European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, following not just yesterday’s speeches, but those today from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, my noble friends Lord Howarth, Lord Griffiths, Lord Murphy and Lord Morgan, the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Randerson, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, from Wales, as well as welcome additions to our West Country debate from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, the Government should have heard by now that the devolved authorities and people close to them feel somewhat squeezed out of the Government’s handling of our withdrawal from the EU and our future relationship with it, and of how the Government plan to discuss, or not, with those representatives as we go forward. That was probably not helped by the response of the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, last night.

We particularly welcome Amendments 18, 23 and 45, accepting in particular that, if we really must have an albeit non-legally enforceable statement about the sovereignty of Parliament in the Bill, it surely has to be accompanied by at least an equivalent nod to the devolution settlements and the Sewel convention to safeguard the union, as my noble friend Lord Murphy emphasised.

Looking towards the future, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said earlier this week that devolved Governments have an interest in all the negotiations. It is not simply the bits that can be identified as within their competence, because how agriculture pans out will absolutely affect the future of those countries. So will other parts of trade.

Our Amendment 29 in the name of my noble friend Lady Smith, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and the noble Lords, Lord Bruce and Lord Kerr, seeks to achieve the input of the devolved authorities in the negotiations. As we have heard, it would place the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations on a statutory footing—something that we have urged on the Government since its formation in 2016. As my noble friend Lord Morgan reminded us, it has been pretty constantly discussed in the Constitution Committee. The amendment would ensure regular and frequent meetings of the JMC on EU Negotiations, which as we have heard, has at times been sidelined, especially when it was seen as a bit inconvenient. The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said that it had a “chequered” history. As my noble friend, Lord Griffiths, reminded us, it was not used in the way intended when it was set up. Importantly—we have not heard this voice this morning—the amendment would also require the JMC to focus on the very unique challenges facing Northern Ireland, including the aspects discussed in your Lordships’ House last night.

The amendment also covers the relationship between the JMC—the Joint Ministerial Committee—and the new and, as we have heard, highly important UK/EU Joint Committee. For example, the Secretary of State would have to brief British members of the Joint Committee to make sure they knew what the JMC was discussing, so that discussions held with the devolved authorities were fed in to the UK negotiators. This is vital. The British members of the Joint Committee, who would, of course, be Ministers, would have to give regard to the views of the Joint Ministerial Committee, which brings together the devolved authorities. They would also have to bear in mind the requirement of the Northern Ireland protocol to facilitate trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

It is particularly important, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said, to realise that, in addition to a general interest in all these negotiations, much of the implementation will fall to the devolved authorities. As any of us who have been involved in developing policy know, if you do not discuss beforehand how it is going to be implemented, the chances are that the policy will not work.

Given the importance of ensuring that Brexit works for all parts of the UK, including the devolved nations, and given the concerns of the devolved Administrations that they are being excluded from vital talks—as we have heard, an amendment which we will come to later about the authority of courts has been tabled without any consultation with them—we look forward to a rather more positive response from the Minister when he replies. If the response is really positive, it might help the Welsh Assembly to consider whether it wants to give its legislative consent to this Bill.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to this group of amendments. The thread that binds together the amendments spoken to by the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords is their entirely legitimate interest in the Government’s level of engagement with the devolved Administrations and the protection of the devolution settlements. Having listened also to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I fully understand that these amendments particularly reflect some of the concerns raised by colleagues in the Welsh Government. I hope I can reassure the Committee that these amendments are not necessary and the Government are fully committed to proper engagement with the devolved Administrations.

I turn first to Amendment 18. It is clear to me that the concern here is about the scope and breadth of the powers in this clause. I hope that I can address those concerns satisfactorily. I should add that the Government have also taken note of the report produced by our noble colleagues in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in relation to the powers contained in this Bill.

I hope I am right in understanding that the noble and learned Lord is concerned that, without this amendment, the devolved authorities would be able to use the powers provided in Clause 22 to implement the protocol and, in doing so, would be able to amend the devolution statutes in those areas where they have such competence. However, I am afraid I have to resist this amendment because the restriction proposed by it risks preventing the United Kingdom fulfilling its international obligations, which stem from the Northern Ireland protocol. The noble and learned Lord will understand that we must be able to fulfil those obligations as a responsible player in the international system and as a close partner of our European neighbours. The particular problem with the amendment is that the proposed restriction would prevent the devolved authorities adopting certain decisions agreed between the UK and the EU in the Joint Committee, in relation to the operationalisation—if I may use such a word—of the protocol in areas of devolved competence. I must make it clear that that risk to the UK being able to fulfil its international obligations is unacceptable to the Government.

This amendment would have the effect of preventing amendments to the devolution statutes, even in situations where the devolved Administrations agreed to an exercise of the power in new paragraph 11M(2) jointly with the UK Government. This restriction could therefore hinder the introduction of UK-wide legislation that has been agreed on by all four nations of the United Kingdom. The Government could not allow such a situation.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but I shall make a couple of comments. It is clear that we will have to return to this at the next stage if the Government do not provide any more detail. First, on the role of the Lords in considering Bills such as this, the noble Baroness said—as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said on a couple of occasions—that this is a largely mechanical Bill. Well, it is a mechanical Bill that gives very wide discretion to the Government to design our future relationship with our most important security, political and economic partners. So a House that concerns itself not with whether the principle of the Bill is correct but with the detail is entirely in accord with its role to ask for detail on what that discretion will be used for.

It would be easier to accept that this is a mechanical Bill and not to raise these difficult questions one after another if we had some confidence that the Government actually know what they want in these areas. Part of our problem is that many of us have no such confidence. I do not think that the Foreign Secretary has a clue about what he wants by way of a future relationship with Europe: I doubt whether he has really thought about it for more than three or four minutes. He is too busy thinking about the next anecdote he is going to tell or the next joke he is going to make. His speech last week was a disgrace for a Foreign Secretary: the Prime Minister’s was of an entirely different quality. For a Conservative Party that has always prided itself on its commitment to a strong foreign policy, it must be a real embarrassment that we still have someone in place who is incapable of giving a serious speech on foreign policy. So this House is fulfilling its proper role in asking for detail on the implications of the Bill.

Secondly, I take up what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said: the engine room is important.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I think it is against the rules and the spirit of this Chamber to criticise a Member of another place by name. I hope that the noble Lord will see fit to moderate his comments accordingly.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I apologise for being perhaps a little stronger than I should have been in this respect. On the engine room—I wanted to return to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on this—much of the business of multilateral organisations, be it NATO or the EU, is done in working groups and committees. The common foreign and security policy structure has some 40 working groups and committees, including a military committee that has been chaired by a British officer. If we are not in any of those working groups, we will miss out on formulating policy.

There are other details that matter a great deal. I remember the noble Earl, Lord Howe, saying on one occasion, when some of us were following the noble Lord, Lord West, and asking, “Where are you going to find the frigates to make up the carrier groups that we need?” The noble Earl said, if I remember correctly, “They do not necessarily have to be British frigates”. I took him as meaning that they might be Dutch, French, Belgian or whatever. Well, that also needs a certain structure, with certain training mechanisms and certain multilateral commands.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 191 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. It would insert a new clause after Clause 206 requiring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify those who have been subject to the powers contained within the Bill, as set out in Clause 205(1) to 205(3), once the operation against them is complete or the warrant is cancelled. There are various conditions for notification and the ability to postpone notification in certain circumstances following discussion with the person to whom the warrant is addressed.

Citizens are entitled to the protection of the law but, as the Bill is drafted, it is impossible to challenge the Government and the use of state instruments of interference in people’s private lives if they have no idea that they have been the subject of surveillance. To quote the briefing provided by Liberty, if a person’s Article 8 rights—to a private and family life—and other Human Rights Act rights have been engaged and potentially violated,

“in order to have access to an effective remedy, as required under human rights law, the person must first be made aware of a possible breach”.

Cases in 1978 and 2006 before the European Court of Human Rights upheld this view. In 2007, the court went further and said that,

“as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the surveillance after its termination, information should be provided to the persons concerned”.

Post-event notification is already in place in some form in Germany, Belgium and the state of California in the United States of America.

There must of course be safeguards and these are built into the amendment, allowing the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to postpone notification if he assesses that it might defeat the purposes of an ongoing serious crime investigation or national security operation, after consultation with the body that issued the warrant. The right honourable Theresa May, the Prime Minister, repeatedly stated when she was Home Secretary that this is world-leading legislation. If that is the case, let us be radical and implement this amendment. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord explained, Amendment 191 would insert a new clause that would see subjects of the lawful and proper use of investigatory powers notified of that fact.

There are a number of problems with that proposition, both in principle and from a practical perspective. First, let me be clear that I agree with the principle that where a serious error has occurred in the use of the investigatory powers, the commissioner should be able to inform a person affected. Clause 198(1) makes this absolutely clear.

However, I do not agree with the principle that, as a matter of course, anyone subject to the lawful use of an investigatory power must be notified, unless it would damage an ongoing serious crime or national security investigation. A principle of that kind would mean, for example, that we would need to notify suspected criminals and terrorists that they have been under investigation just because a specific ongoing investigation had stalled or, indeed, had concluded with evidence of wrongdoing but with insufficient evidence to bring a prosecution.

As noble Lords will know, suspected criminals and terrorists will often appear on the radar of the police and the security services at different times in the context of different investigations. It would clearly not be appropriate to inform them that investigatory powers had been used against them in a particular case as this could prompt them to change how they behave or communicate, which could hamper a future investigation. This is particularly important in relation to national security because this amendment would require the commissioner to make the subject of interest aware of,

“the conduct that has taken place”.

That would not just run contrary to the long-standing policy of successive Governments of neither confirming nor denying any specific activity by the security and intelligence agencies, but would essentially require the techniques the agencies use in specific cases to be made public. That would clearly assist terrorists in their operations, allowing them to stay one step ahead of the agencies.

Beyond the principled objections to this amendment, there would be numerous practical problems. It would not be practical, for example, for the commissioner to make everyone whose data were subject to a data retention notice aware of that fact. For example, he would have to require the relevant telecommunications operator to provide him with a list of all relevant customers, and it would have to inform him every time a new customer joined its service. It would not be difficult for criminals to use that process to identify services that they could use to avoid detection.

Equally, I suggest to the noble Lord that it would put unreasonable burdens on all public authorities covered by this Bill to require them constantly to need to make a case to the commissioner as to whether it would hamper national security or serious crime investigations if subjects were told that investigatory powers had been used against them. It would surely be better for the police to spend time and money on investigating criminals, rather than on determining whether individuals should be informed about perfectly lawful investigative activity.

Furthermore, in the context of bulk warrants under parts 6 and 7, the public authority or commissioner would need to examine all the data collected under the warrant to identify the individuals whose data have been collected. That would not only be impractical, but data would be looked at that otherwise there would have been no need to examine. This new clause would therefore actually lead to greater intrusions into privacy than would otherwise be necessary, which I am sure cannot be the intention.

I submit to the noble Lord that the proposed amendment is at best unnecessary and at worst threatens fatally to undermine the work of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies.

Let us be clear what the effect would be. It is not innocent, ordinary, law-abiding people who would be notified, because the agencies do not seek or obtain warrants against such people; it is suspected criminals and terrorist suspects. They would then change their behaviour, and we would have less chance of bringing them to justice. That point lies at the nub of the argument I have put to the noble Lord. I am sure that cannot be his intention, so I hope he will consider it the right thing to do to reflect on this point between now and Report, and withdraw the amendment at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, with great respect to my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, I am with the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on this one. What my noble friends may have overlooked is the strength, distinction and effectiveness of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If there was any evidence to indicate that the commissioner, whether the present one or a future one, was likely to behave in a malign way and not reveal where improper action had taken place, then my noble friends’ concerns might have some validity. As has been said, though, the Bill is a world leader, not least in the protections that it contains. I commend to the House the provisions that have been placed in the Bill without these unnecessary amendments.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I shall briefly respond to the points that have been made. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for amplifying the case that his noble friend made in introducing the amendment. In the end, we come back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just articulated. We are talking here about the proper, legitimate use of the powers that the Bill contains, with robust oversight and mechanisms for redress built in, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is indeed an important safeguard in that context.

We are absolutely on board with the proposition that where an innocent person has been completely wrongly subject to the use of the investigatory powers—that is, where a serious error has occurred—there is no argument that that person should be informed. However, I submit that one cannot talk in the abstract about someone who has been “wrongly investigated”, which I think was the phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. You can be wrongly investigated if you are completely innocent, but you can also be wrongly investigated if there is perhaps not enough to pin on you as the culprit in a particular case but you might nevertheless, subject to further evidence, be implicated in a serious crime or a threat to national security. So we have to be clear about our terms in this context.

I come back to the fact that there are issues of principle and practice here that make this particular amendment unworkable. I also take on board the very good point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that it is not just an individual who could react to the news that they had been investigated in a way that would frustrate law enforcement agencies or intelligence services but a whole group of people. That in turn could affect national security, or indeed the conduct of criminals, much more widely.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the Minister and to other noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. I was heartened when the Minister started to say that he could see in principle what the amendment was driving at and therefore the merit of it to that extent. He then gave a lot of practical reasons why it would not work in practice. I have to say that I found a lot of those unconvincing, particularly when you look at the wording of the amendment and the fact that:

“The Investigatory Powers Commissioner may postpone the notification … if the Commissioner assesses that notification may defeat the purposes of an ongoing serious crime or national security operation or investigation”—

which would cover the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Presumably the police and security services would know that this individual was part of a wider network and therefore would not inform that individual—at least, not at that stage.

So I think we are on to something here in principle, although I accept the practical difficulties that the Minister pointed out. We need to go back and rethink the amendment to address the practical problems that he highlighted and see whether we can allay his fears at Report. But, at this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.