Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

56ZF: Clause 69, page 41, line 31, leave out “habitually”

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I shall speak also to Amendments 56ZG, 56ZH, 56ZJ, 56ZK, 56ZL, 56ZQ, 56ZR and 56ZS.

This group of amendments takes us to Clause 69, Chapter 3, on the “Closure of premises associated with nuisance or disorder”. The heading ends with “etc”. We have talked quite a lot about the “etc” in this Bill. I am concerned in these amendments with who may be affected by a closure order. For instance, Clause 69(1) provides that there may be a closure notice if,

“the use of particular premises has resulted, or … is likely … to result, in nuisance to members of the public, or … that there has been, or … is likely soon to be, disorder … associated with the … premises”.

The closure notice will prohibit access by everyone, essentially, subject to some particularities. It occurred to me that premises that may well be affected are pubs, which very often have staff living in them. There are particular rights for people who habitually live on the premises, but “habitually” is quite a high test. The provision that I have just mentioned is about access to the premises. I read that as allowing the people listed to continue to occupy the premises, but I may be wrong in that. The guidance that the Government have issued in draft suggests that it means access in order to collect belongings. Will the Minister confirm, or otherwise, that the closure notice could mean that people will be turned out of where they live? The amendment removes the word “habitually” and Amendment 56ZK is consequential.

Amendment 56ZG would add a right of access not just for the owner but also for an operator. I am again thinking about pubs and other leisure or business places. The owner is not necessarily the person who operates the business on the premises. In a later clause, there are provisions for rights of appeal. Again, I seek to add an operator in there, because I am not clear whether an operator would have an interest in the premises for the purposes of these provisions. Interest in land has a narrower meaning than I read it here. I also suggest that there should be access by anyone designated and agreed by the police who is required to ensure the safety and security of the premises. It would be unreasonable to refuse access if looking after the safety and security of the premises is required, as I assume that it would be.

Amendment ZJ is what my noble friend Lord Greaves would call, “One of those legal things”. As the Minister said, he is occupied “Pendling” today, rather than being in your Lordships’ Chamber. Clause 69(4) states:

“A closure notice may not prohibit access by”,

certain people,

“and accordingly they must be specified”.

I suggest that they should be deemed to be specified. If they must be specified, what happens if the specification fails to include them? That would be grounds for a challenge over a relatively small issue. I am trying to be more helpful there than perhaps I am in the other amendments.

Amendment 56ZL is about the service of notices. The guidance to which I referred states that it is a local matter as to who is designated by the local authority to serve the notice. I agree with that, so I think that we should say so and not just say any employee of the local authority.

Amendment 56ZR inserts a new subsection on the display of information. There is a defence of a reasonable excuse. I am not sure whether a lack of knowledge, which this amendment would cure, is a sufficient excuse when we are talking about a criminal offence.

Finally, Amendment 56ZS concerns compensation. In Clause 83(5), it seems that the court needs to be satisfied as to all four matters set out. However, that cannot be right, because the first two are mutually exclusive. This is therefore a drafting amendment, but not a drafting amendment for the sake of it. I am suggesting that the court needs to be satisfied as to the matters in paragraphs (a) or (b) and paragraphs (c) and (d). I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments address aspects of the new closure power. As noble Lords will recall, the power has two key parts: the closure notice and the closure order. Where informal measures have failed, or are inappropriate, the closure notice allows the police or the local authority to close quickly those premises for up to 48 hours out of court. In some cases this will be sufficient to resolve the problem, but in others a longer-term closure order might be required. Following the closure notice, the police force or the local authority that issued it can apply to the court for a closure order to close premises for up to three months, although this can subsequently be extended by the court to a maximum of six months. This allows the local authority or the police to find a solution to the problem while protecting victims and communities.

Amendments 56ZG and 56ZH seek to exempt the operator of the premises and anyone else designated to secure the premises from the effect of a closure notice. The purpose of the closure powers is to restrict the number of people who are able to access premises, and therefore to reduce the nuisance or annoyance associated with it. The clause allows the owner as of right to access the premises so that they may secure and maintain it and obtain any items or information they may need. As my noble friend has explained, there may be cases where a person other than the owner is in control of the premises. Alternatively, the owner may not be able to attend and secure the premises. The closure powers cover a wide range of premises and therefore a wide range of situations. To include the term “operator” may make the definition too wide, enabling a large number of people to claim that they cannot be prohibited from accessing the premises by the closure order. This could have the effect of undermining the closure notice itself.

However, Clause 69 already contains provisions to allow the closure notice to be tailored to the appropriate circumstances, which was a concern my noble friend raised. Subsection (3) allows for the police or for the local authority to define who is prohibited, at what times and in what circumstances. The police or the local authority will therefore consider what the appropriate arrangement is on a case-by-case basis. It is in their interests to have the premises properly and safely secured, as this will help ensure adherence to the closure notice. They will be able to make arrangements to ensure that the appropriate people can access the premises, whether this be the operator or someone designated by the owner.

The list of those whom a closure notice cannot prohibit relates to those who should not be prohibited by an out-of-court notice in any circumstances. It is our view that this should remain as those who habitually live there or who own the premises. The clause adequately caters for my noble friend’s point as regards the operator of the premises.

Amendment 56ZJ seeks to amend Clause 69(4). Subsection (4) states that the closure notice cannot prohibit access to those who,

“habitually live on the premises, or … the owner”.

This means that those people can continue to access and, indeed, occupy the premises. However, a closure order can prohibit those who live in the premises and the owner. A closure order can be made only by the court. That is an important distinction between the two measures. It is for the court to decide who should be prohibited. The breach of closure notice is also a criminal offence, whether or not it is specified. It is important to be clear who can enter premises subject to a closure notice. It also needs to be clear to those who may seek to enter premises as well as those enforcing the closure notice. Whether this is specified or not does not change the fact that the closure notice cannot prohibit those who habitually live on, or own, the premises, as I have already said. Therefore, even where an oversight occurs, it will not result in an individual having breached a closure notice as the notice cannot prohibit access. As I say, a closure order can be made only by the court.

Amendment 56ZQ seeks to allow the owner, occupier or operator of the premises to appeal a closure order. I am pleased to reassure my noble friend that the Bill already allows for this. Clause 77 sets out two categories of people who can appeal a closure order. These are, first, a person on whom the notice was served and, secondly, a person who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served. Clause 72(2) covers the serving of a notice. It lists a number of ways the police or local authority can serve the notice and requires that they do all of these, if possible. Therefore, in the majority of cases, the owner, operator and occupier will be served the notice and therefore can appeal under Clause 77(1)(a). If, for some reason, it was not possible to serve the notice on the owner, operator or occupier, they would be able to appeal under Clause 77(1)(b), which provides that anyone,

“who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served”,

can appeal the closure order. In this clause, “interest” covers those with a financial or legal interest in the premises. Given those reasons, I hope that my noble friend will not move the amendments I have covered.

Amendment 56ZL would allow a local authority to appoint a business partner to serve a closure notice, as my noble friend explained. I acknowledge from my own experience that this can be helpful. Local authorities considered different ways of delivering these services and concluded that the decision to serve a notice should remain with the local authority. I would like to take the amendment away and come back to it on Report.

Amendment 56ZR seeks to ensure that those who may need to know about a closure notice or order are properly informed of its provisions to ensure that it is not breached inadvertently. The Bill requires that the police or local authority,

“must if possible … fix a copy of the notice to at least one prominent place on the premises … each normal means of access … any outbuildings that appear … to be used with or as part of the premises”.

They must also, if possible,

“give a copy of the notice to at least one person who appears … to have control of or responsibility for the premises, and … to the people who live on the premises and to any person who does not live there but was informed (under section 69(6)) that the notice was going to be issued”.

This ensures that, where it is possible to do so, the notice will be clearly displayed and given to the key individuals who may be seeking to access the premises. If, for whatever reason, the notice could not be served and displayed in the way I have indicated, resulting in an individual accidentally entering premises in contravention of a closure order or notice, it could be considered that in the circumstances the individual had a reasonable excuse. They would not then be in breach of the notice or order and would not have committed an offence.

Amendment 56ZS would allow those seeking compensation to have to satisfy only two of the conditions set out in the Bill rather than all four. I listened very carefully to what my noble friend said about the drafting elements, and I am sure that officials have noted that as well. However, the amendment would mean that the court would have to be satisfied only that one of the conditions set out in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of Clause 83(5) had been met alongside the condition in paragraph (d). However, I take on board the helpful comment made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee about the drafting. We will reflect on that in advance of Report.

We have deliberately framed these provisions around the four conditions that have to be met. We often decry the growth of compensation culture and we do not want to add to it here. Of course, where the owner or occupier of the premises subject to a closure notice or order has suffered financial loss, was not in any way associated with the anti-social behaviour on the premises and took reasonable steps to prevent such behaviour, that person should be entitled to claim compensation. However, we do not believe that the ability to seek compensation should extend more widely than this. To do so would open up the police and local authorities to numerous claims, and would make it more difficult for applicants to know whether their claim was likely to be successful. Importantly, this amendment might also deter police and local authorities from exercising their closure powers in appropriate cases, thereby exposing victims to continued distress.

Having said that, I note that my noble friend’s intent in tabling this amendment came from a drafting perspective. However, based on the assurances that I have given, I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I shall do so but, on that last point, when I looked again at my amendment in preparation for today’s debate, I thought that this would be something that would be completely bemusing to anyone who did not have the Bill in front of them. I apologise for that. It should be paragraph (a) or (b) and (c) and (d). It also seems that the applicant having incurred financial loss, as set out in paragraph (c), was a given—one has to incur loss to have a claim for damages. So it may or may not need to be said.

I am grateful to my noble friend for the other points that he has covered. On whether or not one refers to the operator—I am thinking about businesses—we are back to guidance. My noble friend talked about discretion on a case-by-case basis. He is aware that I would prefer to rely on guidance as little as possible.

I remain concerned about the term “habitually resident”. There is a danger of people who live in the premises being adversely affected when they should not be caught up in this. Where will they go?

I note that the Minister talked about “interest”, where it is used in the context of a financial and legal interest, as being something between interest in property and the normal, general meaning of the term. I will think about that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56ZF withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

56AA: Clause 86, page 52, line 37, after “met” insert “and that such an order is proportionate”

[Baroness Hamwee]

Part 5 of the Bill is about recovery of possession of dwelling-houses on grounds of anti-social behaviour. This amendment—and others in this group in my name—proposes that the court’s response should be proportionate and that this should be written into the legislation. I very much support the thrust of the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Young, which are more oppositionist than mine.

The draft guidance on the purpose of the new absolute—I emphasise that word—ground for possession says that it is,

“intended for the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour and landlords should ensure that the ground is used selectively.”

So it is an absolute ground but is to be used selectively. I am very uncomfortable with that. If it is to be used selectively, the legislation should make it clear that the absolute ground is not an absolute ground to be applied in every instance. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which made this point in relation to exclusion from dwelling houses under other clauses, takes the view that reliance on the Human Rights Act, which the Government have prayed in aid, is not satisfactory when Parliament has the opportunity, as we do here, to define the test in the legislation.

Another group of amendments seeks to leave out the term “visiting” so that possession could not be sought on the basis of behaviour by someone who is visiting premises. Can the Minister be specific as to what may or may not be proportionate to fulfil the conditions in the grounds for possession of properties under various tenures—that is, possession of somebody else’s home—when the visitor may not even be a regular and frequent visitor but an occasional one? I would not be persuaded that the fact that someone was a regular and frequent visitor and behaved badly should be grounds for possession.

Amendment 56AE is a small amendment on the regulations about reviewing the requirements. Sometimes whether something “may” or “shall” be provided seems to be a matter of how you feel on the day and how the wind is blowing. I have always had a problem with understanding the term “may in particular” if it means that you must do something. Frankly, some of the Bill is hard enough without it being elliptical.

My noble friend Lord Greaves has tabled a number of amendments to these provisions, to which I will speak briefly. He seeks to change the term “locality” to “vicinity” and asks whether the term “locality” means the same as where it is used elsewhere in the legislation—for instance, with public spaces protection orders—and whether it is wider or narrower than “neighbourhood”. Of course, in any event, how appropriate is it here? His Amendments 56ACA and 56ABA on Clause 86 deal with conditions surrounding a breach of an IPNA which is not in the dwelling house or its locality, but which is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a resident or occupant of housing in the locality or to the landlord or manager. Therefore, as my noble friend says, something that could annoy outside the locality would fulfil the condition and allow possession to be obtained, and a person on his own with nobody else in sight might fulfil the words in the Bill. There would be considerable evidential problems if the person was on his own and nobody else could see it, but in terms of the strict wording he may be right.

Finally—as far as I am concerned—Amendment 56ADD would leave out Clause 87(8), which directs the tenant who needs help or advice about possession notice to,

“take it immediately to a Citizens’ Advice Bureau, a housing aid centre, a law centre or a solicitor”.

My noble friend queries whether it is appropriate to include a reference to the citizens advice bureaux in legislation. Of course, the very obvious questions here are about willing the ends by suggesting that a tenant should go there to seek help, but not willing the means to do so. I beg to move.

[Baroness Young of Hornsey (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 56ADC and 56AL are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady O’Loan. As something urgent has come up, I am afraid that my noble friend cannot be here today. Essentially, I tabled these amendments in order to find out a bit more about what the Government see as the implications of Clauses 86 and 89. My understanding of the Government’s case is that they want to speed up the process of evictions from social housing in order to,

“better protect victims in the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour and criminality”.

I am sure that we would all support that.

The DCLG consultation described the proposed new measure on possession as limited to cases of proven,

“serious housing-related anti-social behaviour”,

which suggests that there would be limited application of these clauses rather than using them as a way of increasing the number of evictions. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify this point because only one of the triggers for mandatory possession in this section relates to a conviction for seriously violent crime. The other triggers relate to breaches of injunctions or criminal behaviour orders.

Given the high rate of breaching of ASBOs over the years of approaching 58%—of that figure, another 43% of all ASBOs issued have been breached more than once—there does not seem to be proportionality in these sanctions. Where is the discretion to allow for different circumstances and for the fact that approximately seven in 10 children breach their ASBO, often due to lack of support or organisation rather than calculated non-compliance? It seems that this proposed new power must inevitably lead to a rise in evictions. If this is not the Government’s intention, will the Minister tell the Committee how the Government will prevent such a rise? These clauses could have very severe implications for under-18s. It will affect children who have done nothing wrong but who have had the bad luck to share a dwelling with somebody who has. The clauses could also be deemed detrimental to the children and young people who do breach or offend.

I am concerned in particular that children will suffer. There do not appear to be many, or any, safeguards. Therefore children will suffer due to the impact of, potentially, one person’s behaviour, especially as a family evicted on these grounds may be deemed to have made themselves intentionally homeless—that is, of course, what the amendment seeks to address—and are thus unlikely to be rehoused in comparable accommodation in their neighbourhood. How does this sanction address the underlying causes of anti-social behaviour? Surely making a whole family homeless due to the behaviour of one family member, or indeed a visitor, is both a both a double punishment and counterproductive. My understanding is that even if mandatory eviction would not amount to a breach of the human rights convention, it is still a public policy proposal that doubly punishes the most vulnerable families in our society. A mandatory requirement for the judge to order possession removes all but the bare minimum of judicial discretion in deciding whether or not an individual or a family is to be evicted.

Can the Minister explain how it is desirable that by the simple act of having a visitor in a dwelling place, a family might be made homeless? How is someone supposed to know that a visitor has breached an ASBO? How will these clauses be policed and monitored? I am particularly concerned that care leavers, who may be helped through the allocation of a local authority flat when they leave care, often find it difficult to prevent local drug dealers or other undesirable elements subject to ASBOs entering their property and sometimes settling in for a long stay. What would the consequences be for a young person in this position who felt bullied into providing accommodation for someone in breach of an ASBO?

--- Later in debate ---

There is no absolute right to social housing or to accommodation in the private sector. Tenants have responsibilities that are enshrined in the terms of the tenancy. They are duty bound to comply with the terms of such agreements and that includes not engaging in crime or anti-social behaviour, particularly where that makes the lives of their neighbours a misery. Where they do engage in such behaviour they have to expect there to be consequences, including, potentially, having their home repossessed. Where a court has already passed judgment—for example, finding a tenant guilty of breach of a criminal behaviour order—the landlord should be able to take swift action to seek repossession. These clauses provide for just that and I commend them to the Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I do not want to go through every amendment again. On the question of the term “locality”, the Minister has explained that there will be confusion if the term used in housing law is not used here and I understand that. My noble friend’s point was that, while that may be the case, there will be confusion if the term is used in the Bill in different places meaning different things, but I will leave that to him to pursue after today.

I was intrigued by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, about local authorities being sued for failing to take steps that were open to them. I wonder whether providing an absolute ground, which the guidance says is to be used selectively, might not cause more difficulties as regards what is open to neighbours to claim. I understand entirely the point about the impact on neighbours—although perhaps I do not understand it entirely, because I am lucky enough not to have suffered from such a degree of unneighbourly activity. Having been a councillor, however, one cannot be unaware of what goes on.

I would be repeating what I said before if I were to comment on the term “proportionate” and the use of discretion, so I will simply beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56AA withdrawn.