Telecommunications (Security) Bill
Debate between Jo Stevens and Iain Duncan SmithMonday 30th November 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 View all Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Jo Stevens
I do not want to step beyond my brief and interfere in that of my shadow Cabinet colleague, but we certainly should not be doing business with any companies that breach both human rights and workers’ rights. We have international labour standards in place and these are not companies with which to do business.
Turning now to broadband and 5G roll-out, and the delays and the costs layering on top of them, we have already seen delays in the roll-out of second and third generation fixed broadband, and we are now at the bottom of the OECD tables. In fact, only last week the Government sneaked out in the Chancellor’s spending review plans to water down their broadband promises. Instead of keeping to their manifesto promise to roll out gigabit-speed broadband to every home in Britain by 2025, the Chancellor revealed that the Government are now aiming to have a minimum of 85% coverage by that date. The budget for that plan remains the same, but now only £1.2 billion of the £5 billion will be made available up until 2024, so this will impact on the so-called levelling-up agenda.
The Government’s delay in dealing with the issue of high-risk vendors until now has also meant that there will be added delays and costs to the roll-out of 5G. The Secretary of State accepted that in July, when he said that the cumulative delay would be two to three years. However, the Government’s impact assessment for the Bill does not establish the effect of removing Huawei from the core network on the timescale for the 5G roll-out, so has the Secretary of State’s position, set out in July, of a two to three-year delay changed at all, and why does the impact assessment fail to address that issue? Also in July, the Secretary of State predicted that removing Huawei would cost operators up to £2 billion, but that could be a huge underestimate, because BT alone is saying that it will cost it £500 million, and the costs could be far greater, including the knock-on effects in terms of lost revenue and wider economic benefits.
As well as those economic consequences, there is another impact, because the provision of 5G for most of the UK will increase the digital divide without significant measures to tackle it. The three central problems at the heart of this divide are lack of internet connection, lack of technological devices, and lack of the skills to use new technology in a meaningful way. The Government have promised, and so far failed, to solve the lack of connection, which is a particular problem for under-served communities. There is nothing about 5G that will make it a better option for those communities, who are already lacking affordable access to fast internet. In addition, there is the distinct possibility that in order to access mobile 5G internet, users will need newer and more expensive devices built for those increased speeds. The pandemic has highlighted these divides and thrown into stark relief the need for help and support for those whose lack of connection, skills and equipment is a real barrier both in terms of employment and other meaningful connections.
There is one other significant consequence to the Government’s delay, and that is the new 4G-based emergency services network. That is now unlikely to completely take over from the existing platform until 2024-25. This delay is costing taxpayers millions. If the Government are forced to keep airwaves going beyond 2022, every year of delay adds an extra cost of about £550 million. The core of the ESM network does feature Huawei equipment, but EE has said that it is already working to strip this out and hopes to complete that by 2023. However, can the Secretary of State reassure the House that the presence of Huawei kit in the 4G ESM network will not have any impact on its lifespan, financial implications or security status and safety concerns?
I turn now to the removal of high-risk vendors’ equipment from the 5G networks. For the purposes of this debate, it is probably easier to refer to it as the removal of Huawei equipment, because that is where everybody’s current focus is. This must all be removed from networks by 2027. There is the “no new purchasing” rule from the end of this month, and the Secretary of State has announced today that existing stocks cannot be used after September 2021. However, there are questions for the Government around the implementation of this that I hope the Minister will be able to answer.
I have five specific questions. First, given that the Bill is based on a distinction between the core and the edge of the networks, how confident are the Government of the durability of the barrier between the core and the edge? Secondly, what steps are the Government taking to prioritise the removal of any existing Huawei equipment from the more sensitive core part of the network, and how much equipment does Huawei have in it? Thirdly, are the Government proposing to provide help to businesses who have invested in Huawei equipment ahead of this decision, and will there be legal support, as many operators may have to honour contracts that they cannot actually use or possibly afford? Fourthly, what steps will the Government be taking to work with local authorities and others to minimise disruption to businesses and individuals when removing the equipment? Fifthly and finally, what steps are being taken to minimise the costs to business?
I have one other point, from a different policy angle. When Australia banned Huawei from participating in its 5G network in 2018, China imposed retaliatory measures on Australian goods. The Government’s impact assessment does not address the economic consequences of potential retaliatory measures, so can they explain what steps are being taken to plan for that possibility?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The hon. Lady makes reference to what the Chinese Government have been doing with regards to the Australians, which is appalling and breaches WTO rules. In a way, her request for the Government to formulate plans against such a breach is really a request of the WTO to act in this case, as it should have done earlier against China’s abuses and breaking of the WTO rules.
Jo Stevens
The right hon. Gentleman makes a valid point.
This Bill gives huge powers to the Secretary of State under the auspices of national security, but it does not define what that means. The Secretary of State will be responsible for making national security judgments and decisions in relation to potential high-risk vendors. The impact assessment suggests that he will not do so unilaterally and that he will consult with the NCSC, but it is incumbent on the Government to explain why they consider that the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport—I mean nothing personal to the right hon. Gentleman in saying this—is the appropriate decision maker on issues of national security. Would it not be better for the Secretary of State to conduct a multi-agency review prior to using these national security powers, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) has suggested in relation to the National Security and Investment Bill, which hands similar powers to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy?
The lack of a definition of national security in this Bill raises particular concerns about the significant level of discretion afforded to the Secretary of State, the transparency with which such decisions will be made and the ability of Parliament to scrutinise those decisions. On another issue relating to scrutiny, Parliament is being asked to vote on this primary legislation before significant elements of how it will operate have been published, because secondary legislation will set out specific security requirements that providers must meet and the codes of practice that have been mentioned. Those will only be available after the Bill has received Royal Assent.
We have concerns about the role and the scope of the powers given to Ofcom in this legislation. These are new powers, which are pretty onerous. With Ofcom also expected to be named as the regulator in the promised online harms Bill—when that finally arrives—we are concerned about the resourcing of and the expertise within Ofcom to be able to deliver its statutory duties and responsibilities. We are concerned not so much about the volume of work, but that the administering of this new security regime may require skills that Ofcom, and potentially DCMS, are unlikely currently to possess. The impact assessment with the Bill suggests a combined monitoring cost for DCMS and Ofcom of £7 million to £12 million over a 10-year period. Do the Government really think that this resourcing budget will be sufficient?
Finally, I turn to the issue of diversification of the telecoms sector. In the ’80s and ’90s, as BT was privatised, our telecoms supply chain was allowed to fall mainly into foreign hands, although they were the hands of our allies. Conservative Governments over the last decade squandered the world-leading position that our broadband infrastructure had been left in by the last Labour Government. Successive Conservative Governments have lost, given away or under-invested in our sovereign telecoms capability as that supply chain has become dominated by high-risk vendors. There are of course added benefits to reducing reliance on a small number of global vendors, including increasing competition, driving innovation and improving resilience, but, as BT and others have warned, it will take time to move at scale towards new approaches. Network operators need to be confident in the maturity, performance, integration and security credentials of new vendors and technologies before they are deployed in their main networks. We agree that the Government can and should help to accelerate that progress, because in doing so, there is the potential to create opportunities for the UK to take the lead, as well as to create much-needed jobs. The strategy published today will need significant scrutiny. The £250 million announced in the spending review last week is obviously welcome, but it lacks sufficient detail, and we look forward to hearing more about how it will be spent.
The Secretary of State claims that this Bill will give the UK one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world and allow us to take the action necessary to protect our networks, and I hope he is right. We will not oppose the Bill’s Second Reading, but we have many concerns that will need to be considered and addressed in Committee. The Bill that the House eventually passes must take steps to ensure that our telecoms supply chain is resilient in the future, or we will be forced to return here in a short time to deal with the next Huawei.
We must be mindful, as with all legislation, that we seek to anticipate the problems of the future rather than just deal with the issues that we face today. We of course fully support steps to remove high-risk vendors from the network, but they must go hand in hand with credible measures to diversify the supply chain. We are in this situation because there are no viable alternatives to Huawei, homegrown or otherwise, and that is, in part, a result of the chronic under-investment and lack of leadership from the Government on digital infrastructure. We have to ensure that this does not happen again.