Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

Debate between Lord Spellar and Guto Bebb

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Guto Bebb]

I agree with many of my hon. Friend’s points, and I agree that the benefits arising from a good deal are worth fighting for. However, I suspect that many Members have concerns about the nature of the proposed deal and about the certainty that any such deal offers Iran’s neighbours, who also have real concerns, as he acknowledged. I accept the point about mistakes made in the past, and the importance of having a proper deal in place. However, the key point is that the deal must be acceptable to all and must give other countries in that part of the world confidence in the long term.

There is also a concern about the proposed length of the deal; we are looking at a deal that will possibly be limited to 10 years. Again, in the context of considering the development of nuclear capacity, we must ask ourselves whether 10 years is reasonable or sufficient. Given that the deal does nothing, as far as I can see, to deal with Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, there is a real question as to whether 10 years is insufficient.

If the aim is to secure the right deal, can we justify the type of concessions that we have been reading about? Hon. Members touched on verification in their interventions, but we need certainty from the Foreign Office and the Government that there is confidence that the degree of verification allowed under any agreement will be acceptable. Once again, the track record of the Iranian regime does not allow us to be confident in that regard. I understand from those who comment and speculate on what happens in Iran that only last month the International Atomic Energy Agency was refused access, and Ayatollah Khamenei said:

“No inspection of any military site or interview with nuclear scientists will be allowed.”

The question whether we will have a proper verification process in any agreement gives rise to real concern. If we have an agreement with a proper verification process, it must be maintained and foolproof, but once again Iran’s track record does not give us much confidence.

The other question that we need to address is whether an agreement that is as compromising as the proposed agreement appears to be actually contributes to an escalation of the arms race in the region, rather than a reduction of tensions. The agreement appears to state clearly that putting Iran in a position in which it is within six months of a breakout for the next 10 years is acceptable. My concern, which I think is shared by hon. Members, is that other countries in the region would end up in an arms race—not to produce a nuclear weapon, but to be within six months of a breakout. It is worth mentioning that Prince Turki al-Faisal from Saudi Arabia stated clearly that

“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too”.

That comment should be taken seriously by the Government when they assess the merits or otherwise of the deal.

Any proposed deal has to satisfy the needs of the P5+1, a very unstable region and our allies in the region. However, the real test is whether it satisfies the original intention, which was to ensure that Iran did not develop a nuclear capacity. Dr Bruno Tertrais stated that we must not

“ignore the lessons of history: nuclear-capable countries never stay at the threshold for very long.”

Looking at the bare bones of the proposed agreement, it would appear that the P5+1 are now willing to accept Iran’s being at the threshold of a nuclear breakout and that that threshold will be maintained for the next 10 years. Dr Tertrais’s words are important in that context. Countries with the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon will almost invariably end up developing it.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman is slightly contradicted by the experience in both Libya and South Africa.

[Guto Bebb]

That is an interesting point, but I suspect that the significant political changes in South Africa made a real difference to how it viewed its position in the world. I suspect that the changes that happened in South Africa are not going to happen any time soon in Iran, so my comments are still worth bearing in mind.

To what extent is the Foreign Office confident that the proposed deal, the outlines of which have been given, will be made in the long-term interest of not only Iran, but neighbouring states in the middle east? If assurances about that cannot be given, there are real questions to be asked about whether we can support any proposed deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Hollobone, to serve under the chairmanship of a fellow alumnus of Bromley Borough Council. I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) on securing the debate, although I will highlight one or two differences from his approach. I make apologies for my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Mr Thomas), who previously dealt with the subject; he has departed from the Front Bench to spend more time with the London mayoral election. Interestingly enough, this will also be my last debate from the Front Bench on foreign affairs, because I will be spending more time on politics, which I look forward to.

Given how the hon. Member for Aberconwy introduced the debate, I think that we may find more common ground between Front Benchers than between Front Benchers and Government Back Benchers—probably not the last time that will occur in this Parliament, particularly on foreign affairs. We have to define what we see as the objective of our relations with Iran, particularly in terms of the nuclear talks. Is any agreement a nuclear freeze or, as some have described it, weapons control? Is it to influence Iran’s foreign policy, and particularly its actions in respect of its neighbours, or is it to achieve regime change? All those things might be desirable, but they are not necessarily the prime objective of the talks. An analogy was made with eastern Europe and arms control, but that was immensely successful, as indeed were the Helsinki accords that helped to bring about perestroika and glasnost.

[Guto Bebb]

To clarify, the analogy with eastern Europe was made in the context of an agreement that was possibly successful as regards arms control, but was not especially good for the people of eastern Europe. An agreement now might be successful in controlling arms, but not be good for the people of the Gulf states, or indeed of Iran.

[Mr Spellar]

That may be true, but such an agreement is preferable to achieving none of those objectives. Not everything has to be agreed, particularly if we view the possession of nuclear weapons as a qualitative rather than simply quantitative change—it is not only another step. Throughout the history of arms control agreements, it has been recognised that the nuclear threshold is a particular and qualitatively different threshold in international relations. We could therefore have arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, even though it was repressing its own citizens and the citizens of eastern Europe and sponsoring terrorism abroad.