Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

Overall, the development of confidence will be critical, but we know, beyond peradventure, that it is an experience which can be life-changing. The Government’s commitment to RJ, which is now being put into statute, must be the key to its proper development. I commend these amendments to the Minister in the hope of seeing the Government getting things right at the start of this important policy initiative. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I welcome the widespread support restorative justice has received across both Houses. Through this Bill, Her Majesty’s Government aim to empower victims by giving them an opportunity to be heard, and also to ensure that offenders understand the impact of their actions on others and, more importantly perhaps, to motivate them to change. We seem to be in agreement that we should be working towards encouraging restorative justice to be used more widely—a sentiment that I know echoes across this House as well as the other place— not as a replacement to, but in parallel with, existing sentencing powers.

As we have heard from my noble friend Lady Linklater, Amendment 12 adds an explicit reference to the needs of the victim to our definition of restorative justice requirements, which is a sentiment I strongly relate to. The Government are aware that restorative justice can be very beneficial to victims, and our research in pilots demonstrates that 85% of victims participating in direct restorative justice conferencing with their offenders were satisfied, so we entirely agree that restorative justice, when used appropriately, can—most importantly—meet the needs of victims.

Therefore, I cannot argue with this point, and if my noble friend Lady Linklater is willing to withdraw Amendment 12, I will consider it in advance of Report and return to this subject at that time. I am sure that my noble friend will understand that I cannot give an explicit undertaking at this stage to bring forward a government amendment but, as I have said, the Government will give sympathetic consideration to the points she has strongly made.

On Amendment 13, I hope that it is fair to say that, as my noble friend acknowledged, we are at a turning point in relation to restorative justice. The Government are attempting to take a victim-led approach to restorative justice and to move away from the offender-led process. We are also making sure that the victim is aware of, and considers, restorative justice as an option much earlier in the process.

This amendment would allow the court to defer sentencing for restorative justice even when the agreement of all the parties, including the victim, has not been obtained. This is despite agreement being necessary for the activity to take place. The Government take the view that it is important that the victim is able to consider and decide whether to give his or her consent before the court defers sentence. We are therefore not convinced that a court would want to defer sentencing unless everyone was signed up to it, as this could ultimately lead to lengthy delays, which are in no one’s interest. We must also remember that additional delays can result in increased costs.

In addition to concerns that the amendment could increase court time, we need to consider the impact on the victim of deferring a sentence. This is about the victim. In many cases, the victim will want speedy justice and closure, if for nothing else than in order to put the whole episode behind them. Any victim of crime shares that sentiment. I wonder whether deferment without the victim’s agreement could look as if restorative justice was being imposed on the victim in the sense that, “We’ve already delayed the court case for you, so you may well wish to consent”.

As I said earlier, I welcome the strong support for restorative justice from across the House and particularly thank my noble friend Lady Linklater for tabling her amendments. Support for the victim is vital, and I totally align myself with that sentiment. In light of the points I have made and my commitment further to consider Amendment 12, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lady Linklater would withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Linklater of Butterstone]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response. I am glad that, overall, he has accepted my arguments. I shall have to read Hansard carefully and perhaps ask a few more questions about deferral because it is a new element of reticence that I was not expecting. I am therefore likely to want to come back to this subject, but in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 15 and 16. I noted with some amusement that my noble friend Lady Linklater said that her children were in their forties, which made me feel like a mere child on the Front Bench.

Amendments 15 and 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee relate to the duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice regarding the processing of data gathered under an electronic monitoring requirement imposed for either the purpose of monitoring compliance or monitoring whereabouts in short tracking offenders.

As my noble friend said, Amendment 15 is intended to extend the scope of the code of practice to include the use of data as well as the processing of data. In fact, the code itself would be designed to ensure such use meets the principles and obligations set out in the Data Protection Act 1998 for the processing of such data. “Processing” is defined in Section 1(1) of that Act to include the “obtaining, recording or holding” of data, including, among other things, the

“use of the information or data”.

To add the words “use of” to this provision could call into question the breadth of “processing” in relation to the code and could have the effect of narrowing the requirement, which I am sure is not the intention of my noble friend.

The code will undoubtedly cover the use of data obtained under this provision. It will fully and clearly set out the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the collection, retention, and sharing of data. For example, we envisage that the code will set out the circumstances in which it may be permissible to share data with the police to assist with crime detection.

The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, correctly pre-empted what I am going to say on Amendment 16. I am always astonished by the great wisdom in this House. Indeed, I can give the assurance that the Government fully recognise the need to consult all stakeholders during the development of the code. Accordingly, the Government intend to consult the Information Commissioner as well as all the other interested parties listed in the amendment to ensure that the framework for processing such data is transparent and lawful while being of value to organisations that are going to use it at an operational level. In the interests of simplicity and flexibility, and given the Government’s undertaking to consult key parties, I feel that this amendment is not needed. Therefore, I hope that I have been able to reassure my noble friend on both counts and that she will be willing to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sorry that I did not do my homework adequately on the first of the amendments and I am grateful for the clarification. On the second of the amendments, will the noble Lord repeat what the Government will consult on? Although he said that the Government would consult these organisations, I was not sure that that extended to the point I made about the impact on offenders; in other words, pulling this into the whole package of taking us forward on the rehabilitative route. Towards the end of his response, the noble Lord explained what the consultation would be.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Government will consult on the full content of the code of practice. My noble friend listed several organisations, including the police and the Information Commissioner. All those listed in the amendment will form part of the consultation.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 18 and 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 18 concerns information disclosed to a court, under the same paragraph—paragraph 27 of Schedule 16—as my noble friend’s earlier amendment; it relates to social security information and information to be disclosed by HMRC relating to a defendant’s finances. In both cases, the information is disclosed to assist the court in inquiring into the defendant’s financial circumstances. Sub-paragraphs (3) and (5) of paragraph 27 limit the purposes for which the disclosure is to be made and used—broadly for the purpose of assisting the court in dealing with the offender, with a general prohibition on further and wider disclosure. So far, that all seems entirely appropriate, but sub-paragraph (7)(b) appears to allow such information to be disclosed much more widely and outside the ambit of the proceedings before the court concerning the defendant, provided only that the information is summarised—what is sometimes called “gisted”—and anonymised by framing it in such a way that the defendant is not identified. That allows disclosure of social security and HMRC information relating to the finances of the offender for purposes other than his sentencing which was the purpose for which the information was originally obtained from the government bodies concerned.

What is the point of sub-paragraph (7)(b)? If there is a point to this collection of information, is this Bill and is this Schedule the place for its introduction? If we are to widen powers to obtain and use information in this gisted and anonymised form, then provisions authorising that should form part of a Bill concerning the collection of such information and not be added by a side wind in this way to a schedule which concerns sentencing and information required to assist the court with that sentencing.

Amendment 19 would ensure that, where social security or financial information about a defendant is obtained from the relevant government departments, the defendant must be shown that information and be told to whom it has been disclosed. It is fundamental that a defendant, about whom confidential financial information is obtained from government in connection with proceedings against him, should be entitled, as of right, to see that information to enable him to challenge and explain it, to know the information upon which the court is asked to act and also to know the identity of anyone to whom it has been disclosed. The paragraph, as drafted, permits such disclosure to him, or at least it does not prohibit it, by sub-paragraph (7)(a), but it does not require it and it should.

Will the Minister consider accepting the amendments or at least take them away and come back with amendments to the same effect?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, this group of amendments relates to provisions in Part 6 of Schedule 16 that enable the sharing of data between government departments for the purpose of setting fines and other financial penalties. My noble friend referred to definitions and what is where I will attempt in my response to Amendment 17 to make clear that, at each stage of the process, access to the data we refer to will be limited to only those with appropriate authority and a genuine need to see the data for the purposes of assisting a court that may wish to see it for sentencing purposes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to the use of the word “wants” in paragraph 27 of Schedule 16. This is intended to ensure consistency with subsections (1), (2) and (3)(a) of Clause 22. We have not used such words as “requires” or “needs” in the Bill because, technically, the court neither requires nor needs access to information held by the Department for Work and Pensions or HMRC. The information in question could be obtained by other means; for example, by requiring the defendant to provide details of their own financial circumstances. The relevant person “wants” the information because it comes directly from the Department for Work and Pensions and HMRC and this is the most reliable way of giving the court the accurate information about the defendant’s financial circumstances. It may arise that financial circumstances have changed. There will always be provisions within such proceedings to allow someone in such a situation to be allowed to present an up-to-date position of their financial circumstances.

Turning to Amendment 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I can confirm that Part 6 of Schedule 16 allows for the disclosure of financial information obtained under these provisions in a summary format. Nevertheless, paragraph 27(7)(b) only allows for the publication of financial information if it is in anonymised form. I remind the Committee that under paragraph 28, the publication of any financial information without lawful authority is a criminal offence, punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment.

The purpose of allowing the publication of summarised financial information obtained under this provision is to allow anonymised financial information to be shared for the purposes of research and statistical analysis. This information will be invaluable in helping to identify trends in the criminal justice system and the financial circumstances of offenders.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, of course I will not press my amendments. Nevertheless, I am not sure that the Minister has answered the point about the defendant’s entitlement to see the information. I accept my noble friend’s assurances that it is the intention of the Government that the information will be disclosed, but there is absolutely no reason why such a provision should not be in the legislation, rather than the current, rather negative, lack of a provision that exists at the moment.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again, I assure my noble friend that the defendant would know of any such use of data. If any legal representative of the defendant wished to access that data, they would also be made available. I hope that we can clarify any other outstanding issues either before or on Report.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it might be useful if at some point we could have a discussion whereby we can understand precisely what all the steps are. Like my noble friend Lord Marks, I am clear about the assurances that have been given, but I am not clear to what extent they are within the wording of the schedule and, even having listened to the Minister, how much they need to be there.

As regards Amendment 17, I will look at the references to the other provisions to which he pointed me when he said that there was a need for consistency. I understand that that is important so as not to suggest there is no difference in provision. I might need to ask him if he would be good enough to spend a little time with me, and perhaps my noble friend Lord Marks, to go through the steps in detail. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I can come back on this. The point is reinforced by the fact that designation under paragraph 3(1)(c) is subject to the affirmative procedure under Clause 30.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving her amendment. When devising the new process for deferred prosecution agreements for England and Wales, the Government sought to ensure that it aligned with key strengths and aspects of the existing criminal justice system. To that end, we provided for decision-making throughout the process to be properly guided, including by the code of practice for prosecutors, and overseen by the judiciary.

Paragraph 3 of the schedule provides that the decision to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with an organisation should be exercised personally by designated prosecutors, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. This is to ensure that there is prosecutorial oversight of each DPA at the highest level. It mirrors existing requirements for such oversight, including, for example, decisions to bring proceedings under the Bribery Act 2010. Offences under the Bribery Act 2010 are among the economic and financial offences for which we propose DPAs. This process should be available, as detailed in Part 2 of Schedule 17.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked what would occur when the relevant director, whom we hope in each case will make the decision personally, is not available. In order that due process can continue without delay, we have provided the power for the relevant director, if they are going to be unavailable, to designate another prosecutor to exercise the oversight and decision-making functions. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked whether they could assign this power to anyone. I suggest that someone who is qualified and in such a senior role will assign it to an appropriate prosecutor in their relevant area.

Consistent with similar powers for personal decisions by directors, such as those under the Bribery Act 2010, we have not sought to constrain the ability to delegate the power to enter into a DPA. We are not contemplating large numbers of deferred prosecution agreements each year, and are confident that the directors are fully committed to making decisions personally, as envisaged, and would designate another person to do so only in exceptional circumstances and with good reason—and, I will add, would designate only an appropriate person.

I consider it important in the interests of openness and consistency that DPAs should align as closely as possible with existing and established law, and with the processes of our criminal justice system. That is what we have sought to achieve in paragraph 3, and indeed throughout Schedule 17. I therefore hope that with this explanation my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response, but he has not quite addressed the issue. There is nothing in the Bill that would require the substitute prosecutor to be a designated prosecutor; they could be anybody nominated by the original designated prosecutor. I again invite the Minister to take this back and have a look at it. It seems—and I think that the noble Baroness agrees with me—that there is a lacuna here that needs to be filled.