The Government firmly believe that wrongdoers should not be able to profit or otherwise benefit from their offending behaviour; that is why DPAs will require organisations to comply with tough terms and conditions. These terms may include financial elements such as requirements to pay compensation to victims, a financial penalty, and the reasonable costs of the prosecutor, as well as a requirement on the organisation to disgorge the proceeds of criminal wrongdoing. However, it should also be remembered—as it was in discussions on a previous amendment, as pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith—that DPAs can include other non-financial requirements, such as updating anti-corruption or fraud policies and retraining staff. Those are important attributes.

Deferred prosecution agreements are intended to ensure that organisations recognise and are held to account for their wrongdoing and take steps to mend their ways. Fulfilling the terms of an agreement should not be seen as simple entries in an organisation’s financial book-keeping records. The harm inflicted on the victims of economic crime and innocent third parties should not be seen simply as a cost of doing business.

It will come as no surprise to your Lordships that my noble friend referred to tax. The tax obligations of organisations relating to financial penalties and compensation payments can be, and are, complicated. These obligations have been very carefully developed over many years to ensure the right balance is struck. Although I welcome my noble friend’s efforts to clarify taxation arrangements under a DPA, the question of whether and which financial elements might be tax deductible is, and should continue to be, determined by finance legislation so that all relevant matters and consequences can be taken into consideration. That also avoids a piecemeal and haphazard approach to tax matters which might set an unhelpful precedent or have unintended consequences. Matters in respect of taxation are properly a matter for the Finance Acts and not for legislation such as this.

In light of these points, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lady Hamwee would agree to withdraw her amendment. In conclusion, I say to the Committee, and in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that I think it would be beneficial to arrange a meeting with officials so that we can address some of the issues more specifically in advance of Report stage. But for now, I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee will agree to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I will withdraw the amendment. I understand that tax is complicated and that the Government prefer to deal with it in specific legislation. Nevertheless, I think that at the moment there is the very real possibility that a donation to charity made under this provision would be treated as deductible. I hope that the Minister will arrange for that to be confirmed to me or otherwise so that I can consider what to do on the next occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 15 and 16. I noted with some amusement that my noble friend Lady Linklater said that her children were in their forties, which made me feel like a mere child on the Front Bench.

Amendments 15 and 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee relate to the duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice regarding the processing of data gathered under an electronic monitoring requirement imposed for either the purpose of monitoring compliance or monitoring whereabouts in short tracking offenders.

As my noble friend said, Amendment 15 is intended to extend the scope of the code of practice to include the use of data as well as the processing of data. In fact, the code itself would be designed to ensure such use meets the principles and obligations set out in the Data Protection Act 1998 for the processing of such data. “Processing” is defined in Section 1(1) of that Act to include the “obtaining, recording or holding” of data, including, among other things, the

“use of the information or data”.

To add the words “use of” to this provision could call into question the breadth of “processing” in relation to the code and could have the effect of narrowing the requirement, which I am sure is not the intention of my noble friend.

The code will undoubtedly cover the use of data obtained under this provision. It will fully and clearly set out the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the collection, retention, and sharing of data. For example, we envisage that the code will set out the circumstances in which it may be permissible to share data with the police to assist with crime detection.

The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, correctly pre-empted what I am going to say on Amendment 16. I am always astonished by the great wisdom in this House. Indeed, I can give the assurance that the Government fully recognise the need to consult all stakeholders during the development of the code. Accordingly, the Government intend to consult the Information Commissioner as well as all the other interested parties listed in the amendment to ensure that the framework for processing such data is transparent and lawful while being of value to organisations that are going to use it at an operational level. In the interests of simplicity and flexibility, and given the Government’s undertaking to consult key parties, I feel that this amendment is not needed. Therefore, I hope that I have been able to reassure my noble friend on both counts and that she will be willing to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sorry that I did not do my homework adequately on the first of the amendments and I am grateful for the clarification. On the second of the amendments, will the noble Lord repeat what the Government will consult on? Although he said that the Government would consult these organisations, I was not sure that that extended to the point I made about the impact on offenders; in other words, pulling this into the whole package of taking us forward on the rehabilitative route. Towards the end of his response, the noble Lord explained what the consultation would be.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Government will consult on the full content of the code of practice. My noble friend listed several organisations, including the police and the Information Commissioner. All those listed in the amendment will form part of the consultation.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again, I assure my noble friend that the defendant would know of any such use of data. If any legal representative of the defendant wished to access that data, they would also be made available. I hope that we can clarify any other outstanding issues either before or on Report.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it might be useful if at some point we could have a discussion whereby we can understand precisely what all the steps are. Like my noble friend Lord Marks, I am clear about the assurances that have been given, but I am not clear to what extent they are within the wording of the schedule and, even having listened to the Minister, how much they need to be there.

As regards Amendment 17, I will look at the references to the other provisions to which he pointed me when he said that there was a need for consistency. I understand that that is important so as not to suggest there is no difference in provision. I might need to ask him if he would be good enough to spend a little time with me, and perhaps my noble friend Lord Marks, to go through the steps in detail. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I can come back on this. The point is reinforced by the fact that designation under paragraph 3(1)(c) is subject to the affirmative procedure under Clause 30.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving her amendment. When devising the new process for deferred prosecution agreements for England and Wales, the Government sought to ensure that it aligned with key strengths and aspects of the existing criminal justice system. To that end, we provided for decision-making throughout the process to be properly guided, including by the code of practice for prosecutors, and overseen by the judiciary.

Paragraph 3 of the schedule provides that the decision to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with an organisation should be exercised personally by designated prosecutors, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. This is to ensure that there is prosecutorial oversight of each DPA at the highest level. It mirrors existing requirements for such oversight, including, for example, decisions to bring proceedings under the Bribery Act 2010. Offences under the Bribery Act 2010 are among the economic and financial offences for which we propose DPAs. This process should be available, as detailed in Part 2 of Schedule 17.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked what would occur when the relevant director, whom we hope in each case will make the decision personally, is not available. In order that due process can continue without delay, we have provided the power for the relevant director, if they are going to be unavailable, to designate another prosecutor to exercise the oversight and decision-making functions. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked whether they could assign this power to anyone. I suggest that someone who is qualified and in such a senior role will assign it to an appropriate prosecutor in their relevant area.

Consistent with similar powers for personal decisions by directors, such as those under the Bribery Act 2010, we have not sought to constrain the ability to delegate the power to enter into a DPA. We are not contemplating large numbers of deferred prosecution agreements each year, and are confident that the directors are fully committed to making decisions personally, as envisaged, and would designate another person to do so only in exceptional circumstances and with good reason—and, I will add, would designate only an appropriate person.

I consider it important in the interests of openness and consistency that DPAs should align as closely as possible with existing and established law, and with the processes of our criminal justice system. That is what we have sought to achieve in paragraph 3, and indeed throughout Schedule 17. I therefore hope that with this explanation my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

EU: European Justice and Home Affairs Powers

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 15th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I know many noble Lords wish to speak on this. Perhaps we can take the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and then come across proportionately to the other Benches.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that it is fundamental to the EU that there is freedom of movement and, that being so, that we need the tools to deal with negative consequences, when there are negative consequences? If that is so, will he give the House an assurance that the Government’s decisions will be based on evidence and informed opinion—of which there is quite a lot—because the Statement is not neutral? Does my noble friend further agree that playing hard to get is not always the best way to progress a relationship?