Financial Services Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

Amendments 45 and 48 strike just the right balance between Parliament and regulators within the evolving structure of the new scrutiny. Once again, I must say that I am pleased to find versions of those recipes in the Economic Secretary’s letter and very pleased that he has endorsed my amendments. I look forward to the Minister’s reply containing, as it surely will, further suggestions as to how this legislation can be made yet more useful.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to turn once again to the issue of parliamentary accountability of the financial services regulators, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this good debate. This is an issue of considerable importance to many in this House and, indeed, has been a central topic of debate during the passage of the Bill.

Each amendment in the group proposes different things but I know that at the heart of them all is a desire for reassurance from me, as Minister, that the Government agree with the regulators that Parliament has a unique and special role in relation to the scrutiny and oversight of the financial services regulators. I therefore take this opportunity to give the House that assurance. It is Parliament that ultimately sets the regulators’ objectives and, of course, right that it has the appropriate opportunity to scrutinise the work of the regulators and their effectiveness in delivering the objectives that Parliament has set them. This most certainly includes the way in which the regulators exercise their rule-making powers but also encompasses their wider work on supervision and enforcement across the financial services sector.

Noble Lords will, I hope, have had a chance to read the letters of 19 March from Nikhil Rathi, the CEO of the FCA, and Sam Woods, the CEO of the PRA, that I have deposited in the House Library and the Royal Gallery. Those letters can properly be interpreted as a commitment to the openness and sincere co-operation which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said she sought. I do not in the least detect the complacency that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said she detected in the letter from Nikhil Rathi. Perhaps I may quote the sentence that she cited. He said:

“We are committed to ensuring that Parliamentarians have the information they need to scrutinise our policy and rule proposals, particularly during consultation”.


I do not detect any shadow of qualification to that commitment. Sam Woods, chief executive of the PRA, wrote:

“When we publish consultations, we always stand ready to engage with Parliament.”


So the regulators have clearly demonstrated that they have heard the views expressed by noble Lords during the passage of the Bill. Despite the reservations of my noble friend Lady Noakes, I hope noble Lords accept that these letters take us forward in a meaningful and material way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 24 and 25 develop the notion of an information system—the information that will be provided by the FCA, PRA and the Government to feed into an assessment of the performance and impact of the financial services sector and the regulators. Amendment 37 goes much wider, as one might have gathered from its presentation, seeking to make, or ask for, a general economic assessment of the role of financial services generally within the UK, particularly the impact of the various regulators and the Treasury.

One of the themes particularly around the discussion of Amendment 37 was that this is not done. There are shelves of academic books that do this, and there are libraries of this material, but what has not happened is that it has not been brought together and assessed in a decision-making environment on a regular basis. The problem with Amendment 37 is that it asks the FCA and the PRA to—to use a phrase that has become popular today—mark their own homework. They are not really the right people to assess themselves; there are plenty of research institutes around this country that do a first-class job of assessing exactly these issues. However, we have not brought them together very well. What is so valuable about Amendments 24 and 25 is that they are targeted on that bringing together—bringing information into what I have called the “New Scrutiny”.

I would be interested to hear the Minister reflect, when he sums up, on the information role that is represented by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the role that that sort of information system will play in our regulatory future.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 24, 25 and 37 return to an issue that I know is of keen interest to many in this House. They seek to introduce requirements to publish reports on the impact of financial services regulation and to undertake assessments of the impact of the financial services sector on the UK more broadly.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, many not feel able to assent to what I am about to say, but, as we consider this topic, we should remind ourselves of the vital role that the financial services sector plays in our economy, employing more than 1 million people nationwide. It is also a critical source of tax revenue, which has proved especially important during these difficult times. We can argue about how we should calculate the precise amount of such revenue, but, by any measure, it is very substantial. We also should not forget the role that the sector plays in enhancing the nation’s standing abroad. The UK exported over £50 billion-worth of financial and insurance activities in 2019, a trade surplus of £41 billion.

Amendment 24 would require the Government to publish a report on the “impact of measures” taken by the FCA, PRA and the Government to regulate this most important financial services sector. In particular, it seeks understanding of the impact of measures on small businesses, innovation and competitiveness. Amendment 25 would add “consumer protection” to the list of things that the Government would be required to report on.

Lest there be any doubt, the Government are wholly committed to ensuring that the financial services sector supports competition, innovation and competitiveness. I hope that this is evidenced by the last set of remit letters issued to the FCA and the PRA by the Chancellor, which requested that the regulators have regard to these three priorities when advancing their objectives and discharging their duties.

In respect of reporting, the FCA and the PRA both have a statutory objective to promote effective competition. What does that involve? It involves promoting a financial services framework that supports new firms to enter the market and grow, promotes innovation and allows successful, innovative firms to grow and thrive. Those, surely, are the key aims for the sector when we talk about effective competition.

I remind my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that both regulators are obliged to prepare annual reports that analyse the extent to which their objectives, including this competition objective, have been advanced that year. Those reports are in turn laid before Parliament for scrutiny. Moreover, I should say to her that, under the Financial Services and Markets Act, the FCA and the PRA are required to publish cost-benefit analyses when proposing new rules. The regulatory initiatives grid, a relatively recent innovation, sets out the regulatory pipeline that allows the financial services industry and other interested parties to understand and plan for the timings of initiatives that may have a significant operational impact. The grid is published at least twice a year, so Parliament has a forward look at upcoming proposals in a material and transparent way.

Turning to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s point about small firms, in my letter to her of 2 March, I set out the Government’s actions to support smaller innovative firms to grow to their full potential, including through the FCA’s regulatory sandbox and our support for the fintech sector. The amendment would therefore duplicate reporting obligations and arrangements that already exist.

I should also note the new accountability frameworks that the Bill puts in place for prudential measures. These require the FCA and PRA to have regard to UK competitiveness, among other things, when making rules to implement Basel or the investment firms prudential regime. Furthermore, the regulators will then be required to report on how having regard to competitiveness has affected their proposed rules.

On consumer protection, which is the subject of the amendment, let me first reassure noble Lords that the protection of consumers is at the heart of our existing regulatory framework. The FCA has an operational objective to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and is required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to consult a consumer panel on the impact of its work. The panel ensures that consumers play an integral role in the regulator’s rule-making and policy development.

The FCA has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to consumer protection. One of the key areas of focus in the FCA’s Business Plan 2020/21 is,

“ensuring…that the most vulnerable are protected”.

The FCA has also recently published guidance on how firms can treat vulnerable customers fairly. As consumer protection is one of the FCA’s statutory objectives, as set out in FSMA 2000, the FCA must already report on how consumer protection has been advanced in its annual report, as outlined earlier. Therefore, as with a previous amendment, the amendment would duplicate reporting that already exists. As regards the PRA, it is important to remember that it already has an important role in protecting consumers indirectly by promoting the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms. This means that consumers are protected from the significant distress and suffering caused by disorderly bank failures.

I now turn to Amendment 37, which would require regular reports on the impact of the financial services sector on a range of topics, including economic development and regional inequality. I have already set out some examples of the overwhelmingly positive impact that the sector has on jobs, productivity and tax revenues across the whole UK.

European Union Referendum: Alleged Russian Interference

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords—

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the Liberal Democrats.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, Cambridge Analytica was using so-called online political microtargeting, which involves collecting, often illicitly, huge amounts of personal data, creating personal profiles for voters and delivering specifically tailored, often false messages. Irrespective of the question of expenses—and I have no doubt that this could form part of the many inquiries that the Minister has mentioned—is this not exactly the kind of secret online targeting which is a threat to our democracy? Should it not be made transparent and be highly regulated under our electoral law?

Electoral Fraud

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 29th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP)]

My Lords—

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the noble Lord, Lord Pearson.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that our first past the post system in local and national elections ensures that their results are democratically fraudulent?

Deregulation Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

87ZA: After Clause 73, insert the following new Clause—
“NHS foundation trusts and NHS trusts: acquisitions and dissolutions etc
(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 56A (acquisitions), after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Where the regulator proposes to grant the application, it may by order make provision for the transfer of employees of B to A on the grant of the application.”
(3) After section 56A (acquisitions) insert—
“56AA  Acquisitions under section 56A: supplementary
(1) On the grant of an application under section 56A—
(a) any order made by the regulator under section 56A(4A) takes effect,(b) the property and liabilities of the acquired NHS foundation trust or NHS trust are transferred to the acquiring NHS foundation trust (other than rights and liabilities which may be dealt with by order under section 56A(4A)),(c) the acquired NHS foundation trust or NHS trust is dissolved, and(d) where the acquired trust is an NHS trust, the NHS trust order establishing it is revoked.(2) So far as may be necessary for the purposes of subsection (1)(b)—
(a) anything done before the grant of the application by or in relation to the acquired trust is to be treated (on and after the grant) as having been done by or in relation to the acquiring trust;(b) any reference in a document to the acquired trust is to be read as a reference to the acquiring trust.(3) Anything (including legal proceedings) that, immediately before the grant of the application, is in the process of being done by or in relation to the acquired trust may continue to be done afterwards by or in relation to the acquiring trust.
(4) In subsection (1)—
(a) “liabilities” includes criminal liabilities;(b) “property” includes trust property.”(4) In section 57 (sections 56 to 56B: supplementary), after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) The order may include provision for the transfer of employees of the trust or trusts dissolved by the order.”
(5) In section 64 (orders and regulations under this Chapter)—
(a) in subsection (4), before paragraph (c) insert—“(ba) section 56A(4A),”;(b) in subsection (4A), after “section” insert “56A(4A),”.(6) In section 65LA (trusts to be dissolved), in subsection (3)(b), for the words following “trust” to the end substitute “—
(i) to an NHS body; (ii) to the Secretary of State;(iii) between more than one NHS body or between one or more NHS bodies and the Secretary of State.”(7) In that section, in subsection (5), for “to an NHS foundation trust” substitute “to an NHS body”.”

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, this clause makes amendments to Sections 56A, 57 and 65LA of the National Health Service Act 2006. These provisions are all concerned with the transfer of property liabilities and staff between NHS bodies. The changes proposed in the amendment simply clarify the provisions in the existing legislation to ensure that it can be used in a seamless and efficient way. They do not create new policy.

The clause is needed to remove the current uncertainty over the powers of an NHS foundation trust in Section 56A to acquire another NHS foundation trust or NHS trust, and to correct the omission of key powers with respect to the transfer of staff and criminal liabilities in this provision. It would also explicitly extend Monitor’s power in Section 65LA to transfer the property and liabilities, including criminal liabilities, of an NHS foundation trust dissolved following special administration.

I am sure that it would help the Committee if I expand on those initial comments. The existing Section 56A provisions are uncertain and open to interpretation. Critically, there is no express explanation in the provision of what happens to the acquired trust’s property and liabilities, or third party rights and obligations. As a consequence of this uncertainty, NHS foundation trusts are unlikely to utilise the current provision for fear of legal challenges. We are keen to ensure that where acquisitions are deemed to be in the best interests of patient care, legislation supports this approach. Accordingly, paragraph 1(3) of the clause inserts new Section 56AA to provide for a direct transfer of property and liabilities by operation of law. The grant of application would also be conclusive proof that the acquired trust is dissolved, and in the case of an acquired NHS trust the establishment order revoked.

The Government are committed to ensuring that staff involved in transfers from one public body to another are treated fairly and consistently, and that their rights are respected. The amendment to Section 56A would give Monitor an additional discretionary power to make an order for the transfer of staff from the acquired to the acquiring trust. This would ensure that in cases where TUPE does not apply, or where it is unclear whether it does, Monitor can set out a clear mechanism of transfer that specifies which of the staff are transferring and the implications of transfer. The amendment would also apply to orders made under Section 57 in respect of mergers and separations.

It is established Department of Health policy that criminal liabilities must be preserved on dissolution and transfer of an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust, so that organisational change does not prevent the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings. New Section 56AA creates a statutory authority for the criminal liabilities of an acquired NHS trust or an NHS foundation trust to transfer to the acquiring trust. Amending Section 65LA will enable Monitor to implement the recommendations of a trust special administrator. Property and liabilities, including criminal liabilities of a failed NHS foundation trust, may need to transfer to more than one NHS body. Currently, Monitor can only transfer to a single NHS foundation trust, and this is not adequate.

As stated earlier, these changes simply clarify the provisions in existing legislation that already support the NHS in taking the decisions necessary on how to continue to deliver high-quality patient care. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, like the noble Earl, I make a happy, though unexpected intervention in the proceedings of this Grand Committee. I thank him for giving me advance warning that he intended to move an amendment on the question of trust mergers. I certainly would not oppose the amendment, but I should like to put some points to him. As this is being introduced at such a late stage, perhaps I could ask him about the Department of Health’s approach to deregulation, because it is entirely relevant to the amendment.

The noble Earl will know that a later clause in the Bill introduces a new duty for non-economic regulators to have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth while exercising their regulatory functions. From the list that we have been given by the Government, we understand that the Care Quality Commission is encompassed in the list of organisations to which the new provisions may apply. The Opposition have asked the CQC for its views on the clause, but we have been informed that the Department of Health has told the CQC that it was not appropriate for the CQC to respond to our query, given that it is an arm’s-length body of government. I am surprised by that. As the noble Earl has frequently said to us, the CQC is an independent body. I am surprised that the CQC even approached the DoH for advice, and I am shocked that the DoH should prevent CQC from giving its advice to parliamentarians on the Bill. I do not expect the noble Earl to respond to this point today, because I doubt that he could, but I ask him to respond to me in due course.

What is the Department of Health’s approach to deregulation? My understanding is that it is in favour, and recently told the Health Select Committee that, unless issues of public safety are concerned, it is not in favour of extending statutory regulation to other professions within the health service, which is entirely consistent with what Ministers are saying in the Bill.

The noble Earl will not be surprised that I then want to ask why the department is still attempting to require non-doctor public health specialists to be statutorily registered. I recently asked a Written Question about that. I cannot for the life of me see that public health non-doctors pose any risk to public safety. That conviction has been reinforced by the evidence that the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care, which is the overarching regulator, has now given to the Government, in which it confirms my view that minimal risks are posed by public health specialists. There is a very limited number of them. Whether they are statutorily regulated or not is not a major issue. The problem is that, by so doing, the Government are threatening the viability of a voluntary register, the UK Public Health Practitioner Register, because it depends on the fees of those non-doctor specialists for its viability. I should have thought that a voluntary register accredited by the Professional Standards Authority is just what a deregulatory approach would lend itself to.

Again, I do not expect the noble Earl to give me a response today, but I wanted to raise with him that there is considerable puzzlement that a Government who brought forward this deregulatory Bill is hell-bent—for some reason that no one can understand—on forcing a statutory approach to non-doctor public health specialists, which will put at risk a voluntary register that is entirely consistent with the deregulatory approach that the Government are taking within the Bill.

I will ask three or four questions about the noble Earl’s amendment. It arises from the issue in Staffordshire. Essentially, the services that were being run by the Mid Staffordshire foundation trust are being transferred to two other trusts: North Staffordshire and the Royal Wolverhampton, one a foundation trust and one an NHS trust. The technical amendment that the noble Earl has brought forward seems eminently reasonable in that context, but I wonder whether he would care to reflect on the process by which that has occurred. He will know of the trust’s special administrators, who were appointed to deal with the problems at Mid Staffordshire. I was very surprised that the estimated cost of that process has been between £12 million and £15 million. Can the noble Earl confirm that and say whether he really thinks that we got value for money from that process?

The second question is whether he can assure me that this new amendment will not make it easier to force through mergers without proper public consultation. Staffordshire health service has a bit of form recently. He will know that the clinical commissioning groups have made some very controversial decisions, including—I think this was announced yesterday—the outsourcing of much of their commissioning responsibility. It is notable that the CCGs are very reluctant to debate or discuss those proposals in public. We have debated Lewisham hospital in south London, which is in a special administration process, and we have had some discussion about how services in Staffordshire are to be reorganised. I have been to a number of meetings in Staffordshire and there is real concern that a lot of these major changes are taking place without adequate public consultation. For instance, in relation to services in Mid Staffordshire, assurances were given—it was called the double-lock assurance—by the Secretary of State that there would, as I understood it, be proper public involvement and support for the changes. I am not entirely sure that that has happened.

I would just like to make two further comments. As I understand it, by statute, mergers have to be approved by Monitor, the economic regulator for NHS foundation trusts—and presumably, for non-foundation trusts, by the NHS Trust Development Authority, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. In the light of experience, does the noble Earl not think that the Secretary of State should have to give their approval to mergers even if they involve foundation trusts? I realise that this amendment is based on parent legislation that goes back further than 2006—perhaps to 2003—and that we now have a much more fragmented system than we had then.

A trust merger is not a business arrangement; essentially, what usually happens is that one trust has fallen into a great deal of trouble and has to be rescued. That will often have a dynamic impact on the services to be provided; Mid Staffordshire is a good case in point. Given that, should the Secretary of State, because of his direct accountability to Parliament, not have to sign off that merger? The noble Earl may know of Clive Efford’s Private Member’s Bill, which I think is being debated in the Commons on Friday. There is a clause in the Bill which actually says that the merger of NHS trusts or foundation trusts should require the consent of the Secretary of State, so I am sure that this is a matter to which the department will be giving consideration.

My final point is about the impact of the amendment on PFI schemes. The noble Earl has already explained about the transfer of criminal liabilities, which makes eminent sense, but let us say trust A is being acquired by trust B. As I understand it, trust B takes on the liabilities of trust A. But what happens to the indemnity that the Secretary of State has made in respect of a PFI scheme entered into by trust B? When trust A takes on trust B’s liabilities, including possibly a PFI scheme, does the Secretary of State’s indemnity also now apply to trust A? I understand that the Department of Health has said that it does not and I would be grateful for some clarity on that.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comments and questions. I shall certainly write to him on the two issues that he raised: first, in relation to the CQC and to extending statutory regulation to non-doctor public health specialists.

[Lord Rooker]

I did not want to interrupt the noble Earl but perhaps I may intervene as he has raised that point at the beginning of his speech. I know that it will take time to write to my noble friend but in two days’ time this Committee will be discussing the growth duty. It would be useful to have a response before we start that debate because there are a couple of amendments relevant to the growth duty. The Joint Committee fully supported the Government’s response on the growth duty in January, but the committee received representations from certain regulators. I do not recall whether the CQC was one of them—I do not think that it was—but there was an open discussion when we were taking evidence about this. Therefore, it would be quite useful to have an answer by Thursday to the specific question raised by my noble friend because there would still be time to table an amendment. Sometimes it takes a few days or even weeks to get a letter, even with the best intentions of the Minister.

[Earl Howe]

I note the request from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I can only undertake to do my best on that front. If I can get an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, by tomorrow, I will. I cannot promise that but I shall use my best endeavours to get an answer to him as quickly as I can.

The noble Lord referred to the administration process at Mid Staffordshire. He is right that the cost of administration has been significant. I cannot confirm the precise cost at this stage but it is substantial and I think that that serves to illustrate that the administration process is not one that any Government, or indeed Monitor, should give the green light to wantonly or ill advisedly. It is a last-resort solution and should always remain so. Clearly, in a challenged health economy, as that has been and still is, it is not surprising that the net result of the exercise is not just a substantial bill in terms of the trust special administration but a very substantial capital commitment by the Department of Health to augment the facilities in the trusts concerned to ensure that the quality of care is as we would all wish it to be. From memory, that net investment will be about £0.25 billion. Therefore, the people of that area should feel satisfied that this process has led to a result that will give them significantly enhanced facilities.

As for the noble Lord’s question about public consultation, this amendment has nothing to do with the process by which a decision is reached on a trust in administration or the consultation requirements that go with it. It merely streamlines the process that takes place after that final decision is taken so that it is not cumbersome.

The noble Lord asked me about the indemnity associated with PFI agreements in relation to a trust that has been taken over. My understanding is that the indemnity does transfer. That is the advice that I have received, but if I need to qualify it in any way, I will correct it immediately after Committee.

As regards the Secretary of State’s approval for trust mergers, it is important to point out that Section 56A provides for the acquisition by an NHS foundation trust of another FT or an NHS trust, and it confers on the sector regulator, Monitor, the power to grant an application for an acquisition. The section was intended to enable acquisitions to take place expeditiously with a minimum level of bureaucracy. The decision to undertake an acquisition, if it is between two foundation trusts, is taken by the FTs themselves with Monitor undertaking a minimal administrative function to implement the decision as long as the set legal process has been followed.