(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as a non-executive director of Thompsons, a leading personal injury firm. I have two or three questions for the Minister, particularly on Amendment 1. I thank him for the reply we received to the letter he referred to.
The House of Lords Regulatory Reform Committee advised that the key measures in this Bill, including the levels of compensation for claimants under the tariff scheme, should feature in primary legislation, not secondary. The Constitution Committee said that Ministers should follow this advice unless there were clear and compelling reasons not to. There seems to be a trend for the Government to seek wide delegated powers that permit the determination and implementation of policy. The Constitution Committee warned that the restraint shown by noble Lords towards secondary legislation might not be sustained—a serious warning to the Government that, if this trend continues, secondary legislation might be much more difficult to accomplish. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that.
Secondly, given that the employer liability clauses will not be dealt with through the new online portal, which is being reserved for whiplash claims, can the Minister confirm that the courts will be able to cope with what will undoubtedly be an increased number of claims without the presence of expert legal representation? It is estimated that they could increase from 5% to 30% of the total number of cases. Can the courts manage that extra responsibility?
Finally, what is meant by “in the long term”? This relates to paragraph 5.66 of the whiplash impact assessment accompanying the Bill, where the Government state that, taking into account adjustments to pre-action protocols, they consider that
“in the long term the courts would operate at cost recovery”.
I would be grateful for an explanation of what cost recovery means in this context.
My Lords, I shall speak to Commons Amendment 3 and shall make a general point about all the amendments in the round. I declare my interests as set out in the register—in particular, those in respect of the insurance industry. I would very much like to add my thanks to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, and the Bill team, who have been very courteous and warm as they have engaged with me, particularly on Amendment 3.
We spent a lot of time discussing the area covered by Amendment 3 in Committee and on Report, and even slightly at Third Reading. The amendments suggested in this House—there were quite a few of them—had a common theme: they were short and clear, and they instructed the FCA to act, as it were, as the scorer and to work out how it would ascertain whether insurers had in fact handed the money back to customers.
The section of the policy note, which the Minister referred to, entitled “Context and overall approach to amendment” refers to an intent to:
“Hold insurers to account in a way that is sufficiently rigorous”,
and to:
“Avoid intervening in an already competitive market or placing disproportionate burdens on insurers or regulators”.
I am very grateful to the Minister for confirming that those should be the guiding principles for the FCA as it begins to consider the best way to discharge this duty. I find the three pages of new Clause 11 pretty difficult and they are potentially extremely onerous for insurers. I note that, depending on how you construe new subsection (2), insurers might also have to report on every single comprehensive household policy they have, because injury cover is possibly included in that. I could make other points on that too.
We now know that this amendment was drafted by a committee full of highly intelligent people, including insurers, obviously very intelligent lawyers, accountants and officials. Of course, we all know that when you put a committee together, you get a camel, and I am afraid that it is a bit of a camel. However, I say again that I am very grateful to the Minister for confirming that the policy note will trump what is in the legislation, as that is important.
That leads on to my general point about the Bill. In Committee I referred to the 2016-17 annual report of NHS Resolution. It stated that moving the discount rate from +2.5% to -0.75% meant that the cost of medical negligence in the UK every year would rise by an extra £1.2 billion. That means that every day £3.3 million is not being spent on the NHS front line. If the personal injury discount rate, which is in Part 2 of the Bill, went up—perhaps not all the way up to 2.5% but maybe to 1%, which is currently the case in France—that would release around £1.75 million a day to the front line of the NHS. In a nutshell, the quicker this Bill passes, the better. My one question for the Minister is whether he agrees with that point.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I add my thanks to the noble and learned Lord the Minister and to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for their help, courtesy and consideration throughout the passage of this Bill. We have all approached the Bill with common purposes; on some of the issues, we have suggested different ways of achieving those purposes. With co-operation from Members across the House, in the Conservative Party and on the Labour and Cross Benches, we have produced a set of amendments that have now improved the Bill significantly as it goes to the Commons. If I may say so, it has been a model of co-operation. We are very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the many meetings that he has held at which he has explained the Government’s thinking and listened to us, and for the letters that he sent us explaining their thinking and, sometimes, changes in thinking. Thank you.
I was not intending to speak, but I associate myself entirely with the remarks and thanks made and given by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I was going to add only what fun it has been working with the Bill team, who have worked immensely hard. They have done a particularly good job on this Bill, which should be recorded.
My Lords, I am not sure I have enjoyed much fun as we have gone through this Bill but, as it leaves the House, I thank the Minister and his colleague on the Front Bench, and the Bill team for their readiness to discuss its provisions and respond to some, at least, of the concerns and suggestions that have been made from all sides of the Chamber. I also express my admiration for those who have brought their professional expertise and knowledge to our debates and discussions. It has been quite an awesome experience to listen to some of those who have spent a lifetime dealing with these matters.
Nevertheless, from these packed Benches, we believe that the Bill is fundamentally flawed and hope that, when it returns to us, it will have been improved. In particular, we would like to see the definition of “whiplash” made by medical experts and the damages determined by the judiciary based on Judicial College guidelines, rather than by a tariff specified for whiplash injuries. If there is to be a tariff, the college should be involved in determining the levels.
The Law Society suggests that the Government should clarify what would constitute a failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate the effect of an injury, which is part of the Bill’s proposition. It is also concerned about the provision in Clause 3 that means the capacity of the Lord Chancellor to allow discretion to increase the award in exceptional circumstances is by way of regulation, again, rather than being left to the judiciary to determine what constitute such circumstances.
Underlying the Bill and the proposals to raise the small claims limit for whiplash injuries to £5,000, and for other personal injuries to £2,000, is the effect of creating obstacles to justice likely to deter legitimate claimants from pursuing and receiving compensation. Where they do, they are likely to add to the growing difficulties experienced by the courts in dealing with unrepresented litigants. To most Members of this House, the sums involved are very modest; to many potential claimants, they are not. For our part, we will in future seek to oppose the intended increase of the small claims limit to all RTA cases to under £5,000 and for all other personal injury claims to £2,000, when the relevant regulations are laid.
We look forward to a review of the impact of this legislation on the much-vaunted claims of the insurance industry significantly to reduce insurance premiums—the noble and learned Lord has referred to that aspiration, as I would describe it—and, more positively, to a significant growth in the number of periodical payments orders in the most serious cases of injury, which are the subject of Part 2 of the Bill, which deals with the discount rate. That is the most positive part of the Bill, and it certainly has our support.
It has been an interesting experience to participate in these debates, and I hope that the Bill will return to us in due course, in an improved form. I await that moment with barely contained impatience.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register, particularly those in respect of the insurance industry. The 2017 Conservative manifesto provides an interesting lens through which I feel one ought to consider various amendments in this group. It states the following in a section entitled, “Cutting the cost of living”:
“We will reduce insurance costs for ordinary motorists by cracking down on exaggerated and fraudulent whiplash claims”.
At a high level, the Bill seeks to do that principally by dictating how whiplash claims procedures will work in the future; that is, through the use of a tariff. Several amendments in this group seek to interfere with the principle of a tariff either by removing it or by making it rather more generous than market forces allow today. Both of these approaches seem to fly directly in the face of that express manifesto commitment. I remain very much of the view that any tariff should be set out in the Bill, just as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended.
We are in extraordinary and difficult circumstances here, with around 1% of the population of the UK annually successfully concluding a whiplash claim. I submit that a social and political necessity trumps jurisprudential purity, such as that advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf, even before considering the manifesto commitment point that I made earlier.
A tariff will bring benefits in terms of certainty and the potential for ordinary citizens to file claims online easily, without the need for external professional help. Any reduction in hassle and the costs of processing a claim will inevitably benefit everyone. Indeed, we heard at Second Reading how a tariff system seemed to work well in Spain. Deleting Clause 2 would deny those benefits. It would certainly deny the Government the ability to deliver on their manifesto commitment because the hugely unsatisfactory status quo would simply continue, with a numerous minority of our fellow citizens continuing to abuse the current environment to their financial advantage. Therefore, I strongly oppose Amendment 18.
Turning to the quantum in the tariff table, I accept that the issue is rather a Goldilocks one. If the quantum is too generous, the problem of exaggeration and fraud will persist. If it is not generous enough, the genuinely injured will be badly dealt with. The Government have attempted to walk this line in their draft statutory instrument; I make no comment on the numbers it contains. The structure of the Bill allows the Lord Chancellor to vary the tariff with suitable safeguards.
I fear that Amendments 10 and 17B are too generous because they depend on the Judicial College numbers, which are derived from cases heard. The numbers are actually above where the market—if I may call it that—is today because the cases that tend to get to court tend to have non-standard features, such as being more complex or involving psychological issues. Therefore, I fear that if either of these amendments were adopted, there would be no saving per the impact assessment—possibly even a negative saving—and thus they too defeat the Government’s manifesto commitment. Accordingly, I oppose them.
In turning to Amendment 30, I start by expressing my support for Amendment 12, which restores constitutional balance in a very elegant way. Indeed, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on his excellent speech. Amendment 12 goes some way to addressing the issues that were set out well by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in introducing Amendment 30. However, Clause 3 is not only a fully important part of a package to frustrate the designs of the claims industry but an important part of a strategy to deliver the manifesto commitment. On that basis, I feel that this amendment should also be resisted.
My noble friend Lord Kinnoull referred to “jurisprudential purity”. I would prefer to describe it as the essential role of the judiciary in deciding what compensation is appropriate. I would be very grateful if the Minister would tell the House whether there is any precedent for a Minister, rather than judges, deciding on the appropriate level of compensation for a civil claimant when that compensation is being paid not by the state—I recognise that that may be a different matter—but by a private wrongdoer or, more accurately, their insurance company. I suggest that either there is no precedent or this is rare, for a very good reason: put simply, judges, not Ministers—or their civil servants, more accurately—have expertise and independence in this area. For those reasons, I strongly support the speech made by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is very hard to follow such a clear speech and say anything. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on such a clear presentation. I will only observe mathematically that the latest NHS Resolution annual report states very clearly that the change from 2.5% to minus 0.75% would cost the NHS an additional £1.2 billion per year. Making the change from minus 0.75% to 1%, which appears to be what the industry in general expects, works back mathematically to suggest that speed is worth around £2 million per day to the NHS. So the amendments have great merit in that they would have a direct positive effect on the front-line availability of NHS funds. Accordingly, I commend them.
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on Amendment 65, in particular, and the consequential amendments. More than anything else, the simplification of the process for the first review of the discount rate will allow the Lord Chancellor to proceed with the speed that everyone in this House has urged. I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister will confirm that the Government are prepared to accept Amendment 65 and the consequential amendments. I look forward to her acceptance.
I entirely accept that it does, but ultimately the question of what the rate is is determined by experts, taking into account the factors which are, I agree, set out in the Bill. I shall listen with interest to what the Minister says, but it still seems to me that that is perhaps dangerously close to the judges getting involved in an area which might render them subject to criticism.
I will speak extremely briefly in support of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. It seems to me that the Lord Chancellor would, very properly, have two questions in life that he would want to ask of an expert. The first is: “Do we need a review?” The second is: “Please will you conduct the review?” However, unless there is a standing panel, who on earth can he ask the first question of? I assume that he will not have anyone within the Ministry of Justice to whom he can turn and say: “Are we in circumstances where we need a review?” That is, in itself, a powerful argument for having a standing function that would allow him some access to expertise in this difficult and esoteric area. So, if the Minister is not minded to be amenable to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, how will that question be answered?
My Lords, at this late hour I propose only to express agreement with much of what has been said from all round the Chamber in these debates. I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about the role of the Lord Chief Justice. It does not seem at all inappropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to be consulted, which is all that the amendment suggests, in the course of making these very difficult decisions. The noble Lord need not worry very much about the consequences of that.
I am happy to support all the amendments that have been discussed and I congratulate noble and learned Lords on the progress that has been made. I assume that the Minister will be inclined to accept, and I certainly hope that that will be the case.
My Lords, this amendment is in identical terms to that which I advanced in Committee. This time I have the support of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. In view of the fact that there are no changes in the nature of the amendment, I think I can be brief in outlining its purpose.
The purpose is to ensure that the reviews are regular—indeed, that is the purpose of the Bill—which is particularly important in the light of the fact that Lord Chancellors so rarely exercised the power in the previous 20 years or so. The question is: how regular? I respectfully submit that the three-year period is too short, and a five-year period would be much better.
I say this based not least on personal experience at the moment and having had conversations with people on, as it were, both sides of the fence. When you are expecting a change one way or another, as is the position now—because the market suggests, as the noble Earl pointed out, that there probably will be a change, let us say from minus 0.7% to plus 1%—one side or another will see it to their advantage either to bring forward a claim or delay it to take advantage of the putative date of the decision.
This process is perfectly legitimate and part of the hurly-burly of litigation—there are lots of uncertainties in litigation—but this one is of particular significance where large sums of money are concerned. I am not disparaging anyone involved in the litigation process. But if the change happens every five years, there will be less of this gaming than if it happens every three years, just as everyone says about the last year of a four-year term of a President—nothing much happens. A lot of positioning will be taking place before the change.
This is a view expressed widely in the profession. I therefore ask my noble and learned friend carefully to consider accepting the amendment, or at least coming back at Third Reading with something that reflects those considerations. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his amendments. I should explain why I did not support them in Committee. In Committee, I listened to two eloquent speeches—one from the noble Lord and one from the Minister. They went carefully through the arguments about gaming and not gaming. I thought it was very interesting. I have a lot of knowledge in this area, but I did not actually know. I then spoke to a large number of practitioners on the insurance side to try to form my own view on whether three or five years was right for gaming. I am afraid I strongly formed the view that five years was right and therefore strongly believe that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is on to something that would greatly benefit all concerned. That is why I support the amendment.
More importantly, I have tabled Amendments 68, 70 and 71, which are to do with the timing of the second review. Broadly, they try to bring the timing in from what I thought was 180 days to what I thought was120 days. Those thoughts were prior to the arrival from the Minister’s office of the draft terms of reference of the expert panel, which I have in my hand. It is very interesting because the expert panel is established at the very moment that the review trigger is pulled—or, I suppose, immediately after. In fact, in a section entitled “Preparation”, before the review is triggered there is a call for evidence, which asks for all sorts of evidence all round.
That raises two issues for me. The first is that it extends the period of uncertainty. There is a 180-day review period and the call for evidence period, which I assume is at least 60 days—probably 90 days—to increase the level of uncertainty. During this uncertain period, the people who suffer are not the banks of lawyers on either side of the argument; the fee clock is still running. The people who suffer are the individuals who have the catastrophic injuries. So I worry about that.
The second thing I worry about is that if I were an expert, I would not want someone else to draft my call for evidence. I probably do not need the call for evidence because I am an expert. The idea that the poor old Ministry of Justice will be able to ask for all this expert evidence is wrong. The Ministry of Justice is not full of this sort of specialist in the esoteric areas around the setting of a discount rate. I do not believe that is a wise thing to do, so will the Minister look again at the draft terms of reference? Maybe, when we have our coffee to discuss timings, we could have a short session on the terms of reference so that we can try to align this. The basic point behind Amendments 68, 70 and 71 is a desire to allow enough time for a panel of experts very well versed in discount rates to arrive at the correct answer, without extending that time unreasonably. The uncertainty is bad for the victims of the catastrophic injuries.
My Lords, I am inclined to agree with the noble Earl about Amendments 68 and 71, but I am afraid I remain unconvinced about the five-year period as opposed to the three-year period, and find myself in the rather strange position of agreeing with the Minister. It is not as though all claimants will be five years off a review. Some will be and others will not necessarily be. There will be different timescales for individual claims, and I do not think five years is necessary to protect the integrity of the system. Some people will try to game, whatever the period. Five years is not necessarily more likely to protect against that than otherwise. Rather unusually—I am sure the noble and learned Lord will stick to the three-year period in the Bill—I will have to agree with him.
I should like to say at the end of this very long day that the House has done its usual very good job of scrutinising difficult legislation. It is a little late to try to recall everything that we have discussed and agreed, but a good job has been done today and I hope the Bill will be improved. The Minister has offered to consider a number of matters before Third Reading—and, in any case, the Bill will go somewhere else in another week’s time and come back to us eventually for further consideration. There may be changes that we have to consider at that stage.
On behalf of these Benches—or what is left of us—I thank the Minister for his running of the Bill. He has been more than willing to talk to colleagues, even when some of them, like me, are rather slow on the uptake in this rather technical area. It is not one where, in practice, I had very much to do with cases at this level, as a personal injury lawyer—thank heavens. Around the House, we have heard some very important contributions from Members from all sides, and there is every prospect of further changes being made at Third Reading or in another place on the basis of the level of debate, discussion and argument that we have had. That is a signal tribute to the work of the House.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 92 in this group would require the Lord Chancellor to carry out a review of the impact of any new rate on the extent of the use of PPOs and to lay this report before Parliament. Our amendment has the same general purpose as Amendment 55 and as other amendments in this group.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has already spoken eloquently to Amendment 55 so I can be very brief. It seems to me that all the amendments in this group are intended to provide a gentle nudge in the direction of PPOs. Their purpose is to create conditions in which the incidence of voluntary uptake of PPOs may increase. Given the scope of the Bill, not to mention the ethical questions that would be created by any reduction in the freedom to choose or not choose PPOs, this is probably as far as we can go.
I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the thinking behind all of these amendments, coming as they do from various parts of the House. If he is sympathetic, perhaps he would be willing to meet interested noble Lords before Report with a view to drafting an amendment or amendments that he might consider bringing forward or supporting.
My Lords, in supporting Amendment 55, I will speak also to Amendment 92A. I declare my interests as listed on the register of the House, especially those in respect of the insurance industry. I can be very brief, because there have been two brief and excellent speeches before me.
My Lords, I begin with my declaration of interest, one I gave in Committee and at Second Reading. It is perhaps of some relevance to the debate that we are currently engaged in that I have for some years been involved in claims of the utmost severity and I am to this day instructed for defendants, particularly the National Health Service, the Medical Defence Union and insurers, but also claimants.
I move Amendment 56 in my name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who is not in his place because he had an unavoidable engagement. He knows essentially what I shall say. I cannot claim a total endorsement of any comment I may make in advance, but I can say that he supports the general tone of what I shall say in support of the amendment.
The desirability of periodical payments is clear, and has been well articulated around the House today—but not, I agree with the Minister, in all cases. The Government have very much acknowledged the need to encourage them but have so far not included in the Bill any specific provisions which would have that effect. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, explained the difficulties of estimating life expectation, and he is of course right—although it may have passed his experience and practice that there is an enormous amount of literature now, particularly from the United States of America, in which very refined estimations of life expectation are provided to the court, particularly in the case of the most seriously disabled, so that you are able to enter an algorithm to see the likelihood of reaching a certain age. Having said that, it may well be the case that there is a spurious accuracy about that documentation, in view of the fact that the expectation of life of a seriously brain-damaged child, for example, has radically increased over the time when I have been in practice. An estimation made 20 years ago would simply not be right now for a child with exactly the same injuries.
Section 2(1) of the Damages Act 1996 gave the courts a power for the first time to order periodical payments, but could not do so unless the parties consented. That was preceded by a structured settlement agreement that had been reached in a particular case; it had attracted much attention and, therefore, Parliament intervened to give judges in appropriate circumstances a power of that sort. Then by Section 100 of the Courts Act 2003 the courts were enabled to order periodical payments, if they thought it appropriate. However, my experience is that they do not generally do so. In fact, I have never heard of the courts ordering periodical payments where a defendant is a secure provider but one side or another objects to such an order.
One consequence of the drastic lowering of the discount rate is that periodical payments have become much less attractive. With such a generous discount rate and the consequent rise in lump sums, there is very little incentive on a claimant to seek periodical payments when he or she can do better even by cautious investment in the market. We do not know what adjustment to the discount rate may be or, indeed, when any such adjustment may be made. Even if there is an increase to +1% as opposed to -0.75%, it may not be enough to discourage lump sums as opposed to periodical payments. It should be remembered that before the case of Wells v Wells in 1998, and for many years, the discount rate was +4.5%. It was lowered to 2.5% in 2001 to reflect the decision in Wells.
Amendment 56 is intended to provide some legislative encouragement to a party to seek periodical payments. The assumption by the courts currently is of a claimant as an incredibly cautious investor; in future, he will be regarded as a slightly less cautious investor by virtue of this Bill. Surely, if an investor is really anxious to avoid the uncertainties of the future, the best way in which he or she can do that is by an order for periodical payments with appropriate indexation. It used to be said, and indeed it has been said this afternoon, that the one thing that one knows about a lump sum is that it is either too much or too little. Inevitable uncertainties about life expectation mean that the degree of inaccuracy may be profound. Surely, then, if a sensible offer of periodical payments is made by a defendant and turned down by a claimant in favour of a lump sum, it indicates that the claimant is not nearly so risk averse as the legislation and the discount rate presumes that he is.
It is, of course, entirely a matter for the claimant what he or she wants to do with his money, subject only to the unlikely intervention of the courts to order periodical payments. It seems to me, therefore, that it should be open to the court to vary the discount rate to reflect the fact that, by turning down a reasonable offer of periodical payments, a claimant has evinced an intention to be rather more adventurous than the legislation presumes that he will be. This could either have the result of reducing the overall sum, thus making periodical payments more attractive in the light of a different discount rate, or of promoting settlements, factoring in the possibility of a court varying the discount rate in the light of sensible offers of periodical payments. One way or another, it may go some way to redressing the tendency away from periodical payments in favour of lump sums. I do not think it falls foul of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, indicated: that Parliament should not tell judges of great experience precisely how to reflect these principles in an individual case.
The other part of the amendment concerns the particular nature of the loss in respect of which damages are sought. In substantial claims, there are a number of different heads of damage, and it may be that with some heads a different discount rate is appropriate. At the moment, the Bill talks of “classes” of case, not of different types of loss within the same case. In large claims there will be many heads of loss. They will include the cost of future care—usually the largest amount—the cost of specialised equipment; adaptations to accommodation; therapeutic and other medical treatment and loss of earnings, to name some of the main established heads of damage. Different considerations as to the appropriate discount rate may apply to different heads of loss.
In 2010, sitting in Guernsey, Jonathan Sumption QC, before his elevation to the Supreme Court, applied different discount rates to loss of earnings claims from those which he applied to other heads. That decision is not, of course, binding on our courts but it does illustrate that it may be appropriate to vary discount rates depending on the type of loss. This is done in a number of other jurisdictions.
My amendment originally contained a further factor to be taken into account in varying the discount rate, namely if a court concluded that a claimant would not in fact seek to recover a particular cost privately but would rely on the state. Very often, an award is made on the assumption that a claimant will, for example, seek to have his medical treatment and care provided privately, when that may not in fact be the case. In certain extreme cases, one is much better off receiving care for complex conditions through the state rather than, as it were, setting up a private hospital. This part of the amendment was initially accepted by the Table Office, but I was then told that it was outside the scope of the Bill. I am bound to accept that ruling but, as other noble Lords have said—and may say again—it is important that an outmoded provision, namely Section 2(4) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, is reviewed, and probably repealed, as soon as possible. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak extremely briefly on Amendment 57. This is merely a drafting suggestion on an issue where there is common ground with the Government. Trouble arises if you use the word “classes” to an insurance-based person like me, for whom it has a different meaning. To me, it means things like motor insurance, medical negligence or employer’s liability. I want to make sure that it is clear that one can not only follow the jurisprudence of Jonathan Sumption sitting in Guernsey—as has just been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—and vary things a little bit by head, but also in terms of what I call the yield curve. The yield curve is a very simple thing: the longer you invest the money, generally, the higher the interest rate you get.
For instance, if you invest the money for a month with the US Government at the moment you will get -0.25% or so; if you invest it for 10 years you will get 3% or so. On the whole, there is a gentle yield curve. That is reflected in Hong Kong and in Ontario, where they have a system of discount rates. In Hong Kong, if you will have future needs for between nought and five years in the court’s assessment, the discount rate used is 0.5%, between five and 10 years it is 1%, and over 10 years it is 2.5%. In Ontario they split it into two rather than three, and again it is based on the number of years of your future needs, which is assessed by the court: between nought and 15 years it is 0% at the moment, and over 15 years it is 2.5%.
My Lords, Amendment 58 and the others to which I will speak would alter the timing of the review of the discount rate, as set out in the Bill. Amendment 58 seeks to cut the timing of the start of that review from within 90 days of commencement to nil. Amendment 72, which I am afraid appears in another group but is worth talking about now, says that the review period will be 180 days. Amendment 94, which interferes with the commencement part of the Bill in Clause 11, says that commencement will be on the day that the Bill passes and not just when the Secretary of State decides to publish regulations. I am trying to cut down the timing of the first review appearing from 270 days plus however long it takes for the Secretary of State to commence the Bill to 120 days flat from the Bill passing.
The reason is simple. It is found in the latest annual report of NHS Resolution, which makes it clear that moving the discount rate from plus 2.5% to minus 0.75% has meant that the cost of medical negligence to the NHS, every year, will be an extra £1.2 billion. That means that every day £3.3 million is not being spent on the NHS front line. If the rate does not go all the way back to 2.5%, but is like the rate in France of 1%, that adds up to £2 million a day. So that is somewhere between £2 million and £3 million a day, which is quite a lot of money. That is why am trying to cut the review period from 270 days-plus down to 120 days. I hope the people in charge of getting the discount rate review done have on their desks, in front of their screens, a Post-it note saying, “I need to get this done quickly. It is costing the NHS £2 million to £3 million a day”. In a nutshell, that is the reason for this set of amendments.
My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this short debate—only 22 minutes, but we have discussed an awful lot of money. In good news terms, I am delighted to hear that at least some preparatory work is going on in appointing the panel, and that it will arrive in 2019.
It was good to hear praise of Amendment 71—I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—and what I thought were warm words about Amendment 94. However, I have quite a lot of experience with discount rates and I simply do not buy that this is so complicated that it will take 180 days. An awful lot of people here are familiar with discount rates. I am looking at one: the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, sitting next to the Minister. I find what was said plausible but thoroughly unconvincing. I wonder whether a couple of extra teabags can be put into the teapot so that we can come round when the Minister is at home, discussing the Bill, and talk about how we could trim days off. Every day that we can chop off is a big win for the country. With that said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. A standing panel would be a great advantage to a Lord Chancellor. Quite apart from the hassle of trying to reassemble a panel every whatever the periodicity is and the cost of assembling one—I assume a firm of suitably expensive headhunters would be involved—you would then have to take the panel up a learning curve as to exactly what is required of it, which would take some time. We do not need to go there.
The biggest thing, though, is that if I was the Lord Chancellor and Black Wednesday happened for a second time I would like to ring someone up and say, “Do I need to do anything here?” I would assume that, as Lord Chancellor, I would not be super-familiar with discount rates and things like that because my expertise would lie somewhere else. Having a standing panel that could answer curveball questions and interact as and when would not be expensive. It would probably cost the same as the periodic panel because of all the start-up costs associated with it, and it would be very helpful for a Lord Chancellor if something really bad happened.
I have in this group Amendments 74, 87 and 88. Amendment 74 is a probing amendment. It provides the Committee with an opportunity to debate the value of the Lord Chancellor having a decisive role in determining the PIDR. As things stand, that is what he or she has—a decisive role. It is true that the Bill will create an expert panel to advise him and that it sets out the assumptions on which he must make that determination, but it is the Lord Chancellor who makes the decision. This poses the obvious question—why? What are the merits of having a politician making this judgment? What merit is there and what dangers might there be in having this decision in the political arena?
It is true, of course, that the rate decision has many serious consequences—for claimants but also for insurers and for the NHS, as we have discussed. These consequences are far reaching—but so are the consequences of changes to the Bank of England base rate. Changes in the base rate affect everyone who has a mortgage, every borrower and every saver. Some recent changes to the base rate have had dramatic effects on millions of people and continue to do so. For example, millions of people with savings have been dramatically disadvantaged by rate changes since 2007. Equally, millions of mortgage holders have benefited enormously from these changes. But these decisions on the base rate were taken not by politicians but by the MPC—an expert panel. If decisions on such wide-reaching and consequential matters can be taken by an expert panel without political involvement, why have political involvement in the PIDR? Why have the Lord Chancellor involved?
I raised this question when I met Ministers to discuss the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, commented that the Lord Chancellor’s role was a matter of government policy. I understood that. However, we did not have time to go into the question of why it was government policy or whether there were better alternatives. We did not discuss what grounds the Government might have for maintaining the policy or whether any assessment had been made of alternative arrangements. We now have a little more time to discuss the issue and the merits of removing this role from the reach of politicians for reasons analogous to removing control of the base rate from them. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Amendments 87 and 88 are straightforward. They deal with the expert panel itself, as set up in paragraph 5 of the new Schedule A1 to the 1996 Damages Act, inserted by Clause 8(2). This panel is to be consulted by the Lord Chancellor in determining the rate. The Bill specifies the members of the panel as the Government Actuary, or his deputy if the office is vacant, who is to be chair, and four other members appointed by the Lord Chancellor, one of whom must have experience as an actuary, one experience of managing investments, one experience as an economist, and one experience in consumer matters relating to investments. All these roles seem pretty well defined, except possibly the last one. Could the Minister flesh that out a little? Can he give examples of the kind of persons who might qualify as having,
“experience in consumer matters … relating to investments”?
It seemed to us that the panel might benefit from an additional member with different expertise. Amendment 87 would add a member who is medically qualified and has experience of changes in medical science and their effects on life expectancy. The PIDR has a very significant effect on the damages awarded against the NHS for clinical negligence, as we have mentioned. Payouts last year amounted to £1.7 billion and the amount has been rising steeply in recent years.
Awards for clinical negligence frequently have to take into account estimates of life expectancy. The Committee will know that the PIDR has a very significant effect on damages awarded against the NHS for clinical negligence. As I said, payouts amounted to £1.7 billion last year, and much of this was determined by reference to life expectancy. Of course, actuarial methods can and do give an estimate of life expectancy, but for the most part this will be based on extrapolations of current trends. What might not be taken into account is the likelihood of discontinuous change brought about by the speed of advances in medical science. We live in a golden age of medical research. It is not a total exaggeration to say that one hears nowadays almost daily of some remarkable medical breakthrough that will in due course benefit patients by curing disease, improving quality of life and prolonging life itself.
It seems to us that the expert panel would benefit from having first-hand, direct experience of these new treatments and their likely effects. A member with such experience would make a valuable contribution to any assessment of the role played by life expectancy in determining awards. I look forward to the Minister’s thoughts on the matter.
Amendment 88 would impose a duty on the Lord Chancellor to secure that,
“each of the appointed members approaches the work of the expert panel as an expert with the object of recommending a rate of return that is fair to … both claimants and defendants”.
It could be argued, for example, that the last change to the PIDR was not fair to both claimants and defendants in that it produced a huge rise in the amounts awarded to claimants. And it works the other way: there might be rates that a panel thought unfair to claimants. If so, it would be important that that view helped form the recommendations. We see our amendments as allowing a dispassionate view of the effects of a change to the PIDR for both claimants and defendants, and this should have an explicit role in informing the panel’s recommendation. I hope that this is not controversial. In fact, I rather hope that the Minister will be able to demonstrate that the amendment is unnecessary and that the requirement for fairness is somehow already built into the procedure.
My Lords, we have had a debate effectively asking the Government to get on with the process of fixing the discount rate. We have now had a debate about who should be on the panel and how they should go about exercising the function of deciding the discount rate. This group of amendments is to do with a shorter, but very important, issue—namely, the regularity of reviews.
It is plain, I suggest, that there must be regular reviews, and much more regular than in the past. One of the problems that existed, and still exists until the law is changed, is that there was no particular period in which the Lord Chancellor had to exercise his or her power to alter the discount rate. It was very rarely done, not least because of the potentially significant political consequences of the decision. When, finally, the then Lord Chancellor, Ms Truss, altered the discount rate in 2017, it had the most dramatic effect. While more regular reviews are desirable, the question is: how regular should they be?
The problem about having a review every three years is that parties to litigation will have a quite understandable tendency to try to guess the outcome of the determination of the new discount rate and to game the system. I do not wish to imply anything inappropriate about such gaming; it may well be done by either side in a dispute, and is simply a factor in the uncertainty involved in negotiations, where a party thinks it would be to their advantage either to wait until after determination of the discount rate or to ensure that a trial or settlement is concluded before the discount rate is altered.
Large claims take some time to get to court. A brain-damaged baby does not have to begin a claim—or, at least, a claim does not have to be begun on their behalf—until after he or she attains their majority at the age of 18. The normal limitation period for personal injuries is three years, but there are exceptions in terms of date of knowledge and, under Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, there is the power to disapply the limitation period in certain circumstances.
In a complicated criminal negligence case, it may be a number of years before there is clarity in terms of causation and, indeed, prognosis, once all the various experts’ reports have been assembled and exchanged, and there have been meetings of appropriate experts. There is then the problem of finding a court date for trial.
There is thus plenty of time and room for manoeuvring. In my view, a three-year period is definitely too short. I would have favoured, if I had been asked, a seven-year period, but I suggest in this amendment five years as a compromise. If any evidence is needed of the gaming of the system, it is apparent now. That evidence may be anecdotal, but there is such an accumulation of this anecdotal evidence that it simply cannot be ignored. Parties are either anxious to conclude their cases before the putative date of the variation of the discount rate or to delay matters. There is much speculation as to when this Bill will become an Act. I fear that such manoeuvring will take place almost continuously if the three-year period is maintained.
I therefore ask my noble and learned friend the Minister seriously to consider altering the period to five years, which will mitigate to some degree the uncertainty that prevails on discount changes. Uncertainty, I accept, is inevitable in litigation, but where there is such a degree of uncertainty, with potentially large consequences in the size of a claim, it militates against settlement. Settlement of claims avoiding court hearings is surely desirable and unless the Government change the frequency of the review, I fear that there will be a very real increase in the number of claims that do not resolve themselves. Alternatively, there will be a number of applications to court to try to adjourn matters or accelerate them to reflect some perceived advantage to one side or another. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak very briefly to Amendments 72, 73 and 75. Essentially, the points I made about the initial review apply here as well, and I shall not repeat them. But it seems to me that the sparking off of a review within a review period —not right at the end—because something has made the Lord Chancellor feel that there had better be a review now indicates that there is probably a need for one, either up or down. Therefore, I feel that we should trim the period of the review down. This is only a discount rate—it is not a very big thing and can be done relatively quickly. The three amendments merely suggest a way of trimming it down. Perhaps I may suggest to the Minister that when we have that very large cup of tea, we kick this around as well. It would be a great shame if future trimming reduced the rate heavily. There may be people whose cases are being settled at the wrong rate, so we have a duty to try to do things at a reasonable pace.
Does the noble Earl not accept that there is a risk that if there is such a frequent review, those who are parties to litigation will simply feel that they are in a permanent state of uncertainty about what the discount rate may be? They have to rely, for at least a reasonable period, on a certain discount rate.
I am sorry if I have confused the noble Lord. I am merely saying that once the review has been sparked off by the Lord Chancellor’s decision—it does not matter what the periodicity is; I was very interested in the arguments advanced by the noble and learned Lord—it should take place at a reasonable pace, because somebody is suffering if it is done slowly. That is the purpose of trying to trim the rates. This is not difficult; one discount rate has been set by a group of people who will have exactly the right sort of skills. I therefore think it can be done a bit quicker but, as I said, it is probably best discussed not in the Chamber but with the Minister.
I am not really persuaded by the logic of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is not as if all claims will be faced with a five-year period. If a case is brought two years before a review, the courts will be dealing with a more recent determination than if it had been five years. I do not see the advantage of the noble Lord’s proposition. There will be some cases that will obviously be closer to that date than others.
I have one point to add to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on the effect of the different approach to the level of risk. One factor which was mentioned by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Wells v Wells was the need to have a relatively stable, constant fund from which funds could be drawn as the need arose over a long period of time. The risk he was contemplating in that part of his judgment was not that of the funds running out, just that the value of the fund would diminish as the stock market went down. In its turn, this would prejudice the viability of the fund to maintain itself at the appropriate level as time went on. The risk we were contemplating then, in looking at the appropriate rate of return, was differentials in performance which would affect the ability of the fund to meet ongoing costs which would not fluctuate. They were the constant costs of equipment maintenance or nursing services which the injured person had to meet from time to time: a level rate of costs, against a fluctuating value in the fund available to pay for them.
There is much to be said for reducing the level of risk to the minimum possible compatible with the aims of the Government, to avoid the problems of fluctuation which affect the viability of the fund. I mention this because it is another factor which lies behind the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has pointed out, the advantage of the Wells approach is that investment advice was not needed. I am not quite sure how these things are structured, but if the fund were to be put in the hands of an adviser, there is usually a performance factor taken out of the management of the fund. It is not so much investment advice as the cost of managing the fund. The larger the fund, the more likely it is that the best way of handling it is to put the whole fund into the hands of an investment adviser who would simply manage it accordingly.
It is rather difficult to extract from that a recoverable figure of the kind that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is directed at. There is a lot to be said for just taking that factor out of the award altogether and leaving it up to the individual to decide how best to have the money managed. If it is a management figure, then that is all right: it is just part of the choice that the injured person makes. It should not be added in as an additional element of damages.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 80 and 81 in my name. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on his heart-rending speech, but it seemed only to go back to saying, “My goodness, PPO is a good idea”. So many of the risks which the noble Lord identified would be sorted out by that, but that is in the past.
New Schedule A1 to the Damages Act is inserted by Clause 8(2). At Second Reading, I said that I was worried that paragraph 3(3) did not give sufficient clarity to what was being asked for in the investment. I was concerned that, without that clarity, there could be a plethora of new Wells v Wells cases, with people trying to grapple with what was actually meant. Amendment 80 probes the word “investments” in the phrase,
“the assumption that the recipient of the relevant damages invests the relevant damages in a diversified portfolio of investments”.
We should at least be clear that those investments were debt securities, not equities.
Secondly, I thought it would be helpful to try to define a “very low level of risk”. That does not actually mean anything to me, with my background, and I suspect it does not mean anything in law. I have tried to define it as the level of risk you have when you buy UK Government debt security. These are probing amendments and I regard this as a discussion, but clarity in this area of the Bill would be greatly to the advantage of everyone concerned.
My Lords, we are dealing with sensitive issues here. Nobody wants claimants to get a raw deal, but we need to examine presumptions that we appear to be writing in, especially in the light— as has just been mentioned again—of the possibility of periodic payments. In his reply to the first group of amendments, the Minister seemed to say that the possibility of periodic payments was a lot more open than it appears to be, due to the statistics.
Amendment 80B is another probing amendment. I tabled it because the language of paragraph 3(3)(d)(ii) of new Schedule A1—it is much easier to say “the last three lines at the bottom of page 9”—does not seem quite right. The wording concerns how it is to be assumed the relevant damages are invested and says to assume,
“less risk than would ordinarily be accepted by a prudent and properly advised individual investor who has different financial aims”.
My amendment deletes the whole sub-paragraph, but it is a vehicle for probing and there are less extreme ways to fix it.
I understand the intention of the words: the claimant should be reckoned to invest in a cautious and advised way, perhaps more cautiously than an individual who does not have the same vulnerability. Paragraph 41 of the Explanatory Notes explains it as,
“less risk than would ordinarily be taken by a prudent and properly advised individual investor (who is not a claimant) with similar investment objectives”.
Those investment objectives clearly need to be the purposes set out in paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1, at lines 25 to 31 of page 9, which includes, for example, that the damages,
“would be exhausted at the end of the period for which they are awarded”.
However, the actual wording in the three lines at the end of page 9 does not seem to say the same thing. The first two lines—
“less risk than would … be accepted by a … properly advised individual investor”—
are broadly okay, but it then says,
“who has different financial aims”,
which is very different from the “similar investment objectives” of the Explanatory Notes. I am therefore slightly puzzled. Was the intention to state that they are different because they are not a claimant, is it a mistake, or have I missed some other point?
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I declare my interests as set out in the register of the House, in particular those in the insurance industry. I am going to speak briefly to three propositions. First, a definition of “whiplash” should appear on the face of the Bill. Secondly, that definition should be wide. Thirdly, it should be amendable without having to resort to primary legislation, but with parliamentary oversight.
I turn to the first of those propositions. My work has been made much easier by the 22nd report of the excellent Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The committee is excellent as well as the report. It says at paragraph 9:
“We take the view that it would be an inappropriate delegation of power for ‘whiplash injury’, a concept central to a full understanding of the Bill, to be defined in regulations made by Ministers rather than being defined on the face of the Bill”.
I very much agree. It is particularly curious to me that there is no definition, because there are so many definitions of whiplash floating around, not least in the pre-action protocol for low-value personal injury claims for motor accidents and indeed in the draft regulations that appeared within the last 48 hours for this Bill. I therefore can see no reason why there should not be a definition on the face of the Bill. I am looking forward to hearing from the Minister whether he might see that one was, in fact, appropriate.
There are two problems with the width issue. The first is that, if the width is narrow—and a whiplash motor accident normally involves several minor injuries to the person involved—we are in the position where a tariff applies to a selection of injuries but maybe not all of them. That would be to the advantage of what I call the claims industry. Aviva, in its briefing to all Peers before the Second Reading, estimates out of whiplash alone to make £500 million a year. It is unbelievably inventive and supple. This morning, I was looking at one of the principal websites, and I will read a bit from it out as it will show just how much the meaning of the word “whiplash” has been stretched:
“Symptoms can include dizziness, blurred vision, disorientation, tiredness, poor concentration, memory loss, nausea, pins and needles in the arms and hands, muscle spasms and pain in the lower back”.
Later on, there is a rather curious sentence:
“Even if you don’t experience any symptoms straightaway, don’t rule out the possibility that you’ve suffered this type of injury”.
That is the sort of entity that, in fact, is doing great damage to the general population. It has increased motor insurance premiums. They are highly intelligent and well funded. I really feel width is important.
There is a second point on width. For the honest claimant, having clarity—so there is one tariff for one sum of money, and so they can fill in the online portals for a claim—is greatly to their advantage. If they have to fill in one online portal to sort out part of their heads of claims, and then no doubt head off to the one of the companies I was referring to, there would be greater chaos and we will not have tried, through legislation, to improve society.
I turn quickly to the point about the importance of it all being amendable. I regret that we will always be playing catch-up with the claims industry. This is not the first attempt to cope with the burgeoning whiplash problem. I remind the House that, even today, 1% of the population every year has a successful whiplash claim, on average—that is 30 times what happens in France. It is a problem that is out of control; we heard many examples of that at Second Reading. There is an enormous prize in having flexibility and, accordingly, I beg to move.
My Lords, I should inform the Committee that if Amendment 1 is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendments 3 to 5 by reason of pre-emption.
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions that have been made so far this morning. I observe that it appears to be generally recognised that the Bill is addressing a very real issue about which policy decisions have to be made and implemented. I quite understand the question raised about where the definition of whiplash injury should appear. The definition in the Bill seeks to limit injuries to those soft tissue injuries that affect the neck, back or shoulder and arise from road traffic accidents. The vires in the Bill are tightly drawn to enable regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor that would apply only to a discrete number and type of injury.
It is interesting to see the diversity of amendments that have come forward this morning. That may underline the particular challenge we face in arriving at a suitable definition, be it in the Bill or in regulation. We have sought to address an issue that involves reconciling a legal understanding of this matter with a medical definition—one which covers both injury and the symptoms of injury. That involves us engaging with not only medical expertise but a degree of legal expertise. In addition, while I am not going to go through the detail of every amendment, because I understand what lies behind them, I will note this much. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, set out three points for consideration, and in doing so underlined the very real problem that we need to address here. It was emphasised by the suggestion that if you go to a particular claims management site you are encouraged to believe that even if you have no symptoms you may still have a claim.
I was reminded of an incident some years ago where I was acting for an American pharmaceutical company. The US attorneys showed me a photograph of a genuine roadside sign that had been erected in the state of Mississippi. It said, “If you’ve taken drug X and suffered a fatal heart attack, telephone this number”. The lengths to which we lawyers will go know no bounds, and our belief in the Almighty is always there. There is a very real industry out there. I do not use the term “racket”, but others have—and with some justification.
Looking to the current position, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, correctly observed that the regulations that we have produced in draft to elaborate the definition of whiplash injury have only just appeared. I quite understand the need for noble Lords to consider those regulations in more detail. In turn, I will consider in more detail whether we should incorporate a more precise definition in the Bill. But I stress that, even if we were to take that step, it would be necessary for us to bear in mind the ability of government to proceed by way of regulations to support any definition in the Bill. We are well aware that flexibility will be required with regard to any final definition so that we can meet the way in which claims development occurs—the way in which this sort of market develops—in order to put limitations on claims.
At the end of the day, the detailed definition of whiplash injury will need to reconcile the current legal understanding with an accurate medical definition covering both injury and symptoms. Our aim is to achieve that objective, but to what extent we achieve it by incorporating the definition in the Bill is not a matter on which I would take a final position. I quite understand the suggestion that we should consider further the extent to which the definition can appear on the face of the Bill, and also allow noble Lords the opportunity to consider the scope of the draft regulation that has only recently been made available. In the light of that, and understanding that these are essentially probing amendments, I invite noble Lords not to press them at this time.
My Lords, I am grateful for those last few sentences from the Minister, which were very helpful and reflect the strong mood of the House. I must say that if we had had a brief fee clock going, with the number of very expensive lawyers here, it would have been going round quite rapidly. I will make one point, following what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said. I too am a non-practising barrister, but I would never do anything to suggest that advocacy was not valuable. Advocates are immensely valuable in our justice system.
I do, of course, have experience of sitting on the other side of the table from the “claims industry”, as I term it—and the last thing those people want is an advocate in the mix. Most of their companies do not employ that many lawyers: some companies have no lawyers at all, or just one on their writing paper. They want a paper-based or telephone-based operation, in order to process things as cheaply as possible. This would actually help advocacy, because it would try to push things back into the proper legal market and away from companies that have been commoditising the rather grubby process of grabbing money. But, on the basis of what the Minister has said, and knowing that we will be having discussions with a view to bringing forward some sort of amendment on the definition—no doubt several noble Lords who have spoken today will be involved—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 15 to 20 and to explain why leaving out the word “psychological” benefits the Bill. As currently drafted, the Bill captures soft tissue injury and minor psychological injury only. If a claimant sustained a whiplash injury and, say, a bruise on their knee at the same time in an accident, the bruised knee would not be captured by the definition, which is limited to neck, back and shoulder in the current Clause 1. Damages for the bruised knee would therefore fall outside the tariff damages but would remain compensatable under common law. As I said earlier, there is a great prize for simplicity here, for being able, as an honest and genuine litigant, to go to a web portal to fill a claim and have predictability about what you are going to get. We will no doubt discuss the tariff a lot later on today. By removing the word “psychological” we bring minor injuries into the tariff so that if you have an accident and get a set of minor injuries, which we loosely call whiplash injuries, but which include bruised knees, you know what you are going to get and there would be a simple web way of doing it. We have tried to do that, and that is the sole reason for removing “psychological”. It would mean that injuries without the word “psychological” include psychological injuries. In fact, the definition I referred to earlier on the pre-action protocol for small bodily injury claims specifically includes psychological injuries. I think I have made the point.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, seems at least to question the underlying premise behind these reforms. I respectfully suggest that the Government have established the premise. The Minister set out the Government’s case, as it were, at Second Reading, and the statistics seem to lead ineluctably to the conclusion that there is widespread abuse of the whole whiplash claims system. The solution, though it is inevitably somewhat rough and ready, is that there should in effect be a reduction in what claimants might have been able to claim under the system that currently obtains, although that is in relation only to damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity and excludes loss of earnings or any other consequential losses. It is a reduction but a fairly modest one and we are speaking of injuries at the lower end of the scale, although I do not downplay the discomfort that can follow from whiplash injuries. However, the purpose behind the reforms is surely, first, to provide certainty and, secondly, to make the awards reasonably modest so as to provide less of an incentive for those who would seek to make fraudulent claims. That, combined with the ban on medical officers, should fulfil what is, as the noble and learned Lord rightly says, essentially a policy decision.
In effect, the losers about whom we should be concerned are those genuine claimants, as opposed to the many who are not genuine, who I accept will get a lesser sum than they would otherwise have obtained. In the round, though, I suggest that this is a sensible policy decision. The House may have in mind that when these reforms were initially trailed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne—and it came from the Treasury rather than the Ministry of Justice—the suggestion was that there would be no damages at all for whiplash injuries. This is a modification of that change, and of course there is the right of the judges to have an uplift in circumstances that we may be exploring later. Still, I suggest that it would be a mistake to pass these matters back to the judges. The Judicial College guidelines are in fact an extrapolation from individual cases decided by judges. They then, as it were, create a form of certainty, although they are variable according to individual cases.
I think the Government have made a case. They have to grasp the nettle, and they have done so in this case.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, for framing a good debate in this important area, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for his very clear opening remarks. There seem to be three issues here: first, who should set the tariff; secondly, where it should be set out; and, thirdly, how it should be amended.
I regard the tariff as being very much a political matter. The problem that we are trying to cope with is a widespread low-level fraud that is afflicting our country. It is easy money offered by the claims industry for people following what are probably genuine motor accidents. I read out earlier a quite shocking quote from one of the leading people in the claims industry:
“Even if you don’t experience any symptoms straightaway, don’t rule out the possibility that you’ve suffered this type of injury”.
I feel that as it is a political and social problem it must have a political solution, and it cannot really have a judicial solution.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, who has lent me his copy of the Judicial College guidelines. The introduction states:
“Assessing the appropriate level of any award remains the prerogative of the courts, which are not constrained by any range identified in this book, since the figures within any such range are persuasive, not obligatory, and merely represent what other judges have been awarding for similar injuries”.
Therefore, the whole basis on which the Judicial College has been gathering figures and making judgments is not the sort of basis on which in any event one would want to build a tariff construction. It is the wrong starting material, although it is an interesting book. Accordingly, I feel that the Lord Chancellor must be the person who takes a decision about what will be contained in the tariff.
In respect of my other two questions, I return to the 22nd Report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which considered this issue at paragraph 13 and stated:
“In our view it would be an inappropriate delegation of power for damages for whiplash injury to be set in a tariff made by Ministerial regulations rather than on the face of the Bill. The tariff should be set out on the face of the Bill, albeit amendable by affirmative statutory instrument”.
I feel that answers both my questions. I urge the Minister to consider having a tariff on the face of the Bill and to ensure that it is amendable with suitable parliamentary oversight.
My Lords, the amendments are, as has been said, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I shall first add to the point made about the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee by quoting what it said about placing the tariff in the Bill. It said that the second central question—the first being the question that I quoted earlier about what is meant by whiplash injury—is:
“By how much are awards of damages to be reduced?”
The committee said that the Government’s answer was that:
“The reduction in damages will be whatever the Lord Chancellor says it will be, in regulations to be made by him or her at some future date”.
The committee came to the conclusion, as the noble Earl pointed out, that that is an inappropriate delegation of power. I again make the point that it is appropriate for the Government to accept that recommendation. That has always been the way that that committee’s recommendations have been dealt with. Of course, amendment in the future can be made by statutory instrument.
I turn to the important point that was made in different ways by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, which is that the cost paid by society for these reforms in this particular case—that is, the reduction in damages—is a reduction in awards for genuine claimants. It is genuine claimants who are made to suffer. I cannot see the justification for that in any of the evidence that the Government have produced. We accept entirely that there is a problem with fraud. We are fully behind attempts to tackle fraud by eliminating, or at least reducing, fraudulent claims. But to remove the right to fair damages for claimants in these particular types of cases does not seem to be an appropriate response to this problem in a civilised society.
We address this central problem by saying that the Judicial College Guidelines are an appropriate way of coming to a conclusion on appropriate damages. They are a fair and workable way in which to achieve comparability. They avoid the problem that fraud may be positively encouraged by a cliff-edge system that encourages exaggeration. Damages under this proposal double if the claimant can persuade the medic who is preparing his report that an injury will have a duration of three months-plus, rather than just short of three months—doubled from £225 to £450. In that context, I make two points. The first is that it is a little odd that the response—
My Lords, my own solution to the problem of the promise that the insurance industry has given is contained in Amendment 46. I am very grateful for the support and advice that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has given me in considering this problem. The promise made by the insurers—percentages are a dangerous game, as there is a question of whether you are counting numbers, premium volume or whatever; but in premium volume terms—represent 90% of the market. The promise says that,
“the signatories to this letter today publicly commit to passing on to customers cost benefits arising from Government action to tackle the extent of exaggerated low value personal injury claims”.
In considering how one should attack that problem, I ask myself two simple questions. First, does the person who accepts the data understand it? Having spent a lifetime in the insurance industry, I can say that claims presentations are phenomenally complicated. I will not even start to use some of the jargon. It is extremely complicated to know whether you are talking about an accident year or the date year, as it were, and to understand certain things such as how the claims coding works, loss triangles, reinsurance effects and so on. But a regulator is someone who can do that.
The second question I ask myself is: will the person who has it have a mechanism for ensuring compliance? Are they good policemen? That is why I have centred on the FCA. I have criticised the FCA in the past but I have never criticised its competence. I have only ever said that it has been heavy handed. It will certainly have people who understand the approximately 250 returns that come in from the participant companies that have motor insurance licences in Britain. We can see who they are on the Bank of England website, and they certainly have the power, not least under the regime of treating customers fairly, but they also have plenty of other soft power. The chief executives of insurers have to be approved, as does the chief risk officer. I seem to recall that even the chairman of our audit committee ended up having to be approved. An insurer cannot afford not to have a good relationship with the regulator, because the insurance industry is much more scared of the regulator getting annoyed than of the court. The regulator can move overnight and do something to your business, whereas a court will take a period of time to do that.
Accordingly, I advance my structure for solving the problem, which I think is proportionate. It would be possible for the FCA to report on it in some way—I had not really considered that part. I am asking for the trigger to be fired twice because, by the end of 2020, this legislation will either have been a terrific success, and we will be absolved of this particular problem with the claims industry, or it will have not been a great success; they will have found a way around it, so we would not need to have the report rolling on for ever. On that basis, I ask for my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, to be considered.
I rise briefly to speak to the amendments I have in this group, which refer to a report by the FCA as well as a report being laid before Parliament.
It is important in this context to look back at Second Reading and the Government’s confession that the insurance industry had not done all it could to get on top of the issue of fraud. In some respects, on Second Reading one could have been forgiven for thinking that the problem of fraud was so great for the insurance companies that they were teetering on the brink of bankruptcy as it was such an urgent issue. Nothing could be further from the truth. A report from Direct Line Group, which is the largest insurance group that we have, shows profits for financial year 2017 of £610.9 million—a leap of 51.4% on 2016. Dividends were up 40.2%. In its interim report in 2017, one of the reasons it gave for that was fewer than expected bodily injury claims. We might argue for a long time about CRU figures, but Direct Line attributes its increase in profits to a decline in personal injury claims.
It is disappointing to those of us who are saddened and troubled by the effect on genuine claimants that there is no proper mechanism in the Bill to ensure that the £1 billion of savings from claimant payments will actually go to the motorists. The Government are saying that that is the Bill’s overall intention. In light of the scale of the fraud that the insurance industry would like us to believe, it is disappointing that it has not invested more of its resources into controlling this fraud because it is a societal issue that affects culture, as opposed to the profits that I have just outlined.
There is a particular legal problem, though, on which I hope the Minister can help us. Many insurance companies are no longer mutuals; they are listed on the stock exchange, with all its reporting requirements and requirements for directors to take into account their shareholders in the payment of dividends. How is that circle going to be squared? You have directors with an obligation to shareholders. They make cost-benefit savings, but they are under pressure either to pay down debt, as some have with some of their profits, or to pay out dividends rather than decrease the premiums they are charging to motorists.
There is a further issue with insurance companies, which is that they have enjoyed bumper savings from the implementation of the Jackson fixed-cost reductions and the LASPO changes that were introduced in April 2013. I am grateful to a fee earner from the Vale of Catmose—and to Thompsons Solicitors—who pointed out to me that insurers have saved at least £8 billion in claims costs between 2010 and 2016; the figure to date is around £11 billion. In spite of this, premiums have continued to increase relentlessly. She said the average premium has gone up from around £385 in the second quarter of 2013 to £493 in the last quarter of last year, according to the ABI’s own premium tracker—an increase of 28% since the LASPO changes.
There have been inordinate savings before that insurers have not passed on as reduced premiums. It may be as a result of being legal entities, as I have described, that they are under pressure from their shareholders to pay out bumper dividends instead of reducing premiums. There needs to be something more effective in the Bill to ensure that, after the Government introduce these changes, insurance companies will be held strictly to account and will pass on the savings they will undoubtedly make.
There is a laissez-faire attitude that, as half the market uses price-comparison websites, these savings will be passed on, but it does not always come to pass. It is ironic that, after the Second Reading of this Bill, we received the message that the Commons had passed the Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill for meters. That clearly shows that, in some circumstances, the market does not provide the savings to consumers that we envisage. The Government need to ensure that savings are passed on and there is a strict mechanism in the Bill to that effect.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, who, as ever, was authoritative and full of charm. I declare my interests as set out in the register of the House and particularly those in respect of the insurance industry.
I also welcome this Bill, seeking, as it does, to tackle two distinct policy areas that are in need of reform. That reform, I believe, will benefit all in the country. I am looking forward to the passage of the Bill, which I hope will deliver these reforms in an optimal way, achieving the vital balance between the interests of all those concerned. To summarise two very interesting early speeches in the debate, from the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Sharkey, there is a great benefit to be gained from having certainty here. I do not believe that we in this House could feel that we had done our job unless we knew there was certainty on a number of the things mentioned in both those speeches. I certainly believe certainty will help.
The Explanatory Notes for the Bill point out that the UK generated 780,000 whiplash claims last year, which is one in 83 of our population. That is now down to one in 100. However, even the one in 100 statistic is worrying. In preparing for today, I came across a Daily Telegraph article entitled “UK ‘whiplash capital of Europe’”. The first paragraph says there are,
“one out of every 140 people claiming for a whiplash injury each year”.
That article was published in May 2011, so one in 140 has gone, via one in 83, down to one in 100. I am obviously delighted that it has come down, but one has to feel, as a bit of a cynic about the claims management industry, that at least part of that is probably due to its spending so much of its energy on some of the new and wonderful things, such as the holiday sickness scam. However, the figures are too new, and I would like to probe them. I have no doubt we will come back to those in Committee. The point is that it is a vast number of people.
We should also take a look here at other countries. I have run personal lines underwriting businesses in continental Europe, so I have some experience on the ground of what in other countries the number of whiplash claims should be. It is a heck of a lot less. Sometimes—for instance, in France—that is due to impediments, which I think are unfair, that are put in the way of allowing people to claim for whiplash injuries, but in markets such as Germany the number is remarkably less. I certainly remember going to meetings and spending the day with Munich Re, a major reinsurance company, in Munich, and people pulling my leg about what they call “the British disease”. It is one reason Munich Re was pulling back from reinsuring British motor insurance.
The noble and learned Lord the Minister, in his speech at the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers conference on 17 April said:
“The number of road traffic accident related personal injury claims remains around 70% higher than in 2005/06 and around 85% of these claims are for whiplash related injuries. This is despite extensive improvements in both vehicle safety and a decline in the number of reported accidents in recent years”.
That decline, in the past 10 years, was 31%, according to the Department for Transport statistics. So 31% fewer accidents, in safer vehicles, are producing 70% more whiplash claims.
All this whiplash-claims activity produces loss cost to the insurance industry. We in the industry of course reprice our products annually, so that cost is therefore charged on as a problem to you and to me. The removal of non-bona fide whiplash claims is estimated in the impact assessment to be worth £1.1 billion a year. The ABI has probed how much of that goes into the pockets of those who have had the whiplash, or allegedly so, and how much goes into the pockets of claims management companies and specialist solicitors firms. The answer is that about 50% goes into the pockets of those assisting the whiplashed people.
Our task, then, is complicated. We are aiming for a £35 a year reduction in annual premiums. We will need to come back to this in Committee, as I do not understand what the promise really is from the insurance industry in respect of the £35 that could be there for the saving. I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, but the industry is incredibly competitive, so I cannot believe that at least some of that will not naturally come back through competitive pressures. It is also true that people have been making these promises to their regulator, the FCA, which—I speak again with experience—is one of the toughest regulators in the world. It would certainly be pretty displeased with someone who had breached a promise to the general public and was not treating customers fairly. The fines for not treating customers fairly are very large. There is a certain amount of carrot and stick there.
On the personal injury discount rate, we have much to thank the House of Lords judges for in the case of Wells v Wells. They laid out the law with great clarity, a clarity that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, exhibited earlier in his seminal contribution. As ever, I learnt a lot; the noble and learned Lord never gets up without me learning. In March last year, the discount rate was lowered from 2.5% to minus 0.75%.
Oddly, this is the second time this year that we have spoken in this Chamber about discount rates, the other occasion being the debate on reconstruction and renewal, where we talked about discount rates in respect of the financial modelling, which gave very surprising numbers as to how expensive it would be to repair the Palace in some of the options being considered. That discount rate came from the Treasury Green Book and was 3%. I noted in that debate how sensitive things were and have looked for a precise example.
In the educational section of the Chartered Insurance Institute website, there is a worked example which is very instructive. It notes that when the discount rate was 2.5% the lump-sum settlement for a 20 year-old man who requires £100,000 of care per year for his lifetime was £3.2 million. When the discount rate changed to minus 0.75%, that £3.2 million rose to £8.9 million, almost three times the amount. That demonstrates just how sensitive it is.
That is why, in its latest annual report, NHS Resolution moved its reserves for past losses up by £4.7 billion and stated that it expected £1.2 billion to be added annually to the budgeted cost going forward for clinical negligence. All that is money coming out of the front line of the health service. This year’s budget for clinical negligence excluding the PIDR change is £1.95 billion, so the extra due to the change represents an increase of more than 60% in the cost for clinical negligence to the NHS.
The insurance industry, naturally, has had to increase its reserves. Noble Lords will have read all about the one-off pain of that, but the industry has the opportunity to reprice, so for classes of insurance such as employer liability and public liability the industry is now repriced and whole again.
Had Wells v Wells been heard in 2018, instead of 1998, a lot of argument would have been presented concerning the lessons learnt in the aftermath of the financial crash and, in particular, the effect that quantitative easing has had on the gilts markets. According to the Bank of England website, the Bank has bought £435 billion-worth of gilts and £10 billion-worth of corporate bonds. To put that number in context numerically, that is about 25% of today’s gilt outstandings. Quantitative easing was unheard of in 1998, and it has certainly had an effect on the very part of the investment market that Wells v Wells is tied to; indeed, that effect has been to depress the PIDR to its current level of minus 0.75%.
I accept that, mechanically, this number is what Wells demands but, like many noble Lords, I feel that it is completely wrong. I could say a lot about that at a high level, but it implies that investors will pay the Government to house their money over the decades ahead. I do not believe that that is credible or the lesson of history. The equivalent of the PIDR in France is 1.2%, in Ireland 1.5%, in Spain 3.5% and in Germany 4%. Britain is an outlier, as other noble Lords have pointed out. Rethinking the PIDR, therefore, is an idea whose time has come.
The Bill makes a good stab at things, but could the Minister give us a bit of colour on what,
“more risk than a very low level of risk”,
means? Indeed, I worry, as others do, that the whole of paragraph 3(3)(d) of new Schedule A1 on page 9 of the Bill is none too legally certain. Also, what timeframe does the Minister have in mind for when the expert panel will have reviewed the PIDR and the level either affirmed or changed? I am thinking, in particular, of the £1.2 billion clock that is ticking for the NHS.
I make one short final point concerning Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 6 of the Bill refers to the role of the FCA, yet it applies only to England and Wales. I am concerned that this could create problems for the UK market and present a potential for the ever-creative claims management companies to arbitrage regulation between the different parts of the UK. The interests of the UK in this regard would be best served by having a single market and regulator. Is the Minister in touch with the devolved Administrations to ask whether they would be willing to make use of this primary legislation to improve the situation generally? I close by welcoming this Bill.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I know the Committee wants to move on but I will make just a couple of brief points—in support of the Government moving on this issue; on the contributions made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness; and on the anxiety that perhaps yet again we will be making constitutional measures on a temporary basis late in the day as a result of decisions by two Executives. While we have to take the Government at their word that these will be temporary measures, many procedures in this House and many elements of our constitution started off as temporary measures but have become almost permanent features of our constitution. In the absence of some changes which will provide a sunset element, we may well be in a similar situation.
Two years ago I brought a Bill to this House for a British constitutional convention, as a result of the Scottish referendum, to try to proactively discuss some of these issues. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, said, we are where we are now with this Bill so we have to address what may be constructive ways forward. I think the contributions made so far are good suggestions for what is a very complex situation because we are extracting ourselves from a single market at the same time as seeking to create one with the powers that will be coming back from the European Union. By definition, many of those powers are designed to be cross-border.
Many elements of European legislation are as a result of international agreements that the EU itself has made to implement global agreements, such as on climate change or safety in aviation. These are complex. Interestingly, as the Government’s own framework paper shows, most of that legislation has come into place since devolution. The evolution of the markets within the European Union does not entirely predate 1999. Whether on animal welfare, safety or aviation, many have developed not only since we established devolution in the UK but since the single market has developed. These are going to be very important for our future trading relationships, not only between us and the EU but in our arrangements with third countries.
Most of those areas concern non-tariff barriers, regulations and legislation in domestic law. These are going to be relevant for every single trade agreement that the UK will negotiate and will be at the heart of our relationship with the European Union. Although I have a degree of sympathy with the Government on a temporary basis, we will have to come back not only to the legislation for the implementation period but to that for the new relationship with the European Union. That adds even more weight to the fact that the discussions taking place now will have to be time-limited.
We are also discussing blind how we would expect a framework or a common market to operate within the UK. In many respects, you would argue that we do not have that at the moment. If you drive from where I live in the Borders to London and if you are selling cigarettes or bringing animals, you will be operating under three different road traffic systems. If it was cigarettes, you might have a different packaging system in Scotland. Certainly in Scotland, not only the language of road signs but road traffic speeds are legislated for differently. We operate within many barriers. The question is how damaging those barriers would be to the functioning of the United Kingdom.
That leads on to my second point. This is not simply going to be a relationship based in law; it is also about how the different component parts of the United Kingdom will operate. Since 1999, as noble Lords have said, there have been major changes to that legislation—changes that previous UK Governments said should not be made because they would be counter to the effective operation of the United Kingdom—and Governments have changed their position, usually as a result of consensus and cross-party negotiations.
Where I did slightly disagree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lang, is that there have been now more than 150 LCMs in the Scottish context, and in many respects devolution has been working extremely well when you take away the rhetoric of the wider nationalistic argument. But it does show that there needs to be a degree of flexibility within this set of arrangements. That flexibility will have to come not just with a government-to-government relationship but also with the other elements that are necessary to determine how effectively a common market operates. Who provides the statistics? What is the dispute resolution mechanism? Who provides the data? We saw this in all the discussions that the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, had during negotiations on the fiscal framework between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. In the end, many of the discussions were not about the legislative element but about the non-legislative element, such as who provided the information, whether there was an independent source of data on fiscal revenue and who did the forecasting going into the future. These are all going to be very important.
Noble Lords perhaps thought I was making a glib comment in the previous discussion when I intervened on the Minister and spoke about managed divergence, but that is part of the parlance in our discussions with the European Union. We have that within the UK, and the question is how divergent we can be in the UK for that common market to operate effectively. Part of this discussion will have to be about the existing offices that consider the markets within the UK—our office for energy, our office for communications, the Competition and Markets Authority—which are now going to have to be covered.
That leads me to my final point, which in a way is to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. The choices that we have made about our relationships within the UK—whether nations were consulted and whether or not consent was provided—have been addressed by our European colleagues in different ways. The noble Lord referred to consent in the German federal structure, under which the Bundesrat provides, under the constitution, a decisive opinion when the federal Government bring forward measures that would impact the interests of the Land parliaments. This House is not a federal House; the House of Commons is not a federal Chamber. We will have to have some forms of institutions which bring this together.
In the first instance, however, I strongly support this legislation and the temporary measures being time limited. We will need a schedule of the specific areas which are, in effect, reservations, because we will have to make sure that those areas are resolved before we go over to the next stage. We will be in a kingdom of divergence and will need new institutions. It is not just about frameworks, but a new relationship across them. As many noble Lords have said, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in his Second Reading speech, all of this will have to be underpinned by trust. It is the non-legislative relationships which in many respects will be more important than the legislative relationships in this Bill, in the next Bill, in the final agreement Bill and in all the different measures that come subsequent to it.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly indeed, in strong support of the government amendments, to make one observation and one point.
My observation follows on from something that the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, said in his speech concerning the memorandum of understanding. The current memorandum of understanding, which is dated October 2013, is only a draft—it was never finally signed off. Since that date, of course, we have had the Scottish referendum and very serious Bills in this House that have given more and more powers to the devolved Administrations. I have said before in this House, as others have, that it is frankly not fit for the purpose of acting as the constitutional glue that the structure it controls should be. A well-functioning memorandum of understanding would breed a healthy atmosphere and the ability for the differing nations of the United Kingdom to talk together. Instead of the C words that we have been discussing today, “consult” and “consent”, there may even emerge—from my experience of international companies, where quite often you have the French arguing with the Germans or whatever—a third C word, “consensus”, which would be enormously helpful in this situation. My observation is that this situation is much to be regretted, and I hope the Government are going to put a lot of weight behind getting it resolved and getting a proper memorandum of understanding structure sorted out so that we are not in the position that we are in today where we have a fractious and pretty horrible discussion going on about these issues.
The noble Earl may know that the Scottish Parliament rejected my suggestion that it should have a house of lairds.
I did. I will send my job application in.
I feel that we must have regard to that issue. I have been through the document pretty carefully, and I feel—this is why my support for the government amendments is so strong—that a good balance has been struck in those amendments regarding the point that I have just made. There is a chance that the devolved assemblies can exercise those powers properly, but if we tip too many in then I feel we will be letting down the citizens of Wales and Scotland.
Before the noble Earl sits down, I would like to pick up the point that was made to him at lunch. He will be aware that when the Scottish Parliament was established, a great deal of store was set by the form of the committee system, which it was hoped would be independent and would provide the kind of scrutiny that a second Chamber would afford. I do not think it is challengeable that the committee system has unfortunately become very political, to the extent that it is very difficult for Members on the committee to strike the kind of independence that we sometimes see in Select Committees in the other place and here. A consequence is that an effort to introduce a principle of “holding to account” has not been maintained in the way that it was in the beginning. If that continues, it makes the case for a second revising opportunity—I do not describe it as a Chamber—overwhelming.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for making a jolly good point very well. At the lunch, that was hinted at, with rather less force. I wholly accept his reasoning and agree with what he said.
I join many noble Lords in congratulating the Government on the way they have handled this issue and reinforce what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth: I have not seen any such movement from any Government in my time here in terms of trying to reach out to the points being made and accommodate them. That is terrific; long may it last. The test will be whether the noble and learned Lord in fact withdraws his amendment before the end of tonight—but I trust him in this case.
I also think that the idea of a probing government amendment is pretty good. It is nice to know that there is an open mind on the other side, and no better way of showing it than saying: “We haven’t got the faintest idea here, but here’s something you might want to consider and discuss and we will listen hard and take away the best bits”. It is good in the sense that it builds trust and engages debate. We have had a terrific debate—possibly a little overlong, but it has been very interesting—and I am sure that many points will take us forward. I recognise that the idea of probing your own ideas may not work unless we can actually come up with some ideas, so it behoves us all to think very hard about the advice that we want to give to the noble and learned Lord and his colleagues.
What do we want? There are five things that I would like to see in revised amendments. We should be looking for an agreed amendment among the various interests around the House as much as possible. There has been enough evidence about where the central points are—we may differ on the nuances, but there is enough there. It would be really good if we could have some informal discussions and meetings before Report—and Third Reading, if it goes that far. By that stage, I hope that we will have a firmer view of what we are going to do in Northern Ireland. I agree that the situation is beyond the power of this House to do anything about, but it is a real gap when we are trying to address our longer-term constitutional position. If we have nothing to say, that says more about us than about the situation in Northern Ireland. I hope that that will be taken into account.
My first point is a negative. The Bill has raised debates, ideas and thoughts that are really important, but they are far too time-rich and need more discussion before they go into the Bill. The Bill is at heart limited to ensuring that we have a legal framework if and when we leave the EU—as the noble and learned Lord said, a fully functioning statute book. We are wrong to try to overload it with too much. I hope that, in offering our advice either privately or in meetings, we will focus on the minimum necessary to get the Bill on the statute book in a way that will be effective and efficient, and will achieve what we are trying to do.
On the other hand, the debate should not be curtailed by the question of what is and what is not in the Bill. We must accept—some noble Lords were ahead of me on this point—that transfers of this amount of responsibility to admittedly mature Parliaments and Assemblies will start a new chapter in the devolution story, and it would be remiss of this House if we did not think through some of the implications of that.
I have no particular remedies here, but it is inconceivable that the current arrangements, under which we determine through a Board of Trade how we conduct trade policy, can accommodate the new arrangements. They will have to be expanded and thought through again. We will have to think about how we deal with treaties and how our ongoing relationship with the EU and its regulatory and other official operations will continue in a devolved situation where trade responsibility and policy is at a level other than national. There may well be a set of rules that will accommodate that. They will not fit into this Bill, but they need to be considered as we go forward.
We have to think also much wider—certainly much wider than this idea that somehow this paves the way to independence for any or all of the parts of the United Kingdom. We have to think about the opportunities that will exist as these things are devolved in terms of such matters as what happens to state aid rules when they are changed. This will raise a lot of concern and interest much more widely than in this House. We will do ourselves a disservice if we do not take that into account as we think this through. For the moment, though, let us think very narrowly about this Bill.
At the heart of it, we want an agreement that, on the face of the Bill, the underlying principle in play is that everything is devolved unless it is reserved. We also want a clear understanding of why certain things are reserved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, gave a very good example of one way into this argument by saying that it was a question of when powers were in consideration which applied in more than one geographical area; however, I put it to him and to the Ministers who are working on this that this is not quite the full story. If you look at the note on the common frameworks that accompanied the full list of them, it goes much deeper than that. These are principles, as I understand it and as I think the noble and learned Lord confirmed, that were agreed by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Governments at a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee in October 2017, so they are not in dispute. The principles make clear that,
“common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: … enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence;”
—the coda about “acknowledging policy divergence” is really important, and we need to know more about that—
“ensure compliance with international obligations;”
—I think that is fairly clear—
“ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties;”
—I have already said I do not know whether that will necessarily be the only way into that debate—
“enable the management of common resources;”
and then two rather important issues that we have not touched on but that surely have to lie at the heart of this:
“administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element;”
and,
“safeguard the security of the UK”.
It has always been the case that national security is the primary concern of all governments, but surely that plus the geographical “bite”, as indicated by the noble and learned Lord, give us—together with the other points I have raised—a much richer context within which the decision to reserve an item can be placed. It is important that this is on the face of the Bill. That is the key issue. There must not be a sense that something has been hidden or held back. We have to be open and trust those who are concerned about this that this will be the way forward. I hope that when the Minister comes to respond, he will be able to confirm that this is an issue that he might look at with some sympathy, because I think it will be the key to it.
I also think, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and others, that we should see the 24 policy areas included as a Schedule to the Bill. The point made by my noble friend Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale is very important: we are talking about those things that will have to be reserved for a reason. We should list them, and we should also understand the reasons why they are reserved.
There are two smaller points—in the sense that they are less full of implications; they are still very important—that I will tag on to the end of this. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, raised a number of points that will need to be picked up and that we must not forget, because the change to the existing Clause 11 will affect other aspects of the area. He made that point well. There have also been calls from all around the House for a sunset clause, which I absolutely support. That is the right thing to do. If that all comes together, however—and I think we are confident that it is possible—what we are signing up to is an agreement to agree on process, but that agreement will be able to get the consent of the devolved Administrations. That combination is vital to the way forward, and I recommend it very strongly to the Ministers.
Finally, if we are going to avoid the veto problem, which I think is a real issue that we have not really bottomed out, we are going to need a dispute resolution mechanism. There is no doubt about that. You cannot just go into this hoping that it will somehow be all right on the night. We need to know what happens when one area, for whatever reason—whether it is a political reason or truly an issue of conscience—wants to put down a veto and hold out. I do not think there has been any dispute, but we have not said it enough: at the end of the day the UK Parliament has to have a backstop power to legislate in cases that meet the criteria for why things are reserved. I think we should keep saying that until it has become part of the fabric of our lives. It is not said enough, as the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, mentioned.
But we also need to achieve the consent that is necessary to establish the agreements that will underpin trust and support for this in the long run. I absolutely think that the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has something in that regard. I am grateful that the Minister has said that he will take this away; we need to workshop it—what we should have is a hackathon—in order to work out together where we might go with it.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Judd. “K” seems to follow “J” quite a lot. He always brings great passion and the wisdom born of many long years of public service, and we are very lucky that he does. I am glad to say that he brings it to every committee meeting, too. I feel that he needs a large carpetbag—in my case, I need a very small toothpaste bag for such things.
I add my thanks and congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on her leadership of our committee. She brings the most marvellous crispness and robustness to meetings, which I find energises us—and we had a strong flavour of that in her speech in introducing the debate. What an excellent survey of the report and state of affairs that was.
I add, as others have, my heartfelt thanks to committee staff for their hard work. They in fact work on every report of the EU Select Committee, being the legal resource. In the 18 months or so since the Brexit vote, there have been 24 Brexit reports from the EU Select Committee, and the standard of work has been high throughout. I do not know how they do it, but they continue to exude an atmosphere of calm efficiency and good humour. I can see some of them there, but I hope that the others are having a mild afternoon off.
Although this report is only 37 pages long, it represents a rounded and important summary and analysis of vital issues that need to be addressed as part of the Brexit process. It was published on 20 March, but I regret that the government response arrived only on 1 December, more than eight months later, well outside the conventional two-month period, even taking into account the election period. I note that the response itself relied heavily on the government paper, Providing a Cross-border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework, of 22 August. The Minister has a strong personal reputation for getting things done on time, being a good Scot, and I ask him to explain briefly some reasons for this delay on this very important topic. As we have heard today, so many people are relying on certainty in this area.
In my remarks I shall confine myself substantially to the perspective of business. Business thrives on certainty. I started the debate by noting down the names of all the noble Lords who made more or less the same point on certainty. However, as that includes everyone who has spoken in the debate so far, I shall not list them. But the certainty point is what everything comes back to; anything that can be done to provide greater certainty benefits business and thus our economy.
From the business perspective, the uncertainty falls in two broad areas. They are what I am calling the “pipeline”, or civil law matters in train at the date of exit, and the “new future”, or matters that arise after the date of exit. I have assumed that any transitional period matters would be part of the pipeline, not only because of recent comment but because it would simply make submissions far too complex to try to analyse them separately.
Turning, therefore, to the pipeline, I feel that the news has seemed quite good. The EU published its views on 12 July in its paper on judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. The UK responded with its paper of 22 August, which I referred to earlier. Annex A of that paper deals with the UK’s views on pipeline issues. The pleasing thing is that, between the two, there is quite a lot of common ground, I feel. In the interim, we have had four months where, presumably, more discussions have been held. Indeed, we have had some further evidence in paragraph 91 of the joint report of 8 December:
“On cooperation in civil and commercial matters there is a need to provide legal certainty and clarity. There is general consensus between both Parties that Union rules on conflict of laws should continue to apply to contracts before the withdrawal date and non-contractual obligations where an event causing damage occurred before the withdrawal date”.
Can the Minister tell the House how close the parties are in terms of agreeing pipeline matters?
I move to the new future—matters that arise after the date of exit. The evidence that we took painted a remarkable picture concerning the development of judicial co-operation in the EU and, in particular, the Brussels I Regulation (recast). This was—and I am disapplying my normal British reserve—that the UK had a huge influence in the legal developments that made judicial processes work well within the EU. The wonderfully named legal tactic, the “Italian Torpedo”, was widely employed to frustrate proceedings prior to the Brussels I Regulation (recast). The lis pendens rule used to apply so that, where proceedings involving the same parties and same causes of action were brought in different member states, any court other than the first court seized stayed its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the first court seized was established—a good rule to prevent parallel proceedings, but misused in the regular commencement of Italian proceedings, where progress is notoriously slow.
The Brussels I Regulation (recast) defeated this by disapplying the “first in time” rule where an exclusive jurisdiction clause existed between the parties. This Brussels I Regulation (recast) change was thanks to pragmatic British pressure and diplomacy. Indeed, the British-engineered Brussels I Regulation (recast) regime is very helpful to commerce, providing certainty and a good framework. The Government paper of 22 August clearly aspires to that and the second half of paragraph 91 of the joint report that I referred to a moment ago states:
“There was also agreement to provide legal certainty as to the circumstances under which Union law on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements will continue to apply, and that judicial cooperation procedures should be finalised”.
Again, I am mildly heartened, but the detail and certainty is not there and is not what business seeks.
The Bar Council has published a series of papers in this area, The Brexit Papers, which I commend to the House. Paper 4, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, suggests a practical route forward with admirable certainty:
“Enter into an agreement based on the Denmark-EU Jurisdiction Agreement, both with the EU and with Denmark albeit with a clause providing not for interpretative jurisdiction of the CJEU but for ‘due account’ to be taken of the decisions of the courts of all ‘Contracting Parties’”.
Secondly:
“Sign and ratify the Lugano II Convention, to preserve the present regime vis-à-vis Norway, Iceland and Switzerland”.
Thirdly:
“Sign and ratify the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements”.
And, finally:
“Enter into an agreement based on the Denmark-EU Service Agreement, both with the EU and with Denmark”.
I found this and its associated reasoning clear and convincing and a good route forward. In closing, I therefore ask the Minister to comment on this Bar Council proposal.